







Propriety, Shame, and the State in Post-Fukushima Japan  
 


















Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements of the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 



































Klaus K. Yamamoto Hammering 




Propriety, Shame, and the State in Post-Fukushima Japan 
 
Klaus K. Yamamoto Hammering 
 
This dissertation tracks the effects of state recognition across a series of vanishing 
and emerging social worlds in post-Fukushima Japan. Based upon two years of fieldwork, 
the dissertation focuses on ethnographic sites at which the failure of state subjectivization 
activates both a reinvigoration of state discourse, and the formation of counter-discourses 
within the temporality of Japan’s endless “postwar” (sengo). In so doing, the dissertation 
seeks to disclose the social violence and iteration of shame as it is mobilized by the state 
to produce an obedient subject – willing to die for the nation in war – and as the failure to 
conform precipitates alternate socialities that may be either opposed to or complicit with 
state interests. 
The ethnographic sites of which I write concentrate on: the compulsory enactment 
of propriety in public school ceremonies, and the refusal by teachers to stand for, bow to 
the “national flag” (kokki), and sing the “national anthem” (kokka), the self-same imperial 
symbols under which Japan conducted World War II; a group of Okinawan construction 
workers in the old day laborer district of Tokyo, Sanya; the stigmatized “radical” (kageki) 
leftist student organization, the Zengakuren; the “internet right-wing” (netto uyoku) group, 
the Zaittokai, whose street protests are performed live before a camera; and “Fukushima,” 
where the charge of guilt has short-circuited memories of the Japanese state sacrificing its 
citizens during World War II. 
As a foil for the remaining ethnographic sites, the obviousness of giving “respect” 
(sonchō) to state symbols in public school ceremonies discloses the formation of subjects 
in a constitutive misrecognition that eliminates – or kills – difference in the enactment of 
social totality. A veritable stain on which the Japanese state drive to war was dependent, 
the singular figure of the sitting teacher formed part and parcel of what rightist politicians 
referred to as the “negative legacy” (fu no rekishi) of World War II. S/he constituted the 
object of an overcoming that – alongside the Okinawan construction worker, the “radical” 
(kageki) leftist, the “resident foreigner” (zainichi) as object of Zaittokai hate speech, and 
“Fukushima” – at once marked the ground of intensification and failure of state discourse. 
For the graduation ceremony of March, 2012, the official number of teachers who refused 
to stand and sing fell to “1” in Tokyo, where the state employs 63,000 teachers. 
With neither family ties, romantic involvements, nor social recognition that would 
confirm their masculinity, the vanishing day laborers of Sanya made all the more insistent 
reference to the trope of otoko or ‘man.’ Closely articulated with the mobster world of the 
yakuza with which many workers had connections, the repetition of masculinity in work, 
gambling, and fighting constituted a discourse that repulsed the shaming gaze of general 
society. Thus, the excessive life-style of the otoko was located at the constitutive margins 
of the social bond of propriety, where he also provided a dying reserve army of labor that 
could be mobilized to undertake the most undesirable tasks, such as work at Fukushima 
Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. 
Echoing the death of Sanya, the Zengakuren numbered in the tens of thousands in 
the 1960s and 1970s, but had dwindled to under 100 active members in 2012. While the 
anti-war “strike” (sutoraiki) constituted the apotheosis of the Zengakuren discourse, their 
espousal and shameless mandate of “violent” (bōryoku) revolution subverted the origins 
of the Zengakuren into a prohibitive discourse which replicated the form of state rhetoric, 
and demanded the eradication of the Stalinist from within their own ranks. 
No less shameless than the Zengakuren, the emergent hate speech of the “internet 
right-wing” (netto uyoku) iterated state discourse among the working poor. Having grown 
from 500 to 10,000 members within only four years, the Zaittokai’s notorious hate speech 
aspired to the instantaneous effect of “killing” (korosu) another legacy of World War II: 
the “resident foreigner” (zainichi). Yet, replicating online forms of writing, the iterability 
of their performative triggered repetition, and in a shamelessness specific to cyberspace – 
in which the reciprocity of the gaze and shame were lacking – the Zaittokai directed their 
paranoid speech at the state, whose representatives were said to be controlled by zainichi. 
Lastly, “Fukushima” marked the apogee of the effectivity and failures of the state 
in containing both the excesses of capitalism, and the “negative legacy” (fu no rekishi) of 
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As to Motome Chijiiwa, the circumstances that drove him here were no doubt complex. 
But it was he who declared his wish to commit harakiri. What followed upon that request 
may not have been what he intended, but he reaped what he himself sowed. 
– The House of Iyi, Seppuku (1962), Dir. Kobayashi Masaki 
 
Introduction: Recognition and the Failures of Fetishism 
 
Ending the Postwar 
 
After two-and-half decades of economic recession, the myth of uniform Japanese 
middle-class society has been displaced by the myth of a generalized national labor force 
perennially unequipped to compete in the global market. Predominantly composed of an 
ever-diminishing “youth” (wakamono), this lacking labor force must shoulder the nation 
under circumstances in which day-to-day existence has become permanently fraught with 
fatigue, social isolation, and economic insecurity.1 What Theodor W. Adorno referred to 
as “objective conditions” of the economy have now been laid bare, as if these conditions 
constituted an order of the natural world.2 Indeed, with the demise of those carefree days 
                                                
1 Lest this lacking subject appear as a novel feature of Japanese state discourse, Tomiko Yoda writes in “A 
Roadmap to Millenial Japan,” in Japan After Japan: Social and Cultural Life from the Recessionary 1990s 
to the Present, ed. by Tomiko Yoda and Harry Harootunian (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006): “By 
defining Japan through the lack of properties that characterize the modern individual/national subject, ne-
oliberals reproduce the modernist mapping of the world divided between subject and object, center and 
margin, and so on. Constituting the Other (the United States) as the embodiment of the global, they faith-
fully replay what Sakai Naoki refers to as the “postcolonial complicity between the West and the Rest.” 
Thus, though neoliberals speak of globalization as a radical new chapter in human history precipitated by 
the worldwide expansion of a borderless market and a technological revolution that links the globe under a 
vast informational network, their rhetoric also relies heavily on the conceptualization of the world and of a 
subject that hearkens back to the regime of the nation-state, imperialism, and colonialism” (24 – 25). 
2 Theodor W. Adorno, “The Meaning of Working Through the Past,” in Critical Models: Interventions and 
Catchwords, trans. by Henry W. Pickford (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998). See also Adorno 
and Max Horkheimer’s Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments, ed. By Gunzelin Schmid 
Noerr, trans. by Edmund Jephcott (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002). One Buddhist monk who 
works with the families of people who committed suicide, people who wish to commit suicide, and who is 
called by police and families to the site of death when it is discovered, writes of his powerlessness before 
“solitary death” (koritsushi) – an effect of the atomizing violence of the labor market; deceased individuals 
are frequently discovered weeks after their death – and the necessity of social connectivity. In Anata Nara 
Dōsuru: Koritsushi (Tokyo: Sanseido, 2013), Nakashita Daiki says: “In me, there is only a tiny and power-
less capacity. Having recognized that, I believe there is still not a little I can do. First off, I would like to 




of “life-time employment” (shūshin koyō) under Japan’s bubble economy, insecurity has 
followed upon neoliberalism as if the Japanese state had merely abandoned its citizens to 
survive under a brute, material rule of law.3 
Yet, this discourse of insufficiency that pervades Japanese media, not to mention, 
schools, offices, families and speeches by politicians, cannot be disengaged from the state 
imperative to produce a pliable population of subjects willing to sacrifice themselves – to 
die – for the nation. If the necessity of state subjectivization was to have been superseded 
by regulatory mechanisms that sustain the population, Japan presents a disastrous case in 
point.4 Men, or so runs the popular discourse, have become effeminate. So-called “girly” 
or “vegetarian men” (saishokukei dansei) have no sex drive. And notwithstanding Hakuo 
Yanagisawa’s outspoken (albeit hardly surprising) declaration in 2007 – then Minister of 
Health, Labor and Welfare – that women are simply “birth-giving machines” (umu kikai), 
                                                                                                                                            
(11). Unless the author has been translated or writes in English, I follow the Japanese practice of placing 
surnames before the given name. All translations are my own, unless otherwise indicated in the citation. 
3 The argument I make for the necessity of techniques of state subjectivization runs against that developed 
by Giorgio Agamben in Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stan-
ford: Stanford University Press, 1998), or for that matter, by René Girard in Violence and the Sacred, trans. 
Patrick Gregory (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1977). Working out of Michel Foucault and a 
misreading of Carl Schmitt, Agamben declares that: “The originary relation of law to life is not application 
but Abandonment. The matchless potentiality of the nomos, its originary “force of law,” is that it holds life 
in its ban by abandoning it. This is the structure of the ban that we shall try to understand here, so that we 
can eventually call it into question” (29). Achille Mbembe builds on this argument in his essay, “Necropoli-
tics,” trans. by Libby Meintjes, in Public Culture (15 (1:2003): 11 – 40). Rather than a general structure of 
abandonment, I foreground techniques of state recognition whose power resides in producing subjects that 
give themselves to overcome the insufficiency that is itself an effect of recognition.  
4 Promulgated by the state, this discourse of insufficiency overlaps with biopolitical regulatory mechanisms 
that would intervene – as Michel Foucault writes in Society Must Be Defended, trans. by David Macey 
(New York: Picador, 2003) and The Birth of Biopolitics, trans. by Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2008) – at the general level of the population. However, a purely biopolitical focus elides the 
question of the state and its subject and hence, the argument I make for techniques of state subjectivization 
departs from Foucault’s notion of governmentality. Rather, along with Althusser in “Freud and Lacan,” in 
Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, trans. by Ben Brewster (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2001), 
I posit the subject. As Althusser writes: “Freud has discovered for us that the real subject, the individual in 
his unique essence, has not the form of an ego, centred on the ‘ego,’ on ‘consciousness’ or ‘existence’ – 
whether this is the existence of the for-itself, of the body-proper or of ‘behavior’ – that the human subject is 
de-centered, constituted by a structure which has no ‘centre’ either, except in the imaginary misrecognition 
of the ‘ego,’ i.e. in the ideological formations in which it ‘recognizes’ itself” (149). 
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the Japanese birthrate remains the third lowest in the world.5 Despite all the pressure, not 
even the Japanese Crown Princess was able to give birth to a boy. In fact, rather than live 
to increase the national growth-rate, Japanese individuals have demonstrated a penchant 
for taking their own lives. While the rate dipped for the first time in 2012, Japan’s suicide 
rate has topped 30,000 per year since the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, a worrisome figure 
that has been repeatedly figured in terms of an economic loss.6 In 2009 alone, the number 
of suicides was calculated to cost the national economy ¥2.7 trillion (approximately $32 
billion USD).7 Figured thus, as a negativity to be overcome, state discourse demands that 
the national population buck up and acquire the “strength to live” (ikiru chikara). So too, 
in the immediate aftermath of the 3.11 tsunami and nuclear catastrophe, the clarion cry of 
state was for residents of Northeast Japan to “do their best” (gambare). As one Buddhist 
monk put it, there was no time or wherewithal to mourn.8 And it is in the name of gender 
equality that the Japanese state – under the Abe administration, no less, a Prime Minister 
who has himself appeared in the media for passing sexist remarks in parliament – plans to 
increase the female workforce by 530,000 in one year, although single mothers, the most 
populous category below the poverty line, do not have leisure to work another minimum 
                                                
5 McCurry, Justin, “Japanese Minister Wants ‘Birth-Giving Machines,’ aka Women, to Have More Babies” 
in The Guardian, 5/8/2015. The Central Intelligence Agency listed Japan with the third lowest birthrate in 
the world in 2014. See Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Country Comparison: Birth Rate, 
5/8/2015. See also “Nearly 40% of Single Japanese Not Interested in Romance: Survey” in The Japan 
Times, 22/6/2015, “Fertility Rate Dips Again” in The Japan Times, 21/6/2015, “Many Parents Say Em-
ployers, Finances Deter Them From Having Second Child” in The Japan Times, 16/6/2015, “Law Still a 
Long Way Behind Fertility Boom” in The Japan Times, 6/6/2015, “Fertility Rate Takes First Fall Since ’05” 
in The Japan Times, 6/6/2015, “Battling the Low Birthrate,” in The Japan Times, 7/4/2015, and “Is Japan 
Becoming Extinct?” in The Japan Times, 16/5/2015. 
6 Naikakufu Jisatsutaisaku Suishinshitsu, “Keisatsuchō no Jisatsutōkei ni Motozuku Jisatsushasū no Sui 
Nado,” 10/2/2015. The yearly suicide rate fell from 30,651 in 2011, to 27,858 (2012), 27,283 (2013) and 
25,426 in 2014. However, as if the rate constituted a barometer of the self-destructive bent of the market, 
Japanese professionals I knew – Buddhist monks or laborers – would remark that, what with oncoming 
reforms like the Trans-pacific Partnership (TPP), the suicide rate was bound to rise again. 
7 “Suicides Cost Japan Economy $32bn,” in BBC, 7/9/2010. 
8 Nakashita Daiki, Kanashimu Chikara (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun Shuppan, 2011), pg. 173. 
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wage job.9 In spite of the state’s effort and, indeed, its success at disciplining the general 
population, future Japan has become beleaguered by negative figures of death, suggesting 
that state policy was having the opposite result from that intended. The social atomization 
consequent on privatization and deregulation already presages that by 2030, one of every 
three people will be above the age of 65 – retirement age – and that one out of every four 
people will be living alone. As a veritable reorganization of production and labor that has 
reinstituted a regime of absolute surplus extraction, neoliberalism has called the limits of 
the laboring body to the fore.10 If 1,200,000 people passed away in 2012, the number of 
deaths in 2030 will have increased to approximately 1,700,000 – 1,800,000. Deaths of the 
baby-boom generation will have become so frequent that urban centers, like Tokyo, will 
require incinerators on the scale of convenience stores.11 And these numbers do not even 
incorporate the cancer rates promising to unfold as a consequence of the nuclear disaster 
in Fukushima, where state scientists claim that radiation can be combatted through stress 
reduction.12 
Saturated with figures of an ever-worsening national debt and decline, the endless 
recession augurs worse times. The negative discourse of the endless recession is, in effect, 
                                                
9 “Sexist Views Dent Abe’s Push for Women’s Rights,” in The Japan Times, 28/6/2014. The Abe admin-
istration’s agenda recalls Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s observation in “Ghostwriting,” in Diacritics (25.2 
(Summer, 1995)), that “the reproductive body of woman has now been “socialized” – computed into aver-
age abstract labor and thus released into what I call the spectrality of reason – a specter that haunts the 
merely empirical, dislocating it from itself” (67). Spivak lists the “taxonomy of the coded discursive man-
agement of the new socialization of the reproductive body: (1) reproductive rights (metonymic substitution 
of the abstract average subject of rights for woman’s identity); (2) surrogacy (metaphoric substitution of 
abstract average reproductive labor power as fulfilled female subject of motherhood); (3) transplant (dis-
placement of eroticism and generalized presupposed subject of immediate affect; (4) population control 
(objectification of the female subject of exploitation to produce alibis for hypersize through demographic 
rationalization); (5) post-Fordist homeworking (classical coding of the spectrality of reason as empiricist 
individualism, complicated by gender ideology)” (Ibid, 67). 
10 For an elucidation of absolute surplus value, see Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, trans. by Ben Fowkes (New 
York: Vintage, 1997), pg. 643 – 654. 
11 Nakashita Daiki, “Koritsushi no Gemba o Tsūjite Kanjiru Koto,” 2/11/2015. 
12 See Ch. 11. 
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inscribed in a temporality that demands a solution – the end to endlessness – and both this 
affect of endlessness and its consequent demand for the end have penetrated everyday life. 
If anything, the phrase coined by sociologist, Miyadai Shinji – “live the endless everyday” 
(owarinaki nichijō o ikiro) – has assumed an all-too-literal and ironic twist in the wake of 
the Fukushima nuclear disaster. The radioactive waste will stay for all eternity.13 And this 
twist is reminiscent of that other constitutive end of World War II, which likewise ended 
in a conflagration of radiation, not to mention, in the imposition of a foreign constitution. 
For the very impossibility of the end – the finality of Fukushima – exacerbates repetition. 
As Yukio Mishima once observed with reference to his 1968 essay, titled “A Defense of 
Culture” (Bunka Bōeiron), Japanese “culture” (bunka) – emblematized in the emperor “as 
a cultural formation” (bunkagainen) – will rise from the ashes like a phoenix, and will do 
so, first and foremost, as a “form” (katachi).14 While students, workers, and citizens were 
roaring across the world against Vietnam and war – and the Japanese student movement 
prepared to mobilize against the 1970 renewal of The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and 
Security Between the United States and Japan (ANPO) – Mishima was making seemingly 
                                                
13 Miyadai Shinji wrote his book (of the same title: “live the endless everyday” (owarinaki nichijō o ikiro)) 
as a “total manual to overcome Aum” (aumu kanzen kuppuku manuaru). Recalling the trauma of the 1995 
Tokyo Subway Sarin Gas Attack, Miyadai inscribes endlessness and the drive to “overcome” (kuppuku) in 
relation to an impossible origin. See Miyadai Shinji, Owarinaki Nichijō o Ikiro – Aum Kanzen Kokufuku 
Manuaru (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1998). See Anne Allison’s Precarious Japan (Durham: Duke Universi-
ty Press, 2013) for a consideration of the effects of the endless economic recession on the general populace 
in terms of precarity, the liquidation of social and familial relations, and the possibilities of “hope” (kibō) in 
the absence of futurity, security, and social place. As Allison intimates in her comprehensive ethnography 
of social alienation and (social) death in contemporary Japan, the desire for social belonging can lend itself 
to captation by right-wing discourse. It is in this respect that I foreground the effectivity of state discourse, 
and more specifically, the subject and failures of state recognition. 
14 Yukio Mishima, Bunka Bōeiron (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 2006), pg. 42 – 45. Mishima’s essay hearkens 
back to the Nihon Romanha (“Japan Romantic School”) and Yasuda Yojûrô’s 1936 Nihon no Hashi (Japa-
nese Bridges). See Yasuda Yojûrô, “Japanese Bridges: A Translation of Yasuda Yojūrō’s “Nihon no Hashi,” 
trans. by Alan Tansman, in Journal of Japanese Studies (34.2 (Summer, 2008)). Following on Mishima’s 
observation regarding the “form” (katachi) of Japanese “culture” (bunka), the notion of kata – form, mold, 
model, pattern – constitutes a tradition of its own in the anthropological study of Japanese ritual and culture. 
See, for instance, Rupert A. Cox’s The Zen Arts: An Anthropological Study of the Culture of Aesthetic 
Form in Japan (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003). 
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innocuous references to classical Japanese literature in a gesture, the compulsive violence 
of which was exposed in his act of ritual disembowelment. Naturally, the nuclear disaster 
in Fukushima did spark an anti-nuclear movement, however just as the movement is fad-
ing three years since its inception, young people have been conspicuously absent from the 
movement to begin with.15 Nor did the Occupy Wall Street movement ever quite make it 
to Japan, where a bifurcation of the labor market confronts university graduates, already 
burdened by tuition debts, with a dearth of jobs.16 In Japan, that very category of “youth” 
(wakamono) that ought to be most vociferous against the state, not least because it is most 
susceptible to the effects of radiation and bears the burden of recovering the national debt 
of one quadrillion yen – ¥1,000,000,000,000 or $10.46 trillion USD, as of 2013, twice the 
Japanese GDP – has remained conspicuously silent.17 Precisely the youth that obstructed 
a 1960 visit to Japan by President Dwight D. Eisenhower has all but disappeared from the 
scene of political protest. It should thus be clear that the temporality of endless recession 
                                                
15 See “Anti-Nuclear Protest in Japan: Fizzling Out” in The Economist, 8/5/2014, and “Japan’s Anti-
Nuclear Movement: Where’s the Protest?” in The Economist, 3/8/2014. 
16 See Tomiko Yoda’s “A Roadmap to Millennial Japan.” 
17 “Japan Gets to Know a Quadrillion as Debt Hits New High,” in Bloomberg Business, 9/8/2013. In the 
“University Problem,” in Zengakuren: Japan’s Revolutionary Students (Berkeley: Ishi Press, 1970), Ko-
kubun Yutaka describes the attempt by the student radical left to prevent Prime Minister Sato from flying to 
South Vietnam in 1968. At the time, the Zengakuren were split into the Yoyogi Zengakuren – in support of 
the pacifist Japanese Communist Party (JCP) – and the Chūkakuha and anti-Yoyogi Zengakuren (of whom 
I write below) – who protested Sato’s flight along with the Shaseido Liberation Faction and Hansen Seinen 
Iinkai. In a description that foregrounds the sheer scale of uprisings in the 1960s, Kokubun writes: 
 “As soon as the news of the student’s death spread, students and workers of the Hansen Iinkai and 
the Shaseido Liberation Faction joined the Chukaku at Bentenbashi Bridge and after pausing for one mi-
nute’s silent prayer, they tried to rush into the airport again. This time however, the police fired tear gas 
into the crowd and they retreated all the way back to Haginaka Park Ground. The result of this day’s futile 
fighting was 1 dead, more than 600 wounded and 58 arrested. On the other side, it was estimated that 1,000 
police were injured as well. The police strategy had been a failure because, although they had stopped the 
students getting into Haneda airport, they were only barely able to do so and had completely underestimat-
ed the violence of the student attacks. Also their helmet visors and small hand shields were useless against 
the student weapons and this is what produced such a high level of police casualties. 
 In sharp contrast to this day of violence at Haneda Airport, the students of the Yoyogi Zengakuren 
went to attend the Akahata (Red Flag) festival by the side of Lake Tama in North West Tokyo. The image 
of 80,000 Minsei students picknicking by the lakeside while they were fighting and dying at Haneda only 
helped to strengthen the resolve of the anti-Yoyogi students to overthrow the JCP” (127 – 128). 
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is subsumed under an encompassing temporality of the endless postwar. As films such as 
Fukasaku Kinji’s 2000 Battle Royale demonstrate, tropes of economic survival cross-cut 
into nostalgic tropes of killing and camaraderie in war.18 The insufficiency of youth is, in 
effect, sutured to a loss that is constitutive of the drive to overcome the endless “postwar” 
(haisengo): defeat in World War II. 
The confinement of “youth” (wakamono) to a discursive sociological category has 
long ago suppressed the incendiary potential that students possessed in the protests of the 
‘60s and ‘70s.19 Thus, the possibility of connecting across multifarious social strata – as it 
occurred in the heyday of ANPO – has been foreclosed, not least because there would be 
no time for politics. But the emergence into visibility of a labor force unequipped to carry 
Japan forwards has achieved another work of displacing the differential temporalities and 
                                                
18 See Andrea Arai’s essay, “Killing Kids: Recession and Survival in Twenty-First-Century Japan,” in 
Postcolonial Studies (6.3 (2003)). 
19 Working out of Jacques Rancière in the context of France, Kristin Ross gives such an analysis in May ’68 
and Its Afterlives (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2002). Notwithstanding recent articles in The Japan 
Times tracking the newly emerged Student Emergency Action for Liberal Democracy (SEALD) group that 
has been protesting against the Abe administration’s (successful) passage of security bills enabling war, the 
magnitude of SEALDs – composed, according to The Japan Times, of approximately 175 members – must 
be counterposed to the sheer pandemonium of student and civilian activism which prevailed in the ‘60s and 
‘70s. The author of one Japan Times article, Mike Sunda, is, however, correct in remarking that “a cursory 
take is guilty of either ignoring or downplaying the importance of numerous groups who have, over the 
decades, continued to run with the baton of youth activism, dispelling the myth that radicalism completely 
fizzled out in the early 1970s.” Listing from Carl Cassegård’s Youth Movements, Trauma and Alternative 
Space in Contemporary Japan (Leiden: Brill, 2013), Mike Sunda includes among these: “the emergence of 
“freeter activism” in the late 1980s and the cultural movements that followed: the anti-establishment, anti-
Emperor system “guerrilla group” Aki No Arashi (1987); the fun-loving Dame-ren “good-for-nothings,” 
who rejected hegemonic lifestyles and consumerist trappings (1992); the General Freeter Union (2004) and 
other precarity movements that protested against the lack of regular work available at the turn of the mille-
nium; and prankster Shiroto No Ran (2005), who revelled in bringing chaos to the streets of Tokyo’s 
Koenji neighborhood and beyond.” See Mike Sunda, “Nation’s Youth Are Attempting to Establish a New 
Political Norm,” in The Japan Times, 26/9/2015, and Hayashi Yuki, “Campaign Group SEALDs Hooking 
Japan’s Youth With Jazzy Placards, Fliers,” in The Japan Times, 21/7/2015. See also William Andrews, 
Dissenting Japan: A History of Japanese Radicalism and Counterculture from 1945 to Fukushima (Lon-
don: Hurst Publishers, 2015), and for a consideration focusing specifically on SEALDs, see David H. Slater, 
Robin O’Day, Satsuki Uno, Love Kindstrand, and Chiharu Takano, “SEALDs (Students Emergency Action 
for Liberal Democracy): Research Note on Contemporary Youth Politics in Japan,” in The Asia-Pacific 
Journal: Japan Focus Vol. 13 (37.1: 2015). In late 2015, SEALDs announced that it would dissolve after 
the Upper House election of summer 2016. 
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forms of labor that ought to have surfaced in the recession.20 The suicide rate is highest in 
middle-aged salarymen and elderly, but the chilling fact – it is said – is its increase in the 
youth. What happened to industrial factory workers? Construction workers? Shoe-makers 
of “outcaste” (burakumin), or literally, “non-human” (hinin) descent? How have the two-
and-a-half “lost decades” affected them? Do these questions even matter, as long as the 
future general population – the “youth” (wakamono) – recover the state’s debt? As Nicos 
Poulantzas writes in State, Power, Socialism, it is the phantasmatic state that conjoins the 
disparate temporalities of capitalist production.21 Indeed, on the occasions when the issue 
of welfare appears on news, the emphasis has been on the drain of state funds, the abuse 
thereof or on the necessity of reduction.22 Like suicides, layoffs have been abstracted into 
economic numbers of loss, such that the failure to find employment rests squarely on the 
shoulders of the individual her or himself. In the abstraction of negative economic figures, 
what Jacques Derrida described as the “visor effect” of the commodity form conceals the 
differential modes of surplus extraction constitutive of capital.23 Even the suicide rate has 
taken on a monolithic aspect of loss, the propensity toward which is increasing among the 
nation’s “weak” (yowai) youth. As Nakashita Daiki says – himself a Buddhist priest who 
works round-the-clock to prevent “suicide” (jisatsu) and “solitary death” (koritsushi), and 
who bears the distinction of being “the Buddhist priest who has seen 2,000 deaths” (2,000 
                                                
20 Yoda writes in “A Roadmap to Millennial Japan”: “We also need to consider the complex ways in which 
not only reactionary moral indignation but also the changing demands of capitalism inform the recent 
youth-bashing. The denigration of wayward youths by conservatives has translated less into a campaign to 
reform them into upstanding and productive Japanese citizens but more into an encouragement of public 
opinion that holds them responsible for their economic and social displacement. What is really at stake is 
not the threat the youths pose to the Japanese post-war ethos but how to master the disruptive effects of the 
Japanese capitalist regime’s withdrawal from the system of social management that had until recently sus-
tained a relatively even income distribution and the phantasm of a homogeneous mass middle-stratum na-
tion” (43). 
21 Nicos Poulantzas, State, Power, Socialism, trans. by Patrick Camiller (Verso: New York, 2000), pg. 110. 
22 See Ch. 4 – 8. 
23 Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New Interna-
tional, trans. by Peggy Kamuf (New York: Routledge Classics, 1994), pg. 6. 
 9 
nin no shi o mita sōryō) – state representatives do not listen unless one uses the language 
of economic figures. Prevention measures cost money, and there must be proper incentive 
for their implementation.24 
But Nakashita Daiki also writes that the suicide rate is unlikely to abate so long as 
the “taboo” (tabū) – a transliterated term, like “shock” (shokku) – on speaking of suicide 
is alleviated in daily life. At once a sensational statistic on the news and shameful subject 
of conversation, Nakashita’s observation already suggests that the normative force of the 
trope – “suicide” (自殺), a combination of the ideograms to “kill” (殺す) the “self” (自) – 
coincides with the social force of taboo.25 Despite himself, Nakashita shifts the discourse 
of suicide into the political domain – where it belongs – because any rigorous scrutiny of 
the conditions that enclose suicide cannot but reveal that its increase correlates with state 
deregulatory measures, and that the act manifests the unforgiving economic imperative to 
surrender the insufficient “self” to surplus extraction. Middle-aged men with families and 
mortgages, Nakashita says, “wanted to live” (ikitakatta), but could not. Saying “I’m sorry” 
(gomennasai) in their suicide notes, they take their own lives in a moment that frequently 
coincides with an increase in their life insurance.26 The limit of Japan’s endless recession, 
not to mention, its astronomical debt – most of which originates in its citizenry, who thus 
work to pay state debts owed to themselves – has been introjected on the population. Like 
radiation, a topic that has become taboo precisely where it should be under discussion, in 
Fukushima, suicide threatens to disclose the guilt of the state and its politicians; many of 
them descendants of World War II Class-A war criminals who should have been deposed 
under the U.S. occupation. Indeed, incidents of suicide among former Fukushima farmers 
                                                
24 This information was relayed in an interview. 
25 See Nakashita Daiki, Anata Nara Dōsuru: Koritsushi. 
26 This information was relayed in an interview. 
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– who lost everything, with little or no indemnification to cover debts – has precipitated a 
momentary rethinking of suicide as murder by the state.27 But this “cause-effect relation” 
(inga kankei) is as unlikely to be recognized by the Japanese court system as the relation 
between radiation exposure and the evident increase of thyroid cancer in children residing 
in Fukushima. 
It ought to go without saying that the taboo cannot be conceived in the absence of 
its opposing Japanese term, the “emperor” (tennō). In fact, it has been suggested by some 
anti-nuclear activists that the imperial palace provides an ideal location to build a nuclear 
plant. While the moats surrounding such a plant would absorb all that global heating, its 
location would certainly gauge the reaction of local residents to a nuclear power industry 
on which they do not depend for jobs, but the energy of which they consume.28 Yet shorn 
from his body by the U.S. occupation, it is precisely the “form” (katachi) of the postwar 
“symbolic” (shōchō) emperor that dissimulates and displaces state guilt: from the center 
to disavowed margins. Moreover, there is a demand for mirroring implicit in the structure 
of taboo that installs sociality in complicity. Observing etiquette makes everybody guilty. 
Proper “form” (katachi) disavows and instantiates the ground of guilt that therefore calls 
for repetition. 
Instead of focusing on the multiplicity of problems that plague people themselves, 
the state appears altogether intent on advancing its own agenda of interests. Hence, while 
                                                
27 See Hasegawa Kenichi’s Gempatsu ni “Furusato” o Ubawarete (Tokyo: Takarajimasha, 2012). For a 
broader take on “responsibility” (sekinin) in relation to the state and individual subject, see also Koide Hi-
roaki’s Damasareta Anata ni Mo Sekinin ga Aru (Tokyo: Gentosha, 2012), and Takahashi Tetsuya’s Gisei 
no Shisutemu: Fukushima, Okinawa (Tokyo: Shueisha, 2012). 
28 Despite the propaganda that nuclear energy does not cause global heating, nuclear power plants circulate 
water to cool their reactors. This is one reason why Japanese nuclear plants are located at the margins of the 
nation – reproducing an urban/rural divide – where local residents have become dependent on the nuclear 
power industry for jobs, while the energy itself is siphoned off to the cities. See Hirose Takashi’s Tokyo ni 
Gempatsu o! (Tokyo: Shueisha, 1986) for the suggestion of moving nuclear plants to Tokyo. 
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acknowledging the importance of addressing national “security” (hoshō), even Nakashita 
says that the media ceaselessly bombards its viewers with “diplomatic problems” (gaikō 
mondai): Senkaku, Takeshima, the Northern Territories, abductions of Japanese citizens 
by North Korea (conducted in the late ‘70s and early ‘80s), unidentified ships in Japanese 
waters, North Korean missiles and nuclear experimentation.29 This brief list can, notably, 
be expanded from its focus on external threats to include the intimately interior problem 
of the postwar Constitution and its (by now) notorious Article 9, that forever renounces 
Japan’s right to wage war. Like preceding administrations and, no doubt, administrations 
to follow – until there is war – the Abe administration appears intent on nothing so much 
as to reinstate Japan’s capacity to conduct war; something that it euphemistically refers to 
as “collective self-defense” (shūdanteki jiei) or rather, “the right to collective self-defense” 
(shūdanteki jieiken). As if the state’s agenda was split from a common interest, Nakashita 
points out that there exists a “mountainload” (yamazumi) of problems internal to Japan, 
connecting economy to conditions of the everyday: the continuously increasing national 
debt, the economic slump, social security for pension, medical treatment and nursing, the 
economic disparity between generations, the increasing disparity between neighborhoods, 
the radioactive contamination and decommissioning that accompanies the management of 
the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident, the energy problem, the Okinawa 
base problem, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), “death from overwork” (karōshi) and 
suicide, and the relentlessly increasing number of “temporary workers” (hiseiki rōdōsha) 
and “sweatshops” (burakku kigyō), etc.30 Of course, all these issues appear periodically in 
the news, but they certainly do not appear to be priorities on the state agenda. If anything, 
                                                
29 Nakashita Daiki, Anata Nara Dōsuru: Koritsushi, pg. 1. 
30 Ibid, pg. 1 
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Nakashita’s list suggests different sectors of society that have been abstracted, shut down, 
if not outright sacrificed by state policies that demand an unflinching show of resolve and 
unity to the external world. Although he points no finger, he goes on to say that the voter 
turnout in 2012 hit an all-time low in postwar history. Echoing Adorno and Horkheimer’s 
Dialectic of Enlightenment, Nakashita writes: 
To become a slave to the company? To become homeless? Our society consists in 
a competitive society that is constantly confronted with these two severe alterna-
tives. In order for oneself to survive, it is necessary to kick down others. In order 
to continue winning without being excluded, one cannot take notice of others. 
Moreover, we are constantly being demanded to produce results. And the global 
economy we live in is a world that, backed by a thoroughgoing rationalism, pri-
oritizes efficiency. Over and above being capitalist, nobody can escape the “game 
of musical chairs.” As a result, we are constantly overwhelmed by something, and 
temporal, psychological and economical “space” is disappearing from society as a 
whole. Because there is no space, there is no leisure to stop and think about things 
deeply or to discuss social problems. If there is no space, it is also difficult to be 
sympathetic with others. As a result, the “self-responsibility doctrine” that you are 
no good because you are not making enough effort comes into vogue. Working 
even from morning till evening, one’s pay does not rise as desired, and with the 
rise of temporary work, the young generation cannot even get married.31 
 
In the “competitive society” (kyōsō shakai) that is Japan, either you are in – which entails 
slaving away for a company – or you are out, which is to say that everyone is incessantly 
threatened with the possibility of expulsion. With not enough musical chairs to go around, 
survival entails “kicking down” (keotosu) others in a globalized economy the out-and-out 
                                                













rationalization of which cannot be escaped. There is no outside. In the demand to produce 
“results” (kekka) – or rather, equivalent surplus value – the subsumption of “society as a 
whole” (shakai zentai) is so complete that there is no “space” (yoyū), not to mention, time 
to think of social problems, others, or oneself. Of course, thinking of others is perhaps not 
so different from thinking of one’s “self,” since the resultant “self-responsibility doctrine” 
(jikosekininron) becomes internalized. The reason I am “no good” (damé) – or rather, the 
reason I could not produce enough money for the company and was therefore dismissed – 
is because my “efforts” (doryoku) were insufficient. Never mind that the game of musical 
chairs has been structured to produce expulsion. There is no space even for the institution 
of marriage – propagated by the state – but then how could there be, if there is no space 
to think of the other in your self. The very possibility of a lateral recognition of common 
interest has been blocked by an ideology of self-responsibility that is as pervasive as the 
act of survival. 
But Nakashita and other Buddhist monks who work in suicide prevention say that 
it is also exactly when the individual reaches the limit – when s/he thinks of suicide – that 
it becomes possible to think of alternatives. In their understanding, the “limit” (genkai) is 
at once one of “hope” (kibō). So too, at least in theory, the academic concept of abjection 
provides the subject with a space from within which alienation can become apparent, and 
from within which the question “Chè vuoi?” – as Jacques Lacan put it – can be asked.32 It 
is, indeed, the fixing of insufficiency as an insufficiency to be overcome that is at stake in 
the state discourse of economic resuscitation, wherein survival bleeds into killing, or war. 
Splits and remainders must be properly situated in actualizing the fantasy of a population 
                                                
32 Jacques Lacan, “The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian Unconscious,” 
in Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English, trans. by Bruce Fink (New York: W.W. Norton & Com-
pany, 2006), pg. 690. 
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that unthinkingly – and endlessly – gives itself to carry out state interests. For it is before 
the group, the “house” (ie), the “buddies” (nakama), or quite simply, “everyone” (minna) 
– so many Japanological iterations of that principal tropic figure without which Japanese 
fascism cannot exist, namely, the phallocentric bastion of marriage, the “family” (kazoku), 
and “culture” (bunka): the “emperor” (tennō) – that the individual subject is caught in the 
insufficiency of shame, driven to overcome a constitutive loss. As ever, it is nostalgia that 
drives this fantasy of the pure presence of a sociality unmediated by the abstraction of the 
commodity form. It is accordingly unwise to reproduce the monolithic master narrative of 
Japan Inc’s fall from grace. By virtue of (a primarily U.S.) gaze from abroad – academic 
or otherwise – the narrative reinforces the appearance of unity in decline and conceals the 
unevenness of recessionary Japan. 
As a veritable reaction to the endless postwar recession, the totalizing discourse of 
insufficiency has assumed a force of self-evidence in the everyday. Sports, for instance, 
and particularly international soccer matches have emerged as occasions for a shameless 
exhibition of nationalism by the Japanese youth. Star players like Nakata Hidetoshi, who 
once refrained from singing the national anthem before a match – only to discover his act 
in the newspapers, followed by threats to himself and his family by the right-wing – have 
been replaced by stars like Honda Keisuke, who claims that the Japanese are not patriotic 
enough and endorses booing when the Japanese team draws with opponents like the 154th 
ranked Singapore. Once so highly regarded for their manners and etiquette, Japanese fans 
have taken to posting “JAPANESE ONLY” signs at domestic soccer games.33 And it is, 
indeed, to the moment of the 2002 FIFA World Cup, cohosted between Japan and South 
Korea, that members of the “internet right-wing” (netto uyoku), notorious for their “hate 
                                                
33 “J. League Probes ‘Japanese Only’ Banner Displayed at Urawa Match,” in The Japan Times, 11/3/2014. 
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speech” (hēto supīchi), trace the beginning of their involvement in the movement.34 Much 
as skating stars have become increasingly visible in the media spotlight as a result of their 
victories abroad, judo has fallen into disrepute on account of sexual molestation scandals 
involving coaches, and the sumo season was even shut down due to bout-fixing scandals 
connecting it to the underworld of the mob. Of course, pop icons have long been objects 
of the at once celebratory and punitive gaze of the public limelight in which possession of 
even a miniscule amount of “drugs” (mayaku) can lead to mass mediated persecution, the 
end of a career, and the demand for public “apology” (shazai). The discovery of traces of 
methamphetamine in the hair of the singer, Sakai Noriko – and 0.008 grams discovered in 
her apartment (a hit of meth requires 0.25 grams) – led to record companies apologizing 
on her behalf, the withdrawal of her goods from sale, the termination of her contracts, and 
the announcement of divorce from her husband, who ostensibly procured the meth. Apart 
from a suspended eighteen month jail sentence, the public persecution of Sakai reinforced 
the normative ideal of the mother, an image that she purportedly projected as an artist. In 
a ten-minute live press conference, unrelenting flashes of cameras captured her downcast 
eyes as she cried, apologized, and admitted in a rehearsed voice: 
By losing to my own weakness, to drugs for which one should never reach out, 
now like this, I have caused a stir with the public and laid a burden on many peo-
ple. It cannot be measured how much regret and disillusionment my irresponsible 
actions have led to among those who have supported and cheered me until now … 
It absolutely cannot be forgiven.35   
 
                                                
34 See Yasuda Kōichi’s Netto to Aikoku: Zaitokukai no ‘Yami’ o Oikakete (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 2012). 
35 Oricon Style, “Sakai Noriko Hikoku, Shazai Kaiken de Kōsei Chikau “Nido to Te o Somenai””, 





Enclosed by cameras and flanked by male company spokesmen, Sakai proceeded to state 
the actions she would take to “repair” (tsugunau) for her unforgivable guilt-ridden “crime” 
(tsumi), a trajectory that included dropping her career and attending nursing school. Thus, 
the discovery of “drugs” (mayaku) on Sakai Noriko disclosed the transgression of a state 
ideal and opportunity for its enforcement.36 As in other instances of public and, no doubt, 
coerced “apology” (shazai), Sakai’s visibility constituted an exercise in scapegoating, the 
enjoyment of which was not lost on viewers. Japanese friends of mine commented less on 
the excessive nature of her persecution, so much as they said that she had brought it upon 
herself, and that she would “do it again” (mata yaru). Watching sports similarly provided 
opportunity to criticize the shortcomings of the Japanese or to applaud their strength. One 
day, as I watched an international volleyball game in which the Japanese men’s team was 
taking an irreversible beating, two friends castigated the Japanese team members as being 
“no good” (damé). Now that the Japanese side was losing, they said, the problem was that 
each of the Japanese team members were playing merely to maintain their own individual 
statistics. As team play, self-sacrifice was required. Winning or losing, moreover, was not 
merely a matter of training or skill. While evaluating the close-up visages of the Japanese 
members, my friends remarked that the Japanese were “psychologically” or “spiritually” 
(seishinteki) weak. 
                                                
36 A youtube search of “apology” (shazai) will disclose any number of public apologies. Other well-known 
instances of such public apology include those, for instance, of TV and Kabuki actor Ichikawa Ebizō (who 
got into a fight with suspiciously underworld characters), of the AKB48 performer Minegishi Minami (who 
was demoted for contravening the AKB48 rule against dating men), or of the politician Nonomura Ryutaro 
(who was caught misusing funds). Notwithstanding the abuse of funds, it is the trifling and private nature of 
the abovementioned contraventions, and the diminutive social status of the culprits that should be noted in 
relation to the shamelessness of the Japanese state and politicians towards others. Sacrificing those below 
them, political bigwigs like Ichirō Ozawa seem to get off scot-free from mismanagement of funds. 
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 Innocuous as pop icons and sports players may appear, their visibility triggers the 
demand for a spiritual restoration that cannot be disarticulated from fascism.37 In his 1935 
Heritage of Our Times, Ernst Bloch thus writes presciently of the “accumulated rage” of 
capitalist crises that leads subjects to seek “fulfillment” in the restitution of a “still living 
past.” As an internal negation – and ultimately, as proxy for the interests of Capital – this 
non-contemporaneous element functions to “distract” from the antagonisms constitutive 
of capitalism.38 Indeed, as Karl Marx once observed in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis 
Bonaparte, the revolutionaries of 1848 borrowed the mask of 1789 in the revenant figure 
of Bonaparte, the misrecognition of which gave authority to representation. But it should 
be emphasized that, with his spectral language of historical repetition, Marx is making an 
argument for difference in repetition. Hence he writes of the repetition of the “tragedy” of 
1789 – resulting in a restoration of order – as the “farce” of 1848.39 If contemporaneity in 
Japan today can be considered against the backdrop of fascism as it emerged in the 1930s, 
as a drive that was always-already in effect, it must be underscored, as Harry Harootunian 
has disclosed, that the representation of the postwar “emperor” (tennō) has become all the 
more powerful as a “symbol” (shōchō) that can be readily mobilized and that has retained 
its sacral archaic functions of presiding over ritual within the present. In fact, it is exactly 
the symbolic status of the emperor that enables a disavowal that instantiates the very form 
of the emperor as a unit that consigns difference to social expulsion or death. It is claimed 
                                                
37 See Etsuko Kasai’s Everyday Fascism of Contemporary Japan, diss. (Columbia University: 2013), for an 
analysis of fascism in the everyday. Kasai’s focus on the modern subject within logics of commodification, 
exchangeability, and mass reproducibility resonates closely with my consideration of the subject produced 
through compulsory state rituals, like bowing to the ‘national flag’ (kokki) and singing the ‘national anthem’ 
(kokka). See below. 
38 Ernst Bloch, The Heritage of Our Times, trans. Neville and Stephen Plaice (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1991), pg. 108 – 109. 
39 Karl Marx, “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte,” in Marx: Later Political Writings, ed. Terrell 
Carver (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
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that the postwar emperor is, after all, merely a symbol of the nation. Indeed, when people 
sing the “national anthem” (kokka) at sporting events and public school ceremonies – an 
anthem also known as the Kimigayo, or “The Reign of the Emperor” – such spectators are 
surely only thinking of the nation. But perhaps this is precisely the issue. This disavowal 
coincides with an act which actualizes the form of the imperial unit, whereby recognition 
constitutes the national subject in a veritable “family-state” (kazoku-kokka).40 
The disavowal consists, therefore, in a repetition, but in a repetition that uncovers 
the discursive limits that it would eliminate. A certain remainder – or “negativity without 
reserve,” as Jacques Derrida says – is always-already in play, triggering the repetition 
that would have eliminated it. In Naming the Witch, James T. Siegel thus references Jean-
Luc Nancy who references Georges Bataille, in turn: “Bataille communicates to me that 
pain and that pleasure which result from the impossibility of communicating anything at 
all without touching the limit where all meaning spills out of itself like a simple ink stain 
on a word.”41 The condition of possibility of any statement is its condition of impossibil-
                                                
40 In Erotic Grotesque Nonsense: The Mass Culture of Japanese Modern Times (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2006), Miriam Silverberg writes of the “family-state” (kazoku-kokka): “Itō Mikiharu pro-
vides a subtle analysis of how two combinatory premises held the prewar family-state (kazoku-kokka) ide-
ology together: (1) the unity of loyalty to the state (chū) was conjoined with filial piety (kō) toward the 
head of household; and (2) the indivisibility of ancestors from descendants (or in other words, the identifi-
cation of family with ancestry)” (145). Carol Gluck traces the history of the “family-state” (kazoku-kokka) 
in Japan’s Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985): 
“From the 1870s through the 1890s the traditional family (ie) had both retained its social centrality and also 
undergone considerable change. The household received new legal articulation in the Household Register 
Law of 1871 and the Civil Code of 1898, which strengthened the legal position of the household head in 
terms of property ownership and social authority. At the same time the family figured in ideology in the 
form of Confucian renderings of family and society, the emphasis on the imperial line, moral precepts of 
loyalty and filiality, and the familial relationship expressed in the Rescript on Education. Metaphorical in-
vocation of the family was also standard in ideological usage. The founder of the modern Japanese police, 
Kawaji Toshiyoshi, had declared in 1876 that “the nation is a family, the government the parents, the peo-
ple the children, and the police their nursemaids.” In his promotion of the local plans (ze) in the 1890s 
Maeda Masana commonly referred to “the autonomy of one town or village as a family.” And scholars 
such as Hozumi Yatsuka and Inoue Tetsujirō developed abstract formulations that compared the ie to the 
Japanese state. There was thus no shortage of attention the family in the decades before the Russo-Japanese 
War” (187). 
41 James Siegel, Naming the Witch (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), pg. 4. 
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ity.42 As an ink stain, failure can trigger repetition unto exhaustion, and given certain his-
torical conditions – as Siegel explicates in Indonesia – a violence that kills, and that ne-
cessitates repetition. In 1998, Nakata Hidetoshi was to learn that the failure to mirror eve-
ryone else in certain ritual acts can unleash severe political pressure. Once the media had 
captured his motionless lips before an international soccer match, the clockwork was set 
in motion. A newspaper article was published. Death threats followed. And he found 
himself in the shameful place of singing the anthem thereafter. Needless to say, disavow-
ing the political import of the emperor takes on a somewhat more hypocritical character 
when it comes to parliament members visiting Yasukuni Shrine in an “unofficial capaci-
ty,” to pay homage to Japan’s war dead.43 Resembling the act of exchange in which labor 
is rendered equivalent, it is the act of memorializing Class-A war criminals that, despite 
words to the contrary, is effective. It is the act of exchange that – before you know it, it is 
too late: “post festum,” Marx writes – has always-already put into motion the machinery 
of domination that Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer describe in the Dialectic of 
Enlightenment. Enlightenment thereby regresses to a “barbarism” manifested in the “all-
encompassing economic apparatus” from which subjects cannot escape, and in a sociality 
within which “anything which does not conform to the standard of calculability and utili-
ty must be viewed with suspicion.”44 As the repeated reference to “culture” (bunka), the 
compulsion to social conformity demands the amputation of differences in a violence that 
cannot be conceived without turning attention to the objective conditions of the economy 
that drive individuals to identification. Overcome by Modernity, as Harootunian says, the 
                                                
42 See Jacques Derrida’s “Signature Event Context,” in Limited Inc, trans. by Samuel Weber and Jeffrey 
Mehlman (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1988). 
43 See Helen Hardacre’s Shinto and the State, 1868 – 1988 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989) 
for an historical account of the relation between Shintoism and the Japanese state. 
44 Adorno & Horkheimer, The Dialectic of Enlightenment, pg. 23, 3. 
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spirit of “cultural authenticity” is as “timeless and frozen as the commodity form itself.”45 
The loss and impossibility of recuperating the pure presence of originary social relations 
compels the demand for restitution. 
 It is therefore necessary to disclose the constitutive limits of Japanese things that 
dispossess them of their certitude and expose them in their non-contemporaneity. For the 
gaze of the ‘West’ is complicit in producing an ideology that gives itself to be recognized 
from abroad, and that cannot exist in the absence of this recognition. How happy it makes 
‘Japanese’ people to tell foreigners – myself a so-called “half” (hāfu) Japanese – that Jap-
anese culture is inscrutable to everyone but the Japanese. Perhaps the primary instance of 
this dangerously fetishistic and common self-exoticization consists in the trope of “shame” 
(haji) – after all, Japanese people feel the sting of group-pressure unlike any other people 
in the world, a uniquely “genetic” (identeki) trait that one has to be Japanese to ‘get’ – but 
that is repeatedly explained by so-called Japanese people to foreigners (and to themselves, 
it should be noted) by referencing Ruth Benedict’s 1946 classic, The Chrysanthemum and 
the Sword.46 Commissioned by the U.S. wartime government, Benedict’s anthropological 
study designates Japanese culture as a “shame culture” – presumably devoid of guilt – for 
                                                
45 Harry Harootunian, Overcome by Modernity: History, Culture, and Community in Interwar Japan 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), pg. xx, xxvi. 
46 In “The Future of an Affect: the Historicity of Shame,” trans. by Sabu Kohso, in Specters of the West and 
the Politics of Translation, ed. Naoki Sakai and Yukiko Hanawa (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 
2001), Satoshi Ukai writes extensively of the identification by ‘Japanese’ with Ruth Benedict’s work. Most 
significantly, he says: “As H.D. Harootunian pointedly criticized, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword and 
this very manner of thinking that opposes shame to guilt came to grasp a certain hegemony (that is, only as 
a theoretical excuse to justify modernist development) in the age of the cold war. At the end of Orientalism, 
Edward Said criticized the conservatives in the Arabic world, saying that the serious problem today is that 
people or the ruling class of the people who are represented by Orientalism themselves deepen their com-
plicity with Orientalism, equally or more so than the “representation” or “creation” of the Orient by the 
West. This situation is consistent with post-war Japan” (17). See also pg. 5 – 7. For a discussion of shame 
in the context Japan’s corporate world and its responsibility to workers who died in work-related accidents, 
see Takehiro Watanabe’s After Prosperity: An Ethnography of Economic Decline in a Japanese Corporate 
City, diss. (Columbia University: 2007), and specifically the chapter on “Death Incorporated: The Corpo-
rate Spirit and Martyrs of the Besshi Mine.” 
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the Japanese only experience social pressure in the presence of other Japanese. In Japan, 
the interiorization of guilt simply does not exist. Benedict writes: 
True shame cultures rely on external sanctions for good behavior, not, as true 
guilt cultures do, on an internalized conviction of sin. Shame is a reaction to other 
people’s criticism. A man is shamed either by being openly ridiculed and rejected 
or by fantasying to himself that he has been made ridiculous. In either case it is a 
potent sanction. But it requires an audience or at least a man’s fantasy of an audi-
ence. Guilt does not.47 
 
This designation does not remain in a realm of fictional fantasy. As Marilyn Ivy writes, it 
provides an “alibi” for Japanese shamelessness towards others – witness yearly Yasukuni 
visits by Japanese politicians – because the Japanese only experience shame in their own 
social world. Or so, at least, runs the discourse of “shame culture,” the identification with 
and actualization of which would achieve an absolution of guilt, so that the very object of 
critique aspires to conform with its designation.48 Like other tropes – and the tropic figure 
par excellence: the emperor – the fascist fantasy of social totality is actively produced as 
that entity before which subjects are crystallized in shame. Notwithstanding the economy 
within which subjects are driven to misrecognition and identification, the specific history 
that informs the iteration of certain tropes in Japan cannot be denied. It is therefore to the 
disavowed margins of the nation, consigned to social expulsion and death by techniques 
of state recognition, and to that constitutive defeat of World War II, that attention must be 
given. For it is the space of difference at these margins that both triggers and destabilizes 
                                                
47 Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword (New York: First Mariner Books, 2005), pg. 223. 
48 Marilyn Ivy, “Benedict’s Shame,” in Cabinet (31 (2008)). Of shamelessness, Ukai observes: “the side of 
“shame culture” is standing at the crossroads by internalizing the representation of “shame culture”: (1) 
either it become shameless before the gaze not only of “guilt cultures” but of all others, by fundamentalisti-
cally standardizing the given self-image and internalizing the shame; (2) or it feels ashamed of being the 
“shame culture” and deepens its shame in the effort of assimilating the “guilt culture”” (17). In effect, the 
internalization of “shame culture” justifies and breeds shamelessness towards others. And it should be said 
that the shame of being ashamed – that is, of being behind economically or democratically to “guilt cultures” 
– makes discourses seemingly critical of the state, like the human rights discourse in Japan, complicit with 
a modernization paradigm that calls for an overcoming, and ultimately, for decisionism. 
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 The structure of this dissertation hence seeks to disclose the non-contemporaneity 
of contemporary Japan. Through the contemporaneous excess of the everyday, it attempts 
to give imaginative space to a series of social worlds which disrupt the unity and unified 
temporality of Japan – organized, in turn, by that archaic figure of the “emperor” (tennō) 
– and which constitute an intransigent fabric of vanishing and emerging socialities, each 
inhabiting a singular present. The dissertation is divided into three sections, in which the 
sites considered are caught in a non-relation to the phantasmatic state, whereby its power 
of recognition consigns them to social expulsion and death. In all these ethnographic sites, 
it is the failure to conform to the demands of general society that precipitates and sustains 
the formation of a counter-discourse. Even the most abject and seemingly outdated forms 
                                                
49 As Marx observes of premodern forms of sociality carrying into modernity, the “formal subsumption” of 
previous forms of labor relations need not be, and arguably are not ever, usurped by purely capitalist rela-
tions. See Marx, Capital, pg. 1019 – 1025. In fact, as a political mobilization and model for general society, 
the emperor of the Meiji Restoration (1868) was unknown to pre-Meiji denizens of the Japanese isles. See 
Takahashi Fujitani’s Splendid Monarchy: Power and Pageantry in Modern Japan (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1998) for an historical account of the remobilization of the emperor. More importantly, it 
must be asked what the imperial figure has enabled in modern Japan, alongside fascism. In this respect, the 
very notion of an essentially hierarchical Japanese society emerges as corollary to the imperial system, both 
as an institutionalized object of cultural practice and of misrecognition from abroad. Of course, the study of 
hierarchical relations in Japan forms an anthropological bibliography of its own. See, among others, Ezra F. 
Vogel’s Japan’s New Middle Class (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2013), Takie Sugiyama 
Lebra’s Above the Clouds: Status Culture of the Modern Japanese Nobility (Berkeley: University of Cali-
fornia Press, 1993), or Matthew Masayuki Hamabata’s Crested Kimono: Power and Love in the Japanese 
Business Family (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990). Such texts must, however, be considered against 
the backdrop of the culturalist alibis that have been proferred for Japan’s conduct during World War II. For, 
as Etsuko Kasai writes in her “Introduction: Fascism as Mass Phenomenon,” in Everyday Fascism of Con-
temporary Japan, the situational behavior implied by Benedict’s first characterization – “shame culture” – 
is adopted by culturalists like Nakane Chie or Takeo Doi, who likewise provide an alibi for fascism during 
World War II. See Nakane’s Japanese Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970) and Doi’s 
“Amae” no Kōzō (Tokyo: Kōbundō, 1971). These alibis should, in turn, be considered together with Masao 
Maruyama’s depiction of fascism during wartime Japan as a purely top-down phenomenon, in his “Theory 
and Psychology of Ultra-Nationalism,” in Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics, ed. by Ivan 
Morris (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969). 
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of subjectivity – or labor – are caught in the normative gaze of the state. Of course, such a 
state of affairs should be no surprise in the wake of the nuclear catastrophe in Fukushima. 
If anything, the momentary emergence into visibility of “nuclear labor” (genpatsu rōdō) 
has illuminated the fact that precisely the most disenfranchised constitute a “reserve army” 
that can be mobilized to do society’s dirty work.50 And this is the case even if persons of 
such status are welfare-recipients. For the monthly allowance barely keeps individuals off 
the streets, and in so doing, it activates the desire for a supplementary income that all too 
often entails self-detrimental work – such as at a nuclear plant – that must necessarily be 
undertaken as the individual’s risk and responsibility.51 Seemingly surpassed, anachronic 
forms of industrial labor – notably, a designation which instantiates a normative gaze by 
triggering an affect of insufficiency in those so named – exist side by side with the ubiq-
uitous figure of the “salary-man” (sararīman). As David Harvey observes, the shift from 
Fordist production to postindustrialism – financialization and the immense “space-time 
compression” of globalization attendant on accelerated “turnover times of capital” – has 
necessitated a general pool of flexible labor.52 But this does not mean that older forms of 
labor have simply vanished; nor, for that matter, that the conditions of ‘flexibility’ – a.k.a. 
disposability – of the salary-man does not also encompass the nuclear laborer, shoemaker, 
                                                
50 Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, trans. by Ben Fowkes (New York: Vintage, 1997), pg. 781. For literature on 
“nuclear labor” (gempatsu rōdō) in Japan, see Horie Kunio’s 1979 classic Gempatsu Jipusī, or “Nuclear 
Gypsy” – nuclear laborers have been so named on account of their gypsy-like migration from nuclear plant 
to nuclear plant; a precarious migration that coincides with the demand for laborers to clean different plants 
as they shut down under rotating schedules throughout the year – republished in 2011 as Gempatsu Rōdōki 
(Tokyo: Kōdansha, 2011), as well as Horie Kunio and Shigeru Mizuki’s illustrated 1979 Fukushima Gem-
patsu no Yami (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun Shuppan, 2011), or “The Darkness of Fukushima Nuclear Plant.” 
And, if not these two works, Hirose Takashi’s Genshiro Jigen Bakudan: Daijishin ni Obieru Nihon Rettō 
(Tokyo: Diamondsha, 2010), or “Nuclear Reactor Time Bomb: The Japanese Archipelago that Fears Ma-
jor Earthquake” prefigures the nuclear catastrophe precisely at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. 
Needless to say, Hirose Takashi is no longer dismissed as a writer with science fictional aspirations. 
51 See Ch. 4 – 8. 
52 David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry Into the Origins of Cultural Change (Ox-
ford: Blackwell Publishers, 1990), pg. 284 – 285. 
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or construction worker. In fact, the ‘flexibility’ which has become a generalized condition 
of existence today was presaged precisely where an excess of industrial labor was located 
during Japan’s “bubble economy” or years of “high economic development” (kōdo seichō 
ki). With the Fukushima nuclear catastrophe and the forthcoming Olympics, the economy 
requires these disavowed margins again. But it should be said that if certain marginalized 
classes willingly undertake society’s dirty work, this does not entail that their subjects are 
necessarily obedient to the state. As Marx points out, it is only “in the last instance” that 
economic forces determine the form of ideology.53 On the other hand, it is most certainly 
the economy, and more specifically, the form of equivalent value – in which subjects give 
themselves in exchange – that precipitates identifications, or rather, misrecognitions, that 
supplement the form predicated by labor. There is therefore nothing inherently ‘Japanese’ 
about the sites I write of. The valence or force of the sites I describe, and specifically, of 
the tropes explicated therein, derives from the coincidence between the economic and the 
historical trajectory that informs each of their social worlds. 
 The three main sections of the dissertation are titled: (1) “The Elimination of Dif-
ference”; (2) “Yama: City of Highs and Lows”; (3) “Vanishing and Emerging Socialities.” 
It should be noted that, whereas sections one and two address each their own discrete site, 
section three addresses three discrete sites that, in turn, revisit sections one and two, and 
conclude with “‘Fukushima.’” Concretely, the three sections address the following sites: 
1) “The Elimination of Difference.” 
The public educational system in Tokyo, and specifically, the act of teachers in 
public schools who – in what Henry David Thoreau would have called civil disobedience 
– refuse to stand for and bow toward the “national flag” (kokki), and to sing the “national 
                                                
53 See Karl Marx, The German Ideology (New York: Prometheus Books, 1998). 
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anthem” (kokka) during entrance and graduation ceremonies. Metonyms for the Japanese 
“emperor” (tennō), this ‘national flag’ and ‘national anthem’ are known as the Hinomaru 
and Kimigayo: the self-same imperial symbols under which the Imperial Japanese Army 
conducted World War II. Needless to say, the refusal to partake in the enactment of such 
ceremonies is not uncommon around the world. In the U.S., Jehovah’s Witnesses refused 
to pledge allegiance to the American flag during World War II – their constitutional right 
to which was recognized by Supreme Court verdict in the 1943 Barnette case – and, upon 
hearing the story of nine black students attempting to desegregate their local high school 
in Little Rock (only to be forcibly kept out), Louis Armstrong, then “Ambassador of Jazz” 
to the U.S, inserted obscenities in his rendition of “The Star-Spangled Banner.” But while 
Armstrong’s 1957 defamatory act resonates in 2015, when police shootings of black men 
have become a daily occurrence that spark demonstrations across the U.S. – “It’s getting 
so bad a colored man hasn’t got any country,” Armstrong said – bowing to the symbol of 
the emperor and singing his longevity have become such obvious acts in Japan that there 
is no room to breathe.54 Notably, everybody in U.S. schools is expected to stand to pledge 
allegiance every morning, an act the significance of which is disavowed by statements to 
the effect that it is “casual,” or that “most people do not” say the words. Nonetheless, it is 
                                                
54 David Margolick, “The Day Louis Armstrong Made Noise,” in The New York Times, 23/9/2007. It is 
necessary to imagine the (compulsory) ritual of standing for the flag and singing the anthem in other con-
texts than its specifically fascist rendering of imperial reverence in contemporary Japan. In the U.S., where 
the reference to a pure racial origin would be nearly impossible, it is nonetheless the self-evidence of pledg-
ing allegiance that is at stake in the morning act of pledging allegiance. One online article, titled “Why Do 
We Say the Pledge of Allegiance in School?”, states: “In America, one of the key cornerstones of an educa-
tional day can be saying the pledge of allegiance in school. For many, it is one of the many tasks which is 
completed at the beginning of the day. However, despite this element being so integral, many students do 
not understand what the purpose of this is – and indeed, why they might be pledging allegiance to the flag. 
In this article, we are going to look at the reasoning, as well as the ethical explorations behind it … So – the 
main reason that the pledge of allegiance is said in schools is to instill a sense of patriotism among students” 
(teAchnology). McCarthyism also constitutes a close corollary to the witch-hunt of sussing out disobedient 
teachers in Japan. 
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“rude” to abstain.55 What distinguishes such rituals in Japanese public education, then, is 
the compulsory character of their enforcement by the state, so that the failure to conform 
is threatened with a visibility of “punishment” (shobun) – shame – that is constitutive of 
the subject. By virtue of the ‘symbolic’ emperor, moreover, the discipline created in such 
rituals attains an automaticity which can be mobilized across an array of social sites.56 In 
the future anterior temporality of what will have been the population, this site reveals the 
production of a ‘flexible’ labor force, the lacking “youth” (wakamono), in its dependence 
on the “negative history” (fu no rekishi) of World War II.57 
This first section is composed of three chapters. Chapter 1, “Barbarism,” locates 
the compulsion to conformity within the postwar temporality of the Japanese state’s drive 
to war, as fascism. Chapter 2, “The Restoration of Shame,” discloses state techniques of 
subjectivization to consist in a misrecognition and mobilization of shame that constitutes 
the subject. Chapter 3, “‘Propriety’ (Jōshiki),” considers the abject place of the disobedi-
ent public teachers alongside the act of standing as an act of killing. 
2) “Yama: City of Highs and Lows.” 
Construction workers in Tokyo’s vanishing day laborer district of Sanya. With 
neither family ties, romantic involvements with women, or social recognition that would 
                                                
55 My family in Texas explains the enactment of the daily ritual in high school thus. 
56 Harry Harootunian quotes Takeuchi Yoshimi in “An Emperor System in Every Blade of Grass and 
in the Leaves of Every Tree” (unpublished): “Takeuchi was prompted to conclude that contemporary Japan 
marked the place of “any number of miniature emperor systems,” which, he was convinced, could be found 
everywhere, in “every single blade of grass, in every leaf of every tree”” (2). 
Although the form of the ceremonies is recognizable across an array of sites and practices – from 
morning calisthenics to the impossibility of questioning superiors at work – it would be mistaken to posit 
its ubiquity. While “traditional” (dentōki) forms of art, ritual and performance – like the tea ceremony – 
lend themselves to remobilization within fascist discourse, other marginal forms of performance go against 
the grain. Consider, for instance, Marilyn Ivy’s writing on taishū engeki (theater for the masses) in Dis-
courses of the Vanishing: Modernity, Phantasm, Japan (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1995). 
57 See Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. by Geoff Ben-
nington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1984), pg. 81, for an explication of the 
future anterior. 
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confirm their masculinity, the men I write of make all the more repeated reference to the 
trope of the otoko or “man.” Intimately articulated with the mobster world of the yakuza 
with which many construction workers had ties, the insistent repetition of masculinity in 
working, gambling and fighting constituted a discourse that countered the normative gaze 
of general society. In its excessive life-style – working (hungover), only to drink, gamble, 
fight, and given the chance, to womanize – Sanya was located at the constitutive margins 
of the social bond of propriety, of which Derrida observes: “It is the making proper of the 
proper itself (propriation du propre même), at least in as much as the proper is opposed 
to the heterogeneity of the improper, and to every mode of foreignness or alienation that 
might be recognized in someone’s resorting to drugs.”58 Indeed, the rhetoric of drugs was 
used by veterans to Sanya to describe Sanya itself: “once you taste” (ichido ajimi shitara) 
Sanya, it was said, you “cannot give it up” (yamerarenai). Thus, fifteen years prior to my 
own stay in Sanya – and long before ‘precarity’ was generalized – Edward Fowler writes 
of the freedom (to sell one’s labor) in Sanya: 
Several observers have commented on the San’ya doyagai’s dearth of families 
and its relative lack of violence. The quiet atmosphere, however, is by no means a 
sign of healthiness. Indeed, San’ya’s diurnal lethargy (there is little to see except a 
few idle men lying about on the streets), in such stark contrast to the bustling, al-
most frenetic, activity seen throughout the rest of the city, suggests a kind of mor-
al degeneracy to mainstream Japanese which is anathema to their way of life. An 
                                                
58 Jacques Derrida, “The Rhetoric of Drugs,” trans. by Michael Israel, in Differences: A Journal of Feminist 
Cultural Studies (5:1 (1993)), pg. 13. Be it for or against, the social “I” is at stake in this propriety: 
“And this value might just as easily be the mainstay of a right-wing as of a left-wing discourse, 
and just as easily in the Orient as in the West. 
This specularity should not surprise you. It is inexhaustible. Anyway, some form of drug addiction 
might just as well have this same fantasy of reappropriation. It might do so naively or with a great “cultiva-
tion,” dreaming of emancipation and of the restoration of an “I,” of a self or of a self’s own body, and in-
deed dreaming of the restoration of a subject once and for all taken back to the forces of alienation, to re-
pression and suppression and to the law which speaks in religion, metaphysics, politics, the family, etc.” 
(Ibid, 12). 
Be it one or the other, Derrida writes of propriety: “The only attitude (the only politics – judicial, 
medical, pedagogical, etc.) I would absolutely condemn is one which, directly or indirectly, cuts off the 
possibility of an essentially interminable questioning, that is a critical and thus transforming questioning” 
(Ibid, 10). 
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acquaintance became visibly disturbed when I told him that I was frequenting this 
section of Tokyo. “I wouldn’t waste my time there if I were you,” he told me. 
“You don’t want to get dragged down in the mire.” In the eyes of my Japanese 
acquaintance, San’ya was not simply an eyesore, a blot on Tokyo’s image, but a 
festering wound capable of infecting any passerby foolish enough to come in con-
tact with it. 
 
San’ya, then, might just as well be considered a state of mind as a slum. Or, more 
properly, “states of mind,” for the meaning of this neighborhood is clearly not the 
same for the resident (or even the different categories of resident) and nonresident. 
For the latter, who rarely if ever sets foot in the area and is left simply to imagine 
it, San’ya is a filthy repository for men whose personal world has gone awry, the 
result of individual excess or error; for the former (at least for the day-laborer res-
ident), it is a refuge – a symbol of defeat, perhaps, but at the same time a cradle of 
opportunity which holds the possibility, however slim, of a second chance in a so-
ciety that is most stingy with second chances. Located in an easily accessible sec-
tion of town, it beckons the laid-off worker, or the stray migrant from the prov-
inces, or the man on the run from creditors, or the gambling addict or excon or ex-
gangster, with its lures of liquor, gambling, casual sex, anonymity, and most im-
portant, a ready income. 
 
Without this last, of course, the other attractions would not be viable. For alt-
hough the outside world typically regards San’ya as a kind of skid row, workers 
based there know it first and foremost as a labor market, albeit one of last resort, 
where a job can be had with no questions asked. And although many jobs require 
only minimal skills, a goodly number demand extensive technical expertise in 
electrical work, masonry, carpentry, or scaffolding and offer a very high wage. 
None of this work is easy, however, and none of the jobs offer security. That is 
why San’ya as a labor market can be said to be located at the intersection of per-
sonal choice and corporate/statist exploitation. The individual worker freely elects 
to come here, it is true, but he makes this choice knowing that there is no place 
else to go in a land where the welfare system tends to be restrictive rather than in-
clusive and where panhandling is strongly frowned upon.59  
 
Of course, in 2013, with the collapse of the bubble economy and the recessionary decades 
that followed, construction work had all but disappeared from Sanya and the district was 
contemptibly referred to as a “welfare town” (fukushi no machi). However it was the after 
effects of unhampered, day-to-day commodification that could be witnessed in the social 
atomization and premature death that faced denizens of Sanya. So too, it was from within 
                                                
59 Edward Fowler, San’ya Blues: Laboring Life in Contemporary Japan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1996), pg. 14. On the note of addiction, consider the title of Tsukada Tsutomu’s book: Dakara Sanya ga 
Yamerarenē (Tokyo: Gentōsha, 2008), or This is Why I Cannot Quit Sanya. 
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the conditions of their social “defeat” – or failure – that the laborers in Sanya maintained 
a sense of “dignity,” or “pride” (iji) by virtue of staying loyal to the “group” or “buddies” 
(nakama), despite the retrograde conditions of their work and their financial dependence 
on the state for welfare. The assertion of masculinity in face of ‘precarity’ had constituted 
the condition of existence decades before the economic bubble burst in 1989.60 It was the 
afterlife of this lifestyle that availed construction companies – not to mention Fukushima 
– of a pool of labor inured to atrocious working conditions.61 Of course, the reference to 
outlaw codes of masculinity in face of economic and social depredation is not a Japanese 
phenomenon. As Philippe Bourgois writes In Search of Respect: Selling Crack in El Bar-
rio, or Elliot Liebow says in Tally’s Corner: A Study of Negro Corner Men, the failure of 
stigmatized men to maintain a dignified job may precipitate alternate forms of sociality 
that function precisely to confer “respect” where all other means of recognition have been 
foreclosed. Drawn from the world of Japanese “historical drama” (jidai-geki), “theater for 
the masses” (taishū engeki), Japanese yakuza movies, karaoke, and an abiding fantasy of 
the outlaw mobster, the specificity of Sanya resided in the trope of the otoko as a self-
sufficient individual who – by having a sensibility of “shame” (haji) – protected the weak 
and sacrificed himself for his “buddies” (nakama). Nonetheless, the group of Okinawans 
I worked with found it necessary to distinguish their “Japanese-style” (jyapanīzu sutairu) 
of life from that of the U.S. If the Americans had Al Pacino and Francis Ford Coppola’s 
                                                
60 San’ya Blues, pg. 39 – 41, Fowler details how the concentration of an excess supply of labor in Sanya, 
not to mention its conditions of ‘precarity,’ has been contingent on explicit state policies. See also Ch. 5. 
61 In San’ya Blues, Fowler writes: “For mainstream society, San’ya and other yoseba thus provide a dual 
safety valve, relieving both economic and social pressures on the majority population, as many observers 
have pointed out. The yoseba, along with the extensive, multitiered system of subcontractors in manufac-
turing and construction (of which the yoseba can be viewed as the lowest tier), provide an otherwise rigid 
social economy with much-needed elasticity; without them, lifetime employment and other corporate bene-
fits of the good life at the top which we hear so much about in the West would be far less secure. During a 
recession, the stress of economic contraction is shifted to the subcontractor, the sub-subcontractor, and so 
on down to the street, where day laborers absorb the brunt of hard times” (15). 
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The Godfather, the Japanese had Bunta Sugawara and Kinji Fukasaku’s Battles Without 
Honor and Humanity (Jingi Naki Tatakai). Likewise, if the U.S. style of murder consisted 
in cold-bloodedly pulling the trigger – bang bang! – the Japanese style resided in flinging 
oneself at opponents in a murderous rage, with a knife: the Japanese “cut” (kiru). 
 This second section consists of five chapters. Chapter 4, “Prelude,” introduces the 
reader to the world of Sanya. Chapter 5, “The Day Laborer,” discloses the materiality of 
the day laborer’s working day, its mediation through time and the wage, and the desire of 
for the working day to have been done. Chapter 6, “Gambling,” tracks the transformation 
of time in gambling as the embodied encounter with the shock of contingency, doubling 
the time of capitalist production encountered in the day laborer’s working day. Chapter 7, 
“Otoko,” exposes the wounds that staking the self for the group would overcome. Chapter 
8, “Death,” elucidates social disintegration as an effect of the individualizing market, and 
foreshadows the finality of death that awaits Sanya.  
 3) “Vanishing and Emerging Socialities.” 
 This last, third section is composed of three chapters which address three discrete 
sites. However, it should be said that, just as Chapter 9, “The “Radical” (Kageki) Leftist,” 
revisits the theme of the vanishing laborer of section two, Chapter 10, ““Internet” (Netto) 
Emperorism,” revisits the subject of the graduation and entrance ceremonies. Chapter 11, 
“‘Fukushima,’” foregrounds the destructive effects of state recognition in ‘Fukushima,’ 
and post-Fukushima Japan. 
Chapter 9, “The ‘Radical’ (Kageki) Leftist,” addresses the postwar remainders of 
the now stigmatized, militant leftist student group, the Zengakuren – a shortening of Zen 
Nihon Gakusei Jichikai Sō Rengō (All-Japan League of Student Self-Government) – and 
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its parent organization, the Chūkakuha (Middle-Core-Faction or the Japan Revolutionary 
Communist League). Now labelled as a “radical” (kageki) group alongside internationally 
renowned organizations – like ISIS – the Zengakuren was formed in 1948, and numbered 
in the thousands throughout the civilian uprisings of the 1960s and 1970s.62 Today, it has 
approximately 100 members. Like other symptomatic sites that have been systematically 
shut down by the state – and the list is endless: Okinawa, Sanrizuka (otherwise known as 
Narita International Airport), Minamata, Nagasaki, Hiroshima, Fukushima (and originally, 
53 other localities that resisted the construction of a nearby nuclear plant), not to mention 
organizations like Sōhyo, the Japan Teachers’ Union (Nihon Kyōshokuin Kumiai), or the 
incendiary “left” (uyoku), and with it, the “youth” (wakamono) – the Zengakuren tells the 
tale of the disappearance and prohibition of resistance to state power. It moreover calls to 
mind that it was precisely during the 1980s bubble economy that, coincident with similar 
reforms by Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, the first massive wave of neoliberal 
state privatization occurred under the Nakasone Yasuhiro administration.63 To participate 
in Zengakuren demonstrations is to risk the potentially debilitating stigma of the “radical” 
(kageki) – of the political – the avoidance of which is constitutive of the proper subject. If 
anything, it is the “shutdown” (fūsa) and confinement of “youth” as a possibly incendiary 
formation that is revealed by the paltry Zengakuren members, as opposed to, for instance, 
the Occupy Wall Street movement. Indeed, in its call for laborers to “unite” (danketsu) in 
a “violent revolution” (bōryoku kakumei), the Zengakuren reproduce the totalizing form 
of a discourse that alienates the object it purports to represent. By replicating the form of 
                                                
62 See Stuart Dowsey’s Zengakuren: Japan’s Revolutionary Students (Berkeley: The Ishi Press, 1970). 
63 See Ch. 9. The 1985 privatization of Japan National Railways led not only to the relocation of 200,000 
workers – it was promised that no one would be fired; a promise that was not upheld – but to 200 suicides 
and the busting of the railway union, Kokurō. 
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the master discourse that the Zengakuren opposes itself to, the heterogeneous symptom of 
labor is subverted into a pure negativity that – as Jacques Rancière has written of Marx’s 
words: “only,” “merely,” “nothing but” – would constitute the possibility of overturning 
capitalism in “total” (zen) revolution.64 Needless to say, such revolution would be a world 
revolution, and thus, the Chūkakuha maintains connections with labor organizations like 
the International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU) in the U.S. 
Chapter 10, “‘Internet’ (Netto) Emperorism,” addresses street demonstrations and 
online videos by the newly emerging “internet right-wing” (netto uyoku), and specifically, 
the Zainichi Tokken o Yurusanai Shimin no Kai, or “Citizens Against Special Privileges 
for Resident Foreigners” (hereafter referred to as “Zaittokai”). By now notorious for their 
“hate speech” (hēto-supīchi), the Zaittokai started as an informal internet-based group in 
the chatrooms of 2channel – the world’s largest online textboard, numbering 2.5 million 
posts per day (in 2007) – and was officially established in January, 2007, as an entity that 
meets face-to-face and takes to the streets in protest. Enacted before a camera, the actions 
of the Zaittokai revisit the disavowal implicit to the act of bowing to the emperor, but do 
so from within a paranoid formation in which the state – not least on account of its retreat 
from the economy – has lost the capacity to shame its subjects. In a shameless enjoyment 
which Jacques Lacan anticipated in the absence of reciprocal signifiers on Television, the 
hate speech deployed against “resident foreigners” (zanichi) in recorded streets protests –
                                                
64 In The Philosopher and His Poor, trans. by John Drury, Corinne Oster and Andrew Parker (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2003), Jacques Rancière writes: “We know “only one science,” the science of histo-
ry. History is “nothing but” the succession of generations, each exploiting the materials transmitted to it by 
the preceding generation. The history of every society down to our day “has been merely” the history of 
class struggle. The ruling ideas are “nothing more than” the ideal expression of the dominant material rela-
tions. Modern government “is but a committee” managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeois class. 
Ideologues go “no further” in their thinking than the petty bourgeoisie in its practice. Communism is “only” 
the real movement that abolishes the present state of things. And these proletarians who “have nothing to 
lose but their chains” will simply be transforming their own condition into a general social condition when 
they eliminate property” (70). 
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“die!” (shiné!), “Korean cockroaches!” (gokiburi chōsenjin!) – at once calls its target into 
visibility in a name-calling that denies subjectivity, and reproduces the absence of reserve 
that can be observed in compulsive online statements written by the internet right-wing.65 
Although the emperor is excluded in its slew of hate speech – his figure, after all, secures 
the minimal line of difference which separates ‘us’ from ‘them’ – the Zaittokai regularly 
turn their invectives against the state and police, as they, too, are ultimately controlled by 
the “resident foreigners,” or zainichi, who pull the conspiratorial strings behind the screen. 
Against insuperable odds – since the Japanese were totally vanquished in World War II – 
the Zaittokai parade for the war that will once-and-for-all rid Japan of its postwar legacy: 
the zainichi. In effect, it is the inscription of Zaittokai activities within the temporality of 
Japan’s interminable postwar that distinguishes it from other supremacist groups. Indeed, 
the exhibition on camera of precisely those aspects of oneself that one hides from view in 
everyday life is readily identifiable in reality-TV. Hate speech in the U.S. by anti-Islamic 
groups – “Fuck Islam,” they say in the name of “freedom of speech” – likewise replicates 
forms of Zaittokai writing; feeding into a patriarchal war that is waged under the alibi of 
liberating Muslim women from their Muslim oppressors, whose religious icon is defaced 
in “draw Mohammed” contests, much as the Zaittokai take enjoyment in proclaiming that 
the World War II “comfort women” (jūgun ianfu) system is a fiction, and that the women 
of ‘Asia’ desired it.66 But it is perhaps the case of the 2015 Charleston Church Shootings, 
in which 21-year-old Dylann Roof was charged with killing nine black people, that most 
                                                
65 Jacques Lacan, Television: A Challenge to the Psychoanalytic Establishment, trans. by Dennis Hollier, 
Rosalind Krauss, Annette Michelson, and Jeffrey Mehlman (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1990). 
Albeit in a technologically mediated form, the Zaittokai’s “hate speech” (hēto-supīchi) recalls Frantz Fan-
on’s explication of the appellation, “black,” in Black Skin, White Masks, trans. by Richard Philcox (New 
York: Grove Press, 2008). 
66 ReverbPress, “UPDATE: ‘Freedom of Speech’ Islamic Hate Group Rally at Phoenix Mosque (VIDEO).” 
30/52015. 
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recently exemplifies the shared experience of Zaittokai members of discovering the “truth” 
(shinjitsu) of the zainichi online. Referring to the 2012 shooting of the unarmed black 17-
year-old, Trayvon Martin, by the gated-community guard, George Zimmerman (who was 
accused, but acquitted), Roof writes in his online manifesto: 
The event that truly awakened me was the Trayvon Martin case. I kept hearing 
and seeing his name, and eventually I decided to look him up. I read the Wikipe-
dia article and right away I was unable to understand what the big deal was. It was 
obvious that Zimmerman was in the right. But more importantly this prompted me 
to type in the words “black on White crime” into Google, and I have never been 
the same since that day. The first website I came to was the Council of Conserva-
tive Citizens. There were pages upon pages of these brutal black on White mur-
ders. I was in disbelief. At this moment I realized that something was very wrong. 
How could the news be blowing up the Trayvon Martin case while hundreds of 
these black on White murders got ignored?67 
 
Like the Zaittokai protest “special privileges” (tokken) of zainichi, Dylann Roof taps into 
a discourse that reverses the order of aggressor and victim. Indeed, in the wake of Roof’s 
killings, the Council of Conservative Citizens itself asserted that the media either “spike” 
stories of black-on-white murder, or “obscure the race of black offenders.”68 Replete with 
capitalized reference to the “White” race, it is the internet that enables Roof’s realization 
that “hundreds of these black on White murders got ignored.” And if the Zaittokai’s acts 
of hate speech have yet to be actualized as acts of killing – war – it may be asked whether 
the Japanese constitution has not played a preventive role. 
 Chapter 11, “‘Fukushima,’” addresses the overcoming or so-called “containment” 
(shūsoku) of ‘Fukushima’ in relation to the self-destructive violence of state recognition. 
Although radiation continues to leak from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant at 
the moment of writing (in 2015), the Japanese state declared that the plant had been “con-
                                                
67 thegrio, “Dylann Roof’s Alleged Manifesto Uncovered: The Trayvon Martin Case Awakened Me.” 
20/6/2015. 
68 American Renaissance, “Statement by President of the Council of Conservative Citizens,” 21/6/2015. 
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tained” (shūsoku sareta) already in December, 2011. Fearing the economic blackhole that 
an exodus of Fukushima residents would give rise to, this declaration of contaiment was 
preceded by assurances by state scientists that “radiation” (hōshanō) levels in Fukushima 
were safe for kids in the immediate aftermath of the disaster, and televised commercials 
urging viewers to eat food from Northeastern Japan: “Let’s Support by Eating!” (Tabete 
Sasaeru!). As if in war, state discourse decreed that residents of Fukushima must remain 
strong. The actualization of state propriety in ‘Fukushima’ thereby entailed a certain self-
denial, by which overcoming radiation would produce the deleterious effects it sought to 
contain. Just as suicide entails the insufficiency of a “weak” (yowai) individual who lacks 
the “will to live” (ikiru chikara), radiation can be combatted through the “psychology” or 
“spirit” (seishin) of the individual. And just as suicide subtends shame as the literalized 
act of negating the insufficient self, the precondition for overcoming radiation is exposure, 
and finally, failure. Yet, the success of state discourse is not indicated by what is known, 
but by the avoidance a topic that has been rendered political – radiation, or for that matter, 
suicide – and as Nakashita says, “taboo” (tabū). We know, but still we eat. Or perhaps we 
know and try not to eat. But the topic is certainly not broached. Hence, in spite of regular 
radiation leaks from Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, the plant has, indeed, been 
“contained” (shūsoku sareta). But propriety entails radiation exposure. As in suicide as a 
final act of making good on one’s economic value, the deathly effects of which will only 
emerge in the future anterior mode – when it will have been too late – the social kills.69 
 
                                                
69 Of course, suicide and radiation can both be considered eminently Japanese ‘Things.’ Japan is the only 
nation to have experienced the atom bomb. As true today as ever, Alan Wolfe writes in Suicidal Narrative 
in Modern Japan: The Case of Osamu Dazai (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990): “To mention 
suicide and Japan in the same sentence is to bring to bear a set of stereotypes that continue to shape West-






Theoretical Excursus: Sociality, Shame, and the State 
 
 This dissertation tracks the effects of state recognition across the above sites, both 
insofar as this recognition calls subjects into a visibility in which they give themselves in 
conformity, and insofar as the violence of state recognition necessitates the formation of 
counter-discourses. In effect, it is the repetition of shame that can be witnessed across the 
array of sites. It is by being caught in the insufficiency (or lack) of shame that individual 
subjects make reference to the sociality of a third which appears to provide reprieve from 
the debilitating effects of the labor market. However, in the no-man’s-land of shame that 
necessarily subsists in-between – say, the ‘U.S.’ and ‘Japan,’ ‘Asian’ nations and ‘Japan,’ 
or the state and its subjects – it is a specific modality of shame that is invoked; namely, a 
modality of shame that, as Satoshi Ukai observes, triggers an affect of “being ashamed of 
shame” (haji o hajiru-koto), so that the drive implicit to an “undertaking,” “overcoming,” 
or of the impossible elimination of shame is activated. As it is manifested by the Japanese 
state and inculcated in the subject of the state, then, the shame of shame assumes the form 
of shamelessness or of shamelessly overcoming shame. Most significantly, such shame of 
shame must be differentiated from a stance that, as Ukai says, “affirms shame, and by so 
doing, resists shame.”70 Identifiable in the solitary figure of the disobedient public teacher, 
                                                
70 Translated from Japanese to English as “being abashed of shame” (haji o hanikamu-koto), Ukai writes of 
this stance in “The Future of an Affect: The Historicity of Shame”: 
 “According to a Japanese dictionary, “being bashful [hanikamu-koto]” is equal to “being embar-
rassed [hazukashigaru-koto]” or “pretending to be embarrassed [hazukashi-sôna soburi-o-surukoto].” In 
other words, it is a synonym, a derivative of hajirukoto [being ashamed of]; a mode of expression of shame. 
“Being abashed and trying to avoid eye contact.” (Mori Ôgai, The Wild Goose) “That is it. That bashful 
smile. That is the feature proper to a talented artist.” (Dazai Osamu, No Longer Human). “‘After getting my 
certification, we can get married, can’t we?’ Hatsue did not respond, but smiled bashfully.” (Yukio Mishi-
ma, The Sound of Waves). These examples from masterpieces of Japanese modern literature listed in a dic-
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who resists the discursive closure of the shame of shame, but who still risks it, this stance 
does not merely act as an affirmation of and resistance to shame, thus contesting the place 
of shame. In its resistance to shame itself, and therefore, to the very structure of relativity 
across which shame emerges, the stance short-circuits the interiority of a guilt that cannot 
be dislodged from the Japanese state and its shaming figure par excellence: the “emperor” 
(tennō). Indeed, the phrase originates from the place of “comfort women” (jūgun ianfu), 
or rather, sex slaves of the Imperial Japanese Army. Yet, it is precisely the interiority and 
locatedness of this guilt that the alibi and production of “shame culture” would absolve in 
shamelessly overcoming shame, for “shame culture” displaces the interiority of guilt, and 
enables the activation of shamelessness. Needless to say, in Japan, the trope of shame and 
the sociality of the group constitute stereotypes that run the risk of effacing the specificity 
of shame as an affect that has no proper place, but which still enjoys a historicity in Japan 
that makes it especially relevant there. As Ukai observes in “The Future of an Affect: the 
Historicity of Shame,” the concept of the “shame culture” is redundant: 
The anxiety of death and the anxiety of shame. These original affects, without 
which language can no longer speak, are also a dynamic expression of the relative 
opacity of a proper culture apropos a proper language. In this sense, the concept 
of “shame cultures” somewhat contains an echo of redundancy. That is to say, is 
                                                                                                                                            
tionary teach us typical uses of the word as it has been internalized in Japanese culture. But, as far as we 
know, this word “hanikamu” [being abashed] has never been thrown into the turmoil of the experience of 
shame, in its reflex movement – essential to it – that cannot be stopped. 
 Even if “hanikamu [being abashed]” is a synonym of “hajiru [being ashamed of],” “being abashed 
of shame” [haji o hanikamu-koto] is a very different, almost opposite posture of “being ashamed of shame” 
[haji o hajiru-koto]. Hanikami is neither “undertaking” nor “overcoming” haji [shame]. It affirms shame, 
and by doing so, resists shame. For the woman who discovered this expression, nay, affect, life was some-
thing that could be narrated only in this manner. She discovered this in the features of elderly Korean wom-
en who had been forced to live as comfort women, as sex slaves, by the Japanese army, and finally have 
come out and testified after half a century. 
 Haji o hanikamu [being bashful of shame]. The advent of this “poematic event [évenement poé-
matique]” did not come to someone whose mother’s tongue is Japanese, or someone educated in a Japanese 
school. It was, perhaps, an impossibility. The impossibility of translating this expression thus no longer 
belongs to the property of the culture that calls itself Japan. If there is any “proper place” for thinking of 
shane, the experience of translation, and words for Traces, it exists nowhere but this topos where a proper 
language and a proper culture no longer overlap” (33 – 34). 
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there any one entity of those which are called culture or call themselves culture 
that does not tremble when facing the anxiety of shame vis-à-vis other cultures 
and the anxiety of death? – for these are the experiences of the finiteness of cul-
ture or the experiences of the cultural boundary. Furthermore, it is here where the 
power relation between cultures in a particular historical context is most cruelly 
exposed. It is not that a certain culture feels equally ashamed in front of any other 
culture; while it sensitively recognizes and responds to the gaze of certain cultures, 
to the gaze of other cultures it can pretend that it does not notice and refuse to re-
spond, or more pointedly, feel ashamed of being ashamed, and immediately deny 
the work of the affect.71 
 
Can the shamelessness of the Japanese state be considered as an instance of the shame of 
being ashamed? And does the internalization and production of shame disavow state guilt 
– without which there can be no shame: the corollary of guilt – such that it is not merely 
towards outside others that the Japanese state gives its population to be seen as shameless, 
but to interior others who are shamed into overcoming? Because the power Ukai writes of 
does not merely subsist “between cultures,” but within them. In the internalization of the 
victor’s gaze – “shame culture” – ‘Japanese’ culture attains a monolithic aspect by calling 
the possibility of difference into a visibility which the individual unit of the labor market 
must do her or his best to overcome. Whether this drive results in a misrecognition and 
identification that intensifies the alienation of the subject or whether it maintains a space 
for lateral understanding, it is the individualization of the subject that precipitates desire 
for social inclusion. 
 Shame exposes subjects in a constitutive insufficiency which ultimately cannot be 
overcome. As Jacques Lacan writes in “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function 
as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience,” the subject is formed in a constitutive loss or 
lack that is antecedent to its symbolic and ‘cultural’ orienation. The “jubilant assumption 
[assomption]” of that specular mirror image reverses the symmetry of the (non-identical) 
                                                
71 Ibid, pg. 5. 
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body, and imposes a totality on it, the aspiration towards which can never be satisfied. In 
effect, the subject is constitutively split. As that “rootstock of secondary identifications,” 
Lacan writes of the imaginary order of the specular image: 
this form situates the agency known as the ego, prior to its social determination, in 
a fictional direction that will forever remain irreducible for any single individual 
or, rather, that will only asymptotically approach the subject's becoming, no mat-
ter how successful the dialectical syntheses by which he must resolve, as I, his 
discordance with his own reality.72 
 
In a misrecognition constitutive of the subject, this “discordance” can never be overcome. 
Alienated from her or his “own reality,” this exteriorized, “fictional direction” of the ego 
can only “asymptotically approach the subject’s becoming.” But it is this loss of being or 
insufficiency which prompts the “dialectical syntheses” whereby the subject, alienated in 
the symbolic “I,” attempts repeatedly to overcome her or his insufficiency.73 Represented 
in dreams by “fortified structures,” Lacan says, it is as if the ego metaphors are “deriving 
from the subject’s very symptoms.”74 As Mladen Dolar elucidates, it is precisely the loss 
which inaugurates the subject and that allows him or her to “deal with coherent reality.” 
The threatening aspect of anxiety consists not in a loss, but in the “too-close presence of 
                                                
72 Jacques Lacan, “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the I as Revealed in Psychoanalytic 
Experience,” in Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English, trans. by Bruce Fink (New York: W.W. 
Norton & Company, 2006), pg. 76. 
73 As opposed to this alienation in the symbolic, Lacan significantly references Freud’s ethical dictum, “Wo 
Es war, soll Ich werden,” and suggests the possibility of traversing the fantasy. See Bruce Fink, The La-
canian Subject: Between Jouissance and Language (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). In it, 
Fink translates Freud’s phrase as: “where the Other pulls the strings (acting as my cause), I must come into 
being as my own cause” (xiii). See also pg. 46 – 48. Notably, this positioning is not unlike that implied by a 
stance which, as Ukai says, “affirms shame, and by so doing, resists shame.” 
74 Though he targets existentialism, in the “Mirror Stage,” Lacan might as well be writing of American ego 
psychology and the Weberian “iron cage”: “At the end of a society's historical enterprise to no longer rec-
ognize that it has any but a utilitarian function, and given the individual's anxiety faced with the concentra-
tion-camp form of the social link whose appearance seems to crown this effort, existentialism can be 
judged on the basis of the justifications it provides for the subjective impasses that do, indeed, result there-
from: a freedom that is never so authentically affirmed as when it is within the walls of a prison; a demand 
for commitment that expresses the inability of pure consciousness to overcome any situation; a voyeuristic-
sadistic idealization of sexual relationships; a personality that achieves self-realization only in suicide; and 
a consciousness of the other that can only be satisfied by Hegelian murder” (80). 
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the object,” which is to say, in the lack of the lack or the loss of insufficiency (the loss).75 
At the margins of society, where the lack lacks, social failure effectively necessitates the 
formation of counter-discourses that repulse the shaming gaze of the state, and that install 
subjects in alternate socialities. The very objects that activate overcoming – World War II 
atrocities, the world of Sanya, the “radical” (kageki) activist, the zainichi, or ‘Fukushima’ 
– call for ethnographic consideration insofar as their heterogeneity undoes the recognition 
that consigns them to death.76 
 As Lacan himself writes, however, sexual difference is constitutive of sociality.77 
Hence, whether it was in the public educational system, in Sanya, or among the Zaittokai 
and Zengakuren, the social was figured in terms that were constitutively phallocentric. As 
the pure presence and mythic origin of the nation, it is hardly surprising that the “emperor” 
(tennō) prescribed a patriarchal order that was all-too-evident in the familial image of his 
ghostly wife who is always situated behind him, and who gives no sign of life (or voice). 
Patriarchy was similarly constitutive of the masculinity which prompted men in Sanya to 
spend vast sums of money on “snackbars” (sunakku), and on frequent visits to Yoshiwara 
soaplands, where the services of Chinese or Korean prostitutes could be purchased at low 
prices. Among the Chūkakuha, whose upper echelons were occupied by men, the Sunday 
family gathering of laborers, their wives, and children, was given as an instance of gender 
inclusiveness. It was above all with the topic of “comfort women” (jūgun ianfu), however, 
that historical revisionism of World War II and the state drive to war was disclosed under 
                                                
75 Mladen Dolar, ““I Shall Be with You on Your Wedding-Night”: Lacan and the Uncanny,” in October 
(58 (1991)), pg. 13. 
76 In effect, the necessity of ethnography entails a theoretical shift from lack to that of difference. 
77 See Lacan, “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the I as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Expe-
rience,” pg. 79. Of the “dialectic that will henceforth link the I to socially elaborated situations,” Lacan says 
that “the very normalization of this maturation is henceforth dependent in man on cultural intervention, as 
is exemplified by the fact that sexual object choice is dependent upon the Oedipus complex” (79). 
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the banner of liberating ‘Asian’ women from their ‘Asian’ captors. As one more instance 
of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s observation that, “white men are saving brown women 
from brown men,” the refusal by the state to acknowledge and compensate victims of the 
systematic sexual enslavement by the Japanese Imperial Army maintains justification for 
past and future war.78 Enabled by the Japanese imperial figure, the shamelessness of the 
Japanese state feeds directly into the Zaittokai discourse which takes pleasure in nothing 
so much as exclaiming that “comfort women” (jūgun ianfu) got what they wanted.  
 As a fetish, the repetitive reference to sociality assumed both the predestination to 
failure and violence of the supplement which, as Derrida writes, “adds only to replace.”79 
It was the failure of the school ceremonies to instantiate social totality that triggered their 
repetition, just as insufficiency prompted men in Sanya to reassert the trope of the otoko. 
As such, the violence of social convention could never succeed in eliminating the stain of 
insufficiency. And insofar as the location of shame activated an overcoming, the trope of 
suicide emerged as its corollary, literalized act of negating and killing the insufficient self. 
Indeed, if the trope of suicide had once been vested with the power to shame the powers 
that be, the retreat of the state from the economy foreclosed the possibility of undoing the 
order of recognition.80 As if observing this power of state recognition, Nakashita says that 
the topic of “suicide” (jisatsu) itself has become “taboo” (tabū). 
                                                
78 See Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of the Vanishing 
Present (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), pg. 284. 
79 Jacques Derrida, “…That Dangerous Supplement…”, in Of Grammatology, trans. by Gayatri Chakra-
vorty Spivak (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1974), pg. 145. 
80 In Suicidal Narrative in Modern Japan: the Case of Osamu Dazai, Alan Wolfe observes that the trope of 
suicide in Natsume Sōseki’s 1914 Kokoro depicted the shift into an age of modern alienation in the jisatsu 
(suicide) of Sensei  – contrary to General Nogi’s 1912 seppuku (suicide) in the name of the deceased Meiji 
emperor – but that it is nonetheless haunted by a premodern violence. Although Wolfe goes on to argue for 
the “polarity” of the modern alienated suicide, jisatsu, in which “any semblance of or desire for control in 





 The writing of this dissertation itself emerged from numerous specific encounters 
in which I sought to be recognized in ways that, more often than not, were intercepted in 
ways that far exceeded my control and imagination. And much as this writing – primarily 
addressed to an anglophone academic audience, though, hopefully also beyond – marks a 
continuation of encounters inscribed daily in multiple notebooks, its moment is separated 
from ‘my’ encounters by such a gulf of time and context which make it hardly believable 
that this text is nevertheless the trace thereof. But thankfully, few of the relationships that 
gave rise to this dissertation were based on “visiting cards” (meishi) or “titles” (katagaki), 
otherwise so prevalent and necessary in Japanese society. If anything, my affiliation with 
Columbia University prompted suspicion when visiting cards were not required and when 
visiting cards were, in fact, required, it was my lack of affiliation with a Japanese institute 
that gave rise to suspicion. However, it was mainly a matter of time for the relationships I 
developed to assume the appearance of trust – at least, for myself – or, for that matter, to 
fizzle out, as they did with the Zengakuren. Of course, it must be said that I confined my 
encounters with the Zaittokai to the internet, save for occasions on which I attended their 
protests or inadvertently found myself on the opposite side of a protest, as their object. As 
such, the chapter on the Zaittokai is the least informed by direct personal experience. 
 On this note, the materials which form the basis of this dissertation were collected 
mainly between September 2011 – 6 months after the tsunami hit Northeast Japan – and 
September 2013. ‘Fieldwork’ took multifarious forms, primarily in Tokyo. 
                                                                                                                                            
ject,” it should be noted that each version of suicide is implied in the other as its negative (35, 45). On this 
note, see Masaki Kobayashi’s remobilization of suicide as revenge in the allegory of his 1962, Seppuku. 
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Time with public school teachers actively fighting against the mandatory entrance 
and graduation ceremonies began in Hiroshima, summer of 2010, where the husband of a 
disobedient teacher had been arrested for handing out flyers at the school gate, and a plea 
for support had been posted to the web. A single phone call connected me with Kurasawa 
Kenji (a teacher), and through him with Yoneyama Yoshie and the movement of teachers 
in Tokyo, and with the Zengakuren; albeit the connection between public school teachers 
and the Zengakuren/Chūkakuha is tenuous. In Tokyo, I attended court-cases related to the 
Hinomaru/Kimigayo issue, symposiums organized by teachers, and conducted around 30 
interviews with teachers and union representatives. I was at my most disingenuous when 
I interviewed union officials under the pretext of inquiring into their activities in general, 
only to press them on the Hinomaru/Kimigayo; an issue on which teachers’ unions folded, 
leaving individual teachers to fend for themselves. However, it was my acquaintance with 
Yoneyama Yoshie that opened up the political implications of the 40-second ceremony of 
standing, bowing to the Hinomaru and singing the Kimigayo. Yoneyama-san was perhaps 
the most forthright in stating that Japan’s hierarchical society of deference to superiors is 
a direct effect of the “emperor system” (tennōsei).81 Herself a public school teacher from 
the shitamachi area of Tokyo, Yoneyama-san had never once stood for the Kimigayo. She 
had been lucky to some extent, since her principal had decided to turn a blind eye to her 
act, even while administrative pressure mounted for schools to have every single teacher 
stand and sing. But when Nezu Kimiko entered the mass media spotlight and came under 
such pressure that her dismissal – on the grounds of refusing to stand and sing – was but a 
fait accompli, Yoneyama-san stepped forward and asked why Nezu was being persecuted 
                                                
81 It should be noted, however, that focus on the “emperor system” (tennōsei) displaces the crucial question 
of the “emperor” (tennō), whose postwar retention enables fascism today. The “emperor system” (tennōsei) 
thus operates as an alibi for the “emperor” (tennō). 
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when she herself had been sitting all along. In acting thus, Yoneyama-san staked and lost 
her (all but guaranteed) right to continue working as a “part-time teacher” (hijōkin kōshi) 
after retirement between the age of 60 and 65. At her final graduation ceremony before 
retirement, Yoneyama-san stayed seated; an act that was officially “witnessed” (gennin), 
and that provided justification for refusing her part-time work. Despite discouragement – 
let the matter rest, others said – Yoneyama-san took the matter to court (lost and appealed 
in the high court) and, along with others, formed an organization which supported her in 
court, and when she took to the streets with a microphone and speakers every month. The 
organization held bimonthly meetings, to which it invited speakers from a multiplicity of 
arenas, be it teachers, lawyers or activists. Talks were followed by general discussion and 
a supplementary gathering at a local izakaya, where food and alcohol were consumed. In 
addition to attending these regular gatherings – at which an array of interested individuals 
attended, including people Yoneyama-san had met when she spoke on the streets – I also 
met with Yoneyama-san regularly over coffee, where our conversations ranged from the 
Hinomaru/Kimigayo issue to neoliberalism, Fukushima, radiation, mental health at work, 
suicide, and to the emergence of “sweatshops” (burakku kigyō). 
Because my engagement with the public educational system took place primarily 
through conversations, interviews, symposiums, and court testimonies, the ethnographic 
encounter inscribed in section one draws largely on written texts and accounts related in 
personal conversations. 
 My time in Sanya began volunteering at a decades-old NPO, Sanyūkai, located in 
the heart of Sanya. While the staff was aware of my purpose in Sanya, I entered its world 
as a volunteer who helped make omusubi (riceballs) and bentō (lunchboxes) two to three 
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mornings every week, and in the afternoons, handed them out to homeless along Sumida 
river. Most of my time was spent in the kitchen area, along Sumida river, and outside the 
NPO, where mainly middle-aged men would sit on benches smoking and waiting for the 
free lunch that was given upstairs. It was thus in the narrow passageway outside the NPO 
– its disavowed margins – that I was able to overhear stories unrelated to the NPO, albeit 
altogether related to Sanya. And it was there that I encountered Akia Norio, a veteran to 
Sanya and volunteer whose health had forced him to retire from construction work and to 
go on welfare. A veritable treasure trove of lived experience and knowledge of Sanya, it 
was through Akia – who had an extraordinary ability to converse confidently with just 
about everyone in Sanya, from the local yakuza to the destitute homeless – that I was able 
to connect with the other side of Sanya, namely, that of the remaining active construction 
workers. Thus, I started drinking, gambling, and witnessing the workers when they came 
back from work. However, it was only when I began going to work with the laborers that 
I ceased to be merely (for I certainly continued to be) a novel fixture in their evening life, 
and that I realized that nobody was any longer filching drinks off me. The period of total 
immersion in their everyday life – working four days per week, waking at six (or earlier), 
coming home at six (or later), then drinking, gambling, eating, sleeping (sometimes all in 
the same room), and waking, only to work hungover – continued for at least six months. 
And afterwards, when I had to allocate time to other things, I maintained contact with the 
laborers, and periodically, went to work. 
 The ethnographic encounter inscribed in section two is grounded in the embodied, 
personal experiences I lived through in Sanya, and the relationships I made. Save for staff 
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at Sanyūkai, I never interviewed anybody in Sanya. Hence, this section is descriptive of 
what I witnessed. 
Time with the Zengakuren and Chūkakuha members began in the summer of 2010, 
when I acted as translator between the Zengakuren and activists visiting from Germany. 
That summer, I carpooled with the Zengakuren from Hiroshima to Nagasaki to protest at 
respective commemorations of the atom bombing, and when I returned to Tokyo in 2011, 
I was put in touch with the Chūkakuha organizer of student activities – the Zengakuren – 
Dafuka Chikara. Motivated at once by being able to converse with Dafuka-san regarding 
issues like “neoliberalism” (shinjiyūshugi), an openness with regard to criticizing politics 
in Japan, and the sheer wealth of information regarding labor conditions that Dafuka-san 
was able to draw on – information that did not rise to visibility in the media – I met with 
Dafuka-san on a monthly basis (if not more frequently). The themes of our conversations 
ranged anywhere from Fukushima, Occupy Wall Street, the Arab Spring, to “revolution” 
(kakumei) and the intricacies of the Chūkakuha’s 2010 “General Draft Plan” (kōryō sōan). 
In addition to these regular one-on-one meetings, I joined the Zengakuren repeatedly for 
protests in Sanrizuka, Fukushima, Tokyo and Hiroshima. And these demonstrations were 
supplemented by symposiums hosted by the Chūkakuha affiliate and railway labor union 
of Chiba Prefecture, Dōrō-Chiba, as well as periodical “gatherings” (shūkai) for “young 
laborers” (seinen rōdōsha), the anti-nuclear Chūkakuha organization, NAZEN (No Nukes 
Zenkoku Network), and the Chūkakuha itself. The stories relayed at these gatherings, and 
in speeches preceding demonstrations, constituted a veritable hotbed of abuse by the state 
and company administrations. 
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In effect, the ethnography of the Zengakuren reflects personal conversations with 
its members, attendance at its rallies, and readings of the texts they propagated.  
Wariness of persecution kept me from interviewing members of the Zaittokai and 
consequently, my materials consisted of video clippings posted to Nico Nico Douga and 
Youtube, their online writing, and secondary sources. I also attended their demonstrations, 
both in Tokyo and Hiroshima, and when I joined the Zengakuren on anti-nuclear protests 
in Hiroshima (on August 6, when the nuclear bomb was dropped), and in Fukushima and 
Tokyo, I found the Zaittokai screaming at us from across a row of riot police. As a result, 
the ethnography of the Zaittokai is primarily virtual and textually based. 
 Finally, the material I gathered on radiation and suicide cross-cut every one of the 
above-mentioned sites. School teachers contemplated suicide when social ostracism took 
them to their limit, and Akia attempted suicide during my stay in Sanya. Likewise, both 
the proximity of actual suicide and the abstracted suicide rate galvanized the Zengakuren 
and Zaittokai into action. As a mobilizable form, the obedient social totality actualized in 
the entrance and graduation ceremonies effected the “containment” (shūsoku) of radiation, 
and Sanya emerged – especially after I left – as a “reserve” labor pool for the Fukushima 
Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, since soaring radiation levels continued to deplete nuclear 
laborers in record time. Similar to suicide, the Fukushima nuclear disaster also galvanized 
the Zaittokai and Zengakuren into protests, for opposing reasons. Beyond my immediate 
encounters with radiation and suicide in the aforementioned sites, however, my meeting 
with Nakashita Daiki in 2010 enabled me to participate in bimonthly informal discussions 
with laypersons, Buddhist monks, professional undertakers, and other individuals whose 
work intersected directly with death, at the non-profit organization Teranetto Samgha. At 
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these bimonthly meetings, Buddhist monks and other professionals working with death – 
be it a professor dealing with poverty and “solitary death” (koritsushi), the head of a non-
profit organization for cancer recovery patients, or a Christian priest heading a non-profit 
for individuals afflicted with AIDS in the Shinjuku Ni-Chōme district of Tokyo – would 
commence the evening with a brief talk on a selected topic, followed by questions. After 
a break, the thirty some individuals in the audience – comprised as much of laypersons as 
of earlier/future speakers, and professionals working on death – would divide into groups 
in which a variety of topics, loosely organized around death, would be discussed. As the 
Teranetto Samgha site says, such topics included “to live” (ikiru koto), “that world” (ano 
yo), “death” (shi), and the “Buddha” (hotoke).82 Needless to say, in the wake of 3.11, the 
related topics of Northeast Japan, “radiation” (hōshanō) and “recovery” (fukkō) were also 
spoken of. And it was through Teranetto Samgha that I was able to volunteer periodically 
with KTSK (Keichō ni Torikumu Shūkyōsha no Kai), an organization of Buddhist monks 
and laypersons that visited the “disaster-stricken areas” (hisaichi) – and particularly, the 
“temporary residences” (kasetsu jūtaku) – in order to maintain social contact, and to offer 
their “listening” (keichō) services on demand.83 Though none of the personal stories that 
were related through Teranetto Samgha or KTSK are included in the chapters below, they 
inform and enable the writing. 
 Asides from the state and a certain theoretical agenda, then, it was I myself, as the 
“researcher” (kenkyūsha) – albeit more frequently the researcher who tried to dissimulate 
his status as researcher; as if being a fly-on-the-wall would disclose social worlds in their 
true distinctions – that connected the otherwise disparate worlds I write of, the final form 
                                                
82 See Teranetto Samgha, 5/8/2015. 
83 See Keichō ni Torikumu Shūkyōsha no Kai, 5/8/2015. 
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of which consists in this ethnography. However, artifice was present everywhere. ‘I’ most 
certainly misrecognized that which gave itself to be seen – to ‘my’ eyes – in a guise that 
dissimulated an ever-receding (and unfolding) social world. On this note, members of the 
Chūkakuha used fictitious names among themselves, so as to disguise their identity to the 
authorities. And the Zaittokai, too, were known to keep their personal circumstances se-
cret – name, job and domicile – even among themselves. Of course, it was foremost the 
state that deployed coercive techniques of recognition, in the rituals of which the general 
population – the “youth” (wakamono) – gave itself to appear as an obedient totality. Yet, 
as Jacques Rancière writes in The Philosopher and His Poor, such “appearance is not the 
illusion masking the reality of reality, but the supplement that divides it.”84 If it was the 
artifice of a certain appearance that was deployed and arrogated by the state, such fiction 
operated to consolidate state power, and to divide society from itself. Notably, it should 
be added that such “appearance” divides the subject from her or himself. Abstracted and 
alienated in the equivalent signifier, even the loss of suicide is recognized as an economic 
debt to the state: a failure of the subject who reaps what s/he sows. However, as Rancière 
says, obedience presuposes equality, for to be obedient the inferior “must already be the 
equal of the superior.”85 The self-entitling deployment of artifice by the state bureaucrat, 
social engineer, philosopher, sociologist, and anthropologist consists in a power which is 
always-already threatened by the objects to which artifice would assign their proper place. 
Hence, it was in the confinement that is Sanya – at the interface between the NPO 
at which I volunteered and the men outside – that the fiction separating society from itself 
was abrogated. There, on the raggedy tatami floors of the NPO, volunteers from without 
                                                
84 Jacques Rancière, The Philosopher and His Poor, pg. 224 – 225. 
85 Ibid, pg. 223. 
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Sanya would gather for snacks, juice, tea and coffee with the local men after an afternoon 
of food hand-outs. And it was during these meetings that Akia – a self-professed pū-tarō, 
floater, vagabond, or vagrant – would elicit the laughter of all and sundry, as if he were a 
professional jester in their midst. For, as the famous mobster-turned-actor, Noboru Andō, 
has observed, there is, indeed, a certain affinity between the yakuza (mobster) or yakusha 
(actor).86 Thus, as staff cashed in on the joke – occasionally slapping Akia’s head from 
behind, shouting “you’re stupid, stupid!” (omae wa baka da, baka da!); that is, until they 
found out Akia had been diagnosed with a brain tumor – Akia stayed silent. Over time, it 
would be Akia’s refusal to remain in place at the NPO that ensured his final “expulsion” 
(hamon). But it was his refusal to observe propriety in yet another sphere, namely, that of 
the construction workers, that enabled my entry upon the scene (not to mention my safety 
in it), because, in bowing his head for me – a contemptible “researcher” (kenkyūsha) – he 
actively imposed himself on others, and staked his reputation in the act.87 A demolition 
                                                
86 Andō Noboru is credited with saying of the yakuza, as if of mimicry itself: “The likes of acting is a half-
assed business, so it is the same as yakuza. Even the spelling is only different by one letter, so it is virtually 
the same” (役者なんていうものは、いい加減な商売だから、ヤクザと一緒だね。字だって１字し
か違わない、ほとんど一緒だよ). See Natalie, “Yakuza kara Yakusha e, Saishin Intāview mo Osatamete 
“Eiga Haiyū Andō Noboru” Bunkoka””, 28/5/2015. If it were not for the dominance of men in Sanya, it 
would be a most heterogeneous place. And Sanya has given rise to literary works like Ōyama Shirō’s A 
Man with No Talents (Sanya Gakeppuchi Nikki), trans. Edward Fowler (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2005)  – also translated by Fowler in his introduction as Living on the Brink in San’ya (xiii) – or to figures 
like the singer-songwriter, Okabayashi Nobuyasu, whose hit-song “Sanya Blues” (Sanya Burūzu) can still 
be heard in Sanya’s karaoke bars. Like Rancière’s descriptions in Proletarian Nights: The Workers’ Dream 
in Nineteenth Century France, trans. by John Drury (New York: Verso, 2012), not a few laborers spent 
their spare time reading, and Akia, master of proverbs and karaoke, had educated himself in jail. 
87 Himself a mobster and construction worker, Miyazaki Manabu describes the toppamono in his autobio-
graphical book of the same title, Toppamono, trans. Kotan Publishing (Tokyo: Kotan Publishing, 2005): “I 
should add that in the world of construction workers, certainly in Kansai, such men are referred to with 
admiration as toppa. The word suggests “bulldozing one’s way through,” so a toppamono is someone with 
a devil-may-care attitude who pushes ahead regardless. Kansai folk are especially fond of paternalistic 
types who act in toppa fashion … Toppa means being single-minded and bullheaded once you’ve decided 
your course of action, and as such it has both a positive and negative side. It’s negative if the person is too 
single-minded to recognize that his actions are having an adverse consequence. But it’s positive if he holds 
his own and stays the course. At any event, toppa describes a man who charges forward without actually 
knowing where he is going. Given family considerations and social conventions, it’s very hard to be toppa. 
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worker, right-wing emperorist, and professional extortionist in his past, it was in Akia 
Norio – overburdened as he was by the past – that Walter Benjamin’s description came to 
make sense: “The destructive character knows only one watchword: make room.”88 
Beginning with the “emperor” (tennō), a certain making room is surely called for 
in Japan today. But it must be one that holds open the possibility of understanding across 
difference. Maybe Akia himself put it best when he would say that “one’s own pain can-
not be understood by others” (jibun no itami wa hoka no hito ni wa wakaranai). However, 
it can be imagined, and it is for this purpose – to imagine the space of difference, without 
taking the place of – that I sought to disclose a difference of Sanya in 250 pages of “thick 
description.”89 As ethnography, the five chapters on Sanya seek to restore the qualitative 
precisely where the signifier of equivalent value had produced the most abject conditions. 
It is, in effect, to invoke the voice of the worker and the respectability of labor – as that of 
an “artisan” (shokunin); the value of which the laborer is dispossessed in exchange – that 
the chapters seek to open a space where the fetishization of equivalence forecloses it. To 
pigeonhole this difference as a pure negativity – or, as Judith Butler suggests of suicide as 
“anti-deed,” consigned to “nullity” in “universality” – would be to reallocate each to their 
                                                                                                                                            
But a small number stubbornly succeed, and while their reckless behavior is regarded with disdain, it also 
earns them a certain respect” (216 – 217). 
88 Walter Benjamin, “The Destructive Character,” in Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings, Volume 2, Part 2, 
1931 – 1934, ed. by Michael W. Jennings, Howard Eiland, and Gary Smith (Harvard: Harvard University 
Press, 2005), pg. 541. Benjamin writes: 
“It could happen to someone looking back over his life that he realized that almost all the deeper 
obligations he had endured in its course originated in people who everyone agreed had the traits of a “de-
structive character.” He would stumble on this fact one day, perhaps by chance, and the heavier the shock 
dealt to him, the better his chances of representing the destructive character. 
The destructive character knows only one watchword: make room. And only one activity: clearing 
away. His need for fresh air and open space is stronger than any hatred” (541). 
89 See Clifford Geertz’s “Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture,” in The Interpreta-
tion of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973). 
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proper place in act that establishes my own privilege.90 In place of the dyadic relation of 
the fetish, so violently manifested in the Zaittokai’s “hate speech” (hēto-supīchi), it is to 
language as a common third that this ethnography appeals. 
                                                
90 Judith Butler, “Restaging the Universal: Hegemony and the Limits of Formalism,” in Contingency, He-










     Figure 1: Nezu Kimiko sitting in front of Tachikawa Junior High  
   School, protesting her one-month suspension from work because she 














The failure by Japanese public school teachers to stand, bow to the ‘national flag’ 
(kokki), and sing the ‘national anthem’ (kokka) during the yearly entrance and graduation 
ceremonies has triggered such excessive pressure to conform from school administrations, 
PTA, parents, colleagues and students alike, that disobedient teachers have been made to 
prostrate themselves in apology before everybody concerned. In fact, in Tokyo, the story 
of public school teachers refusing to obey the top-down command to stand, bow and sing, 
began two years before this act was even inscribed as an official requirement of teachers. 
It began with the singular figure of a woman and “home economics” (kateika) teacher of 
thirty years experience in 2001 – Nezu Kimiko – who, at the height of her persecution by 
the Tokyo Metropolitan Government Board of Education, PTA and school administration, 
found her voice drowned out by a group of noisy individuals as the principal apologized 
on her behalf before an assembly of 120 parents. Her class lessons to junior high students 
on “comfort women” (jūgun ianfu), “common-sex love” (dōsei aisha), and – obviously – 
her refusal to stand, bow to the Hinomaru, and sing the Kimigayo, had led the principal to 
call a “full school emergency parent meeting” (kinkyū zenkō hogosha kai). A parent letter 
had charged the administration not to let Nezu “hurt students again” (nido to seito o kizu 
tsukenai). The principal deemed it necessary to “apologize as a school and find a solution” 
(gakkō to shite shazai shi, kaiketsu hakaranebanaranai). However, Nezu herself writes of 
this attack that: “I felt as if I was undergoing baptism as an ‘unpatriotic person.’ It felt as 
if I had timeslipped 70 years back” (‘hikokumim’ no senrei o uketeiru yōna kimochi o 
ajiwaimashita. 70 nen mae ni taimu surippu shita kanji deshita). Not only had Nezu been 
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called forth before the entire school to account for her actions, but she had been subjected 
to investigations which involved monitoring of her classroom lessons, endless paperwork, 
and punishments culminating in the attempt to fire her. While Nezu survived this attack, 
it would be only two years until the social violence manifest in her case was inscribed in 
official, bureaucratic techniques designed to create the obedience of teachers and students 
to symbols of the state. This event would achieve the total top-down overhaul of Tokyo’s 
educational system. 
It was under these conditions that, threatened with dismissal in 2005, Nezu found 
herself compromising with the school administration. Lest she be fired for sitting on this, 
her third – as rumor had it, the strikeout – transgression, Nezu promised to stand through 
half of the Kimigayo. For Nezu, this split, ambivalent act was to trigger both the memory 
and hallucinatory specter of World War II: 
On the day, “the opening words,” standing to “all rise,” “bow.” When eve-
ryone was facing the “Hinomaru” and bowing, I shifted 90 degrees, and facing the 
students, I did not bow … 
After the “bow,” “singing the anthem in unison” without sitting. The MC 
says, “after the prelude, please sing in chorus.” I was still standing. At only the 
MC’s words, my chest is beating wildly. It felt like my heart would jump out. The 
torment is unbearable. At some point, the figure was floating in my head of a se-
pia-colored, first-year soldier ordered by a senior officer to “charge.” In front of 
the first-year soldier there is tied up a Chinese prisoner of war. It was an image I 
had seen in a collection of photos or other of the Japanese army that had invaded 
China. Some of the students are staring at me. It became white in front of my eyes, 
and it felt as if I was going to fall over. It was a long long time. “I never should 
have promised to stand.” While regretting, and putting power in my legs so I 
would not fall, I waited for the lyrics “until the pebbles” to come, when I had told 




                                                
1 See Ch. 3 for the Japanese text and full account of Nezu’s persecution by the Tokyo Metropolitan Board 
of Education. Though Nezu was by no means the mythic first teacher to remain seated through the ceremo-
nies, her case received an unprecedented amount of media coverage, and arguably inaugurated the move-
ment of school teachers opposed to the Hinomaru and Kimigayo. 
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The “10.23 Directive” 
 
 On October 23rd, 2003, the Tokyo Metropolitan Government Board of Education 
(Tokyo-to Kyōiku Iinkai) issued a directive: “Regarding the Enforcement of Hoisting the 
National Flag and Singing in Unison the National Anthem at the Entrance Ceremony, the 
Graduation Ceremony, and the Like” (Nyūgakushiki, Sotsugyōshiki Nado ni Okeru Kokki 
Keiyō Oyobi Kokka Seishō no Jisshi ni Tsuite). 2  In this “10.23 Directive” (10.23 
Tsūtatsu), as the directive has since been referred to by public school teachers, the Tokyo 
Metropolitan Government Board of Education calls to mind that it has already instructed 
schools to “properly implement” (tekisei ni jisshi) entrance and graduation ceremonies, 
“in accordance with the Curriculum Guidelines” (Gakushū Shidō Yōryō ni motozuki).3 
The directive states that the Tokyo Metropolitan Government Board of Education has 
done so “in order to instill an even more proper recognition of, and to foster a respectful 
attitude towards” (issō tadashī ninshiki wo motase, sorera o sonchō suru taido o sodateru 
tame ni) the national flag and anthem in children and students. Yet, although schools 
have been instructed to hoist the flag and sing the anthem at appropriate ceremonies since 
Heisei 12 (2000), there are “numerous issues” (samazama na kadai) in the “manner of 
implementation” (jisshi taiyō) of this practice.4 On this account, the directive continues, 
                                                
2 This “10.23 Directive” (10.23 Tsūtatsu) can be found on the Tokyo Metropolitan Government Board of 
Education’s homepage. See Tōkyō-to Kyōiku Iinkai, “Nyūgakushiki, Sotsugyōshiki Nado ni Okeru Kokki 
Keiyō Oyobi Kokka Seishō no Jisshi ni Tsuite,” 2/4/2014. It is also cited in “Hinomaru, Kimigayo” Kyōsei 
Hantai Yobō Soshō o Susumeru Kai, Yobō Soshō no Kiroku (Tokyo: “Hinomaru, Kimigayo” Kyōsei Hantai 
Yobō Soshō o Susumeru Kai, 2012), pg. 65 – 66, in “Hinomaru, Kimigayo” Futō Shobun Tekkai o Mo-
tomeru Hishobunsha no Kai, Gakkō ni Jiyū to Jinken o!: Tokyō “Kimigayo” Saiban 1 Ji Soshō 1800 Nichi 
no Kiroku (Tokyo: “Hinomaru, Kimigayo” Futō Shobun Tekkai o Motomeru Hishobunsha no Kai, 2012), 
pg. 199 – 200, in Junko Kawarai’s Gakkō wa Zōkibayashi: Kyōseikyōzon no Kyōiku Jissen to “Kimigayo” 
Fukiritsu (Tokyo: Hakutakusha, 2009), pg. 141, and in Dohi Nobuo’s Sore wa, Mikkoku Kara Hajimatta: 
Kōchō vs. Tokyōto Kyōiku Iinkai (Tokyo: Nanatsumori Shokan, 2011), pg. 14 – 15. 
3 The Ministry of Education (Mombu Kagakushō) issues the “Curriculum Guidelines” (Gakushū  Shidō  
4 The Tokyo Metropolitan Government Board of Education uses the Japanese Imperial Calendar to date its 
documents. Heisei 12 corresponds to the year 2000. The Japanese verb, jisshi (implement), also translates 
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“there is the necessity of planning an even more enhanced improvement and fulfillment” 
(yori issō no kaizen, jūjitsu wo hakaru hitsuyōsei ga aru). The “10.23 Directive” thereby 
voids previous ordinances regarding the national flag and anthem. The full document 
reads: 
Regarding the Enforcement of Hoisting the National Flag and Singing in Unison 
the National Anthem at the Entrance Ceremony, the Graduation Ceremony, and 
the Like 
 
In order to instill an even more proper recognition of, and to foster a respectful at-
titude towards the national flag and national anthem in children and students, the To-
kyo Metropolitan Board of Education has hitherto instructed all schools to properly 
implement the graduation and entrance ceremonies in accordance with the Curricu-
lum Guidelines. 
Accordingly, since the graduation ceremony of Heisei 12, the hoisting of the na-
tional flag and singing in unison of the anthem has been implemented at all metro-
politan high schools and metropolitan schools for the blind, deaf, and physically and 
mentally challenged, but there are numerous issues with its manner of implementation. 
For this reason, at all schools, there is the necessity of planning an even more en-
hanced improvement and fulfillment with regard to the implementation of the hoist-
ing of the national flag and singing in unison of the anthem. 
Therefore, as below, it is directed that all schools properly implement the hoisting 
of the national flag and singing in unison of the anthem at entrance and graduation 
ceremonies … 
 
1. To properly enforce the entrance ceremony, graduation ceremony, and the like, on 
the basis of the Curriculum Guidelines. 
2. Upon implementation of the entrance ceremony, graduation ceremony, and the 
like, to carry them out according to the separate paper: “Implementation guide-
lines regarding the hoisting of the national flag and singing in unison of the na-
tional anthem at the entrance ceremony, the graduation ceremony, and the like”. 
3. To make it known to teachers that, upon implementation of hoisting the national 
flag and singing in unison the national anthem, in the case that any teacher does 
not obey the work orders of the principal based on this directive, their responsibil-
ity while engaged in service will be questioned. 
 
 
Implementation guidelines regarding the hoisting of the national flag and singing in 
unison of the national anthem at the entrance ceremony, the graduation ceremony, 
and the like 
 
                                                                                                                                            
as to “put something into effect,” “to put into force,” “to be enforced,” “to put into practice,” and simply as 
“enactment.” 
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1) Regarding hoisting the national flag 
The treatment of the national flag at entrance and graduation ceremonies shall be 
done as follows: 
(1) The national flag shall be hoisted in the center of the platform. 
(2) Hoist the national flag together with the city flag. In this case, the national flag 
shall be hoisted on the left of the center of the platform, the city flag on the 
right. 
(3) With regard to hoisting the national flag outside, it shall be hoisted in places 
like the hoisting tower, the school gate, and the entrance, where its condition 
of being hoisted can be sufficiently recognized by children, students, parents, 
and guests. 
(4) The time of hoisting the national flag shall be from the opening hour to the 
closing hour for children and students on the day of the ceremony. 
2) Singing the national anthem in unison 
The treatment of the national anthem at entrance and graduation ceremonies shall be 
done as follows: 
(1) In the ceremony program, “singing the anthem in unison” shall be stated. 
(2) When singing the national anthem, the master of ceremonies shall say “sing-
ing the anthem,” and prompt all to rise. 
(3) With regard to the ceremonial hall, teachers shall stand from their assigned 
hall seat facing the national flag, and sing the national anthem. 
(4) The national anthem shall be accompanied by piano. 
3) Regarding the hall arrangement 
The treatment of the hall arrangement at entrance and graduation ceremonies shall be 
done as follows. 
(1) In the case that the graduation ceremony is executed in the gym, a podium 
shall be placed on the platform to confer graduation certificates. 
(2) In the case that the graduation ceremony is executed in an other hall, a podium 
shall be placed in the front of the hall to confer graduation certificates. 
(3) In the ceremonial hall of the entrance and graduation ceremonies, children and 
students shall be seated facing the front. 
(4) The clothing of teachers in the entrance and graduation ceremonies shall be 
appropriate to the solemn and fresh atmosphere in which the ceremony is con-
ducted.5 
                                                














 As of spring, 2013, the Tokyo Metropolitan Government Board of Education had 
given 450 “punishments” (shobun) to teachers who disobeyed the individual “work order” 
issued in accordance with the “10.23 Directive.”6 These disciplinary measures ranged in 















	 	 入学式、卒業式等における国旗の取扱いは、次のとおりとする。 
（１）	 国旗は、式典会場の舞台壇上正面に掲揚する。 
（２）	 国旗とともに都旗を併せて掲揚する。この場合、国旗にあっては舞台壇上正面に向かっ	 	 	  
	 	 	 	 て左、都旗にあっては右に掲揚する。 
（３）	 屋外における国旗の掲揚については、掲揚塔、校門、玄関等、国旗の掲揚状況が児童・ 
	 	 	 	 生徒、保護者その他来校者が十分認知できる場所に掲揚する。 
（４）	 国旗を掲揚する時間は、式典当日の児童・生徒の始業時刻から終業時刻とする。 
２	 国歌の斉唱について 




	 	 	 	 唱する。 
（４）	 国歌斉唱は、ピアノ伴奏等により行う。 
３	 会場設営等について 




	 	 	 	 する。 
（４）	 入学式、卒業式等における教職員の服装は、厳粛かつ清新な雰囲気の中で行われる式典 
	 	 	 	 にふさわしいものとする。 
6 All principals were instructed by the Tokyo Metropolitan Government Board of Education to announce 
the contents of the directive in staff meetings at their respective schools, and to issue an individual, written 
“work order” (shokumu meirei) to each teacher attending the upcoming entrance ceremony. Moreover, 
principals were instructed to record the date and place when each individual order was given. See Dohi’s 
Sore wa, Mikkoku Kara Hajimatta: Kōchō vs. Tokyōto Kyōiku Iinkai. As cited in “Hinomaru, Kimigayo” 
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severity from “warning” (kaikoku shobun), to “salary reduction” (genkyū shobun), to one-
month, and to six-month “suspension from work” (teishoku shobun) without pay. Until a 
Supreme Court verdict of January 16, 2012, deemed it illegal for the Tokyo Metropolitan 
Government Board of Education to issue punishments that exceed the severity of “warn-
ing,” or which accumulate punitive force on every occasion of infringement, there was no 
legal framework in place to keep teachers from being fired for “not standing to attention” 
(fukiritsu). And while no teacher has been fired because they sat, Tanaka Satoshi received 
a “salary reduction” for sitting twice in 2013, despite the Supreme Court Verdict of 2012. 
Even the “warning” (kaikoku) punishment comes with financial punishments, as it delays 
                                                                                                                                            
Futō Shobun Tekkai o Motomeru Hishobunsha no Kai, pg. 201, this “written work order” (shokumu meire-
isho) reads as follows: 
 
Written Work Order (職務命令書) 
 
At the graduation certificate conferment ceremony of this school to be held on March 12, Heisei 16, the 
below is ordered on the basis of the October 23, Heisei 15, “Regarding the Enforcement of Hoisting the 
National Flag and Singing in Unison the National Anthem at the Entrance Ceremony, the Graduation Cer-
emony, and the Like,” and clause 32 of the district public servant law (the obligation to obey regulations 





1. On the day, all teachers shall come to work, follow the work division in accordance with the at-
tached sheet … and execute work properly. (当日、教職員は全員勤務し、別紙平成１６年３
月３日付‘第２５回卒業証書授与式実施要項’による役割分担に従い、職務を適正に遂
行すること。) 
2. Not to speak up or carry out obstructive actions when the ceremony is executed. (式典の実施に
際して妨害行為、発言をしないこと。) 
3. In the ceremonial hall, to stand to attention facing the national flag from the designated hall seat, 
and sing in unison the national anthem. (式典会場では、会場の指定された席で国旗に向かっ
て起立し、国歌を斉唱すること。) 
4. After singing the anthem, to follow the division of work and as necessary instruct students inside 
the ceremonial hall. (国歌斉唱後は、役割分担に従い必要に応じて式典会場内で、生徒の指
導等にあたること。) 
5. To make clothing appropriate to the solemn and fresh atmosphere in which the ceremony is con-
ducted. (服装は、厳粛かつ清新な雰囲気の中で行われる式典にふさわしいものとするこ
と。) 
6. Third year homeroom teachers shall instruct the entry and departure of graduating students from 
the hall, and call names. (第３学年担任は、卒業する生徒の入退場の指導、呼名等の任にあ
たること。) 
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the scheduled pay raise by several months; a deferral that haunts the public school teacher 
throughout their career. However, in terms of financial repercussions for disobeying the 
“10.23 Directive,” the methodical refusal of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government Board 
of Education (hereafter referred to as “Tokyōi”) to acknowledge the right to employment 
of retiring teachers to work as “part-time teachers” (hijōkin kōshi) has hit hardest. On re-
tiring at the age of 60, teachers who refused “to stand to attention” for the anthem – even 
once – lose their source of income between the age of 60 and 65, with additional, nega-
tive consequences for their pension.7 
 Public school teachers have consequently filed suit against the Tokyōi, contesting 
the constitutionality of the “10.23 Directive” and the punishments meted out in its name. 
With just over a total of 740 plaintiffs, these court-cases disclose the wounds endured in 
the educational workplace under the compulsory hoisting of the national flag and singing 
of the national anthem. 
Given the seemingly endless process of the judicial system, however, these court-
cases also channeled initial resistance to the “10.23 Directive” into a temporality of pro-
longed deferral. Plaintiffs themselves observed that by the end of this process, the “10.23 
Directive” had done its damage. With 375 plaintiffs, the Yobō Soshō o Susumeru Kai 
initiated proceedings against the Tokyōi on January 30th, 2004. It was handed a losing 
Supreme Court verdict on January 28th, 2012. In an interview in 2012, a representative of 
the Yobō Soshō o Susumeru Kai outright told me that, for the Tokyōi, the battle to en-
                                                
7 As principal Dohi Nobuo writes, teachers and principals are almost guaranteed work as “part-time teach-
ers” (hijōkin  kōshi) between the age of 60 and 65. The individuals who are denied this opportunity include 
teachers and principals who have either committed some grave wrongdoing during their career or who have 
refused to stand for the anthem during graduation and entrance ceremonies. Having himself refused to issue 
“individual work orders” (kobetsuteki shokumu meirei) for teachers to stand during the Kimigayo, and hav-
ing publicly contested the Tokyōi on a number of other regulations – see below – principal Dohi was given 
an exceedingly low evaluation which disqualified him from “part-time work” (hijōkin  kōshi). See Dohi’s 
Sore wa, Mikkoku Kara Hajimatta: Kōchō vs. Tokyōto Kyōiku Iinkai. 
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force the “10.23 Directive” had already been won. With 276 plaintiffs, the Tokyo 
“Kimigayo” Saiban launched proceedings against the Tokyōi on February 9th, 2007. It 
was handed a divided Supreme Court verdict on January 16th, 2012. By the time of the 
conclusion of these main court-cases, neither of which received public endorsement or 
financial support from teachers’ unions, the official number of teachers punished for “not 
standing to attention” (fukiritsu) during ceremonies had gone down from “193” in March 
2004, to “1” in March 2012.8 
However, it should be added that many of the public teachers I spoke with did not 
believe the Tokyōi’s statistics reflected the true number of sitting teachers. It can happen 
that a sitting teacher goes unnoticed, or that principals neglect to report sitting teachers to 
the Tokyōi. Indeed, the witnessing of a sitting teacher entails considerable hassle not only 
for the teacher her or himself, but for the principal and entire school. Yoneyama Yoshie’s 
act of sitting went unwitnessed while Nezu Kimiko, threatened with dismissal, appeared 
in the news. It was not until Yoneyama-san herself went public with the act – in solidarity 
with Nezu, she asked why Nezu was punished when she herself had been sitting without 
any repercussions – that she was officially “witnessed” (gennin) by her principal. Thus, at 
retirement age of 60, Yoneyama-san was punished for sitting through her final graduation 
ceremony. Her application to work as a “part-time teacher” (hijōkin  kōshi) between ages 
60 and 65 was consequently rejected. And after taking the matter to court and appealing a 
losing verdict in the Tokyo district court, Yoneyama-san lost once and for all in Tokyo’s 
high court. The figure behind the minimal number “1” – Tanaka Satoshi – also explained 
in interviews that, in having to declare himself directly to the Tokyōi, he had to go out of 
his way to ensure that his act of sitting was witnessed. But notwithstanding the rumors of 
                                                
8 See “Hinomaru, Kimigayo” Futō Shobun Tekkai o Motomeru Hishobunsha no Kai, pg. 320. 
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unrecorded refusals, it was recognized that a sitting teacher constituted the rare exception 
to the rule. 
Moreover, with the 1.16 “divided verdict” (bundan hanketsu), the Supreme Court 
was to split the anti-Hinomaru/Kimigayo movement itself. Although the Supreme Court 
granted the right of the Tokyōi to issue “punishments” (shobun) to teachers and to submit 
them to “Recurrence Prevention Training” (Saihatsu Bōshi Kenshū) for refusing to stand 
for the Kimigayo, it did not recognize the right of the Tokyōi to issue punishments which 
exceeded “warning” (kaikoku). As a result, the punishments of two of three teachers who 
had incurred “salary reduction punishments” (genkyū shobun) – those of Tsurukawa and 
Kawarai – were retracted. However, Nezu’s punishments were sustained on the basis that 
her conduct constituted “active obstructions” (sekkyokuteki bōgai) of the ceremonies. The 
Supreme Court found Nezu guilty on three counts: (1) for aiding students in lowering the 
Hinomaru, which the students ripped in half, (2) for wearing an anti-Hinomaru/Kimigayo 
T-shirt during her “Recurrence Prevention Training” (Saihatsu Bōshi Kenshū), and (3) for 
distributing flyers to students that compared the principal’s “instruction” (shidō) to stand 
and sing the Kimigayo with the “mind control” (maindo kontorōru) exercised by the Aum 
Shinrikyō.9 
More disturbingly, in 2012, it was said that high school graduates had no memory 
of entrance and graduation ceremonies conducted in any way other than that stipulated by 
the “10.23 Directive.” Nor had they experienced the educational system before the “10.23 
Directive” was enforced. On the ground that the “10.23 Directive” had been in effect nine 
years – meaning that, in 2012, graduating high school students would have been in third 
                                                
9 For the Supreme Court Verdict, see “Hinomaru, Kimigayo” Futō Shobun Tekkai o Motomeru Hishobun-
sha no Kai, pg. 310 – 319. The religious organization, Aum Shinrikyō, was responsible for the 1995 sarin 
gas attacks on the Tokyo subway system, in which 12 people were killed and 50 injured. 
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grade when the directive was enforced (2003) – this state of affairs was related numerous 
times, both at symposiums and in personal interviews. 
For teachers opposed to the “10.23 Directive,” the number “1” comes frightening-
ly close to realizing the self-professed goal of the Tokyōi to reduce the number of sitting 
teachers to “zero” (zero). “1” signifies near elimination. In fact, with approximately 
63,000 teachers employed by the Tokyōi, the reduction of sitting teachers to “1” virtually 
makes a fait accompli of the “10.23 Directive”. Likewise, the divided Supreme Court 
verdict of January 16th, 2012, acknowledges the legal right of the Tokyōi to punish teach-
ers for “not standing to attention” (fukiritsu), and to subject these teachers to “Recurrence 
Prevention Training” (Saihatsu Bōshi Kenshū). 
 Yet the persistent reappearance of teachers who do not stand for the national flag 
and anthem – the figure rose to “6” during the 2012 graduation ceremony – confronts the 
Tokyōi with a constitutive stain, the origins of which it cannot do enough to efface. 
While the Supreme Court verdict of January 16th, 2012, purportedly put a stop to pun-
ishments exceeding “warnings” (kaikoku), this only prompted the Tokyōi to redouble the 
frequency of “Recurrence Prevention Training” (Saihatsu Bōshi Kenshū) sessions re-
quired of teachers who refuse to stand.10 Following both the graduation and entrance cer-
emonies of 2013, the Tokyōi proceeded to violate the 2012 Supreme Court verdict by 
                                                
10 From having to attend one lecture of 100 minutes of “Recurrence Prevention Training” (Saihatsu Bōshi  
Kenshū) at the Training Center, after the Supreme Court verdict of January 16th, teachers who sat through 
both the graduation and entrance ceremonies were required to attend four 200 minute lectures at the Train-
ing Center, three sessions per month with a Tokyōi representative, and twelve sessions with their own prin-
cipal. Even in the case of teachers who only sat through one ceremony (for whom the number of sessions is 
less demanding), the intensification of the “Recurrence Prevention Training” sessions is incomparable to 
what it was previously. In 2012, Tanaka Satoshi was the only teacher to have received the complete dosage 
of training sessions. For details, see “Hinomaru, Kimigayo” Futō Shobun Tekkai o Motomeru Hishobunsha 
no Kai. 
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handing out a “salary reduction” (genkyū) punishment to Tanaka Satoshi.11 And every 
year, when the new textbooks are released, the Tokyōi recalls versions that make even the 
slightest reference – a footnote – to the fact that such a thing as the “10.23 Directive” 
once led to litigations on behalf of public school teachers.12 
But no matter how close the Tokyōi has come to wiping out even the memory of 
teachers who disobey the “10. 23 Directive,” it appears to be caught between the identifi-
cation of insufficiency – there are “numerous issues” (samazama na kadai), it says – and 
the desire for an “even more enhanced” (yori issō no kaizen) enforcement of propriety. It 
is driven by a totalizing impulse, but the specter and pain of disobedient teachers leads it 
to implement transgressive preventive measures, in the excess of which it takes no small 
modicum of enjoyment. As if the moment of its consummation can never quite be arrived 
at, the instructions of the “10.23 Directive” are implemented every year, to the letter. 
 
 In its drive to establish the unquestionable authority of state symbols through pub-
lic education, the procedures of the Tokyōi partake in the revisionist effort of the Japa-
nese state to overcome the endless legacy of the postwar defeat.13  
                                                
11 While the Supreme Court sustained punishments of Nezu Kimiko that exceeded “warnings” (kaikoku) on 
the basis that she “actively obstructed” (sekkyokuteki bōgai) ceremonies, Tanaka Satoshi says that he mere-
ly sat through the ceremonies. Notably, he was made to practice the ceremonies with the rest of the school, 
and was told by the administration that he was to treat the practice ceremonies like the real ceremonies, as 
he would be evaluated on the basis of his performance in them. Tanaka Satoshi remained seated through all 
the ceremonies. Of course, practice is not to be taken lightly. As a repetition, every instance of performance 
would actualize the totality of the national body. Be it on the actual day of graduation/entrance or not, it is 
precisely practice or repetition that enables the transposition of the ceremonies to the job market and work 
place; that is, beyond the confines of school as a space of practice. 
12 See “Texts that Say Teachers Told to Obey Axed,” in The Japan Times, 28/6/2013. 
13 Harry Harootunian writes of “Japan’s Long Postwar: The Trick of Memory and the Ruse of History,” in 
Japan After Japan: Social and Cultural Life from the Recessionary 1990s to the Present, ed. Harry 
Harootunian and Tomiko Yoda (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006): “What I mean is that remembering 
the postwar in the 1990s worked to recall not the experience of wartime Japan, which the various discours-
es inspired by the Occupation and the enshrinement of Hiroshima effectively displaced, but rather that the 
experience of a time when others, notably the Americans, prevented Japanese from actually forgetting their 
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 Teachers who oppose the “10.23 Directive” situate their actions within a series of 
postwar movements that each resisted the increasing penetration into public education by 
the bureaucratic apparatus of state. In the 1957 – ‘58 “Kinpyō Tōsō,” the Japan Teachers’ 
Union (Nihon Kyōshokuin Kumiai) opposed the requirement by the Ministry of Education 
that teachers be subjected to “Evaluation of Work Performance” (Kinmu Hyōtei) by prin-
cipals. In the 1956 – ’65 “Asahikawa Gakute Jiken,” the Ministry of Education was taken 
to court regarding the newly introduced requirement that all junior high students be given 
nationwide standardized tests. This case concluded with a divided Supreme Court verdict 
that is now referenced by the Tokyōi and plaintiff teachers alike. In the 1960s and 1970s, 
Japan witnessed massive civilian and student uprisings protesting the “Treaty of Mutual 
Cooperation and Security Between the United States and Japan” – known as the “Anpo 
Tōsō” or “Anpo Struggle” – in which the Japan Teachers’ Union took active part along-
side militantly leftist student groups, foremost of which was the Zengakuren.14 However, 
just as the nationwide membership of the Zengakuren had dwindled to some 100 students 
in 2012, the Japan Teachers’ Union fractured into two factions in 1991. By 1995, the Ja-
pan Teachers’ Union (hereafter referred to as “Nikkyōsō”) had even embarked on what 
                                                                                                                                            
continuing status as a defeated nation. Hence Japan was destined to live in the space rather than the time of 
a defeated nation, oppressed by an alien force, groaning in the shadows of an imposed colonialism that had 
thrown the country and its people outside history … In this way, the various forms of historical revisionism 
– left, centrist, and simple reactionary – share a common ground: history has to start anew, and the archive 
needs to be restocked” (101 – 2). Marilyn Ivy similarly writes in “Trauma’s Two Times: Japanese Wars 
and Postwars,” in Positions (16.1 (2008)): “What is crucial to note here is the sense of a time without 
movement toward the future, a time without contingency. Equally crucial is both the stunningly obvious yet 
critically elusive corollary of this deathly stasis of the postwar: Japan is frozen at the moment of defeat be-
cause there is no more war to come. Without the futurity of war, there is no real escape from the postwar. 
The last war, the war of total atomic defeat, stands as the origin and telos of Japanese nationality” (171). 
14 As a shortening of “Evaluation of Work Performance” (Kinmu Hyōtei), “Kinpyō” combines with “Tōsō,” 
or “Struggle,” to signify “The Struggle Over Work Evaluation.” Likewise, “Asahikawa Gakute Jiken” is a 
shortening of “Asahikawa Gakuryoku Tessuto Jiken,” or “Asahikawa Standardized Test Incident.” Finally, 
Zengakuren is a shortening of Zen Nihon Gakusei Jichikai Sō Rengō, or the All-Japan League of Student 
Self-Government. 
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activist teachers describe as a “partnership path” (pātonā rosen) with the Ministry of Ed-
ucation.15 
By 1997, when the historian, Ienaga Saburo, ended almost half a century of court 
proceedings against the Ministry of Education for its refusal to authorize his history text-
books – the Ministry stipulated that he omit references to war crimes committed by the 
Imperial Japanese Army during World War II – the site of the public school had been left 
wide open for the state machinery to take effect. Contrary to Ienaga’s claim, the Supreme 
Court deemed it constitutional that the Ministry of Education decide which textbooks can 
and cannot be taught in public schools. And though the verdict did slap the Ministry with 
misdemeanors for demanding that Ienaga remove references to war-time atrocities com-
mitted in Nanking, and by Unit 731, such minor sanctions against the Ministry of Educa-
tion have done little to deter it, or its minion, the Tokyōi, from amplifying its practices of 
historical revisionism.16 Like that of January 16th, 2012, divided Supreme Court verdicts 
provide the ground of possibility for the Ministry to violate the very legal rights that were 
supposedly granted to the plaintiffs. Hence, in 2000, the Ministry of Education caused yet 
another scandal abroad by authorizing the use in schools of a history textbook written by 
the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform (Atarashī Rekishi Kyōkasho o Tsuku-
ru Kai); the textbook whitewashed Japan’s role of aggressor in World War II. In 2007, a 
former education minister publicly lauded the accomplishment that nearly all references 
                                                
15 Numata Yuko,“Kimigayo” Fukiritsu Shobun o Tekkai Saseyō! Kyōiku no Mineika, “Danketsuken” 
Hakai to Tatakaou! Jinji Iinkai Tōsō Shiryōshū (Jinji Iinkai Shiryōshū, 2012), pg. C-11. 
16 Stationed in Manchuria, Unit 731 of the Imperial Japanese Army is known for conducting chemical and 
biological experiments on human subjects during World War II. 
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to the use of “comfort women” (jūgun ianfu) by the Imperial Japanese Army had been 
removed from junior high textbooks.17 
The repeated denials of war-time atrocities committed during and prior to World 
War II discloses a split between belief and knowledge that Octave Mannoni has described 
as a mechanism of fetishistic disavowal: “I know, but nevertheless …”.18 It is known that 
the Imperial Japanese Army committed unspeakable atrocities following its annexation of 
the Korean peninsula in 1910, leading up to, and during World War II. But nevertheless, 
it is insisted that such atrocities either constitute pure fabrications, or that it was “normal” 
(futsū) – to systematically murder an estimated 300,000 civilians in the three week period 
now known as “The Rape of Nanking” – to do such things during war. Everyone else did 
it, too.19 The logic of fetishistic disavowal would expunge war guilt. In this same manner, 
in August of every year, visits by Japanese politicians to Yasukuni shrine commemorate 
Japan’s enshrined war dead, including Class-A War Criminals, as if the question of guilt 
simply did not exist. Knowledge to the contrary is, of course, disavowed. Representatives 
of state make their yearly, ritual visits to Yasukuni shrine in an “unofficial capacity.” But 
the practice of visiting the shrine supersedes the effect of claims to the contrary – which, 
as disavowals, merely facilitate the practice – as the mass-mediated visits by high-profile 
                                                
17 Yoshida Reiji, “Sex Slave History Erased From Texts; ’93 Apology Next?”, in The Japan Times, 
11/3/2007. 
18 Quoted in Slavoj Žižek, Looking Awry: An Introduction to Jacques Lacan through Popular Culture 
(Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1992), pg. 34. 
19 For an account of this disavowal in terms of Freud’s kettle logic, see Marilyn Ivy’s “Revenge and in Re-
cessionary Japan,” in Japan After Japan: Social and Cultural Life from the Recessionary 1990s to the Pre-
sent, ed. Tomiko Yoda and Harry Harootunian (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006). Ivy writes: “(1) 
Photographs of Japanese atrocities are spurious – we didn't commit any atrocities. (2) Our atrocities are no 
worse than anyone else’s. (3) They were performed during the war, so they are not atrocities” (204). On 
this note, remarks by newly appointed NHK Chairman Momii Katsuto are exemplary. The Japan Times 
writes of Momii that: “He raised eyebrows further by asserting that “every country” had institutionalized a 
wartime brothel program similar to Japan’s massive “comfort women” system, which human rights groups, 
media outlets and others have long stripped the euphemism from, to relabel as “sexual slavery.”” See Yo-
shida Reiji, Ayako Mie, and Eric Johnston, “Momii’s Rise Tests NHK’s Reputation,” in The Japan Times, 
2/2/2014. 
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politicians spark scandals abroad like clockwork; attaining normativity through repetition 
such that the visits can no longer not be carried out.20 
  Teachers opposed to the “10.23 Directive” assert that its enforcement threatens to 
eliminate the knowledge that the national flag and anthem remain the self-same imperial 
symbols under which the Japanese state waged World War II. Unlike official references 
to the “national flag” (kokki) and “national anthem” (kokka), the symbols are commonly 
called by their proper names, the Hinomaru and the Kimigayo, which identify them as the 
unchanged, mythic symbols in the name of which the educational establishment of fascist 
Japan sentenced its youth to die in war.21 “Children” (kodomo), teachers say, do not know 
this. Under the “10.23 Directive,” the ritual act of standing for the Hinomaru and singing 
the Kimigayo assumes a force of disavowal that would remove the stain of war guilt from 
the two symbols of state. However, as a practice that partakes of the impulse to overcome 
the constitutive origins of the Japanese postwar order, the force of disavowal inscribed in 
the “10.23 Directive” exceeds the eradication of memory. Teachers recognize a repetition 
of war-time practices in the “10.23 Directive,” which raises the specter of future war, and 
discloses the mechanism of disavowal to consist in a violence that consigns difference to 
expulsion from the social order. 
The “10.23 Directive” extends into ancillary bureaucratic procedures that enforce 
conformity in teachers and students. Every teacher knows that if a student is witnessed 
sitting through the ceremonies, her or his “homeroom teacher” (tannin) is investigated 
                                                
20 Yasukuni Shrine was founded by emperor Meiji to memorialize the modern nation’s war dead. The cur-
rent source of the shrine’s controversy consists in the fact that it enshrines more than 1,000 war criminals 
and 14 Class-A war criminals of World War II. 
21 As symbols of fascist Japan, the enforcement of the Hinomaru and Kimigayo run directly counter to the 
long-time slogan and emblem of the Nikkyōsō’s anti-war stance: “Never Again to Send Students to the 
Battlefield” (Oshiego o Nido to Senjō ni Okuranai). 
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and may receive an evaluation that deems them “lacking in teaching ability” (Shidōryoku 
busoku). It is therefore in the interest of homeroom teachers that their students stand and 
sing the Kimigayo with a “loud voice” (ōki koe). Of course, if a teacher does not stand, 
s/he receives a “punishment” (shobun), and is thereafter subjected to weekly “Recurrence 
Prevention Training” (Saihatsu Bōshi Kenshū) sessions both with the principal, and at the 
Tokyo Metropolitan School Personnel in Service Training Center. As if these measures 
are insufficient, however – and depending on the specific circumstances of the school in 
question – social pressure may be applied to ensure that the teacher offer a public “apolo-
gy” (shazai) to account for his or her actions to parents and staff members. In such a case, 
the principal will ask, often repeatedly, and citing injury to parents and staff stemming 
from the teachers’ actions, that s/he provide the occasion for such an “apology.” As sev-
eral teachers described it in interviews, the pressure to give an “apology” can be grueling 
if the other staff members are not understanding of the teacher. In one such incident, the 
local news took it upon itself to report that a teacher had remained seated throughout the 
graduation ceremony at a certain school. In subsequent days, this school was encircled by 
black and white right-wing trucks, blaring nationalist songs and screaming abuse through 
loudspeakers. After this commotion, the teacher was successfully made to apologize to 
parents. On top of this, s/he was ordered back into the ceremonial hall for the upcoming 
entrance ceremony, where s/he was made to stand for all to see. 
The all but pervasive and immediate pressure to conform in the above and similar 
incidents – from the principal, colleagues, parents, students, and the local neighborhood, 
burdened by the blare of militant right-wing trucks – attests to the presence of normative 
forces extending beyond the apparatus of state and into the everyday. To be sure, the last 
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decade has witnessed the birth of extremist right-wing groups like the Zainichi Tokken o 
Yurusanai Shimin no Kai or “Citizens Against Special Privileges for Zainichi” (hereafter 
referred to as “Zaittokai”) notorious for its “hate speech” (hēto supīchi), and forming part 
of a more nebulous, on-line entity referred to as the “internet right-wing” (netto uyoku).22 
Zaittokai members are said to sneak into graduation and entrance ceremonies, where they 
identify sitting staff members. Later, they post the names of these teachers to the internet; 
and indeed, the internet has emerged as a favorite place to bash school teachers and other 
so-called “leftists” (sayoku) who oppose the national interest. Of course, it should be said 
that the very mayors responsible for enforcing the Hinomaru and Kimigayo in the public 
schools of Tokyo and Osaka, Ishihara Shintaro and Hashimoto Toru, were voted in office 
for consecutive terms. Likewise, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) administration of 
Prime Minister Abe Shinzo is enjoying popular support for its policy of monetary easing, 
even as it embarks on measures to enable constitutional reform. The proposed reforms are 
widely regarded as aiming to revise Article 9 of the postwar Constitution, in which Japan 
forever renounces the right to conduct war. Yet, as if war itself is necessary to overcome 
the endless “postwar” (sengo), the crux of these reforms resides in the pairing of war with 
the obligation by citizens to “respect” (sonchō) symbols of state.23 In what would amount 
to an unequivocal penetration of state power into everyday life, the LDP’s current “draft” 
(sōan) of the revised constitution includes a clause stipulating that: “The Japanese people 
must respect the national flag and anthem” (Nihon kokumin wa, kokki oyobi kokka o 
                                                
22 See Ch. 10. 
23 See Harry Harootunian’s “Japan’s Long Postwar: The Trick of Memory and the Ruse of History,” J. Vic-
tor Koschmann’s “National Subjectivity and the Uses of Atonement in the Age of Recession,” in South 
Atlantic Quarterly (99 (2000)), Yoshikuni Igarashi’s Bodies of Memory: Narratives of War in Postwar 
Japanese Culture, 1945 – 1970 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000) and “The Unfinished Busi-
ness of Mourning: Maruyama Masao and Postwar Japan’s Struggle with the Wartime Past” in Positions (10 
(2002)), and Katō Norihiro’s Haisengoron (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1997). 
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sonchō  shinakereba naranai).24 Although the “10.23 Directive” has already enforced this 
obligation on teachers and – in all but writing – on children, former Chief of Police and 
Minister of the Lower House, Hirasawa Katsue, nevertheless finds it necessary to endorse 
the new clause:  
What is wrong with being proud of the tradition and culture of one’s own country, 
of the family one was born into, and teaching this. It is also obvious to respect the 
national flag and national anthem. Even abroad, there are countries where you are 
punished if you do not stand when singing the national anthem. If there are people 
who say they cannot respect it, then this must be specified in the constitution.25 
 
Clarifying that nothing is “wrong” (okashī ) with taking pride in the national flag and an-
them – on the contrary, showing “respect” (sonchō ) is so “obvious” (atarimae) that peo-
ple should obviously be punished for neglecting to do so – Hirasawa’s reference to “cul-
ture” (bunka) and “tradition” (dentō ) places his statement squarely within fascist dis-
course.26 Flipping from one extreme to the other – nothing is wrong with being proud of 
tradition and culture: those who do not demonstrate pride are wrong – Hirasawa expels 
bad faith from within the “family” (kazoku), and projects guilt thereof onto others. It is 
telling that, from his very first words, Hirasawa interprets the act of not standing for the 
anthem as an accusation; as if he himself concedes that something might, indeed, be 
wrong with “being proud of the tradition and culture of one’s own country.” In this fash-
ion, Hirasawa elides reference to the familial figure of the mythic, Japanese “emperor” 
(tennō), without which his statement does not attain to sense. Only the unspoken, but im-
                                                
24 This is clause three of the LDP’s “draft” (sōan). See Jiyū Minshutō, Nihon Kenpō Kaisei Sōan (Kenpō 
Kaisei Suishin Honbu, 2011). 




26 Hirasawa’s statement requires the totalizing function of what Slavoj Žižek has described as The Sublime 
Object of Ideology (New York: Verso, 1989), pg. 87, and which Jacques Lacan calls the “point de capiton” 
(“The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian Unconscious,” 681). See my 
discussion of Ernst Bloch in Ch. 2. 
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plicit reference to the “emperor” (tennō) ties the terms of Hirasawa’s statement together, 
enabling “family” (kazoku) to emerge as the imperial family unit: the timeless bearer and 
embodiment of an essential Japanese “culture” (bunka) and “tradition” (dentō).27 
 However, the opening line of the LDP’s revised constitution makes the reference 
clear. It cites the Japanese nation as possessing a “long and unique culture” (nagai rekishi 
to koyū no bunka), “bestowed with the emperor as a symbol of the unity of the national 
people” (kokumin tōgō no shōcho de aru tennō o itadaku).28 
 
 In his 1959 essay, “The Meaning of Working Through the Past,” Theodor Adorno 
attributes the persistence of fascism in post-war Germany to certain economic, “objective 
conditions” that constitute the ground of possibility for fascism. By locating a “possibility 
for totalitarianism” in the unforgiving conditions of capitalism to which the subject must 
submit, Adorno warns not of fascism “against democracy,” but from “within democracy.” 
Submission to the labor market, Adorno says, requires the negation of “autonomous sub-
jectivity.” An inexorable “adaptation” to the market, this negation predisposes subjects to 
“renounce their self” in an identification with the status quo of “power as such,” and 
hence, to reject democracy as unable to deliver subjects from the sacrifices demanded by 
the economy.29  
In Japan as elsewhere, neoliberalism has increasingly handed the subject of labor 
back into the bare hands of the market, a shift to which the educational sector has been no 
exception. Ever since Japan’s bubble economy burst in 1989, the two “lost decades” have 
witnessed a retreat of the state from market mechanisms, and a shift of responsibility for 
                                                
27 See the Introduction for references to the “family-state” (kazoku-kokka). 
28 Jiyū Minshutō, Nihon Kenpō Kaisei Sōan. 
29 Theodor W. Adorno, “The Meaning of Working Through the Past,” pg. 90, 98 – 99. 
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overcoming the endless recession onto the general population and more specifically, onto 
the Japanese youth. Andrea G. Arai observes that, since the late 1990s, global economic 
pressures have led the Japanese state to relinquish “top-down management” in the educa-
tional sector. She is careful to point out, however, that this transfer of responsibility onto 
the “individual and individual community” has not included a transfer of the “means of 
power.” In fact, “top-down management” has increased ten-fold.  Rather, there has been a 
reduction in the fiscal burden of education, accompanied by a rhetoric that displaces ac-
countability for academic failure away from the state.30 Short of altogether privatizing the 
educational system, public schools in contemporary Japan are forced to compete for their 
existence – those with the worst performances are shut down – the burden for which rides 
directly on the results by students on standardized tests.31 Moreover, in a crucial differ-
ence from the emancipatory rhetoric that has accompanied neoliberalism in other places, 
Arai observes that, in Japan, this rhetoric has assumed the form of “identifying a lack in 
the individual (as in youth generally).” The failure to perform in a system that systemati-
cally generates failure is, in effect, regarded as a shortcoming of the individual him or 
herself. But while the onus of survival resides with the individual, the fact of failure fur-
nishes the state with an excuse for intervention. Formulated as an incompetency or insuf-
ficient set of skills to compete globally, the identification of “lack” serves as a pretext for 
the implementation of biopolitical forms of knowledge that would resolve lack by restor-
ing a “strength to live” (ikiru chikara).32 The very symptoms of failing neoliberal reforms 
                                                
30 Andrea Arai, “Killing Kids,” pg. 372. 
31 The excessive focus on standardized tests was frequently compared by teachers who had visited the U.S. 
and spoken with members of the UTLA (United Teachers Los Angeles) to the No Child Left Behind Act of 
2001, enforced under the Bush administration. 
32 Andrea Arai, “Killing Kids,” pg. 372. Among other things, this discourse announces that Japan has one 
of the lowest birth rates in the world, that so-called “herbivore men” (saishokukei dansei) – who do not like 
sex – are growing prevalent, and that the suicide rate tops 30,000 per year with an alarming increase in the 
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have thereby emerged as grounds for their intensification. It is no coincidence that the 
introduction of neoliberal reforms in the early 2000s was accompanied by mass-mediated 
focus on “school refusal (tōkōkyohi), bullying (ijime), inner-school violence (kōnai bōry-
oku),” “collapsing classrooms (gakkyū hōkai), failing homes (katei hōkai), and strange 
kids (hen na kodomo).33 More recently, in 2012, incidents of “corporal punishment” (tai-
batsu) by teachers in public schools – in one case, leading to the suicide of a minor – 
have prompted the Ministry of Education to tighten its administrative stranglehold on lo-
cal schools.34 Needless to say, the failure by students and teachers to stand for the anthem 
has likewise functioned as an attestation, in the register of teaching “ethics” (dōtoku), that 
the youth is lacking in knowledge of “common-sense” (jōshiki) – proper conduct – and in 
“manners” (manā).35 Of course, teachers punished for sitting are quick to point out that 
the penalty incurred for inflicting “corporal punishment” (taibatsu), on the rare occasion 
when it rises to visibility, is less severe than the one received for sitting through the cer-
emonies. 
Neonationalism in Japan has thus long sustained a complicitous relationship with 
neoliberal advocates of globalization and deregulation. Tomiko Yoda observes that, since 
                                                                                                                                            
youth among whom “bullying” (ijime) has also emerged as a social issue. Under the imperative of neoliber-
al “self-responsibility” (jikosekinin), the discursive formation of lack thus introjects the limits of the endless 
economic crisis onto an imagined youth. The question, then, is how the subject of the contemporary order 
comes to embrace the values expounded by this discourse, despite the fact that the discourse flagrantly 
places the burden of working to overcome the crisis on a youth that never had anything to do with it in the 
first place. See the Introduction and Conclusion. 
33 Andrea Arai, “Killing Kids,” pg. 370 – 372. 
34 In 2013, the Ministry of Education conducted a nationwide “Investigation to Grasp the Conditions Relat-
ing to Corporal Punishment” (Taibatsu ni Kakaru Jittai Haaku Chosa). See Mombukagakushō, “Taibatsu 
ni Kakaru Jittai Haaku no Kekka (Dai 1 Ji Hōkoku) ni Tsuite,” 2/4/2014. 
35 The graduation and entrance ceremonies are themselves enforced under the pretext of instilling “com-
mon-sense” or a sense of “propriety” (jōshiki) in students, and teachers or students who fail to stand for the 
Kimigayo are charged with being unable to observe “manners” (manā). Indeed, the dictionary definition of 
“propriety” (jōshiki) slips into “common-sense” (jōshiki), so that propriety is that which is obvious. Hence, 
proponents of the ceremonies would say that it was “normal” (futsū) – obviously proper – to stand and sing. 
See Ch. 2 and discussion of Yoda below. 
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the late 1980s, when the endless economic crisis first precipitated a “crisis of the national,” 
the “apparatuses by which the appearance of sociocultural integrity had been maintained” 
has been in a “process of decline.” But Yoda also notes a certain backlash to this decline, 
as if the economic crisis required a reactionary formation to cover up the “disruptive ef-
fects of the Japanese capitalist regime.” As one such formation, she says, “youth-bashing” 
by conservatives has “translated less into a campaign to reform them … than into an en-
couragement of public opinion that holds them responsible for their economic and social 
displacement.”36 The endless economic recession may have impaired the appearance of, 
and apparati that had maintained sociocultural integrity. But the fractured image of Japan 
Inc has likewise precipitated novel techniques that violently suture the national body back 
together with its head.37 When a high school principal in Hiroshima prefecture committed 
suicide in 1999, ostensibly because he had been unable to prevail over teachers to stand 
for the anthem – such, at least, was the extent of the media coverage given to the event –
the matter was taken out of local hands. Lest there remain any question regarding the le-
gitimacy of the anthem and flag, which, it was said, should not rest on the shoulders of a 
principal to enforce, the 1999 “Act on National Flag and Anthem” (Kokki Oyobi Kokka ni 
Kansuru Hōritsu) legally established the Hinomaru and Kimigayo as the flag and anthem 
                                                
36 Tomiko Yoda, “A Roadmap to Millennial Japan,” pg. 35, 42 – 43. In this respect, “youth-bashing” is 
coupled with the biopolitical project of instilling a “strength to live” (ikiru chikara) in the nation’s youth. 
When Michel Foucault developed the concept of “biopower,” it was with reference to the rising need in the 
late 18th century to regulate the life of the general population in the interest of capital accumulation. That a 
biopolitical response to the endless crisis has arrived with neonationalism is therefore no surprise. But it 
must be stated that, for Foucault, the biopolitical does not merely “intervene” in a population “at the level 
of their generality” to “regularize” the “biological processes of man-as-species” (Michel Foucault, Society 
Must Be Defended, pg. 246 – 7). The biopolitical is fundamentally tied to racism as enabling a “caesura” 
that justifies killing: “The fact that the other dies does not mean simply that I live in the sense that his death 
guarantees my safety: the death of the other, the death of the bad race, of the inferior race (or the degener-
ate, or the abnormal) is something that will make life in general healthier: healthier and purer” (Ibid, 255). 
Foucault writes: “At the end of the nineteenth century, we have then a new racism modeled on war” (Ibid, 
258). 
37 See Marilyn Ivy’s “Revenge and Recapitation in Recessionary Japan” for an incisive reading of Hayao 
Miyazaki’s Princess Mononoke in this respect. 
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of the nation.38 Moreover, only a few months after the suicide, the Ministry of Education 
issued an order for Hiroshima Prefecture to realign its educational practices with official 
guidelines. This “Instruction to Rectify” (zeseishidō ) was to function in Hiroshima as the 
“10.23 Directive” later did in Tokyo.39 The enforcement of social normativity in schools 
was to reproduce the violence of an economic system which, as Yoda writes, “can openly 
round up and expel its lowest performers.”40 
The question of fascism, therefore, is no longer that of identifying its “possibility” 
in the workings of capitalism. As instantiated by the “10.23 Directive,” “self-preservation” 
demands that subjects give at least the appearance of closing the gap “between individual 
action and the social norm” – of eliminating thought by acceding to the social mechanism 
– upon pain of expulsion.41 
 School teachers in Tokyo described in interviews how, after the “10.23 Directive,” 
schools were overhauled into a top-down, “pyramid” (piramiddo) hierarchy in which 
teachers and students alike were deprived of all say.42 At the time, the Ministry of Educa-
                                                
38 See “Hinomaru,” “Kimigayo” Kyōsei o Kangaeru Shimin Shūkai, “Sera Kōkō, Ishikawa Kōchō Sensei 
Jisatsu” Hōkoku Shūkai (Hiroshima: “Hinomaru,” “Kimigayo” Kyōsei o Kangaeru Shimin Shūkai, 1999).  
39 Teachers explain that the enforcement of the Hinomaru and Kimigayo has been harshest in those parts of 
the country that were most adversely affected by World War II, regions which consequently exhibited most 
opposition to the gradual encroachment of the state into the educational system. It was thus pointed out that 
the rate of “mental illness” (seishin shikkan) in public teachers is highest in Okinawa (1.14%), followed by 
Osaka City (1.09%), Tokyo (0.90%), and Hiroshima (0.86%). See Numata Yuko, “Kimigayo” Fukiritsu 
Shobun o Tekkai Saseyō! Kyōiku no Mineika, “Danketsuken” Hakai to Tatakaou! Jinji Iinkai Tōsō 
Shiryōshū, pg. D-8. See also “Hinomaru, Kimigayo” Kyōsei Hantai Yobō Soshō o Susumeru Kai, Kyōsei 
de, Utagoe wa Agaranai: “Hinomaru, Kimigayo” Kyōsei Hantai Yobō Soshō Dai Isshin Saiban Kiroku 
(Tokyo: Meiseki Shoten, 2007), pg. 52. 
40 Tomiko Yoda, “A Roadmap to Millennial Japan,” pg. 42 – 43. 
41 Adorno & Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, pg. 23. In their “final legal brief” (saishū jumbi 
shomen), the Yobō Soshō o Susumeru Kai writes: “The forcing of standing and singing the Kimigayo is to 
demand that teachers conduct themselves as robots, to deny the indispensably needed human subjectivity of 
teachers, and it is to destroy the essence of education” (君が代を起立、斉唱するよう強制することは、
教師がロボットのように振る舞うことを求めるものであり、教師に不可欠に要求される人間的主
体性を否定し、教育の本質を破壊するものである) (“Hinomaru, Kimigayo” Kyōsei Hantai Yobō 
Soshō o Susumeru Kai, “Kyōsei,” 464). 
42 Yamaguchi Toshinori testifies as follows: “Currently, the 10.23 Directive is having all sorts of effects on 
the total, everyday educational activities of the teacher. Among them the biggest is that the staff meeting 
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tion was already screening textbooks, and furthemore, requiring that teachers submit re-
ports detailing the content of their lessons, to be approved in advance. In 2004, the “10.23 
Directive” was reinforced by prohibitions – of course, on pain of punishment – against 
teachers or principals explaining to students and ceremonial guests that, although the 
Kimigayo would be sung and the cue to “all rise” (kiritsu) would be given, one should 
feel at liberty to remain seated.43 These explanations, alongside the one pointing out that 
Article #19 of the Constitution protects the “freedom of thought and conscience” (Shisō 
oyobi ryōshin no jiyū), and that students should feel free to act accordingly, were deemed 
                                                                                                                                            
has significantly changed.” (現在、１０.２３通達は、卒入学式に際して教師の教育活動全体にたい
して、さまざまな影響を及ぼしています。なかでも最も大きいのは職員会議が大きく変わってし
まったことです。) Yamaguchi describes these staff meetings as “staff meetings in which nothing can be 
said” (もの言えぬ職員会議). (“Hinomaru, Kimigayo” Futō Shobun Tekkai o Motomeru Hishobunsha no 
Kai, 156) 
43 “Hinomaru, Kimigayo” Kyōsei  Hantai Yobō  Soshō  o Susumeru Kai, “Kyōsei ,” pg. 38 – 40. Distribut-
ed under the name of the principal on the day of the ceremony, one pamphlet describing the rights of stu-
dents and parents to remain seated, and to refrain from singing, reads as follows: 
 
Congratulations on today’s graduation ceremony. We wish you heartfelt felicitations. (本日の卒業式、
誠におめでとうございます。心よりお祝いを申し上げます。) 
Now, in accordance with a directive from the head of the Tokyo Metropolitan Board of Education, at 
this school it has been decided from before to hoist the flag and to sing the anthem at ceremonial events. 





1) At the graduation ceremony, the freedom to sing, or not to sing, is guaranteed. Please judge by 
each yourselves, which you will decide. (卒業式は、歌うこと、歌わないことの自由が保障さ
れています。どちらにするかは、おひとりおひとりが判断してお決め下さい。) 
2) At the graduation ceremony, the freedom to sit, or to leave your seat, is guaranteed. Please judge 
by each yourselves, which you will decide. (卒業式は、着席や退席の自由が保障されていま
す。どちらにするかは、おひとりおひとりが判断してお決め下さい。) 
3) The prompt to sing the anthem will be given by the assistant principal. (国歌斉唱の発声は、教
頭が行います。) 
 
We ask for your cooperation with the progression of the ceremony, so that it can be solemn, moving, 
and heart-warming for the main actors, the graduating students. (なお、卒業式は、主役の卒業生にとっ
て、厳粛の上にも感動的で心温まるものとなりますよう、式の運営にご協力をよろしくお願いい
たします。) (“Hinomaru, Kimigayo” Kyōsei  Hantai Yobō  Soshō  o Susumeru Kai, “Kyōsei,” 38) 
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“inappropriate instructions” (futekisetsu na shidō ).44 On April 13th, 2006, the Tokyōi re-
leased a notice “Prohibiting that the views of teachers be ascertained by vote or raising 
hands at staff meetings in city public schools” (Toritsu gakkō no shokuin kaigi ni oite 
shokuin no ikō o kakunin suru kyoshu, saiketsu no kinshi). At the time, one school princi-
pal objected that the contents of this “notice” (tsūchi) were redundant because the author-
ity to make final decisions had been vested in the figure of the principal since 1998.45 
Principal Dohi Nobuo thus argued that the notice achieved nothing less than to render the 
opinions of teachers superfluous. As a principal, he said, the notice alienated him from 
his teachers by proscribing that the principal even ask their opinions. In 2006, the “work 
evaluation” (gyōseki hyōka) system was revamped from a five-tier evaluation system (S, 
A, B, C, D), based on the “absolute evaluation” (zettai hyōka) of the principal, into a 
four-tier evaluation (A, B, C, D) system which clearly split evaluations into “good” (A, 
B) and “bad” (C, D). The new system required the principal to submit a “relative evalua-
tion” (sōtai hyōka), in which – contrary to the “absolute evalution” (zettai hyōka) of 
teachers solely according to their performance – at least 20% of teachers were to be 
ranked with a “C” or “D.”46 These evaluations constitute the basis on which teachers to-
                                                
44 Teachers receive “severe warning” (genjū chūi) for making such explanations. Enforced on March 11, 
2004, the “notice” (tsūchi) prohibiting such explanations states that principals shall instruct their teachers:  
 
1) Not to encourage students to not stand with improper instructions in homeroom activities, or at en-
trance and graduation ceremony rehearsals, or such. (ホームルーム活動や入学式、卒業式の予
行等において、生徒に不起立を促すなどの不適切な指導を行わないこと。) 
2) Not to encourage students to not stand with improper instructions at student committees, the exec-
utive graduation committee, or such. (生徒会や卒業式実行委員会等の場で、生徒の不起立を
促すのどの不適切な指導をおこなわないこと。) 
3) Not to involve students in actions that might obstruct the ceremonies. (式典の妨げになるような
行動に生徒を巻き込まないこと。) (“Hinomaru, Kimigayo” Kyōsei Hantai Yobō  Soshō o Su-
sumeru Kai, “Kiroku,” 67). 
45 Dohi Nobuo, Sore wa, Mikkoku Kara Hajimatta: Kōchō vs. Tokyōto Kyōiku Iinkai, pg. 32 – 33. Marx 
writes: “There arises the voice of the worker” (Marx, Capital, 342). 
46 Dohi Nobuo, Sore wa, Mikkoku Kara Hajimatta: Kōchō vs. Tokyōto Kyōiku Iinkai, pg. 50. 
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day are promoted, demoted, or as the system mandates, fired. Unlike the old days when 
there was one principal and a bunch of equal teachers, the workplace of the school today 
is hierarchized into a structure of seven or eight ranks that determine salary and retire-
ment benefits.47 Unless their work evaluations put them up for promotion, public teachers 
may receive the same entry-level salary for their entire career. Naturally, teachers cite 
instances in which the evaluation system has ben abused, and in some cases, challenged 
and taken to court. Teachers who have encountered such abuse say that it occurs because 
evaluations are written solely by the principal, and because teachers are evaluated on the 
basis of how well they follow instructions; that is, of whether or not they are “obedient” 
(jūjun).48 
 Rather than meet with overarching resistance from principals and teachers – albeit 
with notable, isolated and singular exceptions – the penetration of the state administrative 
apparatus into schools has coincided with a jump in suicide and depression rates of public 
teachers.49 For reasons of “mental illness” (seishin shikkan), the incidence of “sick leave” 
                                                
47 Depending on the school, staff can include as many ranks as: “principal” (kōchō ), “sub-principal” (fuku-
kōchō), “assistant principal” (kyōtō), “senior teacher” (shukan kyōyu), “teaching advisor” (shidō kyōyu), 
“teacher” (kyōyu), “assistant teacher” (jo kyōyu), and “instructor” (kōshi). Notably, such ranking systems do 
not differ significantly in Japanese public universities. 
48 Teachers said on numerous occasions that some principals consider every instruction they give to be an 
effective “work order” (shokumu meirei). Of course, not only teachers, but principals recount that they have 
received inexplicably low evaluations for reasons seemingly unrelated to the actual content of their work 
performance. It should be added that many teachers, especially young teachers, find it exceedingly difficult 
to ask the principal the reasons why they were given a low evaluation, though the right to see the details of 
the evaluation submitted to the Tokyōi is supposedly reserved for the teacher. One method of requesting to 
see these details, while avoiding a one-on-one confrontation with the principal, was for teachers to visit the 
principal’s office as a group. See Dohi for the instance of a principal who received a low evaluation, con-
tested and sustained in court. See “Misaki no Kai,” Gyōseki Hyōka Saiban o Shien Suru Kai, 2/4/2014, for 
the instance of a teacher who received a low evaluation, contested and overturned in court. 
49 Shirai writes of “The silent breakdown of education in Tokyo” (東京の教育の静な崩壊): 
“What happens to the educational site if the discipline of the institution is excessively emphasized, 
and the orders of superiors exercises an extreme fierceness. The facts tell this. (組織の規律が過度に強調
され、上司の命令が猛威をふるってまかりとおれば、教育現場はどうなってしまうのか。それは
事実が物語っている。) 
For instance, the leave of absence from work of teachers increased drastically. In particular, the 
leave of absence for reasons of psychological illness are overwhelmingly high. In 2005, the number of sick 
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(byōki kyūshoku) increased by five times over twenty years, from 1,017 in 1990, to 5,407 
cases in 2010. Similarly, the number of suicides by public school teachers rose from 83 in 
2004, to 146 cases in 2010. Much as the Ministry of Education refuses to recognize these 
suicides as having had work-related causes – if families of the deceased decide to pursue 
the case, suicides are written off as having occurred on account of personal “weakness” 
(yowasa), constituting a matter of “self-responsibility” (jikosekinin) although – in 2011, 
76% of suicides by public teachers were recognized to stem from either “health problems” 
(kenkō mondai) or “work-related” (kinmu kankei) causes in the official police report. No 
less than 68% of these “health problems” were concluded to be “depression” (utsubyō).50  
 In spite of these statistics, the entrance and graduation ceremonies instantiate the 
fantasy of a perfectly greased bureaucratic machine. As condensations of the hierarchical 
structure of the school workplace, the yearly ceremonies are at once models “of” and “for” 
the workplace, and by extension, for Japanese society in general. Yet, the normative force 
of the model “for” – as Clifford Geertz has formulated it – consists in the transposition of 
a model “of,” which in turn must dissimulate its normative force by representing society 
                                                                                                                                            
leaves of teachers in Tokyo was 547 people. Within them, the number of leave of absence for reasons of 
psychological illness was 334. Before the 10.23 Directive, sick leave of absence did not reach 300, and 





For instance, the number of people leaving work before retirement are increasing. (たとえば、定
年前退職者が増えている。) 
For instance, work infractions like sexual offenses and corporal punishment are occurring fre-
quently. (たとえば、わいせつ、体罰などの服務事故が多発している。)” (“Hinomaru, Kimigayo” 
Kyōsei  Hantai Yobō  Soshō  o Susumeru Kai, “Kyōsei,” 16). 
50 See the “Introduction” (Hajime ni) to the online report by Hayama Ken’ichi, “Kyōin no Utsubyō Jisatsu 
to Kōmu Saigai Nintei,” 2/4/2014. As Hayama observes in this introduction, the rising incidence of sui-
cides among teachers during these years is in marked contrast to the relatively stable suicide rate in the 
general population. He similarly notes that while suicide in the general population stemmed from a multi-
plicity of causes – be it family problems or economic problems – the predominant cause of suicide among 
teachers was regarded to be work or health-related. 
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as it is.51 In the case of the ceremonies, this cleft that internally divides the model of from 
the model for – and across which the normative force of the model emerges – is amplified 
by a temporality of future anteriority since the ceremonies concern children. One teacher 
says: “It is clear that the true target of compulsory standing to attention and singing is the 
students” (Kiritsu seishō kyōsei no shin no tāgetto ga seito tachi de aru koto wa akiraka 
de aru).52 The ceremonies would instantiate social order as it is, but they are caught in an 
enactment, constitutively divided from itself, of what will have been the unitary image of 
the national body. 
 As a protective measure against the disaggregation of this image, the “individual 
work order” (kobetsuteki shokumu meirei) given under the “10.23 Directive” takes on the 
force and value of a fetish. The paper containing the “individual work order” is delivered 
in person by the principal to every teacher attending the upcoming ceremony, along with 
a seating assignment. Frequently, the principal is accompanied in this task by an assistant 
principal who records the time and place of delivery as proof that the teacher received the 
document. Likewise, the ceremonial hall is meticulously prepared to adhere to the “10.23 
Directive.” By ensuring that every teacher stands during the ceremonies, the “individual 
work order” would ensure the normative force of the ceremonies for students who would 
                                                
51 Clifford Geertz, “Religion as a Cultural System,” in The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic 
Books, 1973), pg. 93 – 94. But following Althusser and Pascal before him, the source of this normative 
force does not reside – as Geertz insists – in the axiom that “he who would know must first believe” (110). 
Belief, rather, follows from the performative act. Geertz himself (momentarily) concedes this by writing: 
“it is in ritual … that this conviction that religious conceptions are veridical and that religious directives are 
sound is somehow generated” (112). The magical act whereby the object is its representation conflates the 
model of with the model for. In a footnote, even Émile Durkheim concedes that the magical act has always-
already been in effect in the social representations (and the belief therein) of the church. Durkheim writes: 
“I do not mean to say there was a time when religion existed without magic. Probably, as religion was 
formed, certain of its principles were extended to nonreligious relations, and in this way, a more or less 
developed magic came to complement it. Even if these two systems of ideas and practices do not corre-
spond to distinct historical phases, nevertheless there is a definite relationship of derivation between them. 
This is all I have set out to establish” (Durheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, trans. Karen 
E. Fields (New York: Free Press, 1995), 366). 
52 “Hinomaru, Kimigayo” Kyōsei  Hantai Yobō  Soshō  o Susumeru Kai, “Kyōsei ,” pg. 40. 
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witness the totality of their teachers standing. Teachers who have refused to sit in the past, 
or who are deemed likely to sit, are put outside the ceremonial hall on reception, parking, 
or guard duty. In some instances, an extra staff member or Tokyōi representative has 
even been put on surveillance to keep extra watch over the worrisome teacher – standing 
alone in an empty parking lot – to ensure that s/he not disrupt the ceremony. One such 
teacher was locked inside the staff conference room for the duration of the ceremony. 
Similarly, should the appointed music teacher refuse to play the piano when prompted, a 
CD recording of the Kimigayo is prepared in advance. The smallest possibility of teachers 
breaching “etiquette” (girei) is protected against to an obsessive degree and the “individ-
ual work order” forms the first and last means of ensuring against this ever-present possi-
bility.53 The fact that an order was given enables the Tokyōi to allocate guilt to the diso-
                                                
53  As in the court testimony below, written references to “etiquette” (girei), and similarly, “order” 
(chitsujo) were contained in quotation marks, as if the brackets themselves would effect the containment 
that the ceremonies would achieve, and that the disobedient teacher violated. See John Pemberton’s On the 
Subject of “Java” (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), pg. 106, for a similar reading of “brackets” in 
the context of text and ritual. Notably, the Japanese word, girei (etiquette), also translates as “courtesy,” 
“formality,” “good form,” “duty,” “protocol,” or “rite.”  
 Above and beyond the containment of undesirable elements, the brackets that surround “etiquette” 
(girei) or “order” (chitsujo) suggest the enframement of “ritual” (shiki) itself as the site in which etiquette is 
enacted. As Talal Asad writes in “Towards a Genealogy of the Concept of Ritual,” in Vernacular Christi-
anity: Essays in the Social Anthropology of Religion Presented to Godfrey Lienhardt, ed. by W. James and 
D. H. Johnson (Oxford: JASO, 1988), the specifically modern form of “ritual” enframement entails a trans-
formation in “institutional structures and organizations of the self to make possible the concept of ritual as a 
special category of behavior” (74). See John Pemberton’s On the Subject of “Java” for the emergence of 
such “ritual” in the context of modern Indonesia. In a shift and iteration of “ritual” (upcara) whose tempo-
rality – dividing a before from after – echoes the “10.23 Directive” as much as its form, Pemberton de-
scribes how the 1966 deployment of ritual under the Indonesian New Order entailed the effacement of 
rebutan – “disruptive events, incidents of sheer conflict (konflik) ultimately intolerable for New Order secu-
rity, unrecognizable as “tradition”” – from ritual (18, 267 – 268). 
On this note of ‘etiquette,’ Shirai testifies in court: 
 “It should be said that it goes against the point of this grand bench of the Supreme Court judge-
ment to say that there is no problem because it is ‘etiquette.’ (‘儀礼’だから問題がないと言うのは、
この大法廷判決の趣旨に反するというべきです。) 
I believe that, at the bottom of the “etiquette” argument is an excessive emphasis on formal order. 
To teach students by saying that firstly the form is important, to make the model of ‘standing and singing’ 
the priority. (‘儀礼’論の根底にあるものは、形式的な秩序を過度に強調する考えだと思います。
まず形式が大事だ、‘立って歌う’ことを率先垂範して生徒たちに教えよというのです。)  
However, how the individual responds to state symbols has a front-to-back relationship with ‘what 
the entity of the state is to that individual.’” (しかし、個人が国家的シンボルにどう対応するかは、
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bedient teacher. Hence, the “individual work order” cannot not be issued. It consists in a 
form that not only disavows – displaces and projects – the memory of war-time guilt, but 
that commits the violence of amputating difference from the social body. Though the To-
kyōi says that it does not order students to stand for the anthem – it only orders teachers – 
students are placed in a sealed ceremonial hall in which nothing is left to chance. In some 
Tokyo wards, the instruction pamphlet for the ceremonies even states that the order to 
“all rise” (kiritsu) shall be given repeatedly, until everyone in the ceremonial hall 
stands.54 
 The violence of the “individual work order” is embodied, by teachers and students 
alike, in the enactment of the ceremonies: proper “form” (katachi) must be observed. It is, 
of course, written that attire should be appropriate to the “solemn and fresh atmosphere” 
(genshuku katsu seishin na fun’iki) of the ceremonies, and that teachers stand and sing the 
anthem. But in the actual ceremony, the observance of propriety exceeds mere attire, and 
is manifested in a punctiliousness of gesture in which even the angle of the “bow” (rei) 
toward the flag is measured, and the hand with which to receive the diploma – from the 
left hand, then the right hand – is predetermined. Upon receiving their diploma from the 
principal, behind whom the Hinomaru has been raised, students are not to turn their back 
to the principal until they descend the stairs leading up to the stage.55 In some schools, the 
Kimigayo is practiced in music class, and the ceremony itself is rehearsed, often multiple 
times, before the actual ceremony takes place. Given the machinic automaticity of rising, 
bowing, and singing demonstrated in the ceremonies, teachers frequently describe them 
                                                                                                                                            
‘国家というものがその個人にとってどういうものであるのか’と表裏一体の関係にありま
す。) (“Hinomaru, Kimigayo” Futō  Shobun Tekkai o Motomeru Hishobunsha no Kai, pg. 141) 
54 This information was relayed in interviews. 
55 This information was relayed in interviews. 
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as “militaristic” (gunkokuteki); not only because they trigger the memory of similar “pre-
war” (senzen) rituals, but because the automaticity of the gestures requires an unforgiving 
conformity. As an embodiment of the “individual work order,” the actualization of “form” 
(katachi) achieves closure between “individual action and the social norm.”56 In 2003, the 
Tokyōi thus instructed principals to: “first enter with the form, it’s enough to put the heart 
in the form, even if it is a formality, if they stand it is one step of progress” (mazu katachi 
kara hairi, katachi ni kokoro o irerebai, keishikiteki de attemo, tateba ippō zenshin de 
aru).57 Later the Tokyōi’s insistence on “form” (katachi) was echoed by a Supreme Court 
verdict on July 7th, 2004 – the “piano verdict” (piano hanketsu) – which said that the act 
of accompanying the Kimigayo on piano was a purely “external action” (gaimenteki kōi). 
Accordingly, when the Tokyōi had ordered music teachers to accompany the Kimigayo 
on piano, it did not transgress the constitutional right of teachers to “freedom of thought 
and conscience” (shisō oyobi ryōshin no jiyū); “thought and conscience” being purely 
                                                
56 Adorno & Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, pg. 23. This unforgiving insistence on “form” – no 
matter what, “to take the form” (katachi o toru); or, as one friend from Sanya expressed it: “to put a lid on 
what stinks” (kusai mono ni futa o) – extends far beyond both the confined space of the ceremony hall and 
the negative legacies of World War II. Depending on the context within which it is mobilized, the insist-
ence on “form” (katachi) operates as a “taboo” (tabū) on a plethora of other social issues, be it “radiation” 
(hōshanō), “suicide” (jisatsu), or the slums of Tokyo. 
57 “Hinomaru, Kimigayo” Kyōsei  Hantai Yobō  Soshō  o Susumeru Kai, “Kyōsei ,” pg. 238. See the Intro-
duction for references to texts that deal with the question of “form” (kata) and ritual in ‘Japanese’ society. 
Sawafuji Junichirō testifies on the meaning of this form: “Because standing, singing, is an act that 
demonstrates the feeling of respect and deference to the state in a public place” (起立、斉唱は、公の場
で国に対して敬意や尊重の念を表明する行為だからです). He further says: “In education, children 
should not be made to fit in one shape, one way of thinking, particularly by unilaterally forcing the way of 
thinking of those in power” (教育においては、一つの考え方、とりわけ権力者の考え方を一方的に
強制して、子どもを一つの形にはめてはならないのです). (“Hinomaru, Kimigayo” Futō Shobun 
Tekkai o Motomeru Hishobunsha no Kai, 140) 
A constitutional scholar, Urabe testifies on forcing the act of standing and singing: “It can be said 
that it arrived to bear the symbolic function of unifying the national population for the central state” (一元
的な国家権力に国民を統合するという、そのための象徴的な機能を担わされて登場したものとい
うことが言えます). (“Hinomaru, Kimigayo” Futō  Shobun Tekkai o Motomeru Hishobunsha no Kai, 
145) 
Ōno Kiyoko testifies on the enforcement of standing and singing: “To enter with form, the form is 
important” (形から入る、形が大事). (“Hinomaru, Kimigayo” Futō  Shobun Tekkai o Motomeru 
Hishobunsha no Kai, 98) 
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“interior” (naishin).58 The Supreme Court verdicts of January 16th and 28th, 2012, reaf-
firmed the right of the Tokyōi to order and punish teachers on this same basis, namely, 
that standing and singing the anthem is a purely “external action” (gaimenteki kōi).59 By 
this logic, the “interior” (naishin) is severed from the “external” (gaimenteki) by an act 
that refuses to recognize visible departure from the norm. Teachers explain that it simply 
does not matter what they say to protest the “10.23 Directive.” “Discussion is useless” 
(Mondō muyō).60 The only thing that matters is whether or not the “work order” (shoku-
mu meirei) is obeyed; that is, that teachers and students give themselves to be seen stand-
ing, singing the Kimigayo, facing the Hinomaru.61 
 This compulsion to conform on pain of social expulsion exemplifies the Dialectic 
of Enlightenment as Adorno and Max Horkheimer explicated it in the early 1940s.62 Writ-
ten in exile from fascist Europe, the Dialectic illuminates the regression of enlightenment 
                                                
58 See “Hinomaru, Kimigayo” Kyōsei  Hantai Yobō  Soshō  o Susumeru Kai, “Kyōsei.” 
59 “Hinomaru, Kimigayo” Futō  Shobun Tekkai o Motomeru Hishobunsha no Kai, pg. 310 - 319. 
60 “Hinomaru, Kimigayo” Kyōsei  Hantai Yobō  Soshō  o Susumeru Kai, “Kyōsei ,” pg. 164. 
61 Notably, the objection by teachers that singing necessarily involves “interiority” (naishin) constitutes the 
flip side argument to the Tokyōi’s insistence that it is purely “external” (gaimenteki). Indeed, if, as Mladen 
Dolar writes in A Voice and Nothing More (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006), the voice can be considered as 
“cloven by the impossible rift between an interior and exterior,” the assumptions regarding interiori-
ty/exteriority by teachers and Tokyōi are mutually constitutive (71). Teachers insist that singing necessarily 
involves interiority – as if interiority could be severed from the exterior act of singing – and yet, the act of 
singing is threatening in its exteriority. The Tokyōi insists the act of singing is purely exterior – as if exteri-
ority had nothing to do with interiority – and yet, the objection by teachers is threatening in its interiority. 
Hence, the Tokyōi insists that students sing with a loud voice, as if a constitutive gap between exteriori-
ty/interiority had to be breached. In effect, both teachers and Tokyōi want to close “the impossible rift be-
tween an interior and exterior” that the voice both manifests and would cover over. Both wish for an im-
possible expressivity that is subverted, on the one hand, by the act of sitting, and on the other, by the act of 
singing. See Ch. 2 for more on voice. 
62 Adorno and Horkheimer’s Dialectic of Enlightenment cannot be considered without prior reference to 
Max Weber’s 1905 The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. Talcott Parsons (New York: 
Routledge Classics, 2001). In the last few pages, Weber writes: “The puritan wanted to work in a calling; 
we are forced to do so. For when ascetiscism was carried out of monastic cells into everyday life, and be-
gan to dominate worldly morality, it did its part in building the tremendous cosmos of the modern econom-
ic order. This order is now bound to the technical and economic conditions of machine production which 
today determine the lives of all the individuals who are born into this mechanism, not only those directly 
concerned with economic acquisition, with irresistable force. Perhaps it will so determine them until the 
last ton of fossilized coal is burnt. In Baxter’s view the care for external goods should only lie on the shoul-
ders of the “saint like a cloak, which can be thrown aside at any moment.” But fate decreed that the cloak 
should become an iron cage …” (123 - 124). 
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rationality to a mythological fatalism in which the repetition of “mathematical formalism” 
– and its identical medium, the “number” – has taken the place of “fate.” Enlightenment 
rationality set out to emancipate humans from mythic fear, but in its “mastery of nature,” 
it has only reproduced the world in its own image. “The pure immanence of positivism,” 
Adorno and Horkheimer write, “is nothing other than a form of universal taboo.” Indeed, 
“nothing is allowed to remain outside, since the mere idea of “outside” is the real source 
of fear.” Embedded in the logics of commodification, abstraction, and the machinery of a 
social order set in motion through exchange, the enlightenment reverts to a “barbarism” 
in which it is no longer “nature,” but the social power of the “all-encompassing economic 
apparatus” that demands submission. Thinking itself becomes a pure instrumentality that 
annihilates all “qualities” through abstraction. Caught within this “machinery of thought,” 
the subject is constrained into the unit of an operational node in which, “as an instrument 
of power, [it] has to choose between command and obedience.”63 
 In 2003, when principals in Tokyo were first ordered by the Tokyōi to issue “in-
dividual work orders” to their teachers, one principal – Dohi Nobuo – deemed that this 
was unnecessary because the “trust” (shinrai) among his teachers was sufficiently high to 
lead him to believe that all his teachers would stand, but also because teachers had re-
fused to stand in the past precisely because an “individual work order” had been issued. 
When the Tokyōi later put him under investigation for neglecting to issue the individual 
work order, Dohi Nobuo asked the Tokyōi point-blank: “Which is more important, that 
the graduation ceremony be carried out properly, or that individual work orders be is-
sued?” (kobetsuteki shokumu meirei o hasshutsu surunoto, sotsugyōshiki o tekisei ni 
okonaunoto wa, dochira ga jūyō nano desuka?). To his complete shock, Dohi says, eve-
                                                
63 Adorno & Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, pg. 20, 11. 
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ryone on the investigative board responded: “That individual work orders are issued is 
more important” (kobetsuteki shokumu meirei no hō ga jūyō de aru). Regarding the in-
strumentality of the “work order,” Dohi concludes that:  
The 10.23 Directive is supposed to be a work order to ensure that the graduation 
ceremony is carried out properly. However, all of the Tokyōi stated that it is more 
important that individual work orders be issued. In the final analysis, work orders 
are means to ensure proper enforcement. The means became the goal. If anything, 
this is mistaking the means for the end.64 
 
On the ground that the prohibition estranges principals from their teachers, principal Dohi 
similarly requested a “withdrawal” (tekkai) of the “notice” (tsūchi) that prohibits “voting” 
(saiketsu) by teachers at staff meetings. Duly punished for both his failure to issue orders, 
and for raising a racket over the 2004 “notice,” Dohi identifies the “10.23 Directive” with 
a compulsion to mastery of thought in its alienating effect: from its objects of domination 
and from itself. As Adorno and Horkheimer say, rationality had sought to master “nature,” 
but in this compulsion to mastery, rationality replicates the compulsion of nature, and 
                                                
64 Dohi, Sore wa, Mikkoku Kara Hajimatta: Kōchō vs. Tokyōto Kyōiku Iinkai, pg. 70. 
The Japanese text reads: “１０.２３通達は、卒業式を適正に行なうための職務命令のはず
です。しかし都教委全体が、個別的職務命令を発出することのほうが重要だと発言したのです。
職務命令はあくまで、適正実施のための手段です。手段が目的になったのです。これこそ本末転
倒です。” The idiomatic expression Dohi uses at the conclusion of this statement, honmatsutentō (mistak-
ing the means for the end), can also be translated as “getting one’s priorities wrong,” “confusing the order 
of things,” “putting the cart before the horse,” and “mistaking the insignificant for the essential.” With 
Dohi’s emphatic preface of “if anything” (korekoso), or “more than anything” (korekoso), he suggests that 
the Tokyōi literally confused the means for the end. And yet, his words also function as a commentary on a 
general state of affairs in which the means have taken the place of the end. What is obvious to the Tokyōi is 
topsy-turvy to Dohi. The order of things has shifted. 
Similarly, another teacher writes: “I decided to sit. Regardless that the “anthem” was running, the 
assistant principal walked around, came close and touched my shoulder, and twice said the words: “please 
stand.” I find it highly questionable how acts lacking in solemnity such as walking around in the middle of 
the ceremony, even to utter words, and touch the body, have been justified in accordance with the order. 
Moreover, it is clearly in contradiction with the order to “stand facing the national flag and sing in unison 





いました。) (“Hinomaru, Kimigayo” Kyōsei  Hantai Yobō  Soshō  o Susumeru Kai, “Kyōsei,” 296) 
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“reflects itself as a nature oblivious of itself.”65 Thinking has thereby ceased to think it-
self. Alienated in a destructive instrumentality that has become its raison d’etre, thinking 
emerges as a pure means. The “machinery of thought” will not determine its own limits 
in an “admission of falseness which cancels its power and hands it over to truth.”66 While 
Enlightenment had sought to disenchant the world, “the wholly enlightened earth is radi-
ant with triumphant calamity.”67 Mythic fear has returned. As many teachers were fond 
of saying, the Tokyōi fears the Nezu Kimiko who resides in every one of its employees. 
 In March every year, the number of sitting teachers signifies a danger far greater 
than their diminutive number would reasonably suggest. Since the entrance ceremony of 
2009, the number of sitting teachers has consistently been under 10, fluctuating from “1” 
to “6.”68 Under circumstances other than the graduation and entrance ceremonies, “1” to 
“6” infractions – out of 63,000 employees – does not even get the attention of the Tokyōi. 
                                                
65 Ibid, pg. 23, 9, 38, 31. In a “world domination over nature,” the abstraction of Enlightenment rationality 
consists in a concordance between the interiority of the subject and the fetish character of the mass market. 
Adorno and Horkheimer write in The Dialectic of Enlightenment that: “the equation of mind and world is 
finally resolved, but only in the sense that both sides cancel out” (20 - 21). Following Marx’s observation 
that exchange value does “not contain an atom of use value,” and that the “act of exchange” replaces “di-
rect social relations between persons in their work” (Marx, Capital, 165 – 166), Georg Lukàcs writes that 
the “ghostly objectivity” of the commodity form “stamps its imprint on the whole consciousness of man” 
(Georg Lukàcs, “Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat,” in History and Class Consciousness, 
trans. Rodney Livingstone (MIT Press: Cambridge, 1971), 87). Hence, Lukàcs goes on to observe in his 
famous essay, “Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat,” that the “qualities and abilities [of the 
worker] are no longer an organic part of his personality, they are things which he can ‘own’ or ‘dispose of’ 
like the various objects of the external world” (Ibid, 100). As Thomas Keenan writes in “The Point Is to 
(Ex)Change It: Reading ‘Capital,’ Rhetorically,” in Fables of Responsibility: Abbreviations and Predica-
ments in Ethics and Politics (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), it is the “act of exchange” – and 
by the same token, that non-reciprocal act of giving oneself to be seen bowing endlessly to the source of the 
nation – that produces this abstraction (and its spectralized remainder). Keenan observes of that magical act 
whereby one thing is equivalent to another, that Marx seems to “presuppose that what must happen (reduc-
tion) has already happened (abstraction) in order to let it happen (likeness or equality)” (114). 
66 Ibid, pg. 18. Of “determinate negation,” Adorno and Horkeimer write: “Unlike rigorism, determinate 
negation does not simply reject imperfect representations of the absolute, idols, by confronting them with 
the idea they are unable to match. Rather, dialectic discloses each image as script. It teaches us to read from 
its features the admission of falseness which cancels its power and hands it over to truth. Language thereby 
becomes more than a system of signs. With the concept of determinate negation Hegel gave prominence to 
an element which distinguishes enlightenment from the positivist decay to which he consigned it” (18). 
67 Adorno & Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, pg. 2. 
68 “Hinomaru, Kimigayo” Futō Shobun Tekkai o Motomeru Hishobunsha no Kai, pg. 320. 
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When 200 teachers were reported to have used “corporal punishment” (taibatsu) in 2012, 
149 of them were merely issued “verbal warnings” (kōtō chūi) or “reprimands” (kunko-
ku).69 These teachers stayed anonymous in the media. But when Tanaka Satoshi emerged 
as the only teacher to receive two “salary reduction” (genkyū) punishments in 2012, and 
when Nezu Kimiko was threatened with dismissal in 2009 – both teachers, for sitting dur-
ing the ceremonies – their names achieved a singular quality rising above the threshold of 
media visibility. As the only principal to oppose the prohibition on “voting” (saiketsu) in 
staff meetings, Dohi Nobuo also received media attention. Naturally, some of these indi-
viduals actively sought out media attention. Likewise, the quality of reporting varies with 
the political bent of the newspaper; some simply state that a specific number of teachers 
did not stand – as if this act were culpable in itself – while others, like the Tokyo Shimbun, 
give voice to the teachers.70 As for the Tokyōi, rather than rest content with the near non-
existence of sitting teachers, its yearly response has been to renew the vigor with which it 
insists on reducing their number to “zero” (zero). Teachers repeatedly attribute this target 
to the Tokyōi, saying the Tokyōi “truly wants to make it to zero” (hontō ni zero ni shitai), 
and that the Tokyōi is, in fact, “afraid” (kowai) of them.71 One teacher accounted for such 
fear by explaining that, for the Tokyōi, the existence of even a single teacher who refuses 
to stand signifies the possibility that other teachers will not stand. Like the Tokyōi insists 
on eliminating the number of sitting teachers – which threatens to multiply out of control 
– Adorno and Horkheimer write of “mythical violence” that it “amputates the incommen-
                                                
69 “Taibatsu de Kyōshokuinra 200 Nin Shobun, Tokyōi, Kyōikuchō Mo Kaikoku,” in MSN Sankei News, 
12/9/2013. 
70 “Hinomaru, Kimigayo Tokyōi Tsūtatsu 10 Nen,” in Tokyo Shimbun, 17/4/2013. 
71 This information was relayed through an interview with Kondo Junichi. 
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surable.”72 Each and every teachers harbors a potential Nezu Kimiko, whose singular act 
of refusing to give herself to the social totality – no matter the odds – must be eliminated. 
On the other hand, the figure “1” retains an overwrought significance for teachers 
themselves because it means that the Tokyōi has not reached its target of reducing them 
to “zero” (zero). Thus, the number “1” puts a “brake” (hadome) on the Tokyōi’s ambi-
tions. It prevents the Tokyōi from declaring that 100% of its teachers stood for the an-
them, and keeps it from proceeding with its “next” (tsugi) step.73 Like the figure of a sin-
gle teacher sitting through the anthem – an act for which there is very rarely more than 
one – at least the number “1” is necessary to uphold the line of difference that protects 
the “interiority” (naishin) of the teachers and the students for whom they sit. Short of “1,” 
and the order to stand would have penetrated and usurped this interior. In their “final le-
gal brief” (saishū junbi shomen) submitted to the Tokyo District Court, the Yobō Soshō o 
Susumeru Kai say that “conscience” (ryōshin) accounts for “being unable to obey” (shit-
agaenai) the “10.23 Directive”: 
If you try to be true to the beliefs of your self, as a human being, as a teacher, it is 
the very limit line of defense of the human subjectivity of a teacher who stands in 
front of students, that only this cannot be yielded, and may be called a “teacher’s 
conscience.”74 
 
The externalized expression of “conscience” (ryōshin) establishes that “very limit line of 
defense of the human subjectivity” (ningentekishutaisei no giri giri no gādorain). In this 
sense, conscience emerges as the incommensurable or “unexchangeable” (kakegaeni nai), 
                                                
72 Adorno & Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, pg. 8 – 9. 
73 This information was relayed through an interview with Tanaka Satoshi. 
74 “Hinomaru, Kimigayo” Kyōsei Hantai Yobō Soshō o Susumeru Kai, “Kyōsei,” pg. 436 – 7. The Japa-
nese text reads: “それは、自己の信念に誠実であろうとすれば、人間として教師としてこれだけは
譲れないという、生徒の前に立つ教師の人間的主体性のぎりぎりのガードラインであって、これ
を‘教師の良心’と言って良い。” Miyamura similarly writes of the teachers as having “preserved the 
single last line” (最後の一線を守ったのである). (“Hinomaru, Kimigayo” Kyōsei Hantai Yobō Soshō o 
Susumeru Kai, “Kyōsei ,” 58) 
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for which teachers might stake their lives.75 By penetrating into, negating, and effectively 
killing the “interior” (naishin) the work order amputates “conscience” (ryōshin).76 Along-
side this “teacher’s conscience” (kyōshi  no ryōshin) which emerges “in front of students” 
(seito no mae), teachers enumerate a list of other reasons why they “cannot obey” (shita-
gaenai) the order to stand and sing, but that conscience preserves. Some teachers say they 
cannot stand because of the history of the Hinomaru and Kimigayo, and the uses to which 
those symbols were put before and during World War II. Yet other teachers have no issue 
with either symbol, but cannot stand because “enforcement” (kyōsei) is not appropriate to 
the educational environment. Other teachers cannot stand because standing and facing the 
Hinomaru while singing the Kimigayo amounts to “worshipping” (sanpai) the “emperor” 
(tennō), and infringes on their religious beliefs; an objection that the Tokyōi – in keeping 
with the Japanese state’s historical persecution of religious minorities, such as Christians 
or the Ōmotokyō – granted zero excemptions.77 Yet other teachers cannot stand because 
                                                
75 Onoyama describes this “conscience” (ryōshin) of the teachers: ““Conscience determines and decides the 
conduct of people, is irreplaceable for that person, and is the supreme judge for judging by oneself. People 
cannot live as human subjects, unless they are able to live their own lives in accordance with their con-




の命までをかけるのです。) (“Hinomaru, Kimigayo” Futō Shobun Tekkai o Motomeru Hishobunsha no 
Kai, 109) In this respect, “conscience” (ryōshin) resounds with Jacques Lacan’s master signifier, of which 
Jacques-Alain Miller writes that: “it marks the subject with an ineffaceable singularity” (“On Shame,” in 
Jacques Lacan and the Other Side of Psychoanalysis, ed. by Slavoj Žižek (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2006), pg. 20). 
76 One music teacher, Takenaka, writes: “to say to cut off the interior that is already held is the same thing 
as saying to throw away that interior … it absolutely cannot be done to cut off the interior and also accom-
pany.” (すでに持っている内心を切り離せ、というのは、その内心を捨て去れ、ということと同
じです	 。。。内心を切り離して演奏することなど絶対にできないのです。 ) (“Hinomaru, 
Kimigayo” Kyōsei Hantai Yobō Soshō o Susumeru Kai, “Kyōsei,” 270 – 271) 
77  Makino Rie writes: For someone like me, to face the “Hinomaru” and stand and bow, to sing the 
“Kimigayo,” is to worship “a thing regarded as a god” other than Christ. Because in Japan’s history up until 
now, the “Hinomaru” has been a symbol that materialized Tensho Daijin, and the “Kimigayo” has been a 
song to worship the emperor. Following the directive, the act of rising and singing the “Kimigayo” in the 
ceremony is, for me, felt like a “sin” as warned against in the Bible.” (このような私にとって、‘日の丸’
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standing would entail showing students an image of themselves violating the values they 
teach. These values, like “human rights” (jinken) or “freedom of speech” (genron no jiyū) 
are, moreover, embodied in the postwar Constitution to which the plaintiff teachers make 
repeated and insistent reference in their court-cases. Their legal proceedings seek a “con-
stitutional trial” (kempō saiban), contrary to the Supreme Court verdicts that have averted 
the constitution by claiming that standing and singing are “external actions” (gaimenteki 
kōi), and that it is the “duty” (gimu) of teachers to follow work orders as “public workers” 
(kōmuin).78 Finally, there are the teachers who cannot stand because the “10.23 Directive” 





Kimigayo” Kyōsei Hantai Yobō Soshō o Susumeru Kai, “Kiroku,” 175) 
 Okada Akira writes: “From before, the “Hinomaru” that the principal and guests deeply worship 
has felt like an “alter” to me. And the Kimigyo to which one stands and sings has practically sounded like a 
worship song to the emperor. In this ceremony, I felt the use of strong pressure to worship the country, and 
pledge allegiance. The ceremony of the anthem and flag does not speak the language of religion, but I feel 
it as an “act of worshipping an icon.” And with the directive, this feeling became a conviction. This is not 






これは単なる国民儀礼などというなまやさしいものではありません。) (“Hinomaru, Kimigayo” 
Kyōsei Hantai Yobō Soshō o Susumeru Kai, “Kyōsei,” 160) 
 Kimura Yoko says of the 10.23 Directive: “It is something that cannot be endured. It violates my 
freedom to religion. I learned the Bible since a child, took in Christ as my savior, received a way of living, 
and received the meaning of living. The 10.23 Directive ordered that I ignore this faith of mine, and denies 
the foundation of my existence.” (とても耐えられることではありません。私の信教の自由を侵すも
のです。私は子どものときから聖書を学び、キリストを私の救い主として受け入れ、生きる道を
与えられ、生きる意味を与えられてきました。１０.２３通達はこの私の信仰を無視することを
命令され、私の存在の根底を否定するものになります。) (“Hinomaru, Kimigayo” Kyōsei Hantai 
Yobō Soshō o Susumeru Kai, “Kyōsei ,” 343) 
78 See the “Final Legal Brief” (Genkoku Gawa Saishu Junbi Shōmen) of the “Hinomaru, Kimigayo” Kyōsei 
Hantai Yobō Soshō o Susumeru Kai. (“Hinomaru, Kimigayo” Kyōsei Hantai Yobō Soshō o Susumeru Kai, 
“Kyōsei,” 408 – 481). 
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violates the “right to organize” (danketsuken) – another Constitutional right – by dividing 
and isolating laborers from one another.79 
 The reference to the post-war Constitution is as overdetermined as the reasons for 
which teachers cannot stand. Teachers and plaintiff lawyers say that the “10.23 Directive” 
violates not only article #19 of the postwar Constitution – which protects the “freedom of 
thought and conscience” – but also articles #6, #12, #13, #20, #23, and #26. In addition, 
the “10.23 Directive” is said to violate article #10 (article #16 of the ‘06 revised version) 
of what teachers regard as an other bastion of postwar heritage, namely, the “Fundamen-
tal Law of Education” (Kyōiku Kihon Hō).80 However the primary reference to article #19, 
protecting the “freedom of thought and conscience” (shisō to ryōshin no jiyū), mirrors the 
above reference to the expression of “conscience” (ryōshin) as that which defends against 
the intrusion of the state into the interiority of the subject and child. As a blockage, at the 
extimate point of which the most intimate interiority is exteriorized with reference to the 
post-war constitution, the expression of conscience would put a brake on the repetition of 
history.81 
                                                
79 See Numata Yuko, “Kimigayo” Fukiritsu Shobun o Tekkai Saseyō! Kyōiku no Mineika, “Danketsuken” 
Hakai to Tatakaou! Jinji Iinkai Tōsō Shiryōshū, pg. B-10 – B-11. 
80 See the “Final Legal Brief” (Genkoku Gawa Saishū Junbi Shomen) of the “Hinomaru, Kimigayo” Kyōsei  
Hantai Yobō Soshō o Susumeru Kai. (“Hinomaru, Kimigayo” Kyōsei Hantai Yobō Soshō o Susumeru Kai, 
“Kyōsei ,” 408 – 481). Under article 10 of the “Fundamental Law of Education” (Kyōiku Kihon Hō), the 
10.23 Directive is said to exercise “unjust control” (futō na shihai). (“Hinomaru, Kimigayo” Kyōsei Hantai 
Yobō Soshō o Susumeru Kai, “Kyōsei,” 106)  
81  For a comparable consideration of extimacy in a theological context altogether removed from Ja-
pan, see Stefania Pandolfo’s essay, “‘The burning’: Finitude and the Politico-Theological Imagination of 
Illegal Migration,” in Anthropological Theory Vol. 7.3 (2007). Pandolfo writes of Moroccan youth as they 
reference theological terms to reconfigure subjectivity in relation to the impossible prospect of “the burning” 
(l-harg), or illegal migration to Europe likely to result in death. 
Referencing Freud’s essay on the “Uncanny,” Mladen Dolar writes of Lacan’s notion of “extimité” 
or the “extimate,” that it “is simultaneously the intimate kernel and the foreign body” (““I Shall Be with 
You on Your Wedding-Night”: Lacan and the Uncanny,” pg. 6). In this respect, Marilyn Ivy writes of Ja-
pan’s postwar constitution with reference to Katō Norihiro’s Haisengoron: 
“Kato presumes that the normal nation-state is nonschizophrenic and thus nontraumatized (and the 
reverse holds true, as well). Yet, in Japan, an originary stain (yogore) has resulted in a pathological swerv-
ing from the path of national normalcy. Kato dreams of a nation and a nationalism without any deviation or 
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 The danger of state interests penetrating and subsuming the interiority of students 
short-circuits the memory of the educational system implemented before World War II. 
Back then, teachers say, the educational system was designed to produce a youth willing 
to die for the nation, and today, the educational system is reverting to “prewar” (senzen) 
conditions. Although the Ministry of Education has left the enforcement of the Hinomaru 
and Kimigayo to the prefectural and municipal administrative levels, discussion in par-
liament has clarified the goals of the 2006 revised version of the “Fundamental Law of 
Education” (Kyōiku Kihon Hō). In February, 2004, Nishimura Shingo of the DPJ de-
scribes the educational system to be embodied in the new law: “An organization that does 
not question throwing life at stake for the nation, in other words, an army of the national 
people must be kept clearly in mind. Within this, national education will revive.”82 As the 
Ministry of Education itself claims, the “prewar” (senzen) system of “moral training edu-
cation” (shūshin kyōiku ), that taught the supreme moral value of dying for the nation and 
“emperor” (tennō), “was mistaken in few places” (machigatteita tokoro wa sukunai).83 
                                                                                                                                            
excess, an ever-normal nationalism (to think about this normalcy, however, is to think about capitalism and 
unevenness). 
But this dream of a unified national subject, the performative subject of national apology with no 
splits or remainders, reminds us of the fantasy of fascism (among other fantasies), in which the contradic-
tions of the social are denied and covered over in the deadly dream of a nation without internal difference. 
As long as the constitution is of alien origin, Japan will always be a thing that is not one; hence Kato’s fixa-
tion on the formal constitution and its Article 9. Since the constitution is the “work of an alien intruder, its 
elimination would enable us to obtain again a stable social organism whose parts form a harmonious corpo-
rate body.” The purity of the origin, then, is more important for Kato than the effect of the constitution—a 
peace constitution that has indeed facilitated the coupling of postwar peace and prosperity” (“Trauma’s 
Two Times: Japanese Wars and Postwars,” 176). 
82 Quoted in Kawaguchi Kazuya, “Kimigayo” no Rirekisho (Tokyo: Hihyōsha, 2005), pg. 3. The Japanese 
reads: “お国のために命を投げ出すことをいとわない機構、つまり国民の軍隊が明確に意識されな
ければならない。” Notably, the Japanese word for “organization” (kikō) contains the ideogram “-ki” (機) 
commonly used to signify “machine” (機械) and can alternatively be translated as “system,” “structure,” 
“mechanism,” or “machinery.” In line with his reference to “military” (guntai), Nishimura’s statement can 
thus be read as calling for education as “a machinery that does not question throwing life at stake for the 
nation.” 
83 See “Mombushō Kondaikai Shokaigō de Zachō ga Shūshin Kyōiku Kōtei –Dōtoku “Kyōka”ka o Suishin,” 
in Shukan Kinyobi News, 15/5/2013. The specter of the revival of pre-war forms of “moral training educa-
tion” (shūshin kyōiku) is coupled with specific texts, primary among which is the “Fundamentals of our 
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While teachers today have no experience of this prewar educational system, they partake 
of a tradition of postwar teachers which continues to embrace the slogan: “Never again to 
send students to battlefield” (Oshiego o Nidoto Senjō ni Okuranai).84 Together with other 
legacies of Japan’s defeat in World War II, like the Constitution and the “Fundamental 
Law of Education,” this handful of teachers constitutes a veritable object of obsession for 
the Ministry of Education. In a statement that reveals just how determined the Tokyōi has 
been to eliminate these teachers, the former head of Tokyōi, Toriumi Iwao says: 
Ambiguity can absolutely not be left behind at the time of reform. Regarding this 
problem of the national song/anthem, it has been conveyed to the head office and 
head of education to please do this 100%, so it may be said that it does not matter 
because it is one person or two persons, but what reform is, in any case something 
like cancer particles created over the period of half a century, if there are even a 
few cancer particles left in a place like that, it is obvious that they will multiply 
again right away. To do it thoroughly. Not to leave any ambiguity. I believe this is 
extremely important.85 
 
Referenced repeatedly by teachers themselves as evidence that the Ministry of Education 
intends to eliminate them, Toriumi’s metaphor of “cancer particles” (gan saibō) discloses 
the body of the nation to be threatened by terminal disease. It magnifies this threat under 
a surgical gaze that would excise the particles, which could proliferate into immeasurable 
proportions at any moment. Yet, Toriumi’s statement also bespeaks an enjoyment not on-
                                                                                                                                            
National Polity” (Kokutai no Hongi), published by the Ministry of Education in 1937. By saying that such 
texts were “mistaken in few places” (machigatteita tokoro wa sukunai) – as opposed to the specificity of “a 
few places” – The Ministry of Education subverts the necessity of addressing even the minor details which 
might have been “mistaken” (machigatteita). The statement virtually amounts to a wholesale endorsement 
of the texts in question. 
84 In an interview, a lawyer for the anti-Hinomaru/Kimigayo, Sawafuji Junichiro, cited the poem that is the 
source of this slogan of the top of his head, as if it were second nature. 
85 “Hinomaru, Kimigayo” Kyōsei Hantai Yobō Soshō o Susumeru Kai, “Kyōsei,” pg. 518 – 519. The text 







ly at the ease with which he is able to publicly slur disobedient teachers, complete with 
the threat to exterminate them. By referring to such teachers as cancer particles “created 
over the period of half a century,” he accords them a spectral quality and invokes them as 
a metonym for the negative legacies of World War II. At once suggestive of Karl Marx’s 
“reserve army of labor,” the production of “an army of the national people” (kokumin no 
guntai) in the “mechanism” (kikō) of education is inscribed in a temporality which deems 
the legacies of World War II an aberration. The “revival” (fukkatsu) of national education 
is predicated on the disappearance of this legacy. 
Contrary to Germany or Italy, where postwar policies were implemented to ensure 
remembrance of atrocities committed in World War II, followed by repeated public apol-
ogies on behalf of representatives of state and financial compensations, the Japanese state 
has not formally admitted that a “comfort women” (ianfu) system existed, or that “forced 
labor” (kyōsei renkō) and the “Rape of Nanking” (Nanking Daigyakusatsu), alongside an 
endless list of other war atrocities, occurred.86 Historical revisionists in Japan commonly 
refer to such events – contested by few others than themselves and the Japanese state – as 
                                                
86 Apologies have, of course, been issued by individual members and Prime Ministers of the Japanese state. 
Most notable among these is the 1993 Kono statement, in which Prime Minister Kono acknowledged and 
apologized for the “comfort women” (jūgun ianfu) system of brothels employed by the Japanese Imperial 
Army. However, it remains unclear whether this and other statements of apology were issued in the name 
of the state, or of individual members of the state. More significantly, such apologies have little credibility 
when members of state either contradict them – claiming, for instance, that the “Rape of Nanjing” is a pure 
fabrication – or repeatedly suggest that the statements may be retracted or revised. In 2015, the orchestrated 
speculation that Prime Minister Abe will omit all apology – not to mention, words like “aggression” – from 
his speech on the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, already undercuts the credibility of whatever 
content the speech may contain. See “Abe Signals WWII Anniversary Statement May Omit Apologies,” in 
The Japan Times, 21/4/2014. But it is the figure of the “emperor” (tennō) that must be attended to in order 
to elucidate this shamelessness of the state. As Ukai observes in “The Future of an Affect: The Historicity 
of Shame”: “But it is historical conditions that determine when and how shame appears, or if it continues to 
function in the unconscious. Up until half a century ago, Japan was dominated by the “God-nation” ideolo-
gy, the ideology of being chosen. On the surface, this ideology was denied by the defeat and the post-war 
constitution. Yet the shame of belonging to this community, if it often became a strong motive drive for the 
formation of individual thinking, has never been acknowledged publicly or socialized. One of the main 
causes that have prevented this from happening was the survival of the Tennô Hirohito as the national sym-
bol up until 1989, almost to the end of the Cold War” (29). 
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a “negative history” (fu no rekishi); in short, as a negativity whose overcoming entails its 
negation. 
The accomplishment of these double negations would announce the apotheosis of 
that transhistorical mythic figure, an embodiment of the totality – 100% – of the “national 
body” (kokutai): the “emperor” (tennō). 
 
 Although the “emperor” (tennō) constitutes the central reference in the graduation 
and entrance ceremonies, his figure is obscurely displaced in both the ceremonial hall and 
the lyrics of the anthem. In official documents, the reference to the “national flag” (kokki) 
and the “national anthem” (kokka) already displaces direct reference to the Hinomaru and 
the Kimigayo. Nor, for that matter, is there an actual image of the emperor in the hall. But 
as teachers were fond of pointing out in interviews, before and during World War II a 
“photographic portrait” (goshinei) of the emperor used to hang where the ‘national flag’ 
is now. During the war, teachers recounted, students and principals risked their lives to 
retrieve this photo from burning school buildings, or took their own lives on failure to do 
so. Though it is known that the postwar Constitution stripped the emperor of his divinity 
and installed him as a “symbol” (shōcho), teachers point out that the meaning of the lyr-
ics of the ‘national anthem’ is rarely taught and students therefore do not understand their 
“meaning” (imi). Hence, the ‘national anthem’ is practiced and sung, but its meaning re-
mains obscure. Naturally, elementary school children most often just hum along; observ-
ing proper “form” (katachi). But even if the meaning of the lyrics is known, teachers say, 
the “history” (rekishi) of the ‘national flag’ and ‘national anthem’ is unknown.87 The To-
                                                
87 Of course, the foreign origins of the Kimigayo are likewise elided; namely, that the Kimigayo was com-
posed upon the suggestion of an Englishman, John William Fenton, and that a German finally transcribed 
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kyōi deems it “inappropriate instruction” (futekisetsu na shidō) to teach students that the 
national anthem, or rather, the Kimigayo – “The Reign of the Emperor” (Kimigayo) – was 
sung in “worship” (sanpai) of the imperial system before and during World War II, and 
that 20 – 30 million people (excluding Japanese nationals) were killed in the name of the 
emperor. Since the lyrics of the ‘national anthem’ come from a ninth-century waka poem, 
they can be memorized without meaning being intelligible. The lyrics may be automati-
cally repeated, but even for adults, they may require pause and thought before their mean-
ing can be translated from classical Japanese.88 In this one-stanza poem deriving from the 
imperial court of the Heian period, however, the “Kimi” (You) does not refer to a lover or 
to “You” in general. After hedging a long time on the significance of “Kimi” (You) in 
“Kimigayo,” the Japanese state did, in fact, officially declare that the “Kimi” does, indeed, 
                                                                                                                                            
the melody derived from imperial court music, gagaku, into Western harmony. See Yamazumi Masami and 
Murasaki Fuyoku, “Cha no Aida de Kataru “Hinomaru, Kimigayo””, in Nikkan Hon no Ai: To-
kushū/Hinomaru, Kimigayo (3.4, (1991)), pg. 2 - 4. As the result of one of such early efforts of transcribing 
traditional Japanese music into Western harmony, one music teacher explained that the Kimigayo consti-
tutes a disastrous composition with all sorts to technical flaws. The crescendos are in the wrong places and 
there is no resolving harmony at the end of the song. Hence, students would come up and ask whether the 
current ending of the Kimigayo was the real ending, as if the song had been cut short. In the immediate 
postwar, the teacher said, it was normal to point out these shortcomings of the Kimigayo. Her own music 
teacher would sarcastically remark that the reason Japanese are “tone-deaf” (onchi) is because they sing the 
Kimigayo. In fact, most such early transcriptions were discarded, the teacher said, but the Kimigayo was 
retained in its current form because it concerns the “emperor” (tennō). As if the Kimigayo never ends, an 
other music teacher, Takenaka Tadashi says: “It ends up feeling as if the piece ended in the middle. As a 
fact, I have been asked by adults: “the Kimigayo ends in the middle of the piece, right?” (曲の途中で終わ
ってしまったようにも感じてしまいます。事実として私は、一般の成人の方から‘君が代って曲
の途中で終わっちゃいますよね’、そう言われたこともあります。) (“Hinomaru, Kimigayo” 
Kyōsei Hantai Yobō Soshō o Susumeru Kai, “Kyōsei,” 275) 
88 Sigmund Freud observes of the “fetish” that it operates across translation to disavow its traumatic origins. 
Of a certain “shine on the nose,” Freud writes: “The most extraordinary case seemed to me to be one in 
which a young man had exalted a certain sort of ‘shine on the nose’ into a fetishistic precondition. The sur-
prising explanation of this was that the patient had been brought up in an English nursery but had later 
come to Germany, where he forgot his mother-tongue almost completely. The fetish, which originated from 
his earliest childhood, had to be understood in English, not German. The ‘shine on the nose’ [in German 
‘Glanz auf der Nase’]—was in reality a ‘glance at the nose’. The nose was thus the fetish, which, inci-
dentally, he endowed at will with the luminous shine which was not perceptible to others.” (Freud, “Fetish-
ism,” trans. James Strachey, in Psychoanalytic Electric Publishing, pg. 152) 
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refer to the “emperor” as the “symbol of State and the unity of the People,” as written in 
the Constitution. “Kimi” refers to the “emperor” (tennō): 
Kimigayo wa   May your reign 
Chiyo ni yachiyo ni  Continue for a thousand, eight thousand generations, 
Sazare-ishi no   Until the pebbles 
Iwao to narite   Grow into boulders 
Koke no musu made  Lush with moss 
 
Even teacher’s union representatives insist the “meaning” (imi) of the lyrics simply “does 
not matter” (kankei nai) because when people sing the anthem at school ceremonies or at 
sports events, like soccer, baseball, or sumo, they are “not thinking of” (ishiki shiteinai) 
the emperor, but rather, of the “nation” (kuni).89 Indeed, even if they were thinking of the 
emperor, it would be as a “symbol” (shōchō) of the nation, as the Constitution states. By 
this token, the origin myth of Japan – which claims that the masculine emperor is a direct 
descendant of the Shinto goddess, Amaterasu, and thus of the god, Izanagi, from who the 
universe and Japan were created as recorded in myths contained in the seventh – eighth 
A.D. classics, the Kojiki and Nihon Shoki – would be just a myth.90 Nevertheless the state 
and academics alike are dedicated to demonstrating that a patrilineal lineage does, indeed, 
link the emperor directly to a divine origin. And although the reference to the emperor in 
Kimigayo seems to be mitigated by his postwar demotion to a profane, symbolic status, it 
has been repeatedly pointed out by the Japanese political left that the lyrics do not contain 
                                                
89 This information was relayed in interviews with union members. 
90 The original inscription of the Kimigayo in the Kojiki and Nihon Shoki recalls the function of the timeless 
classics in the 1942 Kyoto symposium on “Overcoming Modernity” (Kindai no Chōkoku). One participant, 
Hayashi Fusao, expostulates at the conclusion of his essay on “The Heart of Imperial Loyalty”: “Japanese 
literature, return to your true nature! You are the progeny of the country. You are the valiant son who, born 
from your country, can now exalt it. You must succeed to the proper lineage and genealogy of Japanese 
literature. Reject all the filth of contemporary literature! The true purity sought by literature can be found in 
the heart of imperial loyalty. You must cultivate only this sense of imperial loyalty as lies within your 
heart! Do not look anywhere else; just walk straight on the path as revealed by this loyalty” (Hayashi, “The 
Heart of Imperial Loyalty,” in Overcoming Modernity: Cultural Identity in Wartime Japan, ed. and trans. 
by Richard F. Calichman (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), pg. 110). 
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mention of the nation, and that an anthem wishing the emperor longevity contradicts the 
democratic values of the postwar nation.91 The imperial reference in Kimigayo practically 
requires disavowal if the song is to be reconciled with democratic ideals. 
As I was to learn, not understanding the meaning of the lyrics – and not even not 
knowing the lyrics – does not prevent affective investment. One night at the apartment of 
two friends, the older of the two remarked of the other: “Can you believe it?! He doesn’t 
know Kimigayo” (Shinjirareru? Kimigayo shiranaino). Giggling in response, the younger 
of the two – in his late-twenties – explained that when he had been growing up in Osaka, 
there had been people who had been against the Kimigayo, and those who had been for it. 
As a result, the Kimigayo had not been sung through his high school years. While he said 
that he could probably sing the song if he were given the lyrics, his partner kept repeating 
behind him, as if in an endless refrain: “Can you believe it?! Can you believe it?!” (Shin-
jirareru?! Shinjirareru?!). At her schools in Tokyo, she said, it had been “normal” (futsū) 
to sing the Kimigayo. Right from elementary school, it had been “normal” (futsū) to sing 
the Kimigayo at school ceremonies. She appeared genuinely surprised that her boyfriend 
did not know the lyrics of Kimigayo. But it was only when I told them that I was working 
with teachers who refused to stand for the Kimigayo that our conversation truly got out of 
hand. It was ironically not my friend who could sing the Kimigayo, but rather, her partner 
who burst out, saying it was “outrageous” (keshikaran) for “public servants” (kōmuin) to 
                                                
91 Of course, teachers in the anti-Hinomaru/Kimigayo movement repeatedly say this. It is a point that has 
similarly been made by the Japanese Communist Party before the Hinomaru and Kimigayo was established 
as the national flag and anthem by law. Thus, Jacques Rancière writes in Hatred of Democracy, trans. Steve 
Corcoran (New York: Verso, 2006): “Democratic government, it says, is bad when it is allowed to be cor-
rupted by democratic society, which wants for everyone to be equal and for all differences to be respected. 
It is good, on the other hand, when it rallies individuals enfeebled by democratic society to the vitality of 
war in order to defend the value of civilization, the values pertaining to the clash of civilizations. The thesis 
of the new hatred of democracy can be succinctly put: there is only one good democracy, the one that re-
presses the catastrophe of democratic civilization” (4). 
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conduct themselves thus. When I retorted that forcing people to stand for the anthem goes 
against the “constitution” (kempō), I was fiercely questioned: “Which part of the constitu-
tion?!” (kempō no doko?!). Struggling to recall the number of the constitutional clause, I 
replied there were probably “Korean residents in Japan” (zainichi chōsenjin) who object-
ed to the Kimigayo. To this, my friend snapped derisively: “They can get out of Japan!!” 
(Nihon kara deteke ba ii!!). A string of invectives followed, in which the public teachers 
were castigated as “stupid” (baka), as speaking “nonsense!” (nansensu!), and referred to 
as a “minority” (mainoritī). In fact, the tirade ceased only when I asked my friend to stop 
speaking thus of people I knew personally. But the episode was rounded nicely off by my 
other friend when she remarked that the “status” (chii) of “public servants” (kōmuin) had 
recently declined, not least on account of similar actions taken by other servants. As if the 
teachers were partly to blame for this generally sorry state of affairs, she added that more 
and more people do not know how to sing the Kimigayo. 
 In his essay on “Fetishism,” Sigmund Freud observes that the fetish is retained as 
the “last impression before the uncanny and traumatic” encounter with sexual difference. 
The encounter is thereby “scotomized,” but its trace is retained in a series of substitutions 
that operate across translation to repress and disavow the originary encounter.92 Endless 
disputes regarding the legitimacy of a female heir to the imperial family already discloses 
the fetishism of the imperial figure to consist in a phallocentrism as pervasive in Japanese 
society as the imperial family is representative of it.93 As Dohi Nobuo writes, the “10.23 
                                                
92 Sigmund Freud, “Fetishism,” pg. 152, 155. 
93 Alex Martin, “Imperial law revisited as family shrinks, Emperor ages,” in The Japan Times, 16/12/2011. 
On this note, Tomiko Yoda writes of the “Fall of Maternal Society” in contemporary Japan but she 
frames this “Fall” in terms of a neoconservative “surge of paternalism” which “takes for granted the basic 
assumption that Japan is in one way or another a maternal society” (“The Rise and Fall of Maternal Socie-
ty,” in Japan After Japan: Social and Cultural Life from the Recessionary 1990s to the Present, ed. Tomiko 
Yoda and Harry Harootunian (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 239 - 240). Even if contemporary 
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Directive” – and the transformation of the school into a top-down workplace – coincided 
with a restructuring of the Tokyōi to reflect gender in staff listings. Kawarai Junko writes 
of the “prohibition and enforcing of punishment of teaching sexual education” (Seikyōiku 
no kinshi to shobun no kyōkō) that likewise coincided with the “10.23 Directive.”94 And 
if not Nezu Kimiko herself, it was “comfort women” (jūgun ianfu) that at once threatened 
and prompted the patriarchal order to restore things to their place. Sexual slavery was not 
an appropriate topic for a “home economics” (kateika) teacher to teach. Indeed, as Nezu 
herself explained to me when I first met her, the “forcing” (kyōsei) of the Hinomaru and 
                                                                                                                                            
Japan reveals “a form of power that increasingly bypasses the mediation of social identification,” signalled 
by the fall of maternal society, the maternal has nonetheless emerged as a point of negativity that facilitates 
the emergence of neoconservative paternalism (Ibid, 270 – 271). 
As the outrage and murderous violence triggered by the subject of “comfort women” (jūgun ianfu) 
demonstrates (see Ch. 3), the negativity of the postwar legacy – and of the other, who confronts the state 
with a guilt that must be repressed – is figured in terms of the feminine. As if writing of the endlessly re-
peated Kimigayo, Samuel Weber writes of “Freud’s Man Moses” that the unity of monotheism is founded 
on the repression of the constitutive murder and guilt whose return assumes the form of an auditory experi-
ence: “an ongoing process of ringing out, resounding, and in so doing fading away.” The return of this act 
is not compatible with “representational thinking,” however, and requires a repetition that entails the trans-
formation of guilt into “messianic hope” (“Doing Away With Freud’s Man Moses,” in Targets of Oppor-
tunity: On the Militarization of Thinking (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005), pg. 75 – 80). Like 
the Sirens of Adorno and Horkheimer’s Dialectic, the “resounding” of guilt triggers a repetition: “If the 
Sirens know everything that has happened, they demand the future as its price, and their promise of a happy 
homecoming is the deception by which the past entraps a humanity filled with longing” (Ibid, 26). Figured 
at once as danger and lure, the Sirens threaten the “sexual identity” of their listeners: “what proved most 
irresistable to Odysseus was in fact the (“male”) promise of a knowledge so absolute it would rupture the 
bonds of finite subjectivity by assuming the impossible standpoint of the whole” (Rebecca Comay, “Ador-
no’s Siren Song,” in New German Critique (81 (2000)), pg. 24 – 25) History itself is at stake in the call of 
the Sirens, which structure a political discourse in their very impossibility. Thus Rebecca Comay says that 
the Sirens “threaten to disturb the very economy of life and death on which the very order of narrative de-
pends,” and would make a “living death of every present” (Ibid, 24 – 25) Listening to the Sirens, Odysseus 
must undergo self-mutilation – repetition – in order to maintain his self-identity. 
94 See Dohi Nobuo’s Sore wa, Mikkoku Kara Hajimatta: Kōchō vs. Tokyōto Kyōiku Iinkai, and Kawarai 
Junko’s Gakkō wa Zōkibayashi, pg. 129. In her book, Kawarai Junko recalls how she asked a bureaucrat of 
the Tokyo Metropolitan Board of Education how to refer to the genitalia, if sexual education was prohibited. 
She was told to call it a “penis” (ochinchin). But what then of female genitalia, she asked. A “girl’s penis” 
(onna no ko no ochinchin), he replied. See Kawarai, Gakkō wa Zōkibayashi, pg. 130. Notably, this bureau-
crat’s reply recalls Luce Irigaray’s observation that the inscription of the vagina as an absence serves to 
confirm the presence of the phallus. The female genitalia is what the male genitalia is not. Yet, this figuring 
of absence conceals a “hole in men’s signifying economy,” of which the “eternal female” – the “woman” or 
onna, as workers in Sanya would say – constitutes yet another negation. See Luce Irigaray, Speculum of the 
Other Woman, trans. by Gillian C. Gill (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), pg. 50. As the recent court 
case against the self-professed “vagina artist” (vagina ātisuto), Megumi Igarashi, shows, the “heterogeneity” 
of the feminine threatens sociality and unleashes a fetish violence (Ibid, pg. 50). In a nation whose pornog-
raphy industry reaps billions of yen, the state charged Igarashi with “obscenity” (waisetsu) for distributing 
3-D scans of her vagina. See Rokudenashiko, “Mangaka, Rokudenashiko,” 5/8/2015. 
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Kimigayo merely constitutes the tip of the iceberg. With an unfamiliar term – jūgun ianfu 
– whose implications Nezu literally had to explain to me, Nezu shifted the conversation 
back to the missing, constitutive term of the emperor. But the unit of the imperial family 
is overdetermined in the denegations that install it as the exclusive, unitary symbol of the 
nation. Obscurely located both within and without the ceremonial hall – not quite visible, 
yet constituting the field of visibility within which students and teachers give themselves 
to be seen bowing and singing – the figure of the emperor himself is situated in a chain of 
substitutions that disavows the horror of fascism whence the postwar emperor originated. 
The emperor constitutes that symbol, displaced by the Hinomaru, towards which students 
“bow” (rei) at the beginning of the graduation and entrance ceremonies. Likewise, across 
translation of the classical Japanese lyrics, the emperor emerges as the subject to whom 
the formulaic one-stanza words are addressed: “May Your Reign/Continue for a thousand, 
eight thousand generations.” Certain statements, however, put a stop to the slippage along 
the chain of substitutions. As a mere “symbol” of the “nation,” the figure of the emperor 
not only disavows the horrors inscribed in its past.95 As the very name given to this form 
of disavowal, it constitutes the repetition of fascism in the present. 
                                                
95 Of the horror of warfare in the name of the “emperor” (tennō), consider a brief excerpt from Chang’s The 
Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II (New York: BasicBooks, 1997): 
 “… 
—Death by dogs. One diabolical means of torture was to bury victims to their waist and watch 
them get ripped apart by German shepherds. Witnesses saw Japanese soldiers strip a victim naked and di-
rect German shepherds to bite the sensitive areas of the body. The dogs not only ripped open his belly but 
jerked out his intestines along the ground for a distance. 
 The incidents mentioned above are only a fraction of the methods that the Japanese used to tor-
ment their victims. The Japanese saturated victims in acid, impaled babies with bayonets, hung people by 
their tongues. One Japanese reporter who later investigated the Rape of Nanking learned that at least on 
Japanese soldier tore the heart and liver out of a Chinese victim to eat them. Even genitals, apparently, were 
consumed: a Chinese soldier who escaped from Japanese custody saw several dead people in the streets 
with their penises cut off. He was later told that the penises were sold to Japanese customers who believed 




 The figure of the emperor has notably retained a certain trauma in the present. 
Some teachers become so possessed by the dreadful prospect of the ceremonies that they 
cannot sleep at night, or fall depressed. In order to go to sleep, one music teacher said she 
had to “drive out” (oidasu) the Kimigayo by putting on other music. It is this trauma, 
however, that gives sense to the image of the faultless, bureaucratic machinery enacted in 
the ceremonies, for the figure of the emperor makes it clear whence derives the necessity 
of the gestures enacted in the ceremonies. As the very Subject from which the nation (and 
the postwar nation) first emerged, the mythic emperor stages and embodies the originary 
difference to which the life of the nation owes its due.96 The gestures of “rising” (kiritsu), 
“bowing” (rei), and “singing in unison” (seishō ) would return this debt. Yet, there can be 
no final settling of accounts because the imperial family constitutes the very source of the 
nation. The gesture is given without any prospect of return – indeed, the awkwardness of 
the ceremonies consists in the absence of a reciprocating figure – and with a violence that 
repeats the constitutive disavowals that would install the emperor as a total representation 
of Japanese society, absolved of guilt. 
It comes as no surprise that, albeit less commonly known, the imperial family has 
been surrounded by a “taboo” (tabū) called the “Chrysanthemum taboo” (kiku jishuku). 
                                                                                                                                            
 
If the scale and nature of the executions in Nanking are difficult for us to comprehend, so are the scale and 
nature of the rapes …” (88 – 89). 
96 Claude Lévi-Strauss, “The Structural Study of Myth,” in Structural Anthropology, trans. by Claire Jacob-
sen and Brooke Schoepf (United States: Basic Books, 1963), pg. 210. As the form of this originary differ-
ence, Lévi-Strauss notes of myth that it is “language, functioning on an especially high level where mean-
ing succeeds practically at “taking off” from the linguistic ground on which it keeps moving” (Ibid, 210). 
Lévi-Strauss anticipates Roland Barthes’ observation in 1971 that the mythological has shifted into the 
mythic, and that the density of the phrase may have taken the place of even the sentence: “mythologies are 
succeded by a more formal, and thereby, I believe, more penetrating idiolectology, whose operative con-
cepts are no longer sign, signifier, signifier, and connotation, but citation, reference, stereotype” (Barthes, 
The Rustle of Language, trans. by Richard Howe (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), pg. 68). 
Lévi-Strauss and Barthes lay the groundwork for a consideration of the density of the phrase – or, in this 
case, the gesture of standing and singing – as a readily mobilizable form of disavowal analogous to the act 
of killing. See Chapter 3 and Chapter 10. 
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More literally translated as the “Chrysanthemum restraint” or “self-restraint” (jishuku) on 
criticizing the “Chrysanthemum” – “emperor” (tennō) or imperial system – the metaphor 
itself defers to and accords the emperor an unblemished place. Norma Field describes the 
atmosphere of “self-restraint” (jishuku) on the occasion of the Showa emperor’s death in 
1989. In the Realm of a Dying Emperor, Field writes:  
Daily reverential reporting on the body of the emperor throughout the island na-
tion both provoked and reinforced a massively orchestrated “self-restraint,” or 
jishuku, a newly popularized word. Some of the losses – the expunging of felici-
tous wording such as “nice day” from commercials, and of alcohol from political 
fund-raisers – were not regrettable in themselves. But autumn is a time of re-
newed vigor, commercial and otherwise, of recovery from brutal July and August. 
So it was with a certain regret that neighborhood festivals were canceled one after 
another, along with weddings in November, the preferred month for matrimony. 
On field days at school, races began limply without the pistol shot. Not surpris-
ingly, the costs of abstemious behavior were borne unevenly, by the makers and 
vendors of plastic masks, costume jewelry, and goldfish for scooping carnival 
stalls; by caterers for weddings and other festivities; by taxi drivers who trans-
ported merrymakers and entertainers who kept them happy once they got there. 
Like the vampire jokes, the frustration of such people occupying the extensive pe-
riphery of prosperity circulated beneath the surface of official reporting. 
 
In addition to the national promotion of “self-restraint,” numerous preparations 
were made for the day of the unthinkable itself: movie theaters consulted depart-
ment stores about whether to close, and for how many days, or how to stay open 
and convey mourning. Athletic facilities consulted movie theaters. Decisions were 
made about supervising audience conduct at the instant of the announcement, 
about the status of the game, depending on the inning. Television stations, led by 
the government-owned NHK, wrangled only slightly over the number of days to 
be set aside for special programming: other than documentaries chronicling his 
late majesty’s achievements, to be followed by documentaries chronicling the 
prolonged but altogether promising crown princeship of his son the new emperor, 
nature programs were the fare. FM stations stocked up on subdued recordings of 
Bach and Beethoven. Most of these arrangements had been in place for several 
years. In the course of “self-restraint” they were refined and often augmented. 97 
 
Though this atmosphere of “self-restraint” (jishuku) recalls the one which prevailed in the 
immediate aftermath of 3.11, many teachers either had not heard of the “Chrysanthemum 
                                                
97 Norma Field, In the Realm of a Dying Emperor: Japan at Century’s End (New York: Vintage Books, 
1993), pg. 21 – 23. 
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taboo,” or were hard put to identify a specific, formalized set of taboos against criticizing 
the emperor. 
Instead, teachers took the liberty of transposing such a set of taboos into the gen-
eral structure of the workplace which prohibits going against superiors. The hierarchy of 
the imperial system was, in effect, transposed into a model of Japanese society, and more 
specifically, of the Japanese workplace. As a condensation of what Durkheim would have 
referred to as the social, the hierarchical model of the patriarchal imperial family unit was 
always-already in effect in general society. The effectivity of the imperial system in eve-
ryday life was attributed by one teacher to a proverb – cited numerous times, by different 
teachers in different contexts – describing the normative principle of deference to authori-
ty in Japan: “It is no meddling with our betters” (Nagai mono ni wa makarero). An other 
teacher referenced Chie Nakane’s Japanese Society – and, in its indigenous title: Human 
Relations in a Vertical Society (Tateshakai no Ningen Kankei) – as a book that described 
a society based on the very principle of verticality instantiated in the imperial system. On 
the contrary, this teacher wished to foster a society based on a principle of extending out 
to the “sides” (yoko).98 
Only in reference to one, prominent incident was the actual person of the emperor 
brought up. In a mass-mediated and well-known encounter, the emperor had told the head 
of the Tokyōi at the time that the implementation of the national flag and anthem “would, 
after all, be preferable if it were not forced” (yahari, kyōsei ni naru to iu koto de wa nai 
koto ga nozomashī).99 Replete with double-negations and formal words that make it hard 
to understand what the emperor is saying, the statement was initially welcomed by many 
                                                
98 See the Introduction for references to anthropological literature on hierarchy and ‘Japanese’ society. 
99 Dohi Nobuo, Sore wa, Mikkoku Kara Hajimatta: Kōchō vs. Tokyōto Kyōiku Iinkai, pg. 11 - 12. 
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of the teachers opposed to the “10.23 Directive.” If partly to promote the public appeal of 
their movement, teachers quoted the emperor saying that the flag and anthem should not 
be forced in schools. On closer inspection, however, the emperor’s statement dissimulates 
its meaning. It is unclear if the emperor says that “forcing” (kyōsei ) should not be done at 
all, and that people should be free to do as they wish; or that it is, “after all” (yahari), too 
bad that forcing should have to be undertaken, since it would be “preferable” (nozomashī) 
if everyone stood of their own will. Does yahari – “after all,” “after all is said and done,” 
“still,” or “all the same” – suggest that, “after all is said and done,” it would be preferable 
if “forcing” (kyōsei) did not take place? Or that, “after all,” it is a shameful state of affairs 
that forcing should have to be undertaken? Or that, “all the same,” it would be preferable 
if people would just stand of their own volition? Or that, “still,” forcing is a bad thing, no 
matter how it is justified? And does ni naru – “be,” “become,” or “turn out” – signify it is 
too bad that there “is” forcing? Or that it would be optimal if forcing had not “turned out” 
to be necessary? Or that it would be preferable if forcing would “become” unnecessary? 
And who is the subject of the nozamashī – “preferable,” “desirable,” or “good” – whose 
negative, nozomashikaranu, suggests that something is “undesirable” or “unwelcome”? Is 
it not the absence of a pronoun that facilitates a remobilization of the emperor’s words, be 
it by disobedient teachers, or the state? One teacher emphasized that a “taboo” (tabū) on 
criticizing the imperial system is effective precisely in the interpretation that the emperor 
was speaking in the interest of persons who oppose the “10.23 Directive.” If the emperor 
makes such a statement, the teacher said, the statement comes to assume the meaning that 
it would be “preferable” that everyone stood of their own will. It “inevitably becomes so” 
(kanarazu sō naru), the teacher said. Indeed, the imperial court representative interpreted 
 109 
the emperor’s statement as: “I believe that the aim of his majesty was to say that it should 
be voluntarily hoisted, that is, that it is desirable that it be sung” (Heika no shushi wa, ji-
hatsuteki ni kakageru, arui wa utau koto ga konomashī to iwareta no da to omoimasu).100 
The emperor’s comment is transposed into the vision of a frictionless society from 
which the trace of violence has been dissimulated in a gesture, phrase or form that consti-
tutes a repetition of this violence. Many teachers noted that the general, public impression 
of the imperial family is that of a mere surface “image” (imēji); devoid of critical content, 
yet appearing on TV on yearly occasions, international visits, or when visiting Fukushima 
and areas affected by the March 11, 2011 tsunami. 
Harboring a constitutive negativity that endangers the innocuous self-evidence of 
the “emperor” (tennō) with a limitless set of horrifying associations – the institutionalized 
sexual slavery of “comfort women” (jūgun ianfu), Unit 731, “forced labor” (kyōsei renkō), 
the “Rape of Nanking” (Nanking Daigyakusatsu), the “radiation” (hōshanō) which ended 
World War II, 20 – 30 million foreign nationals and 2.5 – 3.3 million Japanese murdered, 
Yasukuni Shrine, the “compulsory mass suicide” (shūdan jiketsu) of Okinawan nationals, 
Kamikaze pilots forced to die, and now, “the right to collective self-defense” (shūdanteki 
jieiken), “radiation” (hōshanō), and the reinvigorated shamelessness of the Japanese state 
… – the contingent figure of the sitting teacher exposes the violence which attends every 
instance of reference to social totality. In another context, this enactment of social totality 
recalls James T. Siegel observing of the Javanese funeral photograph that: “There seems 
to be nothing outside the picture; nothing more to the corpse than what is visible.” Still, a 
certain line must be drawn which separates life from death; a separation and containment 
                                                
100 Ibid, pg. 12. Sure enough, shortly after the emperor issued this statement, pressure on schools to perform 
the Kimigayo was redoubled (Ibid, 12). 
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that is achieved, Siegel writes, by reference to the propriety of high Javanese language, in 
which death – as a “property of the world,” like the funeral picture – is properly ‘dead.’101 
But like the figure of the sitting teacher – and signalling Sanya, whose distinctive feature 
to outsiders was once its “smell” (nioi) – the odor of decaying corpses in Java disturbs the 
line separating life from death. Taking on the force of “contagion,” odor threatens the self 
with death.102 Thus, too, the figure of the sitting teacher returns, threatening disobedience 
of all and sundry. For s/he occupies the place of that constitutive negative and impossible 
kernel in relation to which the performative reference to social totality is enacted, at once 
as its failure and ground of intensification. 
                                                
101 James T. Siegel, “Images and Odors in Javanese Practices Surrounding Death,” in Indonesia (36 (1983)). 
Siegel writes: “high Javanese is not thought of as originating in the person of the speaker. It is talked about 
as though it were a property of the world. To learn it is to learn the nature of the world; to show that one 
knows the “right” names for things and the modes of address that somehow inhere in the person to whom 
one speaks. By contrast, low Javanese is what people speak naturally, without training. High Javanese, 
originating in the world, reflects it as it is, or, rather, as it is when it is named properly. It is not considered 
identical to one’s intentions, as is low Javanese, or, even, to the world itself; it is merely the world embod-
ied in speech. It thus is always secondary; a second language which, always being thought of as language 
not referent, exists by its dependency on the world. It reflects the world, it is the image of the world in lan-
guage … the corpse, of course, cannot speak at all in either high or low Javanese. It nevertheless becomes 
an image of proper speech because it refers to a realm of potential disruption which exists apart from it. 
The corpse is ‘dead,’ which in Javanese usage that the roh, or soul, or spirit, is separated from it” (7). 




The Restoration of Shame 
 
The notion that Japanese society has overcome internal frictions to attain a perfect 
state of historical closure has been repeated many times before. Most notorious, perhaps, 
is Alexandre Kojève’s 1959 footnote in his Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, where 
he claims that the Japanese have already been living life at the “end of History” for three 
centuries. After a brief visit to Japan, Kojève says the Japanese are capable of living a life 
of “totally formalized values,” in which the “form” of values has been detached from the 
historical or social “content” of signification. For Kojève, the ultimate sign that Japan has 
arrived at this posthistorical end is that every Japanese could, in principle, commit a “per-
fectly “gratuitous” suicide.”” In Japan, the pre-existence of universal recognition enables 
suicide to be a pure sign of itself – hence, “suicide” – without reference to latent values 
for which life might otherwise have been put at stake.1 
Like Roland Barthes’ equally fictional Empire of Signs, Kojève’s misrecognition 
of posthistoric Japan assumes scandalous proportions in light of the Japanese suicide rate, 
which has consistently topped 30,000 every year since 1998.2 With one out of every six 
people living under the poverty-line, the fiction of a perfectly satisfied, homogeneous and 
frictionless middle-class society – as if there were no other classes! – has been shattered 
                                                
1 Alexandre Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. 
James H. Nichols (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980), pg. 159 – 162. 
2 As Adorno and Horkheimer observe in the Dialectic of Enlightenment, the suicide rate – the mathematical 
number – assumes a veritably “numinous” character: the enlightened world is filled with conspiratorial 
“demons,” and is “radiant” (if not spectral) with “calamity” (21). In “The Age of the World Picture,” Mar-
tin Heidegger similarly writes of a “mathematical” metaphysic which forces a “relationship to oneself as 
the normative realm.” As the “world” shrinks to become ontological “picture,” however, the dash of math 
and science toward the “gigantic” casts an “invisible shadow” of the “incalculable” into a “space with-
drawn from representation” (“The Age of the World Picture,” in The Question Concerning Technology and 
Other Essays, trans. by William Lovitt (New York: Garland Publishing, 1977), pg. 119, 131, 135 – 136). 
See the Introduction for specifics regarding the suicide rate. 
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by the yearly repetition of the suicide rate, which has emerged as a target of reduction for 
the state.3 Though the rate dropped to 27,858 in 2012 and has stayed below 30,000 since 
then, the relatively high suicide rate in the “youth” (wakamono) – the highest among the 
G-7 nations in 2014 – indicates that the Ministry of Education is not quite succeeding in 
instilling a biopolitical “zest for life” (ikiru chikara) in the national youth.4 
But the observation that Japan’s claim to a “posthistorical” world consists in the 
detachment of “form” from “content” is nonetheless suggestive. In fact, Kojève writes 
that in order to maintain this place – as if the end had not, after all, been reached – the 
posthistorical man “must continue to” detach form from content.5 While it might appear 
that Japan had arrived at the end of history, the maintenance of this end requires a certain 
denegation – a “negating negativity” – through which the very category of the historical 
would be overcome.6 As the negativity which subverts the universal order of equivalence, 
the heterogeneous voice of the laborer – who, unlike the putatively homogeneous middle-
class, has nothing – must be negated in turn. 
Kojève’s declaration that Japanese society had arrived at a posthistorical stage has 
gone through a number of iterations by critical theorists in Japan, most significantly right 
after the peak of the 1980s bubble economy. Notably, the bubble itself coincided with the 
                                                
3 As a negativity to be overcome that enables a certain normative, political discourse, the Japanese suicide 
rate itself emerges as a “Nation-Thing.” From within a range of radiant, numinous, and spectral figures of 
decline – domestic violence, child abuse, environmental degradation, failing education, state debt, crime – 
the myth of the “suicide rate” works as the organizing, impossible kernel of a political discourse that insists 
on a proper way to die: namely, for the nation and not as an economic liability. See the Introduction and 
Conclusion. 
4 See Health Press, “Netto o Katsuyō Shita Wakamono no Jisatsu Taisaku, Nihon no Wakamono no 
Jisatsuritsu wa Izen to Shite Takai!”, 5/7/2015. 
5 As Derrida points out in Specters of Marx, Kojève’s footnote is not as self-evident as it seems. Not only 
does Japanese “snobbery” emerge over against the “animalism” of the United States, but the injunction 
“must” or “should” (doit) implies that the detachment of “form” from “content” harbors the possibility of a 
“future-to-come.” At the end of the historical, when the limit of historicity is reached, it is not “content” but 
the “form” – the “law of the law” – that becomes the injunction which promises “some historicity as future-
to-come” (Derrida, “Specters,” 91 – 93). 
6 Alexandre Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, pg. 21 – 22. 
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introduction of neoliberal reforms under Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone.7 The ‘80s 
was witness to both the massive privatization of Japan National Railway and prodigious 
spendings, the latter of which led writers like Asada Akira to describe an “infantile capi-
talism” that functions “all the more smoothly and effectively” than in the West.8 In the 
late ‘80s, Karatani Kōjin likewise points to the ease with which Japan had slipped into the 
postmodern “information-consumption society”; attributing this to the fact that there was 
no such thing as premodernity in Japan to begin with: postmodernity just rehabilitated the 
nineteenth-century concept “that all is language.” In an all-too-familiar reference to pure 
external “form” – under which the interior subject is negated – Karatani periodicizes and 
brackets Japan’s twentieth century, as if it never even took place.9 As if the collapse of 
                                                
7 See David Harvey’s A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). The pri-
vatization of Japan National Railways was followed by the suicides of 200 former workers. See Nakano 
Hiroshi, We Live on the Railway: Railway Struggle Against Privatization, trans. by International Solidarity 
Committee of Doro Chiba (Chiba: Workers’ Learning Center, Doro-Chiba, 2003), pg. 5.  
8 Asada explains the “functioning” of Japanese capitalism by reference to what he calls an infantile, “other-
oriented” mode of “relative” competition, in which the childlike subject has not internalized the values of 
competition under capitalism. Unlike the Western, Weberian “subject,” who has interiorized the value of 
capitalist competition to the point of striving endlessly to overcome her or himself, the Japanese child – 
who, stripped of interiority, is therefore also not quite a “subject” proper – exhibits a “purely” external and 
“relativistic” competition. In addition to the seemingly frictionless manner in which capital would circulate 
through this so-called Japanese child, infantile capitalism would show an exceptional aptitude for “games 
of differentiation”; in short, for the pure surface “play” of signification through form. As if to give the lie to 
his own argument, Asada concludes his essay with a parodic laugh but even this “laugh” is less than innoc-
uous because the misrecognition has been made repeatedly and insistently that Japan was always-already 
postmodern (Asada, “Infantile Capitalism and Japan’s Postmodernism: A Fairy Tale,” trans. by Kyoko Sel-
den, in Postmodernism and Japan, ed. Masao Miyoshi and Harry Harootunian (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 1989), pg. 275 – 278). Of course, the obsession with surface invokes other theorists of postmodernity. 
But even when Jean Baudrillard writes of the “precession of simulacra” in Simulacra and Simulation – in 
which “signs of the real” have been substituted for the “real,” to the point at which the map “precedes the 
territory,” as “a hyperreal” – he notes a sense of the loss of the real as a result of which “nostalgia assumes 
its full meaning.” Side by side with the “radical negation of the sign as value” – with the disappearance of 
“every reference,” every sign is “exchanged for itself,” resulting in a “gigantic simulacrum” – Baudrillard 
observes that there emerges “a strategy of deterrence” that attempts to produce the “real,” but that only 
cancels any sense of the authentic original (Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, trans. by Sheila Faria 
Glaser (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1994), pg. 1 – 2, 6 – 7, 9). 
9 Karatani Kōjin, “One Spirit, Two Nineteenth Centuries,” trans. by Alan Wolfe, in Postmodernism and 
Japan, ed. by Masao Miyoshi and Harry Harootunian (Durham: Duke University Press, 1989), pg. 270 – 
271. Karatani describes postmodernity in Japan as the return to an Edo “paradise of fools” (Ibid, 271). In 
the late 1980s, Karatani Kōjin says that the ease with which has Japan entered postmodernity can be ex-
plained by the fact that postmodernity in Japan constitutes a “rehabilitation of the nineteenth century.” 
Postmodern Japan marks a return to the origins of its nineteenth century. The twentieth century – modernity 
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the bubble economy, the recessionary ‘90s and the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis had done 
nothing to act as correctives to facile theorizations of frictionless Japanese postmodernity, 
Azuma Hiroki published Otaku: Japan’s Database Animals in 2001. Azuma claims that 
commodities and the computer screen satisfy all needs, having altogether supplanted oth-
er social relations. In Japan, he says, all “objects of desire” can easily be acquired “with-
out all that troublesome communication, through fast food or the sex industry.” Thus, in a 
reversal of Kojève, Azuma says that Japanese society has reverted to a posthistorical state 
of sheer animalism.10 
In order for such theorizations of an end of history be true, however, capital must 
circulate to perfection, and – unlike Marx’s worker, who protests the extraction of surplus 
from her or his labor – all workers must be perfectly satisfied, offering zero resistance.11 
The notion of a posthistorical, frictionless and capitalist society can be traced back to the 
misrecognition engendered by the commodity form. As Marx says in his opening chapter 
                                                                                                                                            
and the aesthetic of modernism, that is – was so suddenly imposed on nineteenth century Japan, that the 
already-existing aesthetic of “pure surface, devoid of all meaning and interiority,” was simply suppressed. 
Consequently, the emergence of twentieth century Japanese literature took on characteristics of “meaning 
(interiority),” but never achieved the totalized worlds produced by Western literary works. Rather, along-
side processes of post-industrialization, Japan has gradually been “sliding” back into into the aesthetic of its 
nineteenth century, namely, a “pure play of language.” In fact, there has never really been an interior, mod-
ern “subject” under this purely surface play of postmodern signifiers. Thus, Karatani even says Barthes was 
correct to have recognized “a place of absence” in contemporary Japan. The ease with which Japan has 
slipped into the postmodern “information-consumption society” bespeaks the fact that there was no such 
thing as premodernity in Japan to begin with, and postmodernity only rehabilitated the nineteenth century 
notion “that all is language” (Ibid, 262 – 264, 265, 268, 270 – 271). In effect, Karatani sidelines the very 
process of Japan’s modernization, not to mention the trauma of World War II. Not unlike capitalist eco-
nomic crises, such events emerge as aberrations in Karatani’s schematization. 
10 Azuma Hiroki, Otaku: Japan’s Database Animals, trans. by Jonathan E. Abel and Shion Kono (Minne-
apolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001), pg. 87. Azuma therefore does not share Karatani, Asada, or 
Kojève’s preoccupation with “form” in Japan, but he practically claims that the otaku subject has been ab-
solutely subsumed by the technological medium of the computer screen, and essentially, of the commodity 
form. In the absence of such a subject, no historical values are left to be desired, and Japan has quite simply 
arrived at the end of history. 
11 Unlike the “voice of the worker” in Marx’s chapter on “The Working Day,” the Japanese worker never 
protests: “The commodity I have sold you differs from the ordinary crowd of commodities in that its use 
creates value, a greater value than it costs.” By appearing purely equivalent to the value at which their labor 
is purchased, the Japanese worker gives her or himself to be totally consumed by the limitless drive of capi-
tal for surplus extraction. Without giving any resistance, s/he would effectively hand her or himself over to 
“premature exhaustion and death” (Marx, Capital, 342, 376 – 377). 
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on the “The Commodity” – that “elementary form” in which the wealth of capitalist soci-
eties appears – the social force in which this form of value circulates has always-already 
occurred. “Reflection begins post festum.”12 Under capitalism, the act of exchange has 
always-already put the machinery of circulation into effect. Through a magical effectivity, 
whereby the thing exchanged is equivalent, the social force of circulation operates 
through a misrecognition that disavows knowledge to the contrary. Hence Jacques Derri-
da writes of a certain “visor effect” that conceals a “spectral asymmetry” of the commodi-
ty form. The equivalent form of the fetishized commodity masks the violently non-
equivalent basis on which surplus is extracted from labor. Yet, “we feel ourselves being 
looked at” … by “someone as someone other,” whose gaze both exceeds and constitutes 
the field of visibility. In the “absolute anteriority” of this gaze, the synchronous time of 
capitalism and the nation is interrupted, making a “law” of anachrony.13 
With two decades of recession, punctured along the way by the 1995 Sarin gas at-
tack in the Tokyo subway system, the Kobe earthquake of 1995, the 1997 Asian Financial 
Crisis, and the 2011 tsunami and nuclear disaster in Northeast Japan and Fukushima, the 
sense of an endless economic crisis under late capitalism has become increasingly de-
fined. As Tomiko Yoda writes, the anxieties that accompanied this sense of endless crisis 
crystallized and entered public discourse in the late 1990s in phrases like the “unease” 
                                                
12 Marx, Capital, pg. 125, 168. Marx writes in the first chapter of Capital, “The Commodity,” that this “el-
ementary form” of value constitutes the form of appearance of the wealth of capitalist societies (Ibid, 125). 
As money, this form of appearance of value is both an abstraction that has been removed from all other 
commodities and is that commodity in which all other commodities express their value. Like the other (al-
beit forced) act of standing and singing the national anthem, the effectivity of exchange – in which the 
money form and the economic order of capitalism is crystallized – has always-already been achieved in the 
act of doing it. Hence, it might be known that the object exchanged is not equivalent to the value given for 
it, but the very act of exchange consists in a magical effectivity whereby the thing exchanged is equivalent. 
13 Derrida, Specters of Marx, pg. 6. 
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(fuan) of living an “endless everyday” (owarinaki nichijō).14 The everyday emerged as 
the site of anxiety and unevenness excessive to the massive organization of a capitalist, 
synchronous time in which the financialization of capital demanded so-called ‘flexibility’ 
of its workers. While theorizations of an end to the endlessness persisted with iterations 
like that of Azuma Hiroki, it was finally the state that stepped in to contain the specter of 
unevenness by suturing an essential Japanese “culture” (bunka) onto a general population 
chronically beset by the upheavals of capitalism. In education, this implementation of 
state discourse was to take the two-fold process of producing an obedient subject – sub-
jectivization – in making visible – by shaming – the anachronic elements threatening to 
disrupt the unified, synchronous time of the nation.15 
 
Capitalism and especially capitalist crises require a dispensable population willing 
to bear the burden of surplus extraction. While the March 11th, 2011 tsunami and nuclear 
disaster demonstrated that coincidence (of nuclear disaster) and repetition spectralize the 
contemporaneous present of capitalism, the economic loss subsequent to 3/11 only added 
to a plethora of other factors – the two-decade-long recession, the national debt, the de-
mise of the “life-time employment” (shūshin koyō) system, suicides, poverty – which 
have made it imperative for the Japanese state to mobilize a docile labor force. The future 
subject of this labor force must take “responsibility” (sekinin) for survival, as if economic 
                                                
14 Yoda, “Roadmap,” pg. 34 - 35. See also Yumiko Iida, “Between the Technique of Living an Endless 
Routine and the Madness of Absolute Degree Zero: Japanese Identity and the Crisis of Modernity in the 
1990s,” in Positions: East Asia Critiques (8.2 (2000)). 
15 By ‘visible,’ I refer to the public distinction that attaches to the departure from the normative and obvious. 
On this note, the “accent” (hatsuon) of a foreigner is as ‘visible’ as the “smell” (nioi) of their cooking. 
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forces constituted natural ones, in spite of the fact that – and particularly under circum-
stances in which – accountability clearly rests with capital, and the capitalist state.16 
It rarely occurs now that two teachers from the same school remain seated during 
the ceremonies. This is both because the number of sitting teachers has drastically dimin-
ished and because the Tokyōi assigns teaching posts that isolate backtalking teachers 
from each other. In the rare event that two teachers from the same workplace do sit 
through the ceremonies together, it becomes the subject of much talk and celebration 
among teachers opposed to the “10.23 Directive.” Indeed, the occasions when two teach-
ers from the same school sat through the ceremonies gave rise to elation among disobedi-
ent teachers, as if it confirmed the sociality of the act within the performance itself. As 
Steven Connor says in Dumbstruck, the act of voicing – or, in this case, not voicing – is 
split from itself, so that the (dyadic) subject is at once speaker and recipient of her or his 
voice: “I cannot speak without putting myself in the position of the one who hears my 
voice; without becoming, in principle at least, my own interlocutor.”17 To find another 
person sitting through the ceremonies with ‘you’ is, in effect, to have the other within you 
confirmed. On the other hand, when any one teacher decides to sit, s/he does so knowing 
that s/he will almost definitely be the only teacher sitting. Because “everyone” (minna) is 
standing, the act of sitting is structured as a visible departure from the social norm. In ad-
dition, the sitting teacher is frequently castigated by the principal, sub-principal or Tokyōi 
representative who walks over to the teacher during the ceremony to tell them to stand; if 
the teacher fails to do so, the fact of the act is officially “witnessed” (gennin) – recorded 
                                                
16 See the introduction for an in-depth consideration of the historically contingent demands placed on youth. 
In light of socialism, it would be mistaken to posit capitalism as the all-encompassing economic system. 
17 Steven Connor, Dumbstruck: A Cultural History of Ventriloquism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000), pg. 5. Connor continues: “And yet I must participate in my voice only by becoming apart from it: 
indeed, it is only because I am always apart from my voice that such participation is possible” (5). 
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on a piece of paper – for the purpose of punishment. Hence, teachers imagine that their 
act of sitting was regarded by the vast majority of students as “strange” (hen); an expla-
nation was necessary on the few occasions when teachers were confronted individually 
by students afterwards.18 Similarly, one teacher recounted how younger teachers ap-
proached him at an informal after-work drinking party to ask him why he remained seat-
ed during the ceremonies; as if the act, in itself, made no sense. On another occasion, 
however, this teacher had been approached by a colleague who said he admired the act of 
sitting and wished that he could do the same, but that he did not have the “courage” (yūki). 
Suffice it to say that, short of the other marginal students, teachers, principals and guests 
who share in the sentiment of wishing to remain seated, the act of sitting is structured as a 
visible departure from the norm. As opposed to the self-evident and “obvious” (atarimae) 
act of standing, which “everyone” (minna) does, sitting gives rise to a range of responses 
that vary from calling it “strange” (hen) to “outrageous” (keshikaran). 
 In a reversal whose parallel can be found in multiple sites, the threatened figure of 
the sitting teacher is transformed into the threatening. In court, the Tokyōi says sitting 
teachers disturb the “order” (chitsujo) of the ceremonies, when, in fact, it is often the en-
raged principal who ends up shouting at children or teachers to “stand!” (tate) when his 
instructions are not obeyed.19 Regardless of their reasons for sitting, teachers explained in 
interviews that the Tokyōi treats them as “criminals” (hanzaisha) in the “Recurrence Pre-
vention Training” sessions.20 Indeed, in the aftermath of the Fukushima nuclear disaster, 
                                                
18 The Japanese adjective, hen, translates alternatively as “singular,” “peculiar,” “curious,” “odd,” “fishy,” 
or “suspicious.” Moreover, in its verb form, the word implies an “incident,” “change,” or “disturbance.” 
19 This information was relayed in an interview with Dohi Nobuo. The Japanese noun, chitsujo, also trans-
lates as “system,” “method,” or “discipline.” It can be used to say something is “well-ordered” (chitsujo 
tadashī) or to “put in order” (chitsujo dateru). 
20 See Ch. 3.  
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precisely when it might seem natural for the general public to contest the legitimacy of 
the state, the yearly school ceremonies have – for almost a decade – practiced the ritual 
condemnation of deviance from obedience to symbols of the state; thereby, making an 
impossible possibility of opposing the sociality instituted by the state. One teacher from 
an area devastated by the 3/11 tsunami recounted that, for the graduation one year after 
the tsunami, black blinders were hoisted across the windows of the ceremonial hall to 
block out the view of the “rubble” (gareki) still lying outside. The students meticulously 
raised the Hinomaru to its proper place in the hall, and the ceremony was carried out as if 
nothing had altered since the tsunami. Notably, the teacher herself was also shut out of 
the ceremonial hall, known as she was for refusing to stand for ceremonies in the past. 
That the potentially sitting teacher was shut out alongside the catastrophic “rubble” 
(gareki) is not a mere coincidence. The very word “rubble” (gareki), for one, has become 
indissociable from radioactive fall-out from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant; 
circulating around the nation without a proper place. As if the radioactive fall-out were 
not enough to recall Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the disaster-hit areas were said to resemble 
“war-zones” (senjō), and politicians were momentarily berated for referring to cities near 
the nuclear plant as “cities of death” (shi no machi).21 Like that word, “rubble” (gareki) – 
which sets off a string of claustrophobic associations of catastrophic, unfathomable past 
events and disastrously irradiated futures – the sitting teacher threatens to trigger a string 
                                                
21 Then Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, Yoshio Hachiro resigned on September 9, 2012, after 
calling the vicinity of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant a “city of death” (shi no machi). One worker 
at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant described work conditions at the plant in the immediate af-
termath of the disaster: “That was a war-zone in which ‘ashes of death’ were falling” (soko wa ‘shi no hai’ 
ga ochiru senjō datta). Not only is the word, “war-zone” (senjō), reminiscent of World War II, but the ref-
erence to “‘ashes of death’” (‘shi no hai’) – note the quotation marks surrounding the original – makes the 
implication of World War II unmistakable. Also translated as “radioactive fallout,” the term – ‘ashes of 
death’ – is doubled by its prior usage in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. See “‘Soko wa ‘shi no hai’ ga ochiru 
senjō datta’: Sagyōin ga Kataru Fukushima Daiichi Genpatsu no Naibu!”, in Gendai Business, 16/4/2011. 
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of specters that would taint the image of state with guilt. In the refusal to give recognition 
to the state, the act of not standing links to an array of anachronic, traumatic elements that 
can neither be incorporated into the temporal unit of the nation, nor become the source or 
justification for surplus extraction. Unlike the physical substance of radiation, however – 
which the state would put out of mind once and for all, as if radiation were non-existent – 
the school ceremonies are designed to make visible those anachronic elements that haunt 
the nation-state from within. They call into visibility that which they would purge and, as 
such, require endless repetition. 
The practice of “forcing” (kyōsei) teachers and students to stand for the Kimigayo 
was frequently likened in interviews to the premodern practice of forcing those suspected 
of believing in Christianity to tread on the image of Christ. Both the name of the practice 
and the bronze tablet on which suspects were made to step, the “fumie,” functioned to 
identify Christians as those who would would not tread, and perhaps more importantly, 
required believers to publicly deface the sacrosanct image of their faith.22 Teachers thus 
                                                
22 See Endo Shusaku, Silence, trans. by William Johnson (New York: Taplinger Publishing Company, 
1980). The reference to “fumie” must, of course, be expanded into a broader consideration of practices of 
“false accusation” (enzai), and forced public “apology” (shazai) or “apology in advertisement” (shazai 
kōkoku) in Japan. 
 Shirai writes: “From the beginning, the forcing of the Hinomaru and Kimigayo was to function as 
a “fumie.” It was to make teachers step on “fumie.” At the same time, it was also to make the principal and 
administrative staff step on the “fumie” of making teachers step on “fumie”. In this way, it tries to “force 
out” (aburidasu) those who cannot step on the “fumie,” and to isolate them. Just as the “fumie” divided 
those who would step and those who would not step, it tries to divide those who stood/accompanied and 






 But the fight of the Yobō Soshō will not allow this division.” (しかし、予防訴訟のたたかいは、
その分断を許さない。) (“Hinomaru, Kimigayo” Kyōsei Hantai Yobō Soshō o Susumeru Kai, “Kyōsei,” 
27) 
 Asked whether the 10.23 Directive resembles the Edo practice of “fumie,” Kimura Yoko replies: 
“In accordance with the 10.23 Directive, I feel an extremely strong violence towards my heart and body. If 
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refer to entrance and graduation ceremonies as practices of “fumie” because the rituals 
“force out” (aburidasu) those who will not bow to the state. More specifically, they force 
solitary individuals out into a shameful place, not only because that place is structured as 
a visible departure from the norm, but since it entails causing a “burden” (meiwaku) to 
others.23 Thus, pressure is often applied for teachers to give a public “apology” (shazai) 
to “everyone” (minna), be it “parents” (hogosha), teachers or students. Thereby the stain 
of “shame” (haji) is structured as an affect constitutive of sociality, to be ashamed of and 
avoided by others who witness the departure from the normative. In effect, the impulse to 
be “normal” (futsū) consists in “being ashamed of shame” (haji o hajiru-koto).24 Indeed, 
the Tokyōi requires that the entire staff undergo training if one teacher among them is 
witnessed sitting.25 Moreover, the duty of the principal requires that s/he accompany the 
                                                                                                                                            
I do not stand, or stand once again, either way I will suffer extremely.” (１０.２３通達によって、私の心
と体に対する非常な強い暴力を感じます。私が不起立をしても、また起立をしても、私はどちら
でも非常に苦しむことになります。そのような状態です。) (“Hinomaru, Kimigayo” Kyōsei Hantai 
Yobō Soshō o Susumeru Kai, “Kyōsei,” 345) 
23 Students refrained from attending the ceremonies for fear that their act of sitting might cause trouble for 
their teachers. A parent explains to the principal: “We have decided to be absent from tomorrow’s gradua-
tion ceremony. For religious reasons, we cannot stand for singing the anthem. We have heard that home-
room teachers have been punished when there is a non-standing student. We do not want to place a burden 
on the homeroom teacher, so we have decided this as a family” (明日の卒業式には欠席することになり
ました。宗教的理由で国歌斉唱時に立つことができません。不起立の生徒がいると担任が処分さ
れるなどということを聞いています。担任に迷惑をかけたくないので家族で相談して決めまし
た。) (“Hinomaru, Kimigayo” Futō Shobun Tekkai o Motomeru Hishobunsha no Kai, 157). 
24 Ukai, “The Future of an Affect: The Historicity of Shame,” pg. 34. See the Introduction for an explica-
tion of these terms. 
25 For instance, Imura Yoko testifies: “But the biggest thing was, if I do not play the piano there, there will 
be held in-school training because I caused a work infraction again, and I thought that, by involving every-
one, I would cause a burden to the other teachers in the school” (でも、一番大きかったのは、私がそこ
でピアノを弾かないと、また服務事故を起こしたということで校内研修が行われ、学校の中のほ
かの先生方、周りをみんな巻き込んで、迷惑をかけるんじゃないかと思ったからです。) (“Hi-
nomaru, Kimigayo” Futō Shobun Tekkai o Motomeru Hishobunsha no Kai, 106). On this ground, other 
teachers might also voice objections to other teachers sitting: “Everyone probably has something they each 
want to protect, but to express that in the shape of “not-rising” is to place a risk not only on the individual, 
but on the school as a whole. If even a single person does not stand, the school will be placed under special 





culpable teacher to the Tokyōi headquarters to go undergo an “examination of the condi-
tions” (jijō chōsa) that led to the incident. At this point, teachers often request the attend-
ance of their lawyer. One teacher flat-out said the reason she did so was because she 
knew that the only purpose of the investigation was to confirm the fact of her guilt.26 
However, the Tokyōi never recognizes the right to legal representation. Investigations are 
conducted in the absence of the teacher if s/he insists on legal representation.27 
In addition to its function of structuring the act of sitting as shameful, the ceremo-
nies are referred to as “fumie” because, by the act of standing, every individual implicitly 
signifies that they leave behind their “self” (jibun) and join selflessly in the interest of the 
social whole represented in the ceremonies. In this sense, the act of standing and singing 
is arbitrary. Sufficiently practiced and repeated, the form of the ceremonies can be trans-
posed and mobilized by authority across an abundance of social arenas. Be it in the form 
of compulsory morning calisthenics or singing the company song before work – lovingly 
committed to cultural memory by the ongoing movie series from the 1980s, Tsuribaka – 
the act of self-renunciation is the same. But while it was said of corporate culture that it 
maintains and even requires the presence of one eccentric person in contradistinction to 
whom the propriety of corporate culture takes shape – and often also the victim of “bully-
ing” (ijime) – it was pointed out that the school ceremonies tolerate no exceptions. Aside 
from the fact that the state is, no doubt, less tolerant of dissidence in its ranks, the primary 
                                                                                                                                            
それでもいいのか。) (“Hinomaru, Kimigayo” Kyōsei Hantai Yobō Soshō o Susumeru Kai, “Kiroku,” 
176). See also the testimonies in “Hinomaru, Kimigayo” Futō Shobun Tekkai o Motomeru Hishobunsha no 
Kai, Gakkō ni Jiyū to Jinken o!: Tokyō “Kimigayo” Saiban 1 Ji Soshō 1800 Nichi no Kiroku and in “Hi-
nomaru, Kimigayo” Kyōsei Hantai Yobō Soshō o Susumeru Kai, “Hinomaru, Kimigayo” Kyōsei Hantai 
Yobō Soshō Dai Isshin Saiban Kiroku and Yobō Soshō no Kiroku. 
26 This information was relayed in an interview with Ikeda Mikiko. 
27 See the testimonies in “Hinomaru, Kimigayo” Futō Shobun Tekkai o Motomeru Hishobunsha no Kai, 
Gakkō ni Jiyū to Jinken o!: Tokyō “Kimigayo” Saiban 1 Ji Soshō 1800 Nichi no Kiroku and in “Hinomaru, 
Kimigayo” Kyōsei Hantai Yobō Soshō o Susumeru Kai, “Hinomaru, Kimigayo” Kyōsei Hantai Yobō 
Soshō Dai Isshin Saiban Kiroku and Yobō Soshō no Kiroku. 
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difference between the public school ceremonies and rituals of self-renunciation in other 
social arenas consists in the nature of the symbols enacted. Given the symbolic status of 
the postwar emperor, the performative reference to the imperial figure is self-referential – 
the sign of a sign – whose very form consists in the total disavowal of difference. If even 
one individual does not stand, the performative reference to and actualization of the pure 
form of social totality fails. It is precisely the form of the symbolic emperor that permits 
zero difference. 
Harry Harootunian has explicated the impossibility of disengaging fascism from 
the problem of representation, with specific reference to modern Japan. Embedded in the 
logics of global capitalism, he explicates certain “aporias of representation” in the prewar 
era as the impossibility of giving stable representation to the “wrenching cultural uneven-
ness” that had beset a rapidly modernized Japan and to a regime of social abstraction that 
had replaced former modes of production, not yet entirely mediated by commodification. 
In Harootunian’s account, it was the turn to aesthetics – emblematically condensed in the 
1942 Kyoto symposium on “Overcoming Modernity” (Kindai no Chōkoku) – that sought 
to finally displace and contain the specter of constitutive unevenness wrought by capital-
ist economic crisis.28 In mutually exclusive, yet complicit articulations that sought to re-
                                                
28 See the essays collected in Richard F. Calichman, Overcoming Modernity: Cultural Identity in Wartime 
Japan (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008). In his 1930 Reflections of Japanese Taste: The 
Structure of Iki, Kuki Shûzô prefigures this turn to aesthetics by writing of iki as a “self-manifestation of 
the specific mode of being of Oriental culture, or rather, of the Yamato people.” As Kuki writes, what is at 
stake in grasping the experience of iki is the unit of the “We,” or “the People,” the frightening possibilities 
of which are disclosed when he finally counterposes the “spirit” of iki to “illusion,” and proposes that the 
historical “self-unfolding of our ethnic being” involves both “‘resignation’ before fate,” as well as “brave 
composure” (Shûzô, Reflections on Japanese Taste: The Structure of Iki, trans. by John Clark (Sydney: 
Power Publications, 2007), pg. 33, 28, 118, 120 – 121). Yet, as Leslie Pincus says of Shûzô’s “modernism 
against modernity,” Shûzô’s analysis partakes of the abstraction of the West through that word “structure” 
(kōzō) which effectively splits his own text (Pincus, Authenticating Culture in Imperial Japan (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1996), pg. 17 – 18, 22). Harootunian thus writes that modernism was de-
flected into the construction of memory and a “cultural authenticity” that was “as timeless and frozen as the 
commodity form itself.” (Harootunian, “Overcome,” pg. xx, xxvi). As the “self-revelation of the minzoku 
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solve the aporias of representation, modernism was deflected into fascism with reference 
to the memory of an eternal “culture” (bunka), as reified as the commodity itself.29 In the 
postwar, after Yukio Mishima’s call for the resuscitation of a “cultural emperor” (bunka-
teki tennō), it was the apparently innocuous discourse of postmodernism that announced 
the “final overcoming” of modernity and the specter of unevenness which always seemed 
to attend it. 
But more than twenty years of recession has successfully put an end to the fantasy 
of a uniform middle-class society. Contrary to Karatani, Asada, or Azuma’s misrecogni-
tion of an end of modernity, it is Fredric Jameson’s observation of postmodernism – “the 
enormity of a situation in which we seem increasingly incapable of fashioning representa-
tions of our own current experience” – that enables postmodernity to be understood as an 
intensification of representational logics inherent to modernity.30 Facile theorizations of 
                                                                                                                                            
(whole) to itself,” Kuki’s treatise on iki was to place itself at the disposal of the state in the 1930s, and to 
develop into a wholesale, discursive justification for fascism in the name of “culture” (Pincus, “Authenti-
cating Culture,” pg. 229, 221). 
29 In Overcome by Modernity, Harry Harootunian writes: “Modernism in Japan sought, therefore, to resist 
the culture of capitalism … and an emerging modern life that itself was constantly being buffeted by a pro-
cess of revolutionizing production, chronic civil strife, and social and economic uncertainty. Above all else, 
modernism in Japan’s interwar period was produced in a conjuncture that prompted the recognition of a 
vast field of economic and cultural unevenness that it sought to resolve, overcome, and even repress. That 
is, modernism sought to flee history at the same time it appealed to older historical representations of the 
authentic cultural object as a way to replace abstraction and fragmentation with concreteness and whole-
ness” (xxi). 
30 Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 1991), pg. 21. Fredric Jameson identifies the shift to postmodernism in the postwar period and writes 
that its “structure of feeling” solidified with the economic crises of 1973. For Jameson, the departure from 
modernism does not mark a definitive break – “residual traces of modernism” persist – but postmodernism 
nevertheless announces what you have “when the modernization process is complete and nature is gone for 
good” (Ibid, xx, ix). Under such conditions, aesthetic and cultural production have become altogether sub-
sumed under the production of commodities. Under “late capitalism,” Jameson writes, the difference of 
postmodernism from modernism consists in the “thoroughgoing and all-pervasive,” not to mention, “per-
manent” manner in which modernization has infiltrated the cultural and the everyday. The distinctive mark 
of such infiltration resides in the fact that postmodernism marks both an age that has “forgotten how to 
think historically,” and is the very “attempt” to grasp contemporaneity in historical terms. Where modern-
ism sought to account for the “New” in terms of aftermath and content, postmodernism remains “more 
formal,” merely registering the events and changes themselves as “shifts in the representation of things.” 
Postmodernism recognizes that the content is, in any case, just more images and surfaces. But postmodern-
ism also seeks to narrate contemporaneity precisely when the historical is called into question. In so doing, 
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an end appear as symptoms of an age which has become even more incapable of grasping 
contemporaneity historically. Not just flat, but super-flat, the postmodernist discourse of 
surface is echoed in the obsession with external “form” (katachi). As Harootunian writes, 
it is necessary to consider the constitutive logics of capitalism and the affective invest-
ments to which these logics predispose subjects. 
 
In his 1935 Heritage of Our Times, Ernst Bloch writes of the unrestrained arrival 
of fascism in Europe by illuminating the “logical character” of certain material and affec-
tive contradictions inherent to the capitalist present. The capitalist “Now,” Bloch says, is 
rife with non-contemporaneous elements that make a non-contemporaneous contempora-
neity of the present. Alongside material impoverishment, that “lacks food” and finds 
something “wrong” – and resolvable – in the external world, Bloch identifies a subjective 
element of lack which misses something “in the centre, something higher as well.” Long 
left to itself, this subjective element transforms into an inner “accumulated rage” that fi-
nally discovers its correlate in objective, external and “declining remnants”; yet to be ful-
filled, such remnants are, of course, products of modernization and the capitalist mode of 
production. By latching on to tropes like “home, soil, and nation,” and seeking subjective 
fulfillment by actualizing the “content” designated by such tropes, the contradictions pro-
duced by capitalism distract from themselves. “Harmonistic images of the past,” Bloch 
says, thus “seek to revoke the excess of capitalism or to subordinate it to themselves.”31 
By virtue of such a dialectical negation, repeatedly reproduced through the constitutive 
                                                                                                                                            
it confronts itself with an object of the present that it itself has produced as the marker of its own historical 
moment. Narrative itself performs the task of bracketing postmodernism as an intensification of modernism. 
As such, the postmodern appears as a sign and symptom of itself (Ibid, 4 – 5, xxi, ix, xii). 
31 Ernst Bloch, Heritage of Our Times, pg. 108 – 109. 
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antagonisms wrought by capitalism, references to vanishing tropes of “home, soil, and 
nation” either “subordinate” or “revoke” the excesses produced by capitalism. Bloch rais-
es the question of that impossible kernel of historical experience that cannot be “con-
tained,” “revoked,” or canceled out in a Hegelian dialectic of negation, but that would 
trigger repetition.32 And as Nicos Poulantzas demonstrates in State, Power, Socialism the 
role of unifying the non-contemporaneity of capitalist production falls to the state. It is 
the state that seeks to bring about the “universalization” of the “differential temporalities” 
of capitalist production, so that the present emerges as but a vanishing point of passage 
towards the future productivity of the nation.33 
As contained in the “draft” (sōan) of the LDP’s revised constitution or as the very 
name of the Japan Restoration Party (Nippon Ishin no Kai) suggests, references to “cul-
ture” (bunka) and “emperor” (tennō) disclose recognition as the technique by which the 
state contains the excesses of capitalism, while maintaining the differential temporalities 
constitutive to production. In its more concrete manifestations, however, the drive to con-
tain the excesses of capital can be identified in the extension of workplace discipline into 
the everyday. The Tokyōi, for instance, unabashedly metes out “punishments” (shobun) 
to teachers and principals on account of their conduct outside work, and seeks them out in 
their private homes to deliver these punishments.34 The insanely demanding hours of the 
public teacher, moreover, are replicated in general Japanese society in which “death from 
                                                
32 See Jacques Derrida, ““From Restricted to General Economy: A Hegelianism Without Reserve,” in Writ-
ing and Difference, trans. by Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978). 
33 Nicos Poulantzas, State, Power, Socialism, pg. 110. Poulantzas considers the nation-state with reference 
to the “serial, fractured, parcelled and irreversible space” that constitutes the industrial organization of 
labor and that gives rise to the “uneven development of capitalism.” The fractured seriality of industrial 
capital demands that it move forward by aggregating itself across an assembly line; capitalism requires the 
formation of “differential temporalities.” In “unification” or “universalization,” the state inscribes these 
temporalities into the single time of the nation. (Poulantzas, State, Power, Socialism, pg. 95, 103 – 4). 
34 See, for instance, Dohi Nobuo’s Sore wa, Mikkoku Kara Hajimatta: Kōchō vs. Tokyōto Kyōiku Iinkai. 
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overwork” (karōshi) and “suicide” (jisatsu) have assumed mythical proportions; traceable, 
however, to conditions of work under which it is “not possible to say anything” (nani mo 
ienai) and guilt is retrojected onto the lacking self. As a model of Japanese society, the 
yearly public school ceremonies paradoxically derive their normative power to re-present 
from the purely symbolic status of the postwar emperor. Harry Harootunian thus observes 
that the postwar emperor has, in fact, become more powerful as a symbol without referent 
that can be mobilized anywhere.35 And as a pure sign, readily transposable to almost any 
social arena, the performative reference to the imperial figure must close the gap between 
signifier and signified such that every reference is self-identical. As a pure sign of totality, 
every occasion of its performance must be complete unto itself. Articulating closely with 
theories of an end of history and postmodernity, the form of the performative reference to 
the imperial figure mandates the expulsion of difference. Yet, the ceremonies themselves 
call into visible dissonance those elements that will not be incorporated in the harmonic, 
timeless image of social totality. Given the right occasion, the ceremonies transform into 
a theater of accusation in which the accused is expelled from the social with an inordinate 
expenditure of energy, and no small amount of pleasure. And whether or not somebody is 
sitting, every instantiation of the ceremonies functions as a threat thereof. 
A certain enjoyment is disclosed in the obsessive extent to which the Tokyōi goes 
to ensure that the ceremonies are conducted 100% according to instructions. Notably, this 
pleasure cannot be separated from the persecutional logic of singling out individuals who 
do not follow work orders – and submitting them to shame – but quite aside from forcing 
people to stand, bow and sing, the order to implement the “10.23 Directive” to the letter 
makes a norm of “ridiculous” (rifujin) practices, as teachers themselves described them in 
                                                
35 Harry Harootunian, “An Emperor System in Every Blade of Grass and in the Leaves of Every Tree.” 
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interviews, contrary to which the “common” (futsū) plea of teachers falls on deaf ears.36 
Thus, at a school for physically challenged students, a giant slope was created to fulfill 
the requirement that students ascend to the ceremonial platform to receive their diplomas. 
To ensure safety, the slope filled half the gym hall.37 At another school, the ceremonial 
platform was so high that the seating format predicated by the “10.23 Directive” required 
that honorary guests sit in the front row facing the base of the platform, unable to see 
anything except the wall for the duration of the ceremony. Likewise, teachers at schools 
for children with special needs remark how the significance of the ceremonies now is lost 
                                                
36 The Japanese adjective, rifujin, translates alternatively as “outrageous,” “absurd,” or “preposterous,” but 
also as “unreasonable,” “irrational,” or “unjust.” Makino Rie, a teacher with 20 years experience with chil-
dren of special needs, says in court: “However in accordance with the directive, it became so that all partic-
ipants had to sit facing the “Hinomaru” on the stage. It became so that, during the entire ceremony, pupils 
had to sit seeing nothing but the back of the wheelchair of the person in front of them. The students who 
had been sitting on a mat up until then likewise had to sit in a wheelchair all the while. It was because if the 
student were to be on the mat, it would be necessary for the responsible teacher to support the student, and 
if you were sitting during the “singing the anthem in unison” you might receive a punishment. In this way, 






のです。) (“Hinomaru, Kimigayo” Kyōsei Hantai Yobō Soshō o Susumeru Kai, “Kiroku,” 175) 
37 Dokata Yoshiko writes as follows: 
“The small graduation ceremonies, in which the life of each and every child was protected by eve-
ryone as if to warm and to embrace them, were conducted so that everyone was connected at the same 
height on top of the same floor. In the entrance ceremonies, too, everyone was at the same height, and 




 From the March 2004 graduation ceremony, the newly bought slope for 787,000 yen was placed to 
stand in the middle of the gym hall. (二〇〇四年３月の卒業式からは、七八万七〇〇〇円をかけて新
しく購入されたスロープが、体育館の中央に聳えたつことになりました。) 
 Because it is not possible to go up and down a steep slope in a wheelchair, if you try to ensure 
such a slope, quite a length becomes necessary. As a result, the slope that materialized became so big that it 
stretched half of the gym hall, and blocked the field of vision of participants” (車椅子で舞台に上がり下
がりするためには、急なスロープでは無理ですから、それだけの傾斜をとろうとすれば、たいへ
んな長さが必要になります。結果として現れたスロープは、体育館の半分までのびるような大き
なものとなり、出席者の視界を遮りました。) (“Hinomaru, Kimigayo” Kyōsei Hantai Yobō Soshō o 
Susumeru Kai, “Kyōsei,” 172 – 173) 
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on most students and that the atmosphere of the ceremonies triggers many to “break out” 
(tobidasu) of the strict posture required of them. Principal Dohi was summoned to Tokyōi 
headquarters seven times to be ordered to issue individual “work orders” (shokumu 
meirei) to his teachers. As Dohi recounts, his decade-long fight with the Tokyōi began 
when a junior colleague “secretly informed” (mikkoku) on him; as if a traitor had been 
snuffed out from the ranks.38 Similarly, one teacher from Hiroshima received no less than 
some twenty phone calls from his principal, at five-minute intervals, because he had not 
shown up for one of the days of his “ten-year training” (jūnen kenshū) sessions.39 On the 
one hand, the repeated phone calls of the principal were interpreted as a demonstration of 
                                                
38 The title of Dohi’s book reads: “It All Started from a Tip-Off” (Sore wa, Mikkoku kara Hajimatta). In the 
prologue, Dohi appeals precisely to the sense of the obvious and “normal” (futsū) that the ceremonies have 
turned on their head. Dohi’s very first lines read: 
 
I believe that I am an “ordinary” person. (私は‘フツー’の人間だと思っています。) 
Because I am an ordinary person, I think things freely, and want to say things freely. (フツーの人
間だから、自由にものを考え、自由にものを言いたいのです。) 
Because I am an ordinary person, I want to be treated equally, and do not want to be discriminated 
against. (フツーの人間だから、平等に扱って欲しいし、差別されたくないのです。) 
Because I am an ordinary person, I believe that I want to lead a happy life, and believe that I want 
to live as a human being. (フツーの人間だから、幸せな生活を送りたいと思うし、人間らし
く生きたいと思うのです。) 
Because I am an ordinary person, I do not want to kill people, and do not want to be killed. (フツ
ーの人間だから、人を殺したくないし、殺されたくないのです。) 
Because I am an ordinary person, I love the Japanese Constitution that guarantees these rights to 
freedom, the right to equality, the right to existence, social rights, and peace, and my policy is the respect 
for fundamental human rights and pacifism. (フツーの人間だから、これらの自由権、平等権、生存権、
社会権、平和を保障している日本国憲法が大好きで、基本的人権の尊重と平和主義が私のボリシ
ーなのです。) 
On this occasion of the fight with the Tokyo Metropolitan Board of Education (Tokyōi), I am also 
not saying anything special. It is my purpose to say something exceedingly “ordinary.” (今回の東京都教
育委員会（都教委）とのたたかいも、何も特別なことを言っているわけではありません。私はき
わめて‘フツー’のことを言っているつもりです。)  
As is clear from example of the pre-war, if the freedom of speech disappears from the place of ed-
ucation, there is a possibility that Japan will proceed to collapse, so I just expressed my opinion. (教育の現
場で言論の自由がなくなれば、戦前の例を見れば明らかなように日本が崩壊していく可能性があ
るからこそ、意見表明をしただけです。) (Dohi, Sore wa, Mikkoku Kara Hajimatta: Kōchō vs. To-
kyōto Kyōiku Iinkai, 3) 
39 This teacher had, in fact, applied and already been approved for a “day off” (kyūka) on this occasion, but 
– as investigations by the teacher revealed – his right to take a day off was revoked when, through the in-
ternal circulation of a pamphlet, the board of education learned that he was planning to attend a leftist 
demonstration for peace on the anniversary of the dropping of the atom bomb on Hiroshima. 
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power with impunity, implicitly conveying the message: “I can do this to you” (ore ni wa 
kore ga dekiru). Through the authority of the principal, the Hiroshima Board of Educa-
tion was understood to be engaging in, and taking pleasure in “power harrassment” (pawā 
hara). On the other hand, descriptions of the principal’s actions quickly slipped into the 
negative. His phone calls were said to exhibit the obsessional characteristics of a “stalker” 
(sutōka). Principal Dohi likewise commented in an interview that the Tokyōi would have 
been ready, literally, to “hit” (naguru) him on account of the trouble he had caused them, 
resisting their “instructions” (shidō), reporting their actions to the media and taking them 
to court. 
At once a pleasurable object to punish and thorn in the side of the educational bu-
reucracy, the very existence of teachers who refuse to stand for the anthem is formulated 
as an uniquely Japanese phenomenon. The Japanese state claims that standing for the an-
them is an “internationally” (kokusaiteki) established “manner” (manā): only Japan lacks 
propriety. Like the “negative history” (fu no rekishi) inherited from the war, it is said that 
“only Japan” (Nihon dake) has public workers – comfortably living off tax money, to add 
– who will not pay respect to the national flag and anthem. In light of international stand-
ards, the shameful existence of these public teachers constitutes a problem to be rectified. 
By mobilizing its power to affix shame, this discourse of state would reverse the negative 
legacy of World War II, and would revoke the shaming gaze of neighboring countries. By 
affixing shame to the figures of the sitting teachers, it would transform them into a threat 
of all things Japanese. Hence, sitting teachers are accused of disrupting the “order” 
(chitsujo), of breaking the “rules” (rūru) and of failing to observe “manners” (manā) – all 
venerated characteristics of the upright Japanese – on the occasion of “everyone” (minna) 
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– the group – showing “respect” (keii) for that pinnacle of Japanese “culture” (bunka), the 
“emperor” (tennō). Interior to the nation of Japan, the teachers occupy a correlate place to 
the threat of Japanese things posed from the outside of Japan. The endless territorial rows 
between Japan and its neighbors constitute a case in point. Like China, Korea and Russia, 
the sitting teachers confront the Japanese state with the knowledge that certain islands did 
not belong to Japan to begin with: they were illegitimately appropriated after World War 
II. Of course, the threat they pose is not just to the legitimacy of territorial acquisitions, 
but touches on the core of Japanese “culture” (bunka) itself. Indeed, not only is “culture” 
(bunka) threatened. In an incontrovertible conjunction of culture and nation – as nation-
culture – the security of Japan and therefore, the state, is threatened. 
The obsessive drive to reduce sitting teachers to “zero” replicates that paradoxical 
and repetitive mode of “pleasure in unpleasure” designated by Lacanian “jouissance,” or 
enjoyment. As Slavoj Žižek writes of the relationship between such enjoyment and the 
nation, the organized practices of enjoyment constitute the means by which a certain Na-
tional Thing is manifested and comes to be. Through performative practice, belief confers 
ontological consistency on the National Thing through the doing of the act, and yet belief 
is itself produced through these practices. At once effect and retroactively produced cause 
that was always-already there, this National Thing is more than simply a point of shared, 
symbolic identification. It occupies the empty place of the “remainder of some real, non-
discursive kernel,” fraught with negativity, the relationship to which is embodied through 
the practice of national myths and fantasies.40 If asked what precisely this National Thing 
consists of, the respondent would be hard-put to give a concrete answer, Žižek says. S/he 
would have to resort to tautology and a list of practices through which this “Thing” – that 
                                                
40 Slavoj Žižek, “Eastern Europe’s Republics of Gilead,” in New Left Review (128 (1990)), pg. 51 – 53. 
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indescribable quality of being somehow “Japanese” – appears. The unforgiving and com-
pletely “unreasonable” (rifujin) insistence on following instructions to the letter gives it-
self to be recognized as Japanese. Asked why instructions to the ceremonies must be thus 
followed to the letter, the answer by advocates of the ritual would be: “because it is Japan” 
(Nihon dakara). In this light, the insistence of public teachers is misplaced when they ar-
gue in court that sitting does not “disrupt” (bōgai) the ceremonies. What is at stake in the 
ceremonies is not the actual “order” (chitsujo), or the “solemn and fresh atmosphere” 
(genshuku katsu seishin na fun’iki). Rather, at stake is that “Thing” disclosed through the 
uniformity of external performance which is threatened, in turn, by the sitting teacher. By 
deeming that standing and singing are “external” (gaimenteki) actions, Supreme Court 
rulings partake of, and provide final justification for the logic that would ensure the regu-
lar instantiation the National Thing. Shame is thereby affixed to the place of the sitting 
teacher, who, paradoxically, forms the constitutive negative, and impossible kernel of the 
real in relation to which the ceremonies take place. 
Over against this singling-out, teachers punished for sitting call for other teachers 
to “unite” (danketsu) with them. Especially teachers with a long history of sitting and re-
peated punishments explained the act of sitting as an implicit “appeal” (apīru) to others to 
sit with them. At least two of the teachers I interviewed had typed up and readily handed 
out a sheet of paper that detailed the consecutive number of times they had been punished 
for “not standing to attention” (fukiritsu) during the ceremonies. The sheet of paper func-
tioned as a list of claims, but also as testimony to the integrity of their cause – inscribed 
in the list of repeated and unwavering punishments – which would block and reverse the 
shaming gaze of the state. Much as the social place of the sitting teacher is structured as 
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shameful, teachers themselves rarely expressed shame over their actions; if they did, it 
was over having stood. Rather, it was shame itself that motivated sitting, so that the stain 
of “shame” (haji) was at once affirmed and held at bay.41 In effect, the structure of shame 
is at stake in the ceremonies. In “uniting” (danketsu), the presence of two sitting teachers 
would invoke the sociality, via an implicit third party, of standing as shameful; threaten-
ing thus to reverse the structure of and power to shame – and to represent – which the 
state would appropriate for itself. All of the teachers I interviewed said that “it is reliev-
ing” (sukkiri suru) to finally remain seated. The liberation many teachers experience after 
sitting is, in part, accounted for by the fact that the normative force of that National Thing 
comes into being through the practice of doing it. After sitting through the ceremony 
once, the act of standing and singing appears in its properly “ridiculous” aspect: the em-
peror has no clothes. But when speaking of the time period leading up to their first act of 
sitting, teachers explained, albeit hesitantly – as if conceding embarrassment – that it re-
quires “courage” (yūki) to be the only teacher sitting. Some teachers ascribed this fear of 
sticking out from the crowd to the fact of being “Japanese” (Nihonjin); as if it constituted 
a pre-existing Japanese trait. It was even said by some people that the fear of sticking out 
was “hereditary” (idenshiteki). Of course, not everyone explained the pressure to conform 
in Japanese society with reference to a trait of the Japanese brought about, if anything, by 
an equally Japanese upbringing. Instead, teachers who took part in the demonstrations of 
the ‘60s and ‘70s said that things were not always like this and narrated how the Japanese 
state has gradually broken down resistance.42 The radical intolerance towards individuals 
                                                
41 Satoshi Ukai, “The Future of an Affect: The Historicity of Shame,” pg. 34. See the Introduction for an 
explication of this stance. 
42 See the Introduction and Ch. 9 for a discussion of the massive student and civilian demonstrations that 
rocked Japan in the ‘60s and ‘70s, and the political status of such backtalk in Japan today. 
 134 
who will not conform was, rather, identified as specific to the Japanese state. One teacher 
thus recounted that she had been shown photos of individuals sitting during ceremonies 
like the Japanese ceremonies under the German Nazi regime, noting that even the Nazis 
had not been as unforgiving in forcing every single person to conform. Likewise, teachers 
repeatedly mentioned the U.S. 1943 Supreme Court “Barnette” verdict, which declared it 
unconstitutional – during war, no less! – to force individuals to pledge allegiance to the 
flag. 
Whether the difficulty of departing from the norm was ascribed to being Japanese 
or to a culture produced by the state, it was agreed that “punishment” (shobun) itself did 
not act as a deterrent to sitting. It was the fact of visibly departing from the norm, and all 
the “trouble” (mendo) entailed by this that acted as the true deterrent. Reference was 
hence made to the importance placed on “appearance” (sekentei) in Japan, and to the ex-
istence of a “public eye” (seken). Even disobedient teachers referenced Ruth Benedict’s 
Chrysanthemum and the Sword to explain – to me, the foreign researcher – the uniquely 
cultural pressure to conform and its intertwinement with the traditional Japanese notion 
of “shame” (haji). Otherwise accessible only to the native, recognition by an American 
and anthropologist was necessary to constitute knowledge of “shame” (haji). Corollary to 
the fear of sitting through the ceremonies, one former office worker explained that it does 
not matter if a salaryman gets ¥1 or ¥20,000 less than their colleagues in wages. What 
matters is the public fact of being paid less than everyone else, and actions are taken to 
avert this ever-present possibility. The force of the “punishment” (shobun) thus derives 
from visibly marking the person to whom it is delivered. Shaming, or the possibility of 
being caught in that place to which shame attaches, is inscribed in the structure of the 
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ceremonies. Together, the reluctance to transgress the norm and the act of shaming par-
take of the National Thing. 
Although the ceremonies function to ferret out and designate any visible departure 
from normativity as shameful, their failure to properly contain these acts as shameful sig-
nals a diminution in their effectivity. The normative power of the anamorphic gaze – like 
Holbein’s death’s head, the supra-historical “emperor” (tennō) is not present, nor absent – 
loses its force. Yet the paradox of the National Thing is that it was always-already threat-
ened because it never belonged to the claimant to begin with. Žižek observes that: “What 
we conceal by imputing to the Other the theft of enjoyment is the traumatic fact that we 
never possessed what was allegedly stolen from us.”43 The gaze of an Other – that is, of 
an Other of the Other – is both constitutive and threatening of the National Thing qua 
“Thing.” An Englishman originally suggested that an anthem, the Kimigayo, be written. 
Like the postwar Constitution – at once a foreign imposition and preserver of the intimate 
“conscience” (ryoshin) of the nation – the threat of theft to national enjoyment emerges at 
that intimate, extimate point, where the interior coincides with the exterior. “The Other is 
in me,” writes Jacques-Alain Miller, “occupying the place of extimacy.”44 Both “intimate 
kernel” and “foreign body,” sitting teachers occupy the place of the impossible origins of 
the postwar order, the ignominious memory of which the state would eliminate. But they 
also constitute the structural condition of possibility for the National Thing itself. Indeed, 
as a remainder of the real, the teachers constitute the “kernel” around which, as Marilyn 
Ivy has elucidated, the practices of the “Japanese-Thing” are organized. By disrupting the 
                                                
43 Slavoj Žižek, “Eastern Europe’s Republics of Gilead,” pg. 54. The identification with the National Thing 
entails a constitutive loss, such that the figuration of the symbolic Other – in whose gaze we give ourselves 
to be seen – also entails a constitutive loss; that is, an Other of the Other. See the Introduction. 
44 Quoted in Žižek, “Eastern,” pg. 54. 
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dialectic of recognition through which the Japanese-Thing comes into being, the paradox 
of the sitting teachers requires the repetition of practice.45 
 
Louis Althusser has argued that material, ritual practices are indispensable to, and 
constitutive of the production of the category of the subject of ideology. In his essay titled 
“Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses,” Althusser reverses the assumption that be-
lief compels practice. He thus cites Pascal – “Kneel down, move your lips in prayer, and 
you will believe” – and asserts that an interpellative framework of “hailing” is necessary 
to constitute the subject. Following Marx, it is thus only “in the last instance” that the so-
called base of the economic structure acts as a determining factor of ideology, just as the 
state only intervenes with repressive violence – in the interest of capital accumulation – 
when other means have been “outrun by events.”46 Otherwise, the reproduction of class, 
or of the relations of production is sustained by the relative autonomy of ritual practices 
that crystallize ideology for and by the subject. Most significantly, Althusser observes 
that the “ideological effect” consists in a primary “obviousness,” such that the subject 
immediately recognizes its truth prior to reflection upon it. It is, in effect, “obvious” (ata-
rimae) and “normal” (futsū) to stand for the anthem and to sacrifice oneself for the social 
totality. By contrast, the one whose actions depart from this obviousness is automatically 
regarded as doing something “that is wicked.” Thus, while ideology consists in a “‘repre-
sentation’ of the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of exist-
                                                
45 See Marilyn Ivy’s “Mourning the Japanese Thing,” in In Near Ruins: Cultural Theory at the End of the 
Century, ed. by Nicholas B. Dirks (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998). 
46 Louis Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatus (Notes Towards an Investigation),” in Lenin 
and Philosophy and Other Essays, trans. by Ben Brewster (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2001), pg. 
114, 92. See Ch. 1 for a consideration of Clifford Geertz’s “Religion as a Cultural System” in terms of the 
anthropological debate surrounding belief and practice in religious ritual. 
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ence,” the “cause” or compulsion of this fantasy consists in an a priori social order. The 
subject is always-already interpellated as a subject of ideology. In fact, Althusser accords 
ideology a status “exactly like the unconscious,” so that its structure and functioning has 
no history: it is “eternal”.47 Moreover, the ideological character of ideology is disavowed. 
Ideology is in force precisely in the places that would be designated as non-ideological.48 
Notably, one clause of the postwar constitution the ruling LDP does appear intent 
on enforcing is Article 4, which prohibits the emperor from exercising “powers related to 
government.”49 Anti-nuclear activist and representative of the Lower House, Yamamoto 
Taro, faced pressure to resign just for handing the emperor a letter pertaining to the plight 
of Fukushima residents affected by the nuclear disaster. After the incident, it was repeat-
edly asserted by mainstream media that the letter “had not reached” (todokazu) the em-
peror – i.e. he had not read the letter, which had been retained by the Imperial Household 
Agency – while Yamamoto’s actions were decried as “inappropriate” (fusawashikunai).50 
Needless to say, the use of  ¥10.26 billion by the Imperial Household Agency (in 2013) is 
a far from non-political expenditure, especially when the welfare system and salaries of 
public servants have come under attack.51 Yet, by giving a letter to the emperor which, of 
all things, details the taboo subject of radiation effects, the power of the imperial figure to 
represent the interests of the general population is threatened. It is not threatened, howev-
er, in the respect that a lowly politician and anti-nuclear activist might have swayed the 
                                                
47 Ibid, pg. 108 – 119. In The Imaginary Institution of Society, trans. by Kathleen Blamey (Cambridge: Poli-
ty Press, 1987) Cornelius Castoriades writes similarly of the a priori social compulsion of the “imaginary” 
that is embodied in the specific practices of the social unit. 
48 Hence, Althusser reminds us: “As is well known, the accusation of being ideological only applies to oth-
ers, never to oneself” (Althusser, “Ideology,” 119). 
49 See “Yamamoto Won’t Resign Over Breach of Imperial Protocol,” in The Japan Times, 5/11/2013. 
50 As the negative of fusawashī – “suitable,” “becoming,” “proper,” “adequate,” “fitting,” or “appropriate,” 
– the Japanese word, fusawashikunai, implies the lack thereof, and also translates as “not suitable,” “wrong 
for,” or quite simply, “beneath.” 
51 The Imperial Household Agency, “Budgetary Matters,” 2/4/2014. 
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political inclinations of the person of the emperor. If, as Claude Lefort says, the political 
gains “access to the world” by installing the symbolic reference through which the living 
“acquire death” – and secure posterity – it is, above all, the form of the imperial head that 
was threatened and violently asserted in face of the attempted missive.52 By breaching the 
taboo on the imperial figure’s political involvement, the very misrecognition that sustains 
this taboo is threatened and the non-political character of the emperor momentarily ceases 
to be “obvious.” Only a moral outcry and the assurance that the emperor has not been af-
fected – the letter never reached him – restores the proper order of things.53 
Rather than raise the political power of the imperial figure to awareness, however, 
Yamamoto Taro himself stands accused of improperly advancing the parochial interests 
of his own political agenda. Althusser notes as much in saying that those who transgress 
the obvious are not just regarded as “wicked,” but of being ideological. The accusation of 
being in ideology is reserved for those who contravene the ideological. Nothing is wrong 
with standing for the anthem: everything is wrong with those who do not! As Durkheim 
pointed out, you experience the force of the social when you go against it. In fact, a list of 
epithets exists in contemporary Japan to designate those who transgress upon the obvious, 
and to which sitting teachers are subject to being called: “radicals” (kageki), “communists” 
                                                
52 Claude Lefort, Democracy and Political Theory, trans. by David Macey (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988), 
pg. 232, 222 - 223. 
53 The displacement of the “inappropriate” (fusawashikunai) content of the letter by its form – as a signifier 
that “had not reached” (todokazu) the emperor – recalls Derrida’s observation of Lacan’s seminar on Poe’s 
“Purloined Letter,” that the attribution of lack to the letter confirms the phallocentrism that the letter origi-
narily threatened. See Jacques Derrida’s “The Purveyor of Truth,” trans. Willis Domingo, James Hulbert, 
Moshe Ron, and M.-R.L., in Yale French Studies (52 (1975)) and Jacques Lacan’s “Seminar on the Pur-
loined Letter” in Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English, trans. by Bruce Fink (New York: W.W. 
Norton & Company, 2006). 
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(shakaishugisha), or plainly “unpatriotic” (hikokumin)!54 It must be asked whence derives 
the violence that institutes this order – an order of which the school ceremonies constitute 
the emblem, repeatedly demarcating the limits of the visible and sayable – at the margins 
of the ideological. Whence derives the force that sustains the “misrecognition/ignorance” 
that, according to Althusser, is “ideology”?55 
As Michel Foucault writes of Bentham’s panopticon, the Tokyōi’s enforcement of 
the 10.23 Directive is aimed to produce a certain “gaze and [its] interiorisation.”56 Ideally, 
everyone would interiorise this gaze as subjects of power. The ceremonies thus constitute 
an aspiration for transparency in that they unequivocally lay out a visible field that would 
render the “symptoms” of disobedience to state immediately legible as “signs” of guilt.57 
Foucault writes that the “clinical gaze” achieves a “complete passage from the totality of 
the visible to the over-all structure of the expressible.”58 In this legibility, the gaze sutures 
the sayable “sign” to the visible “symptom” that is the crime. As an analogue to the “clin-
ical gaze,” then, the Tokyōi’s response to the negative legacy of the war organizes “codes 
of knowledge” so that legible symptoms – sitting as guilty – are distributed across “cases” 
to form “frequencies,” manifest in the fluctuating number of sitting teachers.59 As such, it 
instantiates the work of what Foucault calls “an activity that originates elsewhere.”60 That 
                                                
54 Louis Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses,” pg. 119, 124. The arraignment of whis-
tleblowers – or traitors – such as Edward Snowden and Chelsea Manning suggests a similar state of affairs 
in the U.S. after 9/11. 
55 Althusser writes: “The reality in question in this mechanism, the reality which is necessarily ignored 
(meconnu) in the very forms of recognition (“ideology = misrecognition/ignorance”) is indeed, in the last 
resort, the reproduction of the relations of production and of the relations deriving from them” (Ibid, 124). 
56 Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972 – 1977, ed. by Colin 
Gordon, trans. by Colin Gordon et al. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), pg. 154. 
57 Michel Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception, trans. by A.M. Sheri-
dan Smith (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), pg. 93. 
58 Ibid, pg. 114. 
59 Ibid, pg. 90, 101. 
60 Ibid, pg. 93. 
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is, grounded in a statement, it instantiates the work of an episteme that closes the distance 
between visibility and sayability.61 
 
Along with preparations leading up to the ceremonies, physical boundaries set off 
the ceremonial hall to protect against possible failure. Teachers reputed for sitting in past 
ceremonies are locked out, but, so too, are any signs of the individual achievements of the 
students – paintings, etc – which decorated ceremonial halls before the “10.23 Directive.” 
As Marcel Mauss says of the magical ritual: “Preparatory rites performed before the main 
ceremony mark off and circumscribe this magical milieu from the normal outside world.” 
The ceremonial milieu is, in effect, demarcated so as to separate it from the “normal” and 
quotidian.62 Of course, the ceremonies have a special meaning for teachers, students, and 
parents, especially because the graduation ceremony celebrates the successful completion 
of the academic year. No doubt, the ceremonies have a special significance for the To-
kyōi, too, because they constitute the only occasions of the year when “individual work 
orders” (kobetsuteki shokumu meirei) are issued. Under the “10.23 Directive,” the prac-
tice of the ceremonies instantiate the work order, such that the separation of the ceremo-
nies from the quotidian seeks to ensure that nothing but this instantiation happens inside 
the ceremonial hall. 
For most veteran teachers, the first time they received an “individual work order,” 
or even saw one, was in 2003, when the “10.23 Directive” was issued. At the time, stories 
                                                
61 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language, trans. by A.M. Sheri-
dan Smith (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972), pg. 91, 191 – 192. 
62 Marcel Mauss, A General Theory of Magic, trans. by Robert Brain (New York: Routledge Classics, 
2001), pg. 61. See also other classical works of anthropology, such as Victor Turner’s Dramas, Fields, and 
Metaphors (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975) or Arnold Van Gennep’s The Rites of Passage, trans. 
by Trans. Monika B. Visedom and Gabrielle L. Caffee (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960). 
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abounded of teachers ripping up the order, of teachers handing back the order to the prin-
cipal, and even of teachers who had “supported” (sansei) standing and singing the anthem, 
but subsequently refused to do so precisely because they were ordered to do so. Principal 
Dohi’s commentary has already disclosed the Tokyōi’s insistence on the “individual 
work order” to consist in a certain privileging of the means over the end. But Dohi con-
tinues to describe the unrelenting pressure applied to him by the Tokyōi after they learned 
he might not issue the order. Notwithstanding that the Tokyōi says in writing that the fi-
nal decision to issue individual work orders rests in the “authority and responsibility of 
the principal” (kōchō no kengen to sekinin), on learning that – contrary to “strict instruc-
tions” (kibishī shidō) – Dohi might not issue the individual work order, Dohi was repeat-
edly summoned by the Tokyōi and instructed to do so. Dohi writes: 
After that, there was something dreadful to instructions regarding the issuance of 
individual work orders. The number of times I was instructed was an astonishing 
seven times. The first time was on January 22nd 2008 by two people at school, the 
second time was on January 25th by six people at school, the third time was on 
January 28th by six people at City Hall, the fourth time was on February 15th at the 
Chūbu School Management Support Center by one person, the fifth time was on 
February 20th by five people at City Hall, the sixth time was on February 28th at 
school by two people, and the seventh time was on March 6th at school by four 
people. The number of seven times is not to instruct. It is to coerce and threaten.63 
 
Any sign of reluctance to issue the individual work order is met with automatic, repetitive, 
and unrelenting violence, such that the act of giving “instructions” (shidō) transforms into 
                                                
63 Dohi Nobuo, Sore wa, Mikkoku Kara Hajimatta: Kōchō vs. Tokyōto Kyōiku Iinkai, pg. 68.  






The Japanese word, susamajī (dreadful), also translates as “fierce,” “tremendous,” “awesome,” 
“horrifying,” “frightful,” and “enormous.” Reminiscent of the negative sublime, the slippage from “instruc-
tion” (shidō) to “coercion” (kyōsei) to “threat” (kyohaku) emerges across a senseless amplification of digits, 
until the overpowering threat has breached the protective confines of Dohi’s own school. 
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the compulsive demonstration of the Tokyōi’s power “to coerce and threaten” (kyōsei de 
ari kyohaku). The very “trust” (shinrai) and sociality Dohi sought to preserve between his 
teachers and himself – by refusing to issue the individual work order – is broken between 
himself and the Tokyōi, whose repetitive “instructions” assume the form of the individual 
work order: they order or “coerce,” with the “threat” of punishment.64 As Dohi says, if 
the Tokyōi had simply intended to instruct, he would neither have been summoned seven 
times, often across town to Tokyo City Hall, nor have been confronted by six educational 
bureaucrats inside his own school. As a replication of the form and force of the individual 
work order, the actions of the Tokyōi constitute both a reminder of its power over its staff, 
and the means by which the gaze of something “dreadful” (susamajī) is materialized. 
 Alas, principal Dohi nonetheless found it unnecessary to issue the individual work 
order to his teachers. He recounts that by voicing a “comprehensive work order” (hōkatsu 
shokumu meirei) at one staff meeting, the ceremony “was properly carried out” (tekisei ni 
jisshi sareta).65 Having fewer reservations about the Kimigayo and Hinomaru themselves, 
and believing that – as public worker – it was his duty to cooperate with the Tokyōi, Dohi 
resists the incursion of the “individual work order” by observing regulations to the letter. 
                                                
64 Umehara Toshio testifies: “Above all, in the sense of tearing to shreds the bonds of trust and education 
among the people necessary to run the school, I think that this directive did something that especially 
should not have been done. In this sense, it can only be said that a suicidal act of education took place in 
the name of this directive” (何よりも学校運営にとって必要な関係者の信頼や教育、このきずなをず
だずだに断ち切ったという意味で、私は最もしてはならない行為を行なったと思います。その意
味では、今回の通達は、通達の名によって教育の自殺行為を行なったと言わざるを得ません。) 
(“Hinomaru, Kimigayo” Futō Shobun Tekkai o Motomeru Hishobunsha no Kai, 85). Shirai likewise identi-
fies two points of “excess” (ijōsa) in the enforcement of the “10.23 Directive.” The first is that “discretion 
disappeared from the school” (学校から裁量がなくなったことです). The second is: “That an interven-
tion was undertaken in which the disciplinary power and authority to manage personal affairs were swung 
about in the content and method of instructions, even though there was no problem of danger to the 
life/body of students” (生徒の生命、身体の危険の問題でもないのに、指導内容と方法に懲戒権と
人事権を握りかざした介入がされたことです。) (“Hinomaru, Kimigayo” Futō Shobun Tekkai o Mo-
tomeru Hishobunsha no Kai, 135) 
65 Ibid, pg. 68 – 69. 
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In the absence of a buffer zone such as principal Dohi, the individual work order 
penetrates right down to teachers and, ultimately, to children. Teachers like Nezu Kimiko 
explain that the reason they sit is to act as such a buffer; namely, by showing students that 
it is possible to act differently, thereby thwarting the obviousness of the ceremonies. With 
the “10.23 Directive” and the prohibition on ascertaining the opinions of teachers at staff 
meetings, however, the school workplace had already been transformed into an hierarchy 
in which the unquestionable word of the Tokyōi holds sway and teachers are held directly 
accountable, to parents and the Tokyōi alike, for their shortcomings in the classroom. It 
was similarly recounted by veteran teachers that, unlike the old days, principals today do 
not protect their teachers, leaving them directly accountable to criticism from parents. So 
too, the transformation of the staff meetings into unilateral sessions in which the principal 
gives instructions, as instructed by the Tokyōi, discloses just how principals have become 
little more than vessels of the bureaucratic machinery. With no buffer zone, teachers, like 
the child, have become direct recipients of interpellative procedures from the Tokyōi. In 
fact, the threat of punishment that inaugurated this order was made clear to teachers even 
before the first graduation ceremony took place following the “10.23 Directive.” The To-
kyōi had issued orders for teachers attending the “end of the year event” (shūnen gyōji) in 
2003. By hurrying the delivery of “punishments” (shobun) for teachers who did not stand 
at this event, the consequences of disobeying individual work orders were made known to 
teachers in general; and with zero support from unions on the issue, teachers were left to 
fend for themselves. As one representative of the Yobō Soshō o Susumeru Kai explained 
in an interview, talk of collective opposition crumbled at this point and the decision to 
stand or sit was left to individual teachers. The transformation of schools subsequent to 
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the “10.23 Directive” was initiated by “making an example” (miseshime) of teachers un-
willing to follow orders by falling in line with the hierarchy instantiated in the ceremonial 
hall, and in the coming years, at the workplace itself. Of course, the pinnacle of this hier-
archy consists in the Hinomaru and Kimigayo, but the seating order of the ceremonies is 
likewise predetermined to reflect the hierarchy of the workplace. Every teacher is thus 
given a seating assignment in advance of the ceremonies, reflective of their rank. So too, 
“guests” (raihin) are ranked, and the Tokyōi representative – who has never even been to 
the school before – is visibly seated to outrank the headmaster. Last come those who are 
placed outside the ceremonial hall, which includes teachers who sat in the past, and 
sometimes also students who cannot stand due to a disability. Even the assignment of 
yearly teaching responsibilities is based on whether a teacher has been witnessed to sit in 
the past.66 Because “homeroom” (tannin) teachers are required to attend the entrance and 
graduation ceremonies, teachers known to sit in the past are rarely assigned a homeroom. 
For many teachers, the inability to work as homeroom teacher deprives them of the pur-
pose for which they got into teaching to begin with: to work closely everyday with the 
                                                
66 Albeit prior to the modern emergence of “ritual” (upacara) proper in Java, John Pemberton writes of the 
significance of chairs in late 1700s Javanese wedding ceremonies. As the very “order” (tata) and precondi-
tion of “a tranquil (tentrem) realm,” tata consisted in the “actual deployment (of, for example, court offi-
cials or palace dancers in choreographic positions) or theoretical arrangement (of the realm by means of 
court regulations, or, later, of speech by means of “grammar,” tatabasa) or both as was inherently true of 
palace life in which everything and everyone, from top to bottom, had a prescribed and visible place in the 
royal order of things” (On the Subject of “Java”, 54 – 56). Hence, “nothing was tata-ed more frequently 
than kursi: European-style, straightback chairs. For the potential power of chairs in matters of ceremonial 
place was that they were always set out beforehand in a predesigned and precisely measured formation so 
that provocative issues of status might be taken care of before the ritual fact. Royalty and select guests were 
seated in rows of kursi arrangement (tinata) in studious accordance with a refined system of seating 
(tatanan). And there they sat as if modeling for a portrait in which heads of state sit and present themselves 
for formal viewing. Thus, “the origins of an orderly, tranquil kingdom” became peculiarly embodied in 
chairs, everyday “pillars of the realm,” in many respects, the real foundation upon which the realm ritually 
rested” (Ibid, 56). 
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students.67 If a teacher is suspected of planning to sit – perhaps they objected to the 
Kimigayo in staff meetings – they may find that they have been assigned an isolated seat 
in the back of the ceremonial hall, where they cannot be seen. One such teacher said he 
experienced an urge to barge to the front of the hall and sit through the Kimigayo, in plain 
sight. However, like the “individual work order” itself, measures are put in place that pro-
tect against this possibility. Alongside the threat of punishment, past and potential trans-
gressors are put “under watch” (kanshi) by the Tokyōi. Individual teachers realize they 
had been under watch all along when they are given some sign of special treatment; be it 
before the ceremonies, by the principal pulling the teacher aside to ask about their inten-
tions; or during the ceremony, by being given stern looks by authority figures prior to the 
Kimigayo. In fact, by anticipating contingent disruptions to the ceremonies, the Tokyōi 
produces a general sense of watchfulness, such that the threat of punishment – and fact of 
culpability – coincides with the danger of emerging into visibility. As the title of Dohi’s 
book suggests, Dohi emerged under the watchful gaze of the Tokyōi on account of a col-
league who informed on him: “It All Started from a Tip-Off” (Sore wa, Mikkoku kara 
Hajimatta). In the case of Nezu Kimiko, it was the students who gave her a premonition 
that things were going awry, even before the storm hit.68 One day, a student on the gradu-
ation committee confronted Nezu: “Sensei, you asked us what kind of graduation cere-
mony we wanted so as not to let us do the Kimigayo, right? We thought that we were be-
                                                
67 Yamaguchi Toshinori testifies as follows: “The 10.23 Directive took from me the “work of homeroom 
teacher” that was the purpose of my life as a teacher. Just because I cannot stand and sing for the anthem 
and flag at graduation and entrance ceremonies, am I not suitable for homeroom teacher. I am feeling the 




じています。) (“Hinomaru, Kimigayo” Futō Shobun Tekkai o Motomeru Hishobunsha no Kai, 155 – 
156) 
68 See Ch. 3. 
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ing used by you, Nezu sensei … My mother and grandmother are always saying that they 
have concerns about you, Nezu sensei. You were in the newspaper, too, for going against 
the Board of Education and doing bad things, right.”69 
 The sense of being under watch is not reserved to past and potential transgressors, 
but is pervasive in and constitutive of the ceremonies themselves. Though the Tokyōi 
says that it is the responsibility of every school to surveil itself, it sends out officials to 
oversee the ceremonies. In Osaka, 2013, a “directive” (tsūchi) was even issued which ex-
pands the duties of such officials from documenting whether teachers are standing, to 
conducting a kuchimoto kakunin (mouth check) to “confirm” (gennin) whether teachers 
are actually singing the Kimigayo. The directive explicitly states that the “attitude” (tai-
do) of teachers is under consideration.70 Whether it be to recognize that teachers are sing-
ing or standing, the work of such officials require them to pace the ceremonial hall during 
the ceremonies. In the absence of the assistant principal, to whom this duty otherwise 
falls, these officials walk up to sitting teachers and, by whispering in their ear, tell them 
to “stand” (kiritsu). In Nezu’s case, a Tokyōi official was even assigned to sit beside her 
during the ceremony. If, after repeated attempts to rouse them, the teacher in question 
still refuses to stand, the assistant principal or official make written note of this fact; 
“confirming” (gennin) that so and so remained seated, and thereby setting the machinery 
of “punishment” (shobun) into movement. But when the matter of “confirming” a sitting 
teacher is left to the principal or assistant principal, the affair frequently turns into a veri-
                                                
69 Nezu Kimiko, Kibō wa Seito: Kateika no Sensei to Hinomaru, Kimigayo (Tokyo: Kageshobō, 2007), pg. 




70 “Kimigayo Seishō: Kyōshokuin no Kuchimoto “Kakunin o” Ōsaka-fu ga Tsūchi,” in Mainichi Shimbun, 
23/9/2013. 
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table disruption of order, as when the authority figure starts shouting the order to “stand!” 
(kiritsu!). 
Yet, the sense of being under watch extends beyond the materialization of a gaze 
in persons of authority. While the principal, sub-principal, or representative of the Tokyōi 
ensure that sitting teachers are witnessed, documented, and punished, the ceremonies are 
performed before a symbolic figure who is neither absent, nor present; but whose gaze is 
displaced by the Hinomaru and Kimigayo. Before this symbolic figure, there is no limit to 
the observance of propriety, which is comprehensive of the “attitude” (taido) of teachers. 
Consequently, the subject of the ceremonies is always-already caught in a state of insuffi-
ciency. The materialization of a punitive gaze in which the subject is caught, and made to 
experience lack, can occur in the “severe look” (hageshī metsuki) from any parent, guest, 
or student. However, more often than not, the pervasive character of this gaze is internal-
ized and imagined. Many teachers recounted how “conspicuous” (medatsu) they felt their 
act of sitting to have been. Expecting some kind of reaction after the ceremony, they were 
surprised to be addressed by parents, students, and colleagues as if nothing had happened. 
Contrary to the negative response they had expected, one or two parents might even have 
approached the teacher to thank them for their actions. Similarly, it was not uncommon to 
hear that, rather than actively object to the ceremonies, students – and parents of students 
– who opposed the ceremonies simply refrained from attending them. 
The progression of the ceremonies is designed so that participants find themselves 
always-already caught in its mechanism. The order to “stand” (kiritsu) is spoken at the 
beginning of the ceremony, at a moment antecedent to singing the Kimigayo, so that once  
the signal is given for the Kimigayo to be sung, everyone is already standing. One teacher 
 148 
did sit back down when the prompt for the Kimigayo was given – differentiating between 
the significance of standing with “everyone” (minna), before the Kimigayo, and during it 
– but it was often said by teachers that, even if they had made the decision beforehand to 
sit during the Kimigayo, it was difficult to sit back down once you already found yourself 
standing. Tanaka Satoshi described how he found his body moving, despite his resolve to 
sit, along with everyone in the ceremonial hall. Indeed, not only did Tanaka Satoshi refer 
to this instance in which his “body moved” (karada ga ugoita), as if the body was not his 
own. Other teachers likewise described this incident in interviews, as if the compulsion to 
stand did not belong to Tanaka Satoshi himself, but manifested a social force that coursed 
through the body of everyone present in the ceremonial hall. By the time participants re-
alize they are performing the gestures, the act is already in motion. The gesture of stand-
ing has been made. The mouth is moving, and the realization is reached all of a sudden, 
that the “bow” (rei) has been made to a flag of all things, that cannot return the gesture. 
In that moment of realization, which is always too late, the gaze of an absent third party 
has pierced the subject of the ceremonies so that s/he is caught in the act of paying hom-
age. 
Nothing so much as singing achieves the collapse of interiority with exteriority on 
which the effectivity of the ceremony hinge.71 Like the gaze, the voice is situated at that 
                                                
71 Imura Yoko testifies as follows: “Music ties directly to the spirit of humans, and song and performance 
should not be forced” (音楽は人間の精神に直接結びつくものであり、歌や伴奏を強制すべきでは
ない). Further: “There is no way that piano accompaniment is a mere external action separated from the 
interior of the accompanist” (ピアノ伴奏は伴奏者の内心と切り離された単なる外部行為ではあり得
ない). Further: “I believe that music is something that materializes sentiment in sound. So, what you felt in 
your heart, in other words, unless sentiment, feelings accompany it, I believe that the expression will not be 
abundant” (音楽というのは、心情を音によって表現するものであると思います。なので、心で思
ったもの、要するに、心情が、気持ちが伴わない限りは、表現は豊かにならないと思っていま
す) (“Hinomaru, Kimigayo” Futō Shobun Tekkai o Motomeru Hishobunsha no Kai, 105). A music teacher, 
Takenaka Tadashi writes: “For any music or performing art, there necessarily exists an “audience” to re-
ceive and appreciate it. Even if you yourself are not performing, in listening to the performance, the act is 
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extimate point where interiority collapses with exteriority, and as such, occupies the place 
of a constitutive break between the body and language; indeed, the place of lack in which 
the subject is constituted. As Connor notes of the acousmatic voice – the sourceless voice 
– every voice is “experienced both as a lack and an excess” without origin, and is conse-
quently driven to overcome a constitutive gap.72 As a fetish, the voice activates the very 
insufficiency it would overcome. Moreover, listening – for we are our own interlocutors, 
split in the act of voicing – always-already implies obedience, whereby the affect of sing-
ing the ‘national anthem’ has caught us in its mechanism.73 The excess of voice beckons 
the speaker/interlocutor to partake in the soul of the Other in an act that amounts to noth-
ing less than subjectivization.74 Needless to say, the acousmatic structure of the voice (of 
the other) was amplified in the ceremonial hall, in which “everyone” (minna) was forced 
to sing loudly in unison.75 In this respect, it was above all music teachers obligated to ac-
                                                                                                                                            
undergone of receiving and sharing in feeling the content of the expression.” (どのような音楽、芸能等
であっても、それを受けとめ、鑑賞するという‘聞き手、聴衆’が必ず存在します。自分自身が
演奏をしなくても、その演奏を聴く、ということは、その表現された内容に共感し、受けとめる
という行為が行われます。) (“Hinomaru, Kimigayo” Kyōsei Hantai Yobō Soshō o Susumeru Kai, 
“Kyōsei,” 269) 
72 Steven Connor, Dumbstruck, pg. 23. 
73 Mladen Dolar writes in A Voice and Nothing More: “One could indeed say that there is an effect – or, 
rather, an affect – of shame that accompanies voice: one is ashamed of using one’s voice because it exposes 
some hidden intimacy to the Other, there is a shame which pertains not to psychology, but to structure. 
What is exposed, of course, is not some interior nature, an interior treasure too precious to be disclosed, or 
some true self, or a primordial inner life; rather, it is an interior which is itself the result of the signifying 
cut, its product, its cumbersome remainder, an interior created by the intervention of structure. So by using 
one’s voice one is also “always-already” yielding power to the Other; the silent listener has the power to 
decide over the fate of the voice and its sender; the listener can rule over its meaning, or turn a deaf ear” 
(80). 
74 Dolar writes: “The voice is the flesh of the soul, its ineradicable materiality, by which the soul can never 
be rid of the body; it depends on this inner object which is but the ineffaceable trace of externality and het-
erogeneity, but by virtue of which the body can also never quite simply be the body, it is a truncated body, 
a body cloven by the impossible rift between an interior and an exterior. The voice embodies the very im-
possibility of this division, and acts as its operator” (“Voice,” 71). 
75 Given the subjectivizing effect of the acousmatic voice, it might be asked why the ‘national anthem’ was 
not sung a cappella. Why was there an insistence upon the presence of a sitting pianist? Perhaps the answer 
to this question consists in the fact that, by virtue of sitting, the pianist occupied the place of a constitutive 
negativity that was rendered non-threatening – contained – in being given (if unconsciously) a place. In fact, 
the place of the pianist was a most contradictory one. S/he had to sit and play, as if hers was the place to be 
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company the Kimigayo who repeatedly asserted how preposterous the notion is that mu-
sic, and singing, could be considered a purely “external” (gaimenteki) act. One music 
teacher explained in court that music necessarily involves “emotion” (kimochi) – as if this 
needed explaining – and that music only becomes music when the emotion that emanates 
from one “heart” (kokoro) reaches an other “heart.” To accompany the Kimigayo was not 
only to prompt and “lead” (rīdo), but to “communicate” (komyunikēto) the emotion of the 
song to students. This particular teacher became so haunted by the prospect of playing the 
Kimigayo that the melody kept replaying in her head, requiring her to put on other music 
in order to sleep.76 Thus, music teachers occupy the one role in the ceremonies that oblig-
es them to initiate the Kimigayo and, as a result, makes them responsible for putting the 
machinery of the work order into effect.77 Indeed, when the “10.23 Directive” was first 
issued, principals were not very surprised by the fact that teachers were being required to 
stand. At the time, there even seemed to be a consensus among principals that they would 
prefer to be empowered by a “work order” (shokumu meirei) if standing for the Kimigayo 
was to be made mandatory. But principals expressed surprise that the Tokyōi required the 
music teacher, and no one but the music teacher, to accompany the Kimigayo. Even if an 
                                                                                                                                            
left behind. Not surprisingly, the pianist’s place in the ceremonies was at the back of the hall, such that her 
presence – and most of the music teachers I met or heard of were women – was not visible to participants in 
the ceremonies, nor in photographs thereof. 
76 This information was relayed in an interview with Ikeda Mikiko. Kane Shinmei also recounts: “At night, 
I became unable to sleep well. When I got under the sheets, the melody of the Kimigayo would come float-
ing up, and I really disliked it but, I was unable to sleep with even the lyrics floating up. Such things con-
tinued.” (夜、よく寝られなくなりました。布団の中に入ると、君が代のメロディーが浮かんでき
て、本当に嫌なんですけれども、歌詞まで浮かんできて眠れないんですね。そんなことが続きま
した。) Later, Kane’s diagnosis of “depression” (utsubyō) suddenly turned worse (“Hinomaru, Kimigayo” 
Kyōsei Hantai Yobō Soshō o Susumeru Kai, “Kyōsei,” 316). 
77 This information was relayed in an interview with Ikeda Mikiko. Imura Yoko also testifies: “To sing or 
not to sing … is your own problem, but … when you accompany by piano, you end up sticking to the side 
that says sing” (歌う、歌わないというのは	 。。。自分の問題なんですが、。。。ピアノで伴奏
するとなると、歌いなさいって言っている側に付いてしまう). (“Hinomaru, Kimigayo” Futō Shobun 
Tekkai o Motomeru Hishobunsha no Kai, 105) 
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other teacher knows how to play the piano and offers to play the Kimigayo in place of the 
music teacher, the Tokyōi refuses to accept this possibility. The accompanist can be none 
other than the music teacher. And if the music teacher expresses reluctance to accompany 
the Kimigayo prior to the ceremonies, a recording is prepared so the “play” button can be 
pressed if the teacher continues to refuse even after the assistant principal has approached 
and instructed them to play. Needless to say, prior to the “10.23 Directive,” the Kimigayo 
was sung at certain schools to the accompaniment of a CD recording. The only reason the 
Kimigayo has to be accompanied by the music teacher, one principal said, is because the 
head of the Tokyōi said it had to be so. Thus music teachers who refuse to accompany the 
Kimigayo find themselves transferred to schools where another music teacher is already 
working, rendering them secondary and redundant at their new school. 
Like that retroactive effect of standing and singing – caught in the act of doing it – 
it was somehow always known that the Hinomaru and Kimigayo were the national flag 
and anthem. Even before the symbols were officially established by law in 1998, teachers 
said, they “had known” (shitteita) that the two symbols were the national anthem and flag. 
Though there had been a moment in the immediate postwar when the possibility of a new 
flag and anthem had come under discussion, the undertaking was subverted and the rein-
troduction of the Hinomaru and Kimigayo subsequently took the path it did. Kawarai thus 
writes that, between 1951 and 1958, the Nikkyōso introduced the possibility of adopting 
the “Mountains and Rivers of Green” (Midori no Sanga) as a replacement anthem for the 
Kimigayo, but the endeavor failed. In her book, Kawarai wonders: “Why, at this time, on 
the swell of national discussion, “dialogue,” a “new anthem” did not arrive to replace the 
Kimigayo” (Kono toki ni, naze kokumintekigiron, “taiwa” no uneri de “Kimigayo” ni 
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kawaru “atarashī kokka” ga tanjō shinakatta no deshō ka).78 In the 1980s, leading up to 
the death of the Showa emperor in 1989, the Ministry of Education conducted national 
studies to determine at what schools the Kimigayo was and was not being sung, culminat-
ing in the death and nationally televised memorialization of the emperor in 1989.79 By the 
late 1990s, resistance in the few places actively opposed to symbols of fascist Japan – 
Okinawa, Hiroshima, Tokyo, Osaka – began to be systematically squashed. Today, 
teachers say, students graduating from high schools in Tokyo have never experienced a 
ceremony the way it was before the “10.23 Directive.” These students are now becoming 
teachers in schools. Even knowledge of the fact there was opposition to the Kimigayo and 
Hinomaru is vanishing. 
Thus the reappearance of the Hinomaru and Kimigayo in schools follows the logic 
of that “dangerous supplement,” of which Derrida writes, that it “adds only to replace.”80 
Veteran teachers recount how it used to be that the Hinomaru was not even present in the 
ceremonial hall. But through a compromise between the Tokyōi and the teacher’s unions, 
the Hinomaru made its way into the ceremonial hall, most often standing on a tripod next 
to the school flag. At the time, the walls of the hall and backdrop to the stage were all still 
decorated with paintings by students. Even the ceremonies themselves were organized by 
student committees, under supervision of a teacher. The students were the “leading actors” 
(shujinkō) of the ceremonies, and the order and content of speeches were largely decided 
by the students. Given the flexibility accorded to the manner in which the ceremonies 
                                                
78 Kawarai Junko, Gakkō wa Zōkibayashi: Kyōseikyōzon no Kyōiku Jissen to “Kimigayo” Fukiritsu, pg. 
169 – 170. 
79 See Kobari Makoto, “Gakkō Shikiten (Nyūgakushiki, Sotsugyōshiki) ni Okeru Hinomaru, Kimigayo 
Jisshi no Kitei Yōin: Jisshiritsu no Jōshō (80 Nendai) Kara Kanzen Jisshi (90 Nendai) ni Mukete,” in 
Dōshisha Joshi Daigaku Gakujutsu Kenkyūnenpō (60 (2009)). 
80 Jacques Derrida, “… That Dangerous Supplement …”, pg. 145. 
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were carried out, every school performed its ceremony differently. But it was common, at 
the time, for students to be facing the audience, so that when the “bow” (rei) was given, it 
was received and returned. Similarly, the conferral of degrees was conducted in a manner 
that allowed participants to see the expressions of graduating students.81 And back then, it 
                                                
81  Kaneko Mitsuhiko describes the purpose and form of various floor plans (prior to the 10.23 Di-
rective) at schools for physically and mentally challenged students: 
1) floor form … it is a form that was adopted in pursuit of the possibility of the independent par-
ticipation of children and students for whom it is physically or mentally difficult to receive the 
graduation certificate on the stage. It raised the desire of physically challenged children and stu-
dents with the extremely easy to understand goal of receiving the graduation certificate by oneself. 
For children and students uncomfortable with group participation on account of nervousness, by 
conferring graduation certificates on the floor, and putting the principal and rostrum nearby, close 
to the eye, it was able to reduce unnecessary cause of nervousness. By putting a path of flowers on 
the floor, it had the educational effect of making it easier to visually perceive the path to take to 







2) face-to-face form … for children and students who participate in the graduation ceremony by 
lying on the side or by sitting, the form in which participants all face the platform is such that only 
the back of graduating students can be seen, and is a form that strengthens the sense of alienation. 
With graduating students and current students facing each other and creating a form in which 
looks are closely exchanged, going to receive the graduation certificate with the utmost of one’s 
own strength was an act filled with pride and confidence for the graduating students, while being 
protected by everyone. Again, for the current students, to see the figure of one’s seniors, not on a 
far away platform, but right in front of one’s eyes, was to connect to one’s own figure the follow-








3) hall decorations … the education at schools for challenged children is not just instruction with 
words, but is made to take into consideration a variety of elements of physical stimuli, like hearing 
and sight. The decorations of the graduation ceremony, as an extension of everyday activities, are 
decorations that have been thought up for each individual school. There were initiatives such as a 
10 meter giant wall painting made by the graduating students hung across the whole front wall of 
the stage, on which every student of the school drew a bird. By putting up decorations made with 
the heart, the consciousness that oneself is the actor of the graduation ceremony was nurtured, and 




was not uncommon for students to approach the principal after the ceremony to celebrate 
in their own fashion, by “shaking hands” (akushu), or by posing together for photos. But 
what had originally entered the ceremonial hall as a little flag on a tripod, as an addition, 
altogether replaced the old ceremony. One year, student paintings were removed from the 
backdrop to the stage – in the center of which the Hinomaru was hung – and were moved 
to the sides of the ceremonial hall. Next year, student paintings were altogether removed 
from the hall itself, and placed outside. And in place of the former seating arrangement in 
which the audience was “face-to-face” (taimenshiki) with students, every seat was strictly 
organized to face the Hinomaru at the front of the hall. At the time of this transformation, 
it was not only teachers, but parents and students who objected to the new ceremonies.82 
By violently replacing the former, flexible and widely contrasting ceremonies, the 
Tokyōi realized the installation of an uniform sociality across all public schools in Tokyo. 





い合うという効果を引き出してきた。) (“Hinomaru, Kimigayo” Kyōsei Hantai Yobō Soshō o 
Susumeru Kai, “Kyōsei,” 145 – 146) 
Takenaka Tadashi similarly writes of ceremonies for challenged children: “With regard to the con-
tent of the ceremonies, we had hitherto devised and thought them up so that even children and students with 
severe disabilities could participate enjoyably, and firmly take in the meaning and atmosphere … the ma-
jority of students are required to remain seated until the end of the ceremony. With regard to this, it actually 




場から退場するということも実際に起こります。) (“Hinomaru, Kimigayo” Kyōsei Hantai Yobō 
Soshō o Susumeru Kai, “Kyōsei,” 280 – 281) 
82 At one school where students had been taught of the Hinomaru/Kimigayo and been made aware of their 
meaning for two North Korean students in the ceremony, the student reaction was as follows: “Most of the 
students did not stand. Students with arms joined who looked hard straight ahead glaring, and then students 
covering their ears in the spirit of protest, and then most students entered the hall after the singing of the 
Kimigayo was over.” (ほとんどの生徒が起立しませんでした。腕組みをして正面をじっと見つめて、
にらみつけている生徒、それから抗議の意思で耳を両手で塞いでいる生徒、それから多くの生徒
は君が代の斉唱が終わってから入場してきました。) (“Hinomaru, Kimigayo” Kyōsei Hantai Yobō 
Soshō o Susumeru Kai, “Kyōsei,” 313) 
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The enforcement of the Hinomaru and Kimigayo signalled an out-and-out transformation 
of the forms of social intercourse that had preexisted the “10.23 Directive.” Not only was 
the “trust” (shinrai) between superiors and subordinates shattered, as Dohi recounts. The 
“10.23 Directive” drove a “shaft” (kugi) in between teachers by individualizing them, and 
as one teacher put it, depriving them of of their “right to unite” (danketsuken).83 Students 
were stripped of the right to organize their own ceremonies. And the seating arrangement 
was streamlined for all to face the front of the hall, precluding any form of lateral connec-
tivity, and replicating the “order” of the workplace. It was therefore frequently remarked 
that the ceremonies themselves do not matter as much as the transformation of the day-to-
day work environment reflected in their practice, and for that matter, the unforgiving job 
market that meets students after graduation. Durkheim hence observed in the early 1900s 
that rituals function to condense and crystallize collective sentiments by binding the indi-
vidual to the social whole and suffusing everyday conduct with the values ascribed to this 
sociality. He says that the point of the ritual technique is not so much to exercise “physi-
cal restraint,” but is rather, “to reach, fortify, and discipline consciousness.”84 However, 
the particular sociality produced in the ceremonies is predicated on a misrecognition that 
tears away the old interests of the participants and re-presents it in the hypostatized image 
of the imperial figure. 
 
The subject of the ceremonies is crystallized through the form of a misrecognition 
that similarly led Karl Marx to write of the small-holding peasant class that: they “cannot 
                                                
83 See Numata Yuko, “Kimigayo” Fukiritsu Shobun o Tekkai Saseyō! Kyōiku no Mineika, “Danketsuken” 
Hakai to Tatakaou! Jinji Iinkai Tōsō Shiryōshū. 
84 Émile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, pg. 422. See Ch. 1 for Durkheim on magic, 
religion, and its implications for belief and practice. 
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represent themselves, they must be represented.”85 In The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis 
Bonaparte, Marx accounts for a certain “superstition” with which small-holding peasants 
of 1851 invest their “faith” in the revenant figure of Bonaparte when, in fact, the figure of 
Bonaparte is mobilized by the state as a proxy for the interests of the industrial and finan-
cial elites. By seeking to secure the property of their land through the figure of Bonaparte, 
the small-holding peasants insist on maintaining the conditions that sustain their exploita-
tion. 
To account for the force with which the small-holding peasants misrecognize their 
interest in the “idée fixe” of Bonaparte, Marx looks to the mode of production at the time, 
and to the social formation of the unit of the small-holding peasant family. He writes that, 
like the commodity-form itself, the productive unit of the small-holding peasant has been 
abstracted into a form that seems to foreclose the possibility of the lateral recognition of a 
“common interest.” They “form an immense mass” of serialized, familial productive units 
whose abstraction obstructs mutual recognition; but whose force of misrecognition is as 
manifest in the head of the national body as in the hopes of revolution. Although Marx is 
ironic when he says they “cannot represent themselves,” he analyses a process by which 
the “common interest was detached from society and counterposed to it as a higher, gen-
eral interest, torn away from independently generated activity.”86 Summoning “spirits of 
the past” in a mythic, spectral mode of historical repetition, the hypostatization of this 
“general interest” – in the form of the revenant Bonaparte – is misrecognized by the 
                                                
85 Marx, “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte,” pg. 117 
86 Ibid, pg. 115 – 118. Because the laborer has nothing, s/he constitutes the “internal negation” – as Žižek 
says: the symptom that “subverts the very universal rational principle of this totality” – of the commodity-
form and harbors the possibility of the mutual recognition of a “common interest” (Žižek, The Sublime Ob-
ject of Ideology, 23). Thus, Georg Lukàcs writes in “History and Class Consciousness” that the dialectical 
antinomy of subject and object lays the ground for an eruption of contingency into history as a proletarian 
“self-consciousness of the commodity” (169). 
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peasant in that mode of obviousness of which Althusser writes. As an “idée fixe,” the 
ghostly figure of the returned emperor is always-already there. Hence, Marx employs a 
language shot through with the specters of historical repetition, but also with metaphorics 
of visibility. Sarcastically, he says that the interests of the peasants must be represented 
by a “master” who “watches over them from on high.”87 This master figure occupies a 
place that is neither within, nor outside of history, but structures a field of visibility in 
which the peasant gives himself to be seen – he is watched over, protected by the emper-
or – and in whose image the peasant misrecognizes himself.88 But this mistaken invest-
ment in Bonaparte not only quells the 1851 revolution. It shores up the powers of the 
state bureaucracy, and creates “the conditions in which free competition could be devel-
oped.”89 
 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s reading of Marx’s Eighteenth Brumaire reveals the 
power of the revenant Bonaparte to consist in its capacity to act at once as a “proxy” and 
“trope.” As “proxy” for the interests of the financial and industrial elites, its power to rep-
resent the small-holding peasants slips into a normative “trope” for this emergent class. In 
its power to transpose a certain model of into a model for, the faith invested in Bonaparte 
                                                
87 Marx, “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte,” pg. 117. Much as this imperial figure occupies a 
special place within the network of signifiers, the structure of this misrecognition consists in the fetish 
character of the commodity. Thus Žižek writes: “the essential feature of commodity fetishism does not con-
sist of the famous replacement of men with things (‘a relation between men assumes a relation between 
things’); rather, it consists of a certain misrecognition which concerns the relation between a structured 
network and one of its elements; what is really a structural effect, an effect of the network of relations be-
tween elements, appears as an immediate property of one of the elements, as if this property also belongs to 
it outside its relations with other elements” (Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, 23 – 24). 
88 Althusser writes in “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses”: “Which means that all ideology is cen-
tered, that the absolute Subject occupies the unique place of the Center, and interpellates around it the in-
finity of individuals into subjects in a double mirror-connection such that it subjects the subjects to the Sub-
ject, while giving them in the Subject in which each subject can contemplate its own image (present and 
future) the guarantee that this really concerns them and Him, and that since everything takes place in the 
Family …” (122). 
89 Marx, “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte,” pg. 32. See also Takashi Fujitani’s Splendid 
Monarchy: Power and Pageantry in Modern Japan. 
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forecloses the formation of a transformative, historical class.90 Harootunian thus observes 
of the postwar emperor that his symbolic status has set it: 
free in the infinity of representations, since, as symbol, he has become the subject 
of all representations. In this sense, the symbolization of the emperor opened the 
way for the interchangeability between what Marx once called Darstellung-the 
power to re-present-and Vertretung-a stand-in or substitute for a political body-,a 
constant running together of the power to represent and the representation of 
power, signifying and signified. As a result, symbolization provided the site for 
the consequential conjuncture and coupling of power and representation and inau-
gurated what might be described as the characteristic chiasma of politics and cul-
ture which has marked the end of the postwar era in Japan.91 
 
As a “symbol without referent,” the figure of the postwar emperor has become mobilize-
able – by the state that wields the power to re-present – to any social scenario in a “con-
juncture” that renders the political indistinguishable from the cultural, and vice versa. In 
effect, the force of a floating signifier is mobilized to achieve commensuration and stabil-
ity in the signification of Japan. While the ceremonies operate to instill a sense of shame 
in individual subjects, the instantiation of social totality is attained in the performance of 
a magical conjunction that would impose unity on the discursive formation of a fractured, 
lacking body of the national youth. 
                                                
90 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak writes: “Such a model of social incoherence – necessary gaps between the 
source of “influence” (in this case the small peasant proprietors), the “representative” (Louis Napoleon), 
and the historical-political phenomenon (executive control) – implies not only a critique of the subject as 
individual agent but even a critique of the subjectivity of a collective agency. The necessarily dislocated 
machine of history moves because “the identity of the interests” of these proprietors “fails to produce a 
feeling of community, national links, or a political organization.” The event of representation as Vertretung 
(in the constellation of rhetoric-as-persuasion) behaves like a Darstellung (or rhetoric-as-trope), taking its 
place in the gap between the formation of a (descriptive) class and the nonformation of a (transformative) 
class: “In so far as millions of families live under economic conditions of existence that separate their mode 
of life … they form a class. In so far as … the identity of their interests fails to produce a feeling of com-
munity … they do not form a class” (Marx, Surveys from Exile, pg. 239, Emphasis mine). The complicity 
of vertreten and darstellen, their identity-in-difference as the place of practice – since this complicity is 
precisely what Marxists must expose, as Marx does in The Eighteenth Brumaire – can only be appreciated 
if they are not conflated by a sleight of word” (Spivak, A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a Histo-
ry of the Vanishing Present (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, 1999), pg. 260). Notably, this closure of 
the potentially transformative gap by the tropic form of Darstellung recalls the power of language – as a 
fetish form of propriety – to separate and contain elements that threaten social life and life itself. See my 
reference in Ch. 1 to James T. Siegel’s “Images and Odors in Javanese Practices Surrounding Death.” 
91 Harry Harootunian, “An Emperor System in Every Blade of Grass and in the Leaves of Every Tree,” pg. 
36. 
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Writing of the notion of mana in his Introduction to the Work of Marcel Mauss, 
Lévi-Strauss observes that the structure of language entails a fundamental “contradiction” 
by which “there is always a non-equivalence or ‘inadequation’ between” the total system 
of signifiers and any given signified. In Lévi-Strauss’ clarification of Mauss, “a signifier-
surfeit” requires that a “supplementary ration” function such that the “available signifier 
and mapped-out signified may remain in the relationship of complementarity which is the 
very condition of the exercise of symbolic thinking.”92 Short of satisfying this condition 
of adequation between the totality of signifiers and signifieds, symbolic thinking does not 
function. Moreover, short of science or knowledge providing such an adequation, magical 
thinking would have to provide it. In consideration of that non-contemporaneous contem-
poraneity of the two-decade-long recession, the place of “youth-bashing,” and the endless 
“postwar” (sengo), Japan – like other nations – is burdened with a negativity that exceeds 
the limits of the signifiable, but that cries out for an end. Following Lévi-Strauss, it would 
be the function of a floating signifier of zero symbolic value to effect the complementari-
ty in which symbolic thinking is effective.93 
 In magical rituals, the power of words to create the fact of such adequation resides 
in the copula, to be. By linking dissimilar things through performance and metaphoricity, 
the copula, is, constitutes the “heterogeneous” term or “force” of language through which 
the magical ritual attains its efficacy. At once “action,” “ether,” and “milieu,” Mauss says 
                                                
92 Claude Lévi-Strauss, Introduction to the Work of Marcel Mauss, trans. by F. Baker (London: Routledge 
& Kegan Paul, 1987), pg. 62 – 63. 
93 Ibid, pg. 62 – 64. Lévi-Strauss writes: “I see in mana, wakan, orenda, and other notions of the same type, 
the conscious expression of a semantic function, whose role is to enable symbolic thinking despite the con-
tradiction inherent in it.That explains the apparent insoluble antinomies attaching to the notion of mana, 
which struck ethnographers so forcefully, and on which Mauss shed light: force and action; quality and 
state; substantive, adjective and verb all at once; abstract and concrete; omnipresent and localised” (Ibid, pg. 
64). 
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that the magical ritual achieves both the confusion, and the coincidence, whereby it estab-
lishes its goal as fact through the copulaic force of mana as a “grammatical clause.”  
Yet, contrary to Lévi-Strauss’ reading of mana as a purely complementary factor, 
Mauss privileges a view of mana such that it gives rise to “a confusion between actor, rite 
and object.”94 The rite “adds” mana to the objects and actors of the rite, although mana is 
of “the same nature as the rite” itself.95 As if by a conjuring trick, the ritual eliminates the 
“discordant factor” between desire and dream, confusing representation with reality. The 
conjunction of the magical performance attains an a priori status and the fact of the con-
junction constitutes proof unto itself. Mauss thus writes that: “between a wish and its ful-
fillment there is, in magic, no gap.” Like that fearsome body of students which stands like 
“robots” (robotto), and does not “think with its own head” (jibun no atama de kangaeru), 
the magical ritual closes the “gap” between “wish and fulfillment” – or “order” (meirei) 
and obedience – demonstrating an “automatic efficacy” in which the truth of the conjunc-
tion was always-already so.96 Whipped into anticipation by the “order” (meirei) to stand, 
the organization of lack is achieved in the totalizing gaze of an agent that is the totality of 
participants standing. As an instantiation of the symbolic emperor, the fact of social total-
ity is created in the moment that “everyone” (minna) rises to sing in unison; a totality that 
– as structuralist Foucault says – nevertheless depends on the sitting teacher that it is not. 
The words, “all rise” (kiritsu), assume a formulaic power that is transposable to positions 
of authority in other social scenarios.97 With a single stroke, the lacking, disorderly youth 
                                                
94 Marcel Mauss, A General Theory of Magic, pg. 151, 138, 134. 
95 Ibid, pg. 137. 
96 Ibid, pg. 78, 144. 
97 When I interviewed the director of an NGO which sought to prevent “bullying” (ijime) in schools, it was 
matter-of-factly explained to me that bullying was deeply associated with the disorder of the classroom, the 
permissiveness of teachers, and a style of teaching that sought to match the abilities of the lowest perform-
ers. When I asked what could be done to alleviate the problem of “bullying,” I was told by the director – his 
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is shamed into conformity by the total social order enacted within the ceremonies. On this 
note, Althusser writes: 
We observe that the structure of all ideology, interpellating individuals as subjects 
in the name of a Unique and Absolute Subject is speculary, i.e. a mirror structure, 
and doubly speculary: this mirror duplication is constitutive of ideology and en-
sures its functioning.98 
 
This speculary loop would achieve closure in the misrecognition by subjects of the social 
totality that is themselves standing. By the same token, however, the presence of a sitting 
individual disrupts this loop, and the mobilization of that fetish image of social totality is 
disclosed to consist in the attempt to frame, or name, a constitutive “confusion” or excess 
that haunts every instance of its instantiation. Nor are the ritual conditions in place which 
would facilitate healing – of an individual before an audience – for the sitting individual 
teacher threatens the sociality of the act. 
The effectivity of magical rituals to achieve the desired end notably hinges on the 
conventionality of its means. Mauss thus observes that, not only must the representations 
of magic be collective, but the desired end of the rituals must likewise appear collective: 
“It is because the result desired by everyone is expressed by everyone, that the means are 
considered apt to produce the effect.” For the magical conjunction to work, it must be the 
case that “the whole society suffers from the false images of its dream,” for “the synthesis 
                                                                                                                                            
palms turned upwards horizontally, and rising from the chest – that teachers should start by having students 
“rise” (kiritsu) at the beginning of every class. Though I was first bewildered by this response, the political 
inclinations of the NGO were revealed to me when the Nikkyōsō was referred to as a negative influence, 
and likewise, when it was said that teachers who do not do as they are told might as well quit. Citing the 
English phrase, the director took a “zero tolerance policy” stance towards bullying. At a single stroke, the 
act of “standing” (kiritsu) would reform the disorder of the public classroom. Indeed, if carried out properly, 
the discipline of “standing” (kiritsu) would recuperate the losses associated not only with “bullying” (ijime), 
but with “suicide” (jisatsu) – the very endpoint of bullying – by endowing future students with a “strength 
to live” (ikiru chikara). In short, it would enable students to be injected into a perfect competitive system 
that favors high performers, preparing them for, and immunizing them against the pressures of the market.  
98 Louis Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses,” pg. 122. 
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between cause and effect occurs only in public opinion.”99 In turn, mana, or that force by 
which the magical conjunction would be achieved is this force of the social. 
But in the ceremonies it is the sociality of the sign of the social par excellence that 
is at stake. The presence of disobedient teachers shows that the Hinomaru and Kimigayo 
may constitute collective representations, but that they are not endorsed by everyone. Nor 
are the “false images” of society – the endless negative legacy of the war and the lacking 
youth of the two-decade economic recession – agreed upon as negativities to be “rectified” 
(tadasu) in the total sociality that would-have-been.  
The ceremonies thereby seek to establish the fact of the guilt of sitting teachers, as 
much as they seek to establish social totality. Starting with the “individual work order,” a 
punitive system has been implemented to “witness” (gennin) sitting teachers, to submit 
them to an “examination of the conditions” (jijō chōsa) surrounding the act, and to “pun-
ish” (shobun) them in accordance with the severity of their transgression. Conducted im-
mediately after the ceremonies, punished teachers say that the “examination of the condi-
tions” is purely designed to verify the fact that the teacher sat: the inquiry is limited to the 
when, where, what and how. Likewise, teachers emerge from the endless rounds of “Re-
currence Prevention Training” (Saihatsu Bōshi Kenshu) saying that they have been treat-
ed as “criminals” (hanzaisha). It is, of course, not a coincidence that the afflictions of the 
social body are formulated with metaphors of “crime” (hanzai) – and guilt – rather than 
solely with reference to “cancer particles” (gan saibō).100 If the symbols of all nations are 
                                                
99 Mauss writes that: “A magical judgment is imposed by a kind of convention which establishes, prejudi-
cially, that a symbol will create an object, and a part will create the whole, a word, the event and so on” 
(Mauss, A General Theory of Magic, 154). 
100  While the act of sitting was not illegal in itself, the Tokyōi’s treatment of disobedient teachers – as 
if they were “criminals” (hanzaisha) – does not only displace guilt onto the teachers. In violating Supreme 
Court rulings – for instance, that the Tokyōi cannot issue punishments which exceed “warnings” (kaikoku) 
– the Tokyōi arrogates a suspension of law reminiscent of Carl Schmitt’s state of emergency. See Schmitt’s 
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imbued with a degree of trauma, the school ceremonies trigger the specter of a “negative 
history” (fu no rekishi) which was to-have-been eliminated in the youth. The ceremonies 
seek to establish a sociality anterior to any magical representation, and that is constitutive 
of the success of magical rituals. Because the facticity of the conventional is at stake, the 
ceremonies are strangely self-referential in their aim of harnessing that irrational force of 
the social in the name of the emperor. The very consistency of the symbolic is contingent 
on securing an automaticity of misrecognition. 
 Slavoj Žižek writes that the sublime object of ideology subjectivizes by filling out 
an “empty place” in the symbolic order. A “structural place,” Žižek writes, that “precedes 
                                                                                                                                            
Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, trans. by George Schwab (Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 1985), and Ch. 1. 
 After the first “Recurrence Prevention Training” (Saihatsu Bōshi Kenshu) held in the second floor 
basement of the Tokyo Metropolitan School Personnel in Service Training Center in summer of 2013, par-
ticipating teachers said the following. Kobayashi Keiko says: “This was my first training. When you de-
scend into the darkness of the second floor basement, there are some ten staff members standing here and 
there in the hallway, and when you go to the bathroom, there is a female staff member standing in front of 
it. I thought that they wanted to make us feel that ‘You lot have done something bad.’” (今回初めての研
修だった。地下 2 階の暗い中をおりていくと、廊下には 10 数人の職員が処々に立っていて、お
手洗いにいくとその前には女性の職員がいた。‘おまえたちは悪いことをした’ということを感
じさせたいのだと思った。) O-san says: “I took the training shaking because it was so cold. It was pain-
ful for both the mind and body, with the attitude of staff members as if surveilling, the claustrophobic sen-
sation of being surrounded, being told over and over again that I had violated work orders.” (寒くてがた
がたふるえながら研修を受けた。監視するような職員の態度、囲まれている圧迫感、くりかえし
職務命令違反と言われ、心身ともに苦痛だった。) Ouichi Kiyoko says: “At the end, I was told to say 
what I thought. While being told that I was free to say my thoughts, they had gone so far as to prepare a 
response stating that from now on I will follow work orders of my superiors and stand and sing the anthem.” 
(最後に自分の考えを述べろといわれた。考えは自由と言いつつ、これからは上司の職務命令に
従って起立して国歌を斉唱しますという答えまで用意されていた。) And Tanaka Satoshi says: “On 
the reflection sheet, there was a question asking how I would complete work orders from here on after, to 
which I wrote that as a public servant of all citizens, I would observe the constitution and various laws and 
regulations, and see my duties through. The instructor asked if the principal’s work order is also included in 
those various rules and regulations, right? Of course that is the case, I said, but in the event that there is a 




た。) (“Hōkoku: ‘Kimigayo’ Fukiritsu Kyōin ni ‘Saihatubōshi Kenshū’ ~ Jinken Shingai Yarihodai no 
Tokyōi,” on Labornet, 4/5/2015). 
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objects which occupy it.”101 Convention fixes the objects that are constitutive of subjects 
as subjects of ideology. Indeed, as the object-cause of desire the sublime object embodies 
a constitutive lack, located there where Freud says: “Where it was, shall I be” (Wo es war, 
soll ich werden). Žižek writes of this object that it is the: “nothing which ‘is’ the subject ... 
the subject is the void, the hole in the Other, and the object the inert content filling up this 
void: the subject’s entire ‘being’ thus consists in the fantasy-object filling out his 
void.”102 Teachers pointed out the senselessness of a system in which everyone suspends 
their own judgement, and acts as they do merely because they have been ordered to do so 
from above. Notwithstanding that the Tokyōi’s “Curriculum Guidelines” (Gakūshū Shidō 
Yōryō) says that the educational system aims to foster “independence” (jiritsu) in students, 
the Tokyōi prohibits teachers from exercising their own judgement, “thinking with their 
own heads” (jibun no atama de kangaeru), and acting accordingly. Hence, teachers asked 
how they can nurture “independence” (jiritsu) if they themselves are prohibited from act-
ing in accordance with their best judgement. Moreover, if everybody in the hierarchy acts 
as they do because they have been so ordered from above, then where do orders originate 
and where does “responsibility” (sekinin) reside? In Jacques Lacan’s fitting description of 
the form of signification, the hierarchy of the educational system discloses a “chain of the 
signifier” in which “meaning insists, but that none of the chain’s elements consists in the 
signification it can provide at that very moment.” Anticipated in the form of the signifier, 
meaning emerges retroactively across this “chain of the signifier.”103 It only follows that 
                                                
101 Slavoj Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, pg. 194. 
102 Ibid, pg. 196. 
103 Jacques Lacan, “Subversion,” pg. 682.  Lacan writes: “The subject’s submission to the signifier, which 
occurs in the circuit that goes from s(A) to A and back from A to s(A), is truly a circle, inasmuch as the 
assertion that is established in it – being unable to close on anything but its own scansion, in other words, 
failing an act in which it would find its certainty, refers back only to its own anticipation in the composition 
of the signifier, which is in itself meaningless [insignifiante]” (682 – 683). 
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certain signifiers function to set a stop to the sliding of meaning across the chain. Yet, no 
meaning lurks behind such signifiers. By quilting, the “point de capiton” merely encloses, 
for a moment, the self-referential play of a given chain of signifiers so the senseless slide 
of meaning attains sense in the embodiment of the total system’s – or chain’s – nullity.104 
The copula, is, achieves that conjunction by which the empty sign of the emperor 
fills the void constitutive of ideology and the subject of ideology. But as “fantasy-objects,” 
the Hinomaru and Kimigayo are loaded with an excess of trauma that is triggered, in turn, 
by the coincidence of the form of their deployment with barbarism. Under the reign of an 
elite state bureaucracy – such as the famed historian, Masao Maruyama, has advocated in 
his writing – the violence of the ceremonies splits the present of the ceremonies and holds 
forth the specter of slaughter as what will-have-been the end of Japan’s endless “postwar” 
(sengo). As James T. Siegel writes in Naming the Witch, in such instances the copula, is, 
takes on an “hyperbolic” form, because “it tries to designate something it is incapable of 
bringing into expression.”105 By uncovering a limit of signification that undermines their 
effectivity to install a master signifier there where the “I” is inaugurated, the ceremonies 
give participants an intimation of something nonsensical, “strange” (hen) or foreign at the 
source of the nation: a witch that must be eliminated in the enactment of social totality. 
The place occupied by the figure of the familial Japanese emperor is analogous to 
that of the revenant Bonaparte described by Marx. Neither absent nor present in the hall, 
nor inside nor outside of history, the mythic emperor partakes of a logic of repetition such 
                                                
104 Jacques Lacan, “The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian Unconscious,” 
pg. 681. 
105 James T. Siegel, Naming the Witch, pg. 228. Contrary to Lévi-Strauss’ description of shamanic healing 
as providing a “language” with which to bring into expression an otherwise “inexpressible, psychic state” 
(Lévi-Strauss, “The Effectiveness of Symbols,” in Structural Anthropology, trans. by Claire Jacobsen and 
Brooke Schoepf (United States: Basic Books, 1963), pg. 198), Siegel writes of the “witch” that “it does not 
make up for discrepancies between registers nor does it draw on the power to signify rather than significa-
tion itself” (Siegel, Naming the Witch, 228). 
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that his figure assumes a spectral form in the Hinomaru and Kimigayo. And as the ghost-
ly figure toward whom the totality of subjects bow, and in whose gaze the subjects of the 
ceremonies give themselves to be seen, the imperial figure constitutes a field of visibility 
in which any departure from propriety is deemed culpable. Reminiscent of Michel Fou-
cault’s panopticon – the Tokyōi demands that schools surveil their own ceremonies – the 
internalized gaze in which subjects are seen derives its force, however, from its power to 
shame. Thus, the “10.23 Directive” identifies insufficiency – there are “numerous issues” 
(samazama na kadai), it says – so that an “even more enhanced” (yori issō no kaizen) en-
forcement can take place. The Tokyōi not only asks if teachers and students are standing, 
but whether they are singing (not just mouthing the words), and whether they are singing 
“with a loud voice” (ōki koe de), and with the proper “attitude” (taido).106 It is, in effect, 
not simply its power to re-present, but the power of the ceremonies to catch subjects in a 
state of insufficiency – its power to shame – that produces the cleft across which the indi-
vidual subject will strive selflessly, and endlessly, for the nation. It is this power to shame 
that is thrown into question by the sitting teachers; the demand that such teachers make a 
public “apology” (shazai) discloses the drive to restore shame to its proper place. Like-
wise, the serialization and individualization of a mass of subjects produces a disposition 
in which the individual is isolated before symbols of state, a logic replicated in the To-
kyōi’s strategy of isolating sitting teachers at different schools. By driving a “shaft” (ku-
                                                
106 This notion of singing with a “with a loud voice” (ōki koe de) recalls Connor’s observation of the em-
bodiment of voice in space: “the fact of speech gives them new possibilities of movement, including the 
possibility of impossible, or fantastic kinds of movement, as the body stretches and contorts into the pos-
tures dictated by its utterance. Now, the soaring note of incredulity will stretch and attenuate the body; the 
‘WHHHHAAAATT!’ of shocked surprise will render the body of the character spiky and horrent, the note 
of misery will drag the body down into a sagging, flattened bag” (Connor, Dumbstruck, 11). 
 167 
gi) between teachers, the reference to a common, third interest immanent to teachers and 
students is blocked. 
The blog of a politician and representative of the Japan Restoration Party reveals 
the restoration of normativity to consist in the allocation of shame. After attending a high 
school graduation ceremony as honorary guest and speaker, Nishida Kaoru describes “An 
Unfortunate Graduation Ceremony” (Zannen na Sotsugyōshiki): 
This morning at 10:00, it was the graduation ceremony at what was my own, local 
high-school. 
 
When singing the national anthem at the beginning, there was a non-standing 
teacher. In front of the students, and to top it, in the front seat. 
 
Before the ceremony started, and before entering the hall, I had said to the princi-
pal as we were walking and talking: “The other day, the incident of someone not 
standing was reported at an other school but, it could not possibly be that some-
thing like that will happen today ~.” 
 
To my surprise, for whatever reason, the principal replied: “I don’t know. The 
work order has been issued.” 
 
I was shocked. To say, “I don’t know”? As if it concerned a stranger. 
 
What if it was a police organization. 
 
Is it okay for a senior officer’s subordinate to lunge forwards at a site in which an 
atrocious crime is barricaded in? Would you respond “I don’t know” to this ques-
tion? 
 
What is this principal. 
 
He was giving the lengthiest of fine greetings. 
 
But before saying this to the students, one would want things conveyed properly 
to the teachers of one’s own school. 
 
In the ceremony, I was the first of the invited guests to be introduced. If it was as 
usual, I would say “Graduating students, congratulations with your graduation,” 
with a few words and a big voice. Today, I said, “Everyone, I am sorry. Even 
though the school is where what is proper in society, the rules of society are 
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taught I apologize that there is a teacher who cannot uphold these rules. I am truly 
sorry.” 
 
It was the first time I have ever made such a greeting. 
 
Even while the graduation certificates were handed over, this dumbfounding non-
standing teacher was jabbering and laughing with the homeroom teacher next to 
them. 
 
Perhaps he was triumphant at having remained seated … ? 
 
I was only full of remorse for the pure, innocent children. With a feeling of deep 
regret, I was unable to smile. To have let them come in contact with a teacher who 
has such a biased and indiscrete mentality. And at the place of public education. 
 
I became convinced that, as a pressing need, it is necessary to reform education.107  
                                                
107 Nishida Kaoru, “Zannen na Sotsugyōshiki,” 2/4/2014. The Japanese text reads: 
 






























As his comparison suggests, Nishida would like for nothing less than the public school to 
be a “police organization” (keisatsu soshiki). Moreover, the normative force of Nishida’s 
comparison is reinforced by his repeated use of military metaphors to describe the “actual 
site” (genba) of the graduation ceremony. He refers to the principal as a “senior officer” 
(jōkan) and to the teacher as a “subordinate” (buka), as if the only relationship that could 
possibly exist between the two is one of administering orders, and obeying them. The act 
of sitting – or of insubordination – is described as facilitating, and hence, partaking of “an 
atrocious crime” (kyōakuhan).108 Significantly, aside from a passing reference to “singing 
























108 The Japanese word, kyōakuhan, also translates as “thug,” “dangerous criminal,” or “felonious offense.” 
It is as a noun, however, that the word – kyōakuhan (atrocious crime) – suggests that the actions of the sit-
ting teacher threaten a certain containment. Indeed, the kyōakuhan is “barricaded in” (tatekomotteiru) and 
rather than capture the criminal, it is the duty of the policeman to maintain the barricade or boundary which 
keeps the kyōakuhan in place. It is in this respect that the actions of the lunging policeman, like that of the 
sitting teacher, are described not only as “biased” or “prejudiced” (katayotta), but as “imprudent” and “in-
discrete” (fukinshin). The guilt of the kyōakuhan is displaced on the insubordinate subordinate – a “stranger” 
(tanin) within the ranks, to add – whose indiscretion threatens to expose the crime that should be contained. 
Notably, this word – fukinshin (indiscrete) – was also used to limit the expression of independent journal-
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the national anthem at the beginning” (bōtō no kokka seishō), Nishida makes no reference 
whatsoever to why it should be considered “proper” (jōshiki) to stand for the anthem. The 
point is not up for discussion, and is elided as a given fact. Of course, the very facticity of 
what constitutes “propriety” (jōshiki) or “common-sense of society” (shakai no jōshiki) – 
the meaning of “proper” (jōshiki) slips into the obviousness of “common-sense” (jōshiki) 
– is what is at stake in the ceremonies.109 Hence, Nishida does not explain or reason why 
not standing is improper. Instead, he poses a rhetorical question to which the response is 
only obvious: “What if it was a police organization” (keisatsu soshiki dattara dō deshō)? 
If the school was a police organization, obviously insubordination would not be tolerated. 
To bring up the question of the content of standing for the anthem would implicitly be to 
question and compromise the facticity of its propriety. Nishida thus skips the minor detail 
that the public school is neither a police station, nor the scene of a crime. Instead, Nishida 
focuses on the glaring and visible fact that the form of the “work order” (shokumu meirei) 
has not been observed. And while, like a police station, the ceremonies function to make 
visible every infraction against the law of social normativity, it must be said that the truly 
“atrocious crime” (kyōakuhan) is out of sight and “barricaded in” (tatekomotteru). As an 
act of “lunging forwards” (totsunyū) – or of disrupting ranks – “not standing to attention” 
(fukiritsu) makes visible and effectively constitutes proof of the existence of that greater 
“crime” lurking beneath the tip of the iceberg. As his last remark makes clear, Nishida is 
henceforth determined to “reforming” (seitoka) education. As a “pressing need” (kyūmu) 
                                                                                                                                            
ists in the wake of the March 11, 2011, earthquake and nuclear disaster. I owe this last piece of information 
to Etsuko Kasai’s dissertation chapter, “Introduction: Fascism as a Mass Phenomenon,” in Everyday Fas-
cism of Contemporary Japan. 
109 The Japanese word, jōshiki, translates as “propriety,” “proper,” “common-sense,” “common knowledge,” 
“common practice,” “accepted practice,” “social etiquette,” “sensible,” “practical,” “normal,” “ordinary,” 
and can be used to say “it is obvious that” (wa jōshiki da), “it goes without saying that” (wa jōshiki da), or 
“it is taken for granted that” (wa jōshiki da). 
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or an emergency measure, such “reform” would compensate for a shameful incompetence 
or lack, evidenced and figured prominently by the sitting teacher “in front of the students, 
and in the very front seat” (seito tachi no mae de, soremo ichiban mae no seki de). 
The identification of lack in the educational institution is constitutive of Nishida’s 
writing. He begins by recounting that there was a sitting teacher in the front. But even 
before the fact, he had anticipated the eventuality by calling the principal into accounta-
bility. In short, he had always-already known that such teachers existed. The actual event 
serves as proof thereof – of an “atrocious crime” – confirming that reform is required to 
prevent future, yet inevitable occurrences. As compensation for lack, however, reform 
would take the form of instilling a sense of shame over lack, to subjectivize, where, pre-
viously, there was shamelessness. Nishida thus asks “what is this principal?” (kōchō tte 
nandeshō), who does not know or care whether his own subordinates will obey work or-
ders. Likewise, the teacher is described as shamelessly “jabbering and laughing” 
(pechakuchapechakucha to warainagara), as if s/he “were triumphant” (kachi hok-
kotteita) at having remained seated throughout the ceremony. Indeed, at the very place 
that teaches “what is proper in society, the rules of society” (shakai no rūru, shakai no 
jōshiki), there is a teacher who is not able to “protect” (mamoru) these rules. And to top it, 
this is occurring at a “place of public education” (kōkyōiku no ba). In Nishida’s eyes, 
such teachers are not only bad examples for children, or mere hypocrites. As the slogan 
of his homepage suggests – “To Protect Life” (Inochi, Mamoru) – such teachers consti-
tute a veritable threat to the rebirth of the nation, espoused as a value by the Japan Resto-
ration Party. To “observe” (mamoru) or “protect” (mamoru) the rules is, effectively, “to 
protect life” (inochi, mamoru). The “indiscrete and biased mentality” (fukinshin de kata-
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yotta shisō) of teachers who do not stand threatens to contaminate the “pure, innocent” 
(junshinmuku) children of the nation. In order to rectify this situation – and rather than 
outright vilify the teacher and principal – Nishida decides to apologize to the children, on 
behalf of the school. His strategy – and one would have to assume that he thought this out 
in advance, since he himself describes how he anticipates that a teacher will remain sit-
ting – is to place shame where shame ought to be. He says “I am truly sorry” (hontō ni 
gomennasai) that there is a teacher present who cannot “protect” or “observe” (mamoru) 
the very rules that the school is supposed to teach. He apologizes on behalf of both the 
sitting teacher, and the principal who neither knows nor cares that a teacher might sit 
through the ceremonies. 
 The effectivity of Nishida’s statement hinges on framing a certain set of actions as 
shameful, which from the online responses to his blog, is not altogether successful. One 
former student of the school writes that: “Even though I did not have anything to do with 
it, I found it somehow unpleasant. The teacher may be wrong, too, but I wish that such a 
big thing had not been made out of it. To me, this article is not saying to do the best from 
here onwards, but looks like mere bad-mouthing.”110 However, notably the student here 
does not comment on the rectitude of standing or sitting. The content of the act from 
which the excess of attention originated is hardly up for discussion. What is concerning – 
“unpleasant” (iya) – to the student is the fact that such a “big thing” (koto o ōkiku) was 
made of it, and that this attention intruded upon his or her personal life through the pass-
ing comment of a friend, thereby implicating them in the matter. “Bad-mouthing” (waru-
guchi) takes on the significance of magnifying the teacher’s act of sitting. The subsequent 
                                                




visibility impinges on anyone associated with the school, taking precedence over the rec-
titude of the act that instigated the uproar. Of course, if it is the excess of attention that is 
“unpleasant” (iya) to the former student, the blame for causing this attention easily shifts 
from the guest speaker to the teacher who triggered the incident. Regardless, the teacher 
in question has “been made an example of” (miseshime). 
 Subjectivization is achieved by introducing a certain repetition compulsion in the 
subject. Hence the Tokyōi insists that “individual work orders” be given to all teachers 
every year. The threat of “punishment” (shobun) is constitutive of the field of visibility 
within which the subject gives her or himself to be seen.111 Though it is rare for teachers 
to attract the magnitude of attention elicited by “An Unfortunate Graduation Ceremony,” 
the form of intimidation at work in the incident is replicated by the “10.23 Directive.” 
Individual teachers are “made an example of” (miseshime). Like rumors circulated of 
punishments issued by the Tokyōi even before the first graduation ceremony of 2004, 
teachers in general are made to know what can happen to them if they do not obey the 
                                                
111  Shirai writes of the goal of “10.23 Directive”: “To teach children the sense of value that it is cor-
rect to stand and sing the Kimigayo. To teach that if you do not take in this sense of value, ‘you will receive 
criticism from your surroundings.’ The Tokyōi itself has said that this is the goal of the 10.23 Directive. 
The Tokyōi has written in their legal brief that, in the future, when students go out in society, ‘instruction 
should be given so the result will not be that, when they confront a situation in which the anthem is sung, 





nomaru, Kimigayo” Futō Shobun Tekkai o Motomeru Hishobunsha no Kai, 136) 
Kawaguchi writes: “Regardless that, for the plaintiffs, not standing was to maintain dignity as a 
teacher, as a human being, as a modest pride for a teacher’s life up until now, the words that the Tokyoi 
spilled down from the top were the scornful remarks that you are a disqualified teacher, that you are the 
shame of all teachers. Even now, these scornful remarks do not disappear. Unless the disciplinary punish-




取り消されない限り、原告らの名誉は挽回されません。) (“Hinomaru, Kimigayo” Futō Shobun Tek-
kai o Motomeru Hishobunsha no Kai, 116 – 117) 
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“individual work order.” Moreover, the “punishment” not only carries the threat of an 
excess of attention. It threatens to shame you into submission in front of everyone with a 
social ostracism and castration reminiscent of the traumatic moment in which the subject 
is founded. Recalling Dohi’s comment, the machinery of bureaucracy reveals something 
horrific and “dreadful” (susamajī) – not unlike that something “unpleasant” (iya) de-
scribed by the student above – when “instruction” (shidō) is disclosed to consist in the 
violent forms of “coercion” (kyōsei) and “threat” (kyōhaku). The “dreadful” aspect of 
Dohi’s prolonged encounter with the Tokyōi (or Japanese state) emerges through repeti-
tion – summoned and sought seven times over one and a half months – even from inside 
the familiar confines of Dohi’s own school. Having achieved a certain interiority even for 
Dohi himself – who refuses and thereby blocks the compulsive aspect of the work order – 
Dohi describes the actions of the Tokyōi in their design to break down resistance by pen-
etrating into the interiority of their object; metaphorized in Dohi’s story by his school, or 
in other accounts, by the home-visits the Tokyōi pays to deliver punishments to disobedi-
ent teachers. Even, or particularly for those who learn of what the Tokyōi did to Dohi, the 
compulsively threatening aspect of the Tokyōi’s actions is interiorized and replicated, if 
only in the form of avoiding a similar fate. Something quite senseless is disclosed in the 
repetition with which Dohi was summoned before the Tokyōi; most forcefully manifested 
by the number of Tokyōi representatives, six at the most, with which Dohi was confront-
ed as an individual principal. 
Much has been said of the normative role that the trope of “shame” (haji) plays in 
Japanese society and of the harmonious group ethic that supposedly governs the behavior 
of the Japanese. The anthropologist, Ruth Benedict, famously called Japanese culture a 
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“shame culture.”112 Nakane Chie has described the vertical “group formation” of Japa-
nese Society as a distinctly Japanese characteristic.113 Such stereotypical perceptions of 
the Japanese and Japanese things are, of course, constituted in the eye of the foreigner – 
most often Western – and confirmed in practice by the Japanese themselves. However, 
just as the foreign gaze both constitutes and threatens Japanese things in their inherent 
Japaneseness, the practice of so-called “group behavior” cannot be considered apart from 
the sites of its reproduction, wherein the normative force of shame assumes a radically 
individualizing function that works across the board. As a plaintiff teacher, Okada Akira 
writes as follows: 
Is it really alright to make the “heart” the object of punishment. Teachers 
who have been assigned a seat in accordance with the work order, ended up hav-
ing to either stand, sing and kill their own “heart,” or to follow through on not 
standing and receive punishment.  
The feeling of the public, and this reasoning has been invoked in court as 
well, is that “it is okay to think whatever you want inside your heart, but you are a 
public worker, so do what you are told.” However, I do not believe it is possible 
to think when separating the inside of the heart and the outside of action. Every 
time I come in contact with such reasoning, I have come to think that there is no 
motivation to scrutinize the orders from above because there are no scruples about 
standards and thoughts, and so it becomes possible to think of the “heart” of oth-
ers lightly. And so I was made conscious of the air of suppressing the “freedom of 
the heart” that is filling this country. In this country, if you say your own opinion, 
                                                
112 Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword. See the Introduction for an discussion of shame. 
113 Chie Nakane, Japanese Society. The notion that the Japanese sense of individuality is somehow weaker 
or inferior to notions of the self in the West – and foremost the USA, to which Japan’s postwar has been 
most intimately intertwined – assumes mythical proportions in these and other texts, like the above-
mentioned by Asada, Karatanin, and Azuma. Even the anti-Hinomaru/Kimigayo movement replicates this 
fiction – albeit as an attempt to shame the shameless state – by inscribing the enforcement of the Hi-
nomaru/Kimigayo in a modernization paradigm of individual rights. In their “Final Legal Brief” (Junbi 
Shomen), the “Hinomaru, Kimigayo” Kyōsei Hantai Yobō Soshō o Susumeru Kai writes: “though it has 
become an obvious thing to sufficiently consider the individual’s psychological freedom in developed 
countries, the reality that only our country undertakes enforcement is uncommon for a developed country” 
(先進諸国では、個人の精神の自由を十分に配慮することが当然のこととして考えられているの
に、ひとりわが国だけが強制を行なうという実態は、先進国としては異常なことである。) (“Hi-
nomaru, Kimigayo” Kyōsei Hantai Yobō Soshō o Susumeru Kai, “Kyōsei,” 419). In a similar vein, refer-
ence is made repeatedly to the 1943 US Supreme Court “Barnette” verdict, which deemed that school chil-
dren could not be forced to salute or pledge allegiance the US flag (Ibid, pg. 427). By inscribing the place 
of modern Japan in comparative lack, the anti-Hinomaru/Kimigayo risks complicity with a discourse that 
posits such lack as the very justification that gives force to enforcement and overcoming. 
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you stick out from your surroundings. You get bullied. Your true intentions may 
be different, but it is safer to stick to the side of the stronger ones or the group. 
That is why you do not make your own assertions. That is why the “heart” of the 





It can be said that the reason Japanese do not think as “individuals,” refrain from 
making comments, and refrain from acting, is because these are pointless at 
school, and because they continuously experience their meaninglessness.114 
                                                
















Similarly, Oyama writes with regard to the specific history of “public” (kō) versus “self” (watashi) 
in Japan: 
“From way back in Japan, “public” was said to be “official,” and was thought to be something re-
lating to government agencies, the government, the imperial court and the state as a whole. Matters im-
portant to the state is what is ‘public.’ That is why it is thought obvious that the state (officials, the emper-
or) decide on things related to the ‘public.’ For example, because school textbooks are important to the 
state, when the state (officials, the Ministry of Education) does an approval examination, and the submitted 






 As opposed to this, because ‘self’ is not something important to the state, it was consigned to the 
freedom of the private individual. That is why even with something that is grouped in the domain of the 
“self,” once the state (officials) regard it as important, it intervenes without reserve or consideration. The 




 However, this is vastly different from the understanding of “public,” “self” that has been thought 
in the democracies of Europe and America. In the democracies of Europe and America, the “self” is some-
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In “setting an example” (miseshime), the threat of “punishment” (shobun) interpellates 
teachers in general. Materialized through an automaticity of repetition, the senseless, pu-
nitive and anamorphic gaze of the Tokyōi functions to castrate the subject. By conjuring 
up the split “I,” the Tokyōi discloses the wound – lack of lack – or cleft across which 
contemporary Japanese state culture is reproduced; a wound, moreover, that constitutes 
both the condition of possibility for this culture of conformity to authority and its possible 
undoing. 
Many teachers opposed to the ceremonies repeatedly imagine, and scheme how to 
avoid the forty seconds of the Kimigayo.115 It was repeatedly said the Kimigayo lasts for-
                                                                                                                                            
thing that involves the interiority of the individual, and is thought as a domain that even state power must 
not intervene in. It would be the same for regional governing bodies that wield public power like Tokyo 
City. The expression in clause 19 of the constitution, “shall be held inviolable,” clearly indicates this. And 





市民（people）に共通する利害関係事項だと考えられている。)” (“Hinomaru, Kimigayo” Kyōsei 
Hantai Yobō Soshō o Susumeru Kai, “Kyōsei,” 108 – 109) 
115 One teacher testifies: “How easy it would be if I were able to stand and sing without having any 
thoughts towards the “Hinomaru” and “Kimigayo,” let me stand at that time without thinking anything be-
cause I am afraid of punishment … but no, I cannot go against my own thoughts … with thoughts like these 
coming and going, my head was always filled with the ceremony. Of course during break periods, and 
when facing the students during class and homeroom, and even after getting home, the graduation ceremo-
ny would not leave my head. With meals not quite going down my throat, it became difficult to sleep at 
night. When I would finally fall asleep, I would wake up numerous times in the night, and the nights would 
continue in which it was not clear whether I was awake or asleep. When I would wake at night, my whole 
body is always be covered in sweat. Every once in a while my wife would say that I was screaming some-
thing in a loud voice in the middle of the night, and it happened numerous times that I woke in shock from 
my own voice. It also happened a number of times that I would get a splitting stomach ache, and that my 










ty seconds, but that the forty seconds last an “eternity” (eien). The forty seconds were 
cause of anguish, especially for teachers who had yet to sit through a ceremony, or who 
had yet to decide to sit. Hence, in anticipation of the forty seconds, many teachers strate-
gized for ways to escape or shield themselves against the Kimigayo. While teachers noted 
in interviews that, as a last resort, it is possible to call in sick on the day of the ceremo-
nies, most seemed to seek a means of avoiding the act of standing while actually attend-
ing the ceremonies. A music teacher recounted how, in anticipation of the first ceremo-
nies after the “10.23 Directive,” she and other teachers discussed ways of performing the 
Kimigayo that might undermine the effect of the song. One option was to play the 
Kimigayo ironically – exactly as written in the late 18th century music score – but at the 
end of the day, the teachers concluded that whether or not the song was performed ironi-
cally, the effect would be lost on the students. Ultimately, the fact of the performance 
would override any comical effect to the contrary. A teacher from Osaka similarly ob-
served that, although Osaka prides itself on a tradition of overturning hierarchies through 
jest, the act of standing or sitting is so black and white that it shuts out this possibility. 
One teacher found that sitting does not make enough of a statement, and consequently 
raised his left hand in a defiant fist while sitting through the Kimigayo. An other said that 
avoiding the ceremonial hall – by requesting reception duty, etc. – amounts to the same 
thing as standing through the ceremonies. Similarly, when the Kimigayo was first made 
compulsory in Hiroshima prefecture, teachers stomped their feet through the song, or 
scratched the CD recording so it would skip; thereby obstructing the performance, yet 
enabling the complicit principal to report that the song was sung. 
                                                                                                                                            
胃がきりきりといたむようになり、突然心臓の動悸が激しくなり呼吸が苦しくなることも何度も
ありました。) (“Hinomaru, Kimigayo” Futō Shobun Tekkai o Motomeru Hishobunsha no Kai, 116) 
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What is at stake in these strategies of obstruction is the maintenance of a final line 
of legible difference that protects against the intrusion of the Kimigayo into the interiority 
of the subject. Like the singular number “1” and the act of sitting itself, such strategies 
interject a barrier between the persons in the ceremonial hall, and the violence of the rep-
resentation. When possible, they even give the appearance of adhering to regulations – as 
when the Kimigayo is played on a skipping CD, allowing the principal to check-mark the 
box stating that the Kimigayo was played – while dissimulating the deliberate farce of the 
performance. As one music teacher said vis-a-vis the possible irony of the performance: it 
may be that, when there is no other resort, it can be found at that “very last place” (giri 
giri no tokoro) – a hint of irony, a subtle twist of the phrase, an elongated ritardando. The 
suggestion that irony could attend the performative acts of standing and singing opens the 
possibility for the periperformative.116 Yet, almost all teachers felt that the act of standing 
and singing – or sitting and not singing – was not forgiving of irony as a strategy either of 
enacting or dissimulating subversion. The solemn seriousness of the ceremonies required 
unequivocality. Neil Hertz thus writes regarding the romantic poet and representations of 
the Kantian sublime that a moment of “blockage” is necessary to establish the “minimal 
difference” that prevents the writer from losing her or himself in the text. Such “blockage” 
would mark the difference between “representor and represented,” Hertz says, and would 
secure the moorings of the representing subject.117 Of course, in the ceremonies, blockage 
                                                
116 See Kosofsky Eve Sedgwick, Touching, Feeling (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003). 
117 Neil Hertz, “The Notion of Blockage in the Literature of the Sublime,” in The End of the Line (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1985), pg. 60. Hertz writes of the necessity for the romantic poet to es-
tablish “an emblem of minimal difference fixed in relation to itself. The power of the emblem is that it 
reestablishes boundaries between representor and represented and, while minimizing the differences be-
tween them, keeps the poet-impresario from tumbling into his text. I would suggest that this is the common 
function of the moment of blockage in sublime scenarios” (60). In The Critique of Judgement, Immanuel 
Kant similarly stresses the necessity and capacity of reason to contain and separate itself from the immeas-
urably fearful of sublime, thereby affirming the independent “superiority over nature” of the mind (Kant, 
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consists in maintaining a legible line of difference not between the self-same “representor 
and represented,” but between the potential subject and the violence of a representation – 
loaded with the traumas of World War II – that threatens to alienate the subject within the 
mechanism of its compulsion. 
For lack of a moment of “blockage,” the subject of the ceremonies not only risks 
losing her or himself like Hertz’s romantic poet. S/he risks incurring a penetration that 
recalls the origins of those “traumatic neuroses” that Sigmund Freud writes of in his 1920 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle. Freud observes that, after the mechanization of warfare in 
World War I, so-called “war neuroses” demonstrate a compulsion to repeat unpleasurable 
experiences. Contrary to an economistic model in which the “pleasure principle” was said 
to predominate, Freud is led to theorize what may occur when a “protective shield against 
stimuli” is penetrated, so that certain primary, unconscious and “instinctual impulses” are 
triggered.118 Until such impulses are properly “bound,” he writes, the compulsion to re-
peat unpleasurable experiences is likely to exhibit “an urge inherent in organic life to re-
store an earlier state of things.” As death, this “earlier state of things” is, of course, im-
possible to represent; and, indeed, after a prolonged “détour,” Freud himself is led to pos-
it myth at the impossible origin of life.119 Only by containing or naming the impossible 
cause of the compulsion to repeat  – effectively binding it – can processes of “reality-
testing” and the “pleasure principle” commence. But since repetition consists in an at-
tempt to master and overcome the originary trauma that triggered the compulsion to re-
peat, it recalls the cause of repetition, and can thus give rise to endless repetition. Thus 
                                                                                                                                            
Critique of the Power of Judgement, trans. by Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews, ed. by Paul Guyer (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 145). 
118 Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, trans. by James Strachey (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 1961), pg. 33. 
119 Ibid, pg. 43, 70. 
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Freud writes that repetition happens in place of remembering. Though an automaticity of 
the traumatic experience is triggered, the past experience is not raised to consciousness – 
as remembering or reality-testing require, by separating the memory from the reality of 
the present – but is, instead, repeatedly enacted. Unlike coincidence which triggers the 
“memory-trace” and specter of a repressed memory – the first remembrance being the 
second – the automaticity of repetition instantiates the originary traumatic encounter. In 
this sense, teachers repeat the forty seconds of the Kimigayo endlessly in anticipation of 
the ceremonies, unable to “drive out” (oidasu) or contain the song. As a source inexhaust-
ible repetition and in slow motion, teachers repeatedly visualize singing the Kimigayo. 
With the indecision of standing or sitting – or not knowing how one will act when the 
decisive moment arrives – the mere prospect of standing for the Kimigayo has triggered a 
repetition compulsion. Teachers “knew” (shitteita) all along that the Hinomaru and 
Kimigayo constituted the national anthem and flag. As the self-same symbols of fascist 
Japan, the “postwar” (sengo) order was founded in the traumatic defeat of the Hinomaru 
and Kimigayo which, however, never became the objects of remembrance. 
The enforcement of the ceremonies is itself an instance of historical repetition. On 
an historical register, teachers warn that enforcement of obedience to symbols of state in 
times of economic crisis recalls Japan of the 1930s, and threatens a “repetition of history” 
(rekishi no kurikaeshi).120 Like the endless nuclear disaster in Fukushima prefecture, the 
                                                
120  One teacher writes of the stained Hinomaru and Kimigayo: “Without being able to rid itself of the 
bad image of their use in the past, having been established as the national flag and anthem, their bad image 
is increasing even more by being used as a threatening tool to say, once again now, that you will be pun-
ished if you do not face the Hinomaru in front, and sing the Kimigayo. Even if it was attempted to clean it 
up in order to get rid of the bad image, the Hinomaru will never be saved if conditions like this 10.23 Di-




specter of full-blown fascism splits the contemporaneity of the present. More specifically, 
it confronts teachers with a prospect that postwar teacher’s unions pledged “never again” 
(nido to) to take part in: namely, sending “students to the battlefield” (oshiego o senjō ni). 
And like the “end of the war” (shūsen) ceremony on August 15th, the unfailing regularity 
of the school ceremonies constitutes repetitions in which sociality itself is founded on the 
violent disavowal of the atrocities committed in the name of the emperor. As a repetition, 
propriety takes the form of forgetting, or of having never remembered in the first place. 
In Totem and Taboo, Freud writes that sociality is founded on the primary murder 
or crime that establishes the unit of the totem. Of the totemic ritual, Freud observes that it 
“would be the repetition and commemoration of this memorable, criminal act with which 
so many things began, social organization, moral restrictions and religion.”121 The form 
of this commemoration, however, is that of forgetting by which the guilt of the originary 
act is repressed and substituted by certain taboos. The social itself, Freud writes, is 
“based on complicity in crime, religion on the sense of guilt and the consequent remorse, 
                                                                                                                                            
しても、今回１０.２３通達のような状況を作り出していれば、いつまでたっても日の丸は救え
ません。) (“Hinomaru, Kimigayo” Kyōsei Hantai Yobō Soshō o Susumeru Kai, “Kyōsei,” 299) 
 Similarly, Takenaka says of the 10.23 Directive: “When it is forced with the threat of punishment 
which denies you all say, it felt extremely dreadful that I myself was placed in this whirlpool just now. I 
felt the heavy pressure of being exactly in the middle of this, that history is reversing itself.” (有無を言わ
せぬ‘処分’という脅しをかけて強制すること、今まさに自分自身がその渦中に置かれたことが
大変に恐ろしく感じられました。歴史が逆戻りしていく、まさにその只中にあるという重圧を感
じました。) (“Hinomaru, Kimigayo” Kyōsei Hantai Yobō Soshō o Susumeru Kai, “Kyōsei,” 285). 
 Ikeda Mikiko writes: “The “Kimigayo” is a song that was used under the war, in an age when it 
was taught that the supreme national virtue was to die for the emperor. Reviving this without changing it in 
the slightest, it is now a song that symbolizes the continuity between the prewar and the postwar.” (‘君が
代’は戦時下に天皇のために死ぬことが最高の国民道徳だと学校で教えた時代に使われた歌です。
これを寸分変わらない歌のまま復活させて、今は日本の戦前、戦後の連続性を象徴する歌となり
ました。) (“Hinomaru, Kimigayo” Kyōsei Hantai Yobō Soshō o Susumeru Kai, “Kyōsei,” 141) 
 Kimura Yoko says: “For me, I believe the Hinomaru is a flag that was waved in the pre-war for 
the emperor, used in imperial education, and was used in military education.” (日の丸は私にとって戦前、
天皇のために振られ、皇民化教育の中で使われ、軍国化教育の中で使われた歌であると思ってい
ます。) (“Hinomaru, Kimigayo” Kyōsei Hantai Yobō Soshō o Susumeru Kai, “Kyōsei,” 341) 
121 Sigmund Freud, Totem and Taboo: Resemblances Between the Psychic Lives of Savages and Neurotics, 
trans. by A. A. Brill (New York: Vintage Books, 1918), pg. 183.  
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while morality is based partly on the necessities of society and partly on the expiation 
which this sense of guilt demands.”122 It is out of this “sense of guilt,” the memory and 
fact of which is repressed in the repeated commemorations, that the taboos on both incest 
and killing of the totemic animal emerge. The symbolic animal substitutes and makes up 
for the lack of the murdered father, repressing social guilt through the installation of the 
law prohibiting unadulterated enjoyment. Notably, the place occupied by the symbolic is 
both historically and structurally determined. 
Reminiscent of that “atrocious crime” (kyōakuhan) crime of which Nishida writes, 
the logic of ceremonial repetition and expiation requires that the guilt in which the “post-
war” (sengo) nation was founded be projected onto an other. Undoubtedly, the transposa-
ble structure of the “chrysanthemum taboo” (kiku jishuku) functions precisely to prohibit 
criticism of the symbolic head of the nation, whose guilt is constitutive of postwar Japan. 
However, the primal father figure of Freud’s account is a mythic father with untrammeled 
access to enjoyment: a “violent, jealous father who keeps all the females for himself and 
drives away the growing sons.”123 In his mythic status, the primal father confronts his 
sons with an enjoyment the theft of which is threatened by the Other of the Nation-Thing. 
The ceremonies thereby repeat the originary murder of the primal father figure by in-
stalling a substitute symbol, the punitive law of which is predicated on an elimination of 
difference; of difference, that is, which enjoys a structural place correlate to that of the 
mythic father. Yet the inescapable effect of the school ceremonies is to trigger, through 
coincidence, the specter of guilt that their performance was designed to produce – as the 
social bond itself – and to repress. 
                                                
122 Ibid, pg. 188. 
123 Ibid, pg. 182. 
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 The figure of the sitting teachers confronts the state with this guilt, and the specter 
of death. Samuel Weber writes that insofar as the “sense of guilt” over death functions to 
deny death, guilt is intimately connected with the “fear of death.” Weber notes that, while 
the representation of one’s own death is impossible, a possible “solution” to this “quanda-
ry” consists in displacing death, and fear thereof, from oneself to an other. Herein, Weber 
suggests, resides the attractiveness of wartime representations. Such displacements would 
function to “institutionalize the other as enemy, to legitimize killing, and thus to create an 
image of death that, exactly qua image, holds it at bay.”124 Death of the Other secures the 
immortality of the national subject. The mechanism of denying guilt over death becomes 
one and the same as displacing the prospect of death – by killing – onto the other. Indeed, 
in the school ceremonies, the act of repressing and forgetting guilt occurs simultaneously 
with that of eliminating the other. Guilt appears as an attribute of the other, who deserves 
to be eliminated. But in this elimination, the ceremonies produce the ground for repetition. 
The figure of the sitting teacher has always-already been produced as an effect of the cer-
emonies themselves. For the very enframement of the ceremonies, precisely as ceremony, 
entails the production of a constitutive remainder. 
 
                                                
124 Samuel Weber, Targets of Opportunity: On the Militarization of Thinking (New York: Fordham Univer-






 At the margins of the social, teachers who refuse to stand for the Kimigayo run the 
risk of falling into abjection. Like “refuse and corpses,” Kristeva says the abject “show[s] 
me what I permanently thrust aside in order to live.” By refusing to concede to a place of 
shame, sitting teachers not only live with that guilt whose repression constitutes the basis 
of sociality. At what Kristeva calls “the border of my condition as a living being,” sitting 
teachers refuse the particular organization of lack that constitutes them as subjects within 
the social in Japan. Thus Kristeva writes of lives that are not lived on the basis of desire, 
but on the basis of a certain kind of “exclusion.”1 
In an interview, one teacher who had been standing for the Kimigayo, despite his 
objections, described the affect of standing with the onomatopoeiac phrase: “moya moya,” 
“hazy,” “smoky,” or a state in which “the actual state of affairs or cause remains unclear” 
(jittai ya genin ga hakkiri shinai sama).2 While haziness recalls the collapse of interiority 
with exteriority characteristic of trauma, the absence of a “cause” (genin) suggests the 
lack of a constitutive lack, the absence of desire, and an unhinging of the subject position. 
The abject, Kristeva writes, is “a land of oblivion” – as opposed to the locatedness of the 
emperor – whence the question is asked not of “Who am I?”, but rather, “Where am I?”.3 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, trans. by Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Colum-
bia University Press, 1982), pg. 7 – 8. 
2 “Moya moya,” Yahoo Japan Jisho, 2/4/2014. 
3 Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror, pg. 7 – 8. Recalling the Introduction, Mladen Dolar writes: “Here the 
Lacanian account of anxiety differs sharply from other theories: it is not produced by a lack or a loss or an 
incertitude; it is not the anxiety of losing something (the firm support, one's bearings, etc.). On the contrary, 
it is the anxiety of gaining something too much, of a too-close presence of the object. What one loses with 
anxiety is precisely the loss - the loss that made it possible to deal with a coherent reality. "Anxiety is the 
lack of the support of the lack," says Lacan; the lack lacks, and this brings about the uncanny” (Dolar, ““I 
Shall Be with You on Your Wedding-Night”: Lacan and the Uncanny,” pg. 13). 
 186 
A profusion of written court testimonies evidence the abject dislocation to which 
individuals opposed to the ceremonies were subject, particularly in the act of standing in 
spite of themselves or in the early enforcement of the “10.23 Directive.” As a teacher of 
Korean descent, Kane Shinmei imagines what the Korean marathon runner, Mako, must 
have felt in 1936, when he won the Olympic marathon for Japan with the Hinomaru plas-
tered across his chest: 
I believe there were many complicated feelings. Especially that the land was tak-
en, and that the country was taken, the language was taken, that absolutely every-
thing was taken under the imperialization policy. And, when in reality he would 
have wanted to win as a Korean, he became a representative of Japan, and was 
recognized under the Hinomaru and Kimigayo. I believe it was a complicated 
emotion in which lots of things entered and mixed, like real anger and resentment, 
suffering, sadness.4 
 
Of the early enforcement of the “10.23 Directive,” Makino Rie, a Christian, recalls: 
 
When March came along I was given a “work order” by the principal. 
Everyday “to be prepared for dismissal and follow Christ” or “to crush and kill 
my own faith and follow the work order,” my heart was largely shaking and mov-
ing. It felt like I was moving in a tunnel without an exit in sight. In the middle of 
March on a Sunday, I reached a conclusion while reading the words of the Bible 
in service. It was the words, “forgive us our sins,” that Jesus Christ taught in “The 
Lord’s Prayer.” I thought, “I, too, can only pray, please forgive” … 
On the day of the graduation ceremony in March, 2004, I stood for the 
“singing the anthem in unison.” As I listened to the piano accompaniment by my 
colleague teacher, I felt as if my heart and body were crumbling into pieces. Hold-
ing tight the hands of the children in wheelchairs on my sides, I prayed in my 
heart, “lord, please forgive.” 
When the third semester was over, I was tired out, and could not move my 
body for some time. It became April, a new principal arrived, and straightaway I 
was handed the “work order.” For the “singing the anthem in unison” of the en-
trance ceremony, I stood, feeling as if there was a wrapper hung around my heart. 
The new semester started, and by staying busy, I made it so as not to think of this 
problem. In the May holidays, I ardently read job advertisements. To obey Christ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  







as a Christian, to obey the directive as an educational public servant, inside I 
thought the two could not be compatible, and thought of quitting.5 
 
Kawaguchi, a lawyer, testifies in court on behalf of the plaintiffs: 
 
There emerged many teachers with unstable physical conditions caused by all 
sorts of thoughts going around in their head. This is no surprise. To begin with, it 
is not possible to make an either/or decision between the life of a teacher that you 
have staked your whole personality on building up until now, and the real demand 
of making a living and future. The 10.23 Directive forced this choice on the plain-
tiffs. The plaintiffs tasted the suffering of having their personality wripped to 
shreds.6 
 
Kawaguchi continues to quote a plaintiff: 
 
“I will probably never in my life forget what happened when the “Kimigayo” was 
forced at the ceremony. No matter how old and senile I become, I believe that on-
ly this will remain as a life-time scar on my heart. A staff member was assigned to 
surveil, and during the singing, walked around behind the backs of teachers who 
had been ordered to line up and stand, while confirming the numbers the assistant 
principal had put on the chairs. At the moment of ordering the non-standing me to 
“stand” from behind, it felt as if I had been poked with a spear on the back. As for 
myself, I was unable to stand and remained sitting, desperately trying to make the 
effort to regain my composure as I felt that it was going dark before my eyes. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
























When the calling of the names of the graduating students finished, my whole body 
was overtaken by an unspeakable sadness and feeling of fear.” 
 
Then, the plaintiffs were treated as “criminals,” and received “punishments.” The 
words that were stuck to the plaintiffs were “inappropriate action as a public serv-
ant of all citizens,” “damaged the trust of the profession of public teacher and 
servant,” “dishonorable to the profession as a whole.”7 
 
Like so many other teachers, Tanaka Masuzoe recalls his deteriorating mental and physi-
cal condition leading up the ceremonies: 
 
In March this year, B was approaching graduation. He invited his mother to the 
graduation. It was a very happy thing. However, as the homeroom teacher, I was 
stricken with extreme insomnia since around January, and fell into poor physical 
condition. It did not seem that I could endure facing the “Kimigayo,” and when I 
went to the hospital my blood pressure was extremely high with the top at 214, 
the bottom at 114, and I was diagnosed “hypertensive emergency.”8 
 
Above all, this “land of oblivion,” in which precisely the split subject is materialized – in 
wearing the Hinomaru as a Korean, in the incompatibility of following the work order or 
the Christian faith, and in the “either/or decision” (dochiradake o erabukoto) forced upon 
subjects by a “work order” (shokumu meirei) whose violence threatens you with physical 
penetration (“it felt as if I had been poked with a spear on the back”), damaged health and 
your “personality wripped to shreds” – must be left behind. Albeit in a passing whisper in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  


















interviews, some teachers said that they had thought of “suicide” (jisatsu) when the social 
pressure was worst, even after years of sitting through the ceremonies. 
Contrary to the self-evidence of standing, a predisposition exposes some teachers 
to the blind mechanicity of the ceremonies, abandoning them in abjection. Notably, none 
of the current, expiring generation of sitting teachers had experienced World War II – the 
Tokyōi requires teachers to retire at the age of 65 – and it was mainly memories from the 
immediate postwar, of parents and mentors, and encounters with underprivileged students 
that led teachers to establish a staunch stance of refusal. One teacher recalled how, during 
his childhood, his father would always switch the TV off when the closing hour came for 
the Kimigayo to be aired. As a child, he had thought this act silly – to be affected thus, by 
a mere symbol – until one day, at his first school as a teacher, he was confronted with an 
out-and-out “right-wing” (uyoku) principal. Among other things, this principal would say 
that World War II had just been the “first round” (daiichi raundo) between Japan and the 
U.S. and that Japan would prove itself in the second round. This principal was rumored to 
have sliced his dog in half with a Japanese katana, simply because the dog had barked at 
his – the master’s – son. The shock of this encounter was to register the reality of fascism 
with the teacher, after which he never compromised on refusing to stand for the Kimigayo. 
Other teachers gave less dramatic reasons for their resistance to the Hinomaru/Kimigayo. 
One teacher simply said the generation of teachers before her had lived through the war, 
and had both opposed the imperial symbols, and the use to which education had been put 
during World War II. This legacy had led her never to stand for the Kimigayo. Still other 
teachers recounted how they had worked with students from foreign countries, second or 
third generation Koreans and Chinese – “residents in Japan” (zainichi) – and at schools in 
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low-income areas with many students of foreign descent. One teacher recalled the years 
he had worked at an evening school exclusive to foreign students, and how the Kimigayo 
had been made compulsory at ceremonies there, like at all other schools. By encountering 
individual students who expressed unwillingness to stand for the Kimigayo, the history of 
the symbols was rendered real for this teacher. Of course, there were teachers of foreign, 
Chinese, Korean, or even North Korean descent, for whom the compulsory nature of the 
ceremonies would force them to disavow their own histories. However, even for the few 
teachers who refused to stand, yet expressed no objection to the Hinomaru and Kimigayo 
– so redolent with the stains of World War II that the red and white of the Hinomaru have 
been said to represent blood and bones – the refusal to stand derived from an objection to 
the compulsory nature of the ceremonies. “Forcing” (kyōsei), and especially “forcing” of 
the ideological, they said, should have no place in the educational setting. Consonant with 
the mechanicity of warfare, the memory of which is triggered by the ceremonies, it is the 
form of “forcing” (kyōsei), violence, and penetration which requires a stance of refusal on 
behalf of those for whom this violence is experienced as violence. 
 In contradistinction to the abject and the propensity to suicide, teachers who stood 
through the ceremonies in spite of themselves only to reverse their actions by deciding to 
remain seated all relayed in interviews that, no matter what the consequences, they would 
never go back to standing given the way they had felt. Indeed, it was often said by teach-
ers that they felt a sense of “relief” (sukkiri) after sitting through the ceremonies.9 Hence, 
teachers hand out a sheet of paper listing their consecutive punishments since the day 
they stopped standing and state that they have “never once” (ichido mo) stood for the cer-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 The Japanese word, sukkiri, also translates as “refreshed,” “fine,” “clear-headed,” “completely,” “without 
trouble,” “thoroughly,” “not even slightly,” or “lucidly.” 
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emonies, sometimes forgetting to mention that one occasion when they did stand. The list 
functions as a proof clearly demarcating before from after; both the trace and future threat 
of having once stood must be protected against. In that no-place of abjection where the 
boundary between interiority and exteriority collapses, desire is replaced by exclusion, 
but a specific kind of exclusion relating to the unconscious: 
The “unconscious” contents remain here excluded but in strange fashion: not radi-
cally enough to allow for a secure differentiation between subject and object, and 
yet clearly enough for a defensive position to be established – one that implies a 
refusal but also a sublimating elaboration. As if the fundamental opposition were 
between I and Other or, in more archaic fashion, between Inside and Outside.10 
 
The mechanism of the “unconscious” – its “contents,” so to speak – must be properly ex-
cluded in order for a primary differentiation between subject and object, or interiority and 
exteriority to be established. As Kristeva writes, abjection consists in the failure to have 
established such a line of minimal difference. Though it was especially true that teachers 
who had been standing for the Kimigayo, despite themselves, experienced something akin 
to abjection, such a line of difference must effectively carry over into everyday life where 
sitting teachers experience radical social ostracism, and “bullying” (ijime). Kristeva thus 
identifies the possibility for a “position” of “refusal”; a position, or place, that anticipates 
a further “elaboration” into reasons or meanings. Teachers who stood in the past say that 
when they began sitting through the ceremonies, they did not think of the significance or 
“meaning” (imi) their act might entail and communicate. Only afterwards did they start to 
think of their act as an “appeal” (apīru) for others to sit “together” (issho) with them. 
 But any such elaboration is one to which the act of standing would render partici-
pants blind. In Blindness and Insight, Paul de Man observes that “articulation is precisely 
the structure that prevents all genuine origination from taking place.” Given the rhetorical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Julia Kristeva, The Powers of Horror, pg. 7 – 8. 
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character of language, he writes, the “true question” consists in whether “language is or is 
not blind to its own statement.”11 The performative effect of the ceremonies – the truth of 
their statement – requires a constitutive blindness. Sitting teachers were largely viewed as 
“strange” (hen) and idiosyncratic, or as having committed an “outrageous, unforgivable” 
(keshikaran), and hypocritical act that must be atoned for with proper “apology” (shazai), 
and the restoration shame. Yet, for sitting teachers, it was precisely the force of this blind 
misrecognition that confirmed the rectitude of the act of sitting. 
 If the failure of the ceremonies exposed the constitutive wounds of postwar Japan 
to the powers-that-be, the act of sitting frequently enabled an elaboration by disobedient 
teachers that was indicative of healing. With the notable exception of instances in which 
social pressure forced sitting teachers to stand, disobedient teachers continued to sit after 
their first experience of refusal. In interviews, the consistent refusal to stand thereafter 
was described as conducive to a composed state of mind, unlike the alternative of folding 
to social pressure, apologizing, and standing. In fact, it was not just with a sense of “relief” 
(sukkiri) that sitting teachers continued to sit, but with a “clear-headedness” (sukkiri) that 
was “without trouble” (sukkiri). Once it was decided once-and-for-all, sitting could work 
wonders for teachers who objected to the ceremonies. Rather than the cancerous postwar 
body of the nation, it was the individual sitting teacher who was healed by the ceremonies. 
By a curious reversal in which misrecognition by the mass of standing students, teachers, 
and audience conferred certitude on the individual teacher that s/he had followed through 
on her convictions against all odds, the sitting teacher acted as interlocutor of her own act. 
The exceptionalism of disobedience gave validity to the act – it only required one person 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Paul de Man, Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1983), pg. 122, 137. Notwithstanding the controversy surrounding Paul de 
Man’s fascist past, the theoretical relevance of his writing cannot be denied. 
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to undo the closure of social totality – and the overwhelmingly negative gaze of the mass 
of participants had precisely the opposite effect from that intended: to confirm the act of 
sitting in its position of refusal. What appeared as weird and out-of-place for the mass of 
standing participants consisted in an act that healed the afflicted, while, on the other hand, 
the act of standing appeared self-evident to the sitting teacher, when, there were doubtless 
those in the crowd who suffered on account of doing so. Mutually constitutive, misrecog-
nition worked both ways. The healing of the sitting teacher was as dependent on the mass, 
as the alienation of standing was on its constitutive negative. 
 Of course, the danger and threat of abjection was constitutive of subjectivity itself. 
On the physical proscenium of the ceremonies, the prospective subject is threatened with 
castration lest s/he supplement this originary wound by assuming the place of a social “I.” 
In order to achieve its performative effect, the ceremonies mandate the introduction of a 
trauma in each of its participants – by “making an example” (miseshime), and “forcing” 
(kyōsei) on pain of “punishment” (shobun) – the senseless violence of which assumes ret-
roactive sense in the misrecognition of the imperial figure who was always-already there: 
the originary object cause of the social, and sublime object of ideology.12 Subjectivization 
thereby entails the threat of stripping the individual of social recognition, lest s/he submit 
to the shaming gaze of the state – and its organization of lack – in practice. It is by neces-
sity that the ceremonies bring prospective subjects into proximity with abjection. At the 
margins of the real, impossible and deathly, the loss of a constitutive loss recalls the state 
of the melancholic of whom Freud says that s/he introjects the lost object, so that it is not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Slavoj Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, pg. 194 – 196. 
 194 
the exterior world, but the ego itself that exhibits this “impoverishment.”13 Suicide here 
emerges as an alternative to the establishment of a “defensive position,” or the bad faith 
of standing in spite of oneself. As an instantiation of the social violence that requires the 
subject qua subject to leave her or his self behind to partake in the social – to eliminate or 
kill the self in the act of standing – suicide appears as the consummation of subjectiviza-
tion. It constitutes an act which has been literalized numerous times – consider Kamikaze 
pilots, Yukio Mishima’s mass-mediated suicide and his influence by the Japan Romantic 
School, or Nishimura Shingo’s call for education to foster “an army” (guntai) – but that 
exposes a constitutive contradiction in means-end rationality.14 As an act of expendability 
in its essence, the prospect of suicide necessarily attends subjectivization, but – unless the 
person is on welfare – its actual occurrence undercuts the optimization of value.15 Yet it 
is, of course, a certain incorporation into the social that the ceremonies would achieve by 
virtue of a floating signifier whose effectivity is undermined because the propriety of the 
symbolic is not only threatening, but threatened. An originary wound, or lack of lack, en-
dangers the symbolic on which the consistency of the subject and nation that would-have-
been hinges, and whose very propriety is at stake in the ceremonies. 
 In Lacan’s seminal essay, “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function,” the 
moment of symbolic identification inaugurates the individual as a social being, achieving 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Sigmund Freud, “Mourning and Melancholia,” trans. James Strachey, Psychoanalytic Electronic Pub-
lishing, pg. 246. 
14 See Kevin M. Doaks’ Dreams of Difference: The Japan Romantic School and the Crisis of Modernity 
(Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1994), for an elucidation of the relation between suicide as an 
ironic gesture, the Japan Romantic School, and Mishima. 
15 As much as the suicide can be considered an instantiation of the self-abnegation constitutive of sociality 
– as in the case of the indebted salary-man whose suicide coincides with a rise in his or her life insurance – 
the act might also be intercepted as an intended interruption of the self-evidence of the social; as in the case 
of the suicide who throws her or himself in front of a rush-hour train. Of course, these instances of suicide 
must be differentiated, in turn, from the corporate or political suicide, whose act implies a loss of face – the 
exposure of shamelessness where there had been a show of propriety – and recognition to which the lower 
class is never privy. Ch. 4 – 8 explicate the conditions under which suicide (of welfare-recipients) might be 
optimal for the state. 
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the final alienation of the subject into the discourse of the Other. This alienation, however, 
is never quite complete. Of the move from the specular into the social, which also marks 
a move into a specific social history, Lacan writes: 
the mirror stage is a drama whose internal pressure pushes precipitously from in-
sufficiency to anticipation – and, for the subject caught up in the lure of spatial 
identification, turns out fantasies that proceed from a fragmented image of the 
body to what I will call an “orthopedic” form of its totality – and to the finally 
donned armor of an alienating identity that will mark his entire mental develop-
ment with its rigid structure.16 
 
Lacan’s use of “drama” as a metaphor for the mirror stage is no mere coincidence. It sug-
gests that the push from “insufficiency to anticipation” – and destination – in a totalizing 
fantasy of symbolic identification is activated in a performative mode. The visibility of 
this carnal scenario is manifest in the ceremonies, which literally constitute a proscenium 
for participants to enact propriety. The unity of all participants standing at once gives that 
image of “totality,” surgically imposed upon the body of participants, and the body of the 
postwar nation. The “armor of an alienating identity” is likewise evident in the normative 
violence with which transgression is not only punished, but protected against. Hence, La-
can writes of the “ego defenses” with which the “I formation is symbolized in dreams by 
a fortified camp, or even a stadium.”17 Walls, like those of the ceremonial hall, may even 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Jacques Lacan, “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience,” pg. 
78. In his essay, “Freud and Lacan,” Althusser similarly invokes the performative of the Oedipul phase 
which: “is not a hidden ‘meaning’ which merely lacks consciousness or speech – it is not a structure buried 
in the past that can always be restructured or surpassed by ‘reactivating its meaning’; the Oedipus complex 
is the dramatic structure, the ‘theatrical machine’ imposed by the Law of Culture on every involuntary, 
conscripted candidate to humanity, a structure containing in itself not only the possibility of, but the neces-
sity for the concrete variants in which it exists, for every individual who reaches its threshold, lives through 
it and survives it” (147). In the ‘West’ as in Japan, this “phase” is constitutively gendered. As Althusser 
says: “When the small boy lives and resolves the tragic and beneficial situation of castration, he accepts the 
fact that he has not the same Right (phallus) as his father, in particular, that he has not the same Right as his 
father over his mother, who is thereby revealed as endowed with the intolerable status of double use, moth-
er for the small boy, wife for the father; but by accepting that he has not the same right as his father, he 
gains the assurance that one day, later on, when he grows up, he will get the right which is now refused 
him through his lack of ‘means’” (Ibid, 146). 
17 Ibid, pg. 78. 
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demarcate the exterior from the interior of such a “camp” or “stadium,” protecting against 
and repressing the constitutive split of the “I.”18 
 Contrary to this alienation and the aggressivity that attends it, the eminent, ethical 
quest of psychoanalysis is to enable a traversal of the fantasy, such that the originary mis-
recognition is disclosed as a misrecognition, and the subject becomes able to say of her or 
himself: “Thou art that.”19 Hence, while the act of sitting triggers a normative violence, it 
also opens the possibility for subjects to recognize this violence and their alienation in it. 
By the mere act of sitting, teachers exteriorize an historically specific trauma and guilt on 
the overcoming of which the neoliberal subject of late modern Japan is founded. Yet, this 
implicit reference by sitting teachers to the foundation of “postwar” (sengo) Japan in guilt 
is itself strangely split, because the form of the ceremonies constitute a repetition wherein 
this guilt is reproduced as the basis of sociality. The historical guilt from World War II is 
disavowed in an act that structurally – unconsciously – implicates everyone in the guilt of 
eliminating difference from the social body.20 Faced with the specters of sitting teachers, 
the Tokyōi can only redouble its effort to eliminate the cancerous particles of the postwar 
legacy. Triggered by the ceremonies themselves, the sitting teacher constitutes the failure 
and undoing of the signification of social totality, and the unconscious pretext for intensi-
fication and repetition. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 My citation of Lacan’s word, “camp,” is not intended to invoke Agambem. The argument I make for the 
production of the subject through techniques of state recognition is fundamentally at odds with Agambem’s 
notion of abandonment. See the Introduction. 
19 Jacques Lacan, “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience,” pg. 
81. 
20 See Freud’s essay “The ‘Uncanny’”, in Writings on Art and Literature, trans. by James Strachey. (Stan-
ford: Stanford University Press, 1997) for an explication of the overlap between structural and historical 
conditions with specific reference to the uncanny. Notably, the difference between the structural and histor-
ical cannot be maintained; giving way to a slippage – between the historical and structural – which can sim-
ilarly be observed in the guilt of the ceremonies described above. 
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Because subjectivization is mediated dialectically, the drive to overcome the end-
less postwar constitutes an inexhaustible endeavor for the Tokyōi. First it was only the 
act of sitting through the Kimigayo that was cause for punishment. Now, members of the 
prefectural government surveil the ceremonies, conducting what they call kuchimoto 
kakunin to “confirm” (gennin) that teachers are really singing the Kimigayo.21 By subject-
ing the movement of the lips and the emanation of voice of individual teachers to scrutiny, 
it is the material voice as link and break between exteriority and interiority, between the 
body and language, that is at stake in the kuchimoto kakunin.22 But this break is constitu-
tive and even a kuchimoto kakunin does not suffice to bridge the threatening gap between 
interiority and exteriority. Alas, the invasive “mouth check” (kuchimoto kakunin) is nec-
essarily accompanied by additional means of ensuring that students and teachers alike are 
properly invested in singing the longevity of the emperor. Students are now told to sing 
enthusiastically, with a “loud voice” (ōki koe). Next, teachers will be evaluated on wheth-
er they are singing with proper “heart” (hāto). The ante can only be upped. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 The “mouth-check notice” (kuchimoto tsūchi) was released in Osaka on 26 January 2013. See “Kimigayo 
Seishō: Kyōshokuin no Kuchimoto “Kakunin o” Ōsaka-fu ga Tsūchi,” in Mainichi Shimbun, 23/9/2013. 
22 See Mladen Dolar, A Voice and Nothing More, pg. 60 – 61. 
Figure 2: Manga by ichi-hana-
hana. Taken from Kawarai-san 
Nezu-san ra no ‘Kimigayo’ Kaiko 
o Sasenai Kai, “E? Utawanai to 
KUBI!?”.  
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However, the persisting irony of this witch-hunt consists in the fact that the truth 
of the ideological resides in the individual who transgresses the norm and enacts the split 
subject. Hence, a documentary movie starring Nezu Kimiko and Dohi Nobuo is entitled 
“’Watashi’ o Ikiru” – “To Live “Myself”” – in which quotation marks surrounding “Wa-
tashi” (“Myself” or “I”) foreground the split function of the pronomial signifier; throwing 
the givenness of identification into question.23 In fact, Nezu Kimiko’s refrain to students 
has always been to “think with your own head” (jibun no atama de kangaeru). Contrary 
to alienation in the individualism of a socially constructed “I,” Nezu issues this statement 
in a context of unforgiving conformity that enables her words to foreground the split that 
institutes the social subject.24 Like Lacan’s “Chè vuoi?”, Nezu’s injunction asks not what 
“you,” as the alienated subject of the social desires, but what “you” – as the split subject – 
desires.25 Thus, Nezu relates that, for her, the act of sitting is one of “education” (kyōiku) 
for students: in itself, sitting demonstrates the possibility and choice of difference within 
the social body.26 As Adorno and Horkheimer observe of “determinate negation,” sitting 
“discloses” the “image [of totality] as script.” As the true language of reason, the dialectic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 As the film follows the retrospective trials of Nezu Kimiko, Satō Miwako and Dohi Nobuo as they clash 
with the Tokyo Metropolitan Board of Education, incur ostracization and persecution by the administration, 
colleagues, parents, and even children, fantasize of suicide, and persevere in the midst of insuperable social 
pressure, it is the split “I” that emerges in the space between the social “I,” and their refusal to partake in a 
machinery of domination that permits no difference. By bracketing the “I” (“Watashi”), the title of the film 
clearly invokes the notion of the split pronomial signifier, of which Émile Benveniste writes that it occupies 
a peculiar place insofar as “I” only designates a “reality of discourse.” Unlike signs that refer to objects, “I” 
refers merely to a position of locution, namely, the person who utters the “I” in each instance of speaking. 
As such, the “I” is necessarily split between the “I” as referent, the person who utters the “I,” and the “I” as 
referee, the speaking position of the person who refers to “I.” See Émile Benveniste, “The Nature of Pro-
nouns,” trans. by Mary Elizabeth Meek (Coral Gables: University of Miami Press, 1971), pg. 218. However, 
like Benveniste’s “I,” the title also suggests the fundamental split that inaugurates and alienates the subject 
in the social. This was evident in comments by viewers to the effect that the documented individuals truly 
lived their “self” (watashi) or “I” (watashi). 
24 Nezu Kimiko, Kibō wa Seito: Kateika no Sensei to Hinomaru, Kimigayo, pg. 17. 
25 Jacques Lacan, “The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian Unconscious,” 
pg. 690. 
26 The Japanese word, kyōiku (education), can refer quite simply to the state-endorsed “education” one has 
received, but it also translates as “training,” “culture,” “upbringing,” “instruction,” “pedagogy,” “fostering,” 
“raising,” “nurturing,” and to “teach,” but also to “learn.”  
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of the act “teaches us to read from its features the admission of falseness which cancels 
its power and hands it over to truth.”27 
 Moreover, the act of sitting threatens to activate the sociality of an absent third 
party that could counteract the individualizing, shaming gaze of the state, and could even 
reverse it. Though few teachers explicitly described their act of sitting as a gift, exchange 
– and the social obligations of exchange – clearly framed the motivations and the hopeful 
expectations of the act. Whether teachers chose to remain seated because their father had 
switched the TV off every night before the Kimigayo, or because the previous generation 
of teachers had opposed the mobilization for war, or because their personal experience or 
background brought them close to people marginalized by the Kimigayo in Japan, the act 
of sitting was regarded as preserving a certain heritage of lessons learned from the World 
War II – be it in the bare form that the enforcement of ideology ought to have no place in 
education – and of providing sheltering space for difference within the social sphere. As a 
practicing Christian, Okuno Yasutaka states that, though he knows that God “will forgive” 
(yurushitekureru) him each time he stands to sing the Kimigayo, it “is not possible to give 
back that love” (sono ai o kaesu koto ga dekinai) unless he sit through the ceremonies.28 
The act of sitting emerges as an ultimate act of hospitality; indeed, of self-sacrifice at the 
risk of social death. It is in this respect that Maurice Blanchot writes of a certain “respon-
sibility” of hospitality to the Other, emerging at the edge of abjection or “subissement” of 
the “self wrested from itself”29: 
If the Other is not my enemy … then how can he become the one who wrests me 
from my identity and whose proximity (for he is my neighbor) wounds, exhausts, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Adorno & Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, pg. 18. 
28 This information was relayed through an interview with Okuno Yasutaka. 
29 Maurice Blanchot, The Writing of the Disaster, trans. by Ann Smock (Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
Press, 1995), pg. 15. 
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and hounds me, tormenting me so that I am bereft of my selfhood and so that this 
torment, this lassitude which leaves me destitute becomes my responsibility? For 
responsibility is the extreme of subissement: it is that for which I must answer 
when I am without any answer and without any self save a borrowed, a simulated 
self, or the “stand-in” for identity: the mandatory proxy.30 
 
Hence, Nezu says that the act of sitting demonstrates the possibility for difference within 
the social, and hence Kawarai Junko describes her vision of the utopic school as a “copse” 
or “growth of miscellaneous trees” (zōkibayashi).31 So too, innumerable teachers said that 
they sat through the ceremonies thinking of the marginalized students that the ceremonies 
exclude. Yet if not with an outright expectation, the act of sitting was accompanied by the 
hope of some form of reciprocity. Kurasawa Kenji said he came to view the act of sitting 
as an “appeal” (apīru) for others to sit with him. For him and many other teachers, the act 
of sitting was preceded and followed by speaking up at staff meetings, and by distributing 
pamphlets at work encouraging other staff to exercise their own judgement. Nezu Kimiko 
similarly entitles her book “Hope is the Students” (Kibō wa Seito), as if the motivation for 
the act could be passed on and realized. Kawarai says the “growth of miscellaneous trees” 
does not exist, subtitling her second book: “Wanting to Take Back the Work of Education” 
(Kyōiku no Itonami o Torimodoshitai).32 As much as giving, sitting is thus regarded as an 
act that would “take back” (torimodosu) the social relations destroyed in the aftermath of 
the “10.23 Directive.”33 With the rhetoric of the far left, Numata Yuko writes that she sat 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Ibid, pg. 22. Blanchot continues: “Responsibility is innocent guilt, the blow always long since received 
which makes me all the more sensitive to blows. It is the trauma of creation or of birth. If the creature is 
“he whose situation is ceded to him by the other,” then I am created responsible. My responsibility is ante-
rior to my birth just as it is exterior to my consent, to my liberty. I am born thanks to a favor which turns 
out to be a predestination – born unto the grief of the other, which is the grief of all” (Ibid, 22). 
31 See Junko Kawarai, Gakkō wa Zōkibayashi: Kyōseikyōzon no Kyōiku Jissen to “Kimigayo” Fukiritsu. 
32 See Junko Kawarai, Zōkibayashi no Ketsui: Kyōiku no Itonami o Torimodoshitai (Tokyo: Hakutakusha, 
2013). 
33 This phrase – to “take back” (torimodosu) – has taken on an hyperbolic charge in light of the irrevocable, 
eternal losses caused by the triple nuclear meltdowns at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. See 
Ch. 11. 
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through the ceremonies to make a statement: “let’s take back the class solidarity of labor-
ers!” (rōdōsha no kaikyūtekidanketsu o ubaikaisō!). By “uniting” (danketsu) – the clarion 
call of the far left – “the original, human form of cooperation that has been deprived, will 
vividly revive” (ubawaretekita ningenhonrai no kyōdōsei ga iki iki to yomigaette kuru).34 
Regardless of the specific signifier of the social referenced in each act of sitting, it 
is the act itself, and the form of sitting – that “gift” or poison to the ceremonies – which 
brings into play the reference to a third, absent signifier of sociality that counterposes that 
of the state. But a minimum of two sitting teachers was required to confirm this sociality 
of the act. Teachers express something like jubilation when there is more than one teach-
er sitting through the ceremonies at a single school. The dyad necessarily implies a third. 
It almost does not matter whether the two teachers were sitting for the same reasons. In 
this manner, Marcel Mauss cites Tamati Ranaipiri: “Now, I give this article to a third per-
son who, after a certain lapse of time, decides to give something as a payment in return 
(utu) … the taonga that I received from for these taonga (which came from you) must be 
returned to you.”35 Likewise, the formation of the imaginary “I” of the mirror stage – in 
which the infant jubilantly gives her or himself to be seen in the mirror – exceeds the dy-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Numata Yuko, “Kimigayo” Fukiritsu Shobun o Tekkai Saseyō! Kyōiku no Mineika, “Danketsuken” 
Hakai to Tatakaou! Jinji Iinkai Tōsō Shiryōshū, pg. C-9, B-11. 
35 Marcel Mauss, The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies, trans. by W. D. Halls. 
(New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2000), pg. 11. Notwithstanding Marshall Sahlins’ observation that 
a third party is only necessary in the case “that one man’s gifts should not be another man’s capital” – that 
is, in the case that incremental value accrues to the gift – the hau of the dyadic relation necessarily impli-
cates the common third of social convention (Sahlins, “The Spirit of the Gift,” in The Logic of the Gift: 
Toward an Ethic of Generosity, ed. by Alan D. Schrift (New York: Routledge, 1997), pg. 79). Moreover, as 
in the case of World War II legacies, or the forgiveness of God, the gift that teachers would preserve cannot 
simply be returned and finished within the dyadic relation. It necessarily exceeds dyadic reciprocity and 
must be passed on indefinitely. Of course, Marx also points out the third term implicit to the equivalent 
form of the commodity: “What does this equation signify? It signifies that a common element of identical 
magnitude exists in two different things, in 1 quarter of corn and similarly in x cwt of iron. Both are there-
fore equal to a third thing, which in itself is neither the one nor the other. Each of them, so far as it is ex-
change-value, must therefore be reducible to this third thing” (Capital, pg. 127). 
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ad insofar as this “symbolic matrix” anticipates recognition and ultimate alienation in the 
gaze of a social third.36 
The possibility of a counter-discourse emerges here. Yet, it is a counter-discourse 
that necessarily emerges in contradistinction – and frequently by way of abjection – to the 
dominant discourse of the state. As a discourse, such a counter-discourse necessarily runs 
the danger of blindness and alienation, like the discourse it opposes. But it is precisely as 
a counter-discourse that it materializes the constitutive split that can enable a traversal of 
the fantasy, and facilitate an exposure of the falseness that cancels the power of power. 
In his reading of Hegel’s master-slave dialectic, Kojève says that the precondition 
for true self-consciousness resides not in the master, but in the slave. In the “fight” to the 
death with the master, through which the master comes into consciousness, only the slave 
has experienced the “fear of death,” or the “absolute liquefaction of every stable-support.” 
It is only in the slave that the possibility for “pure Being-for-itself” resides, since only the 
slave has experienced the terror of “absolute negating-negativity.”37 To reiterate Kristeva, 
the experience of abjection, that no-place of denegation, would be the condition of possi-
bility for the subject to achieve true self-mastery. The master cannot attain true autonomy 
because he does not recognize the slave – on whose recognition he is dependent to be as-
sured of his position as master – except as an object that labors for the master. The master 
is therefore stuck in a certain “impasse,” because satisfaction requires mutual recognition. 
And only the slave is motivated to “overcome” his or her own place – of slavery, that is – 
by forcing recognition on the master whom the slave already recognizes, not as an object, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Jacques Lacan, “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience,” pg. 
76. See also Samuel Weber’s, Return to Freud: Jacques Lacan’s Dislocation of Psychoanalysis, trans. Mi-
chael Levine (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pg. 118. 
37 Alexandre Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, pg. 21 - 22. 
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but as an other. Kojève thus observes that the master “either dies or preserves himself in-
definitely in identity to himself,” dependent on recognition through the slave, whereas the 
work of the slave emerges as the truly transformative, historical action.38 
To conjure the forgotten horrors of World War II, Derrida writes of “a negativity 
without reserve” that threatens this dialectic with an excess which cannot be contained.39 
Whereas negativity for Hegel functions as that “reassuring other surface of the positive,” 
Derrida suggests that an instant of limitless negativity endangers the Hegelian dialectic – 
and signification – with an “irruption suddenly uncovering the limit of discourse and the 
beyond of absolute knowledge.”40 Negativity “without reserve” threatens to undo the lim-
its of historicity and language. By triggering an hallucinogenic, and ultimately impossible 
memory of World War II – of the institutionalized sexual slavery of “comfort women” 
(jūgun ianfu), Unit 731, “forced labor” (kyōsei renkō), the “Rape of Nanking” (Nanking 
Daigyakusatsu), the “radiation” (hōshanō) which ended World War II, 20 – 30 million 
foreign nationals and 2.5 – 3.3 million Japanese murdered, Yasukuni Shrine, the “com-
pulsory mass suicide” (shūdan jiketsu) of Okinawan nationals, Kamikaze pilots forced to 
die – it is such a negativity that threatens to engulf teachers who experience the ceremo-
nies in their proper violence; and such a negativity that, through the moment of blockage, 
is thrust back upon the Tokyōi by the act of sitting. The contingent, spectral figures of the 
sitting teachers threaten to unleash the charge of guilt to an endless array of atrocities that 
were conducted in the name of the Japanese “emperor” (tennō), as Iris Chang documents 
in The Rape of Nanking. Citing a testimony by a Japanese soldier, Chang writes of certain  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Ibid, pg. 20 – 21. 
39 Jacques Derrida, “From Restricted to General Economy: A Hegelianism Without Reserve,” in Writing 
and Difference, trans. by Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), pg. 259. 
40 Ibid, pg. 261. 
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“desensitization exercises” conducted by the Imperial Japanese Army to initiate soldiers 
to killing: 
One day Second Lieutenant Ono said to us, “You have never killed any-
one yet, so today we shall have some killing practice. You must not consider the 
Chinese as a human being, but only as something of rather less value than a dog 
or cat. Be brave! Now, those who wish to volunteer for killing practice, step for-
ward.” 
No one moved. The lieutenant lost his temper. 
“You cowards!” he shouted. “Not one of you is fit to call himself a Japa-
nese soldier. So no one will volunteer? Well then, I’ll order you.” And he began 
calling out names, “Otani – Furukawa – Ueno – Tajima!” (My God – me too!) 
I raised my bayoneted gun with trembling hands, and – directed by the 
lieutenant’s almost hysterical cursing – I walked slowly towards the terror-
stricken Chinese standing beside the pit – the grave he had helped to dig. In my 
heart, I begged his pardon, and – with my eyes shut and the lieutenant’s curses in 
my ears – I plunged the bayonet into the petrified Chinese. When I opened my 
eyes again, he had slumped down into the pit. “Murderer! Criminal!” I called my-
self.41 
 
As that constitutive negative of the ceremonies, the possible failure of the ceremonies to 
instantiate social totality nevertheless constitutes the condition of possibility of their suc-
cess. If every performative – as Derrida says – bears the mark of writing, and is therefore 
iterable, no performative can “be possible if a citational doubling [doublure] did not 
come to split and dissociate from itself the pure singularity of the event.”42 The condition 
of possibility for the performative to be a success therefore constitutes the condition of its 
impossibility. The infelicitous presence of sitting teachers undercuts the signification that 
the Hinomaru and Kimigayo symbolize a social totality.43 Worse still, the sitting teachers 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Iris Chang, The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II, pg. 56 – 57. 
42 Jacques Derrida, “Signature Event Context,” pg. 17. 
43 J.L. Austin’s infelicities, or “the things that can be and go wrong” in performative utterances, are listed 
as follows: 
(A.1) There must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a certain conventional effect, 
that procedure to include the uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances, 
and further, 
(A.2) the particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invoca-
tion of the particular procedure invoked. 
(B.1) The procedure must be executed by all participants both correctly and 
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split the ceremonial present, doubling the bureaucratic order and mechanism of “standing” 
(kiritsu) by haunting it with the specters – raised in the present from the past, holding 
forth the future of what will-have-been – of mechanized murder and war. From this dou-
bled perspective, the act and form of “standing” (kiritsu) coincides with killing, of the 




As a “home economics” (kateika) teacher with thirty years experience at the time, 
Nezu Kimiko recalls how the “attack” (kōgeki) on her from the Tokyōi, the PTA, and the 
school administration began for real after she was transferred to Tama junior high school 
in 2000.44 In her first class at the school, one student had pointed to an other, saying “this 
guys is a fag” (koitsu OKAMA daze). Shortly thereafter, Nezu was to learn that “words 
like “rape,” “fag,” “homo” were humorously exchanged among the students on a daily 
basis, and that there were porn magazines, and even contraceptives lying about the class-
rooms after class dismissal.”45 This prompted her to dedicate five to six classes “in search 
of symbiosis between men and women,” of which two classes had been dedicated to the 
problem of “comfort women” (jūgun ianfu).46 On February 28, 2001, the principal in-
formed Nezu that parents had issued a “complaint” (kujō) about these classes. Nezu was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(B.2) completely. 
(C.1) Where, as often, the procedure is designed for use by persons having certain thoughts or 
feelings, or for the inauguration of certain consequential conduct on the part of any participant, 
then a person participating in and so invoking the procedure must in fact have those thoughts or 
feelings, and the participants must intend so to conduct themselves, and further 
(C.2) must actually so conduct themselves subsequently. (Austin, How to Do Things with Words 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), 14 – 15) 
44 Nezu Kimiko, Kibō wa Seito: Kateika no Sensei to Hinomaru, Kimigayo, pg. 130. 
45 Ibid, pg. 123. The Japanese text reads: “生徒たちの間で日常的に‘レイプ’や‘ホモ’‘オカマ’
等のことばが面白おかしく交わされ、また放課後の教室にはボルノ雑誌や、時には避妊具が転が
っている。” 
46 Ibid, pg. 124 – 130. 
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asked whether she had, in fact, taught on “comfort women,” and “common-sex love” 
(dōsei aisha), to which she replied in the affirmative, and that she would be willing to 
give an explanation at the PTA meeting. The principal merely replied by saying: “That is 
not necessary. The problem is whether or not you did it” (Sonna koto wa hitsuyō nainda. 
Yō wa yatta ga dōka to iu mondai da).47 In the next month, students approached Nezu, 
asking her reproachfully why she had taught on “comfort women” when this topic did not 
fall under “home economics” (kateika), or within the purview of the “Curriculum Guide-
lines” (Gakūshu Shidō Yōryō). Nezu was to learn that the principal himself had been say-
ing this to the students. On March 15, the principal, assistant principal, and a representa-
tive of the Tokyōi arrived unannounced to observe Nezu’s class. On March 16, the prin-
cipal declared at a staff meeting that he had told the PTA that Nezu’s classes “deviate 
from the Curriculum Guidelines” (Gakushū shidō yōryō kara itsudatsu shiteiru). On 
April 21, the principal gave Nezu the paperwork for an “investigation into the circum-
stances” (jijō kikitori). The paperwork declared that complaints had been made by parents, 
but not what these complaints consisted of, nor which classes they were regarding. As she 
had done all along, Nezu again asked that she be given the opportunity to “speak with” 
(hanashiai) the complainants themselves, but her request was declined. The first “inves-
tigation into the circumstances” (jijō kikitori) was held on April 25 at the Tokyōi. Three 
more investigations followed, in which Nezu was questioned regarding her class on 
“comfort women” (jūgun ianfu) and “common-sex love” (dōsei aisha), sticking to “Cur-
riculum Guidelines,” and if she had indicated that grandparents of the students had killed 
people. During the meetings, the content of the originary complaints was never disclosed 
to Nezu, despite her repeated requests. She says that the Tokyoi, “did not care if I was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Ibid, pg. 131. 
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asking questions, on the contrary, they were consciously covering up my voice, talking 
with a voice loud enough to drown it out.”48 At last, at the final investigation meeting on 
May 23, Nezu left the meeting halfway through with the request that the contents of the 
complaint be disclosed, and that a new date for the meeting be set. The Tokyōi responded 
with a confirmation: “So you have rejected the investigation into the conditions” (Jijō 
kikitori o kyohi shimashita ne). Nezu replied: “I have plenty of will to undergo the inves-
tigation into the conditions. Please guarantee it” (Jijō kikitori o ukeru ishi wa jūbun ni 
arimasu. Sono hoshō o onegaishimasu). 
It was at this point that Nezu began to feel that the Tokyōi was determined to take 
her off her teaching post by judging her “lacking in teaching ability” (shidōryoku busoku), 
even if this entailed bending the truth.49 Her “feeling of uncertainty grew” (fuan wa okiku 
natte ikimashita). In mid June, two letters of complaint were sent by parents to the school, 
one of which charged the school not to let Nezu “hurt the students again” (nido to seito o 
kizu tsukenai) by her “comments” (hatsugen). The principal deemed it necessary in a staff 
meeting to “apologize as a school, and find a solution” (gakkō to shite shazai shi, kaiket-
su hakaraneba naranai). Accordingly, he called a “full school emergency parent meeting” 
(kinkyū zenkō hogosha kai) on June 22. 120 parents attended this emergency meeting, in 
which the principal accused Nezu of rallying students to her support and deliberately us-
ing them, “apologizing” (shazai shimashita) for the incident. While Nezu objected, one 
group of parents made considerable noise. “In these conditions” (Watashi wa kono jōkyō 
ni oite), Nezu writes, “I felt as if I was undergoing baptism as an “unpatriotic person.” It 
felt as if I had timeslipped to before the ‘30s” (“hikokumim” no senrei o uketeiru yōna 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Ibid, pg. 131 – 138, 138. The Japanese text reads: “私が質問をしていても構わず、むしろ意識的に
私の声に被せて、それをかき消すほどの大きな声で話していました。” 
49 Ibid, pg. 139. 
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kimochi o ajiwaimashita. 70 nen mae ni taimu surippu shita kanji deshita). After the par-
ent meeting, Nezu recounts, “most third year students became unable to meet eyes with 
me, or came to glare at me” (sannensei no ōku ga watashi to me o awasenakunari, arui-
wa niramitsukeru yōni narimashita).50 On July 2, a second emergency parent meeting 
was held, from which Nezu was barred entry. On July 11, the principal handed Nezu a 
list of demands resulting from this meeting.51 On July 17, a parent meeting for all third 
year students was held, at which Nezu was denied entry by the principal, who told her: 
“The parents do not desire it” (Hogosha ga nozondeinai). When Nezu nevertheless en-
tered the hall, the principal started the meeting by saying: “I have not allowed it, but here 
is Nezu sensei. Everyone, what do you think?” (Watashi wa kyoka shiteinai no desuga, 
koko ni Nezu sensei ga imasu. Minasan, dō desuka?). Nezu was ousted from the hall, af-
ter one parent shouted out: “Please leave as this is a meeting for the third year parents” 
(Sannen no hogosha kai nanode seki o hazushite hoshī), and “It will not be fixed by talk-
ing with Nezu sensei” (Nezu sensei to hanashite mo kaiketsu shimasen). Nezu says: “I 
wanted to ask the parents directly what is wrong with taking up “comfort women” in 
class, but I was unable to ask anything.”52 
Since July 6, the principal, assistant princial and representatives of the Tokyoi had 
begun regular, unannounced “class observations” (jugyō kansatsu) of Nezu’s classes. At 
this same time, the principal and Tokyōi both started to send work orders and paperwork 
to Nezu on an almost daily basis.53 The “class observations” continued through the entire 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Ibid, Pg. 141 – 142. 
51 Ibid, pg. 143. 
52 Ibid, pg. 144 – 146. The Japanese text reads: “私は従軍‘慰安婦’を事業で取り上げるのがどうし
ていけないのか、直接保護者の方々に訪ねてみたかったのですが、何も聞くことはできませんで
した。” 
53 Ibid, pg. 145 – 146, 148 – 9. The excess of the written orders assumes the form of violence. 
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semester. At first, it was only the principal, assistant principal, and two representatives of 
the Tokyōi who came to observe, but “as the number of times increased” (kai o kasaneru 
goto ni), there were as many as eight officials observing the class. To conclude, Nezu was 
ordered to attend a “conference” (kyōgikai) at which her performance with the third year 
students was to be evaluated. On March 25, 2002, Nezu was deemed “lacking in teaching 
ability” (shidōryoku busoku) and was given three months deduction in pay for refusing to 
attend her evaluation conference.54 
  
During these thirteen months of persecution, Nezu says in retrospect that she was 
faced with the choice between “self-destruction” (jimetsu) and “moving forward” (maeni 
susumu). Her writing discloses the split “I” of abjection in the slippage between “myself” 
(jibun) and “I” (watashi): “As I was being attacked like this I faced myself, and thought 
about education. If one does not do that, one cannot move forward. Because there is only 
self-destruction if one does not move forward, the everyday consists in thinking to live; I 
was made stronger of myself.”55 The risk of “self-destruction” (jimetsu) slips into the risk 
of “suicide” (jisatsu) – 自殺 or “killing the self” as the ideograms for suicide signify – at 
the conclusion of the normative force of “self-responsibility” (jikosekinin): “At that mo-
ment, if one is able to not think of it as self-responsibility, but as “I am not at fault,” it 
might be possible to defend against sickness or suicide, and it might be possible to get 
back on one’s feet.”56 Only social connectivity protects against the normative force of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Ibid, pg. 152 
55 Ibid, pg. 157. The Japanese text reads: “こうして私は攻撃される中で自分と向き合い、教育につい
て考えました。そうしなければ前に進めません。進まなければ自滅しかないわけですから、生き
るために考える、という日常にあり、自ずと強くしてもらいました。” 
56 Ibid, pg. 184. The Japanese text reads: “その時それを自己責任と思わずに‘私は悪くない’と思え
たら、病気や自死を防ぐことができるかもしれない、立ち上がることもできるかもしれない。”	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killing – the self, as the Other: Blanchot’s “I without I”57 – as Nezu writes of her students 
of old: “Because the only people who truly know my work is the students who shared the 
classes and activities. So, the support of those students, becomes the power to withstand 
the most merciless attacks.”58 
 
In March 2005, Nezu says she “ended up standing half-way …” (tochū made tatte 
shimatta…). At the time, rumors were rife that teachers would be fired on their third time 
sitting. The upcoming graduation ceremony would be the third ceremony after the “10.23 
Directive,” and if Nezu were to sit, she would be issued her third “punishment” (shobun) 
for refusing to stand. Fearful of her future, Nezu finally compromised with the principal, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
It must be noted that, despite the high incidence of “mental illness” (seishin shikkan) and “suicide” (jisatsu) 
among public school teachers, the causal relationship between extreme overwork, social alienation, “bully-
ing” (ijime) by colleagues and superiors, and the act of suicide, was rarely acknowledged by courts with a 
verdict that allocated guilt to the state. If an individual teacher had been unable to control students, such 
that they were issued a negative evaluation and, in addition to a mountainload of paperwork that already 
kept them working every day past midnight – such was the workload of public teachers, it was said, that 
there was literally no time to talk to colleagues – that they had to take additional training lessons with the 
principal (or at a center) to compensate for their lacking teaching ability, and if this overwork was coupled 
with derogatory comments from colleagues, and a systematic allocation of additional work by the principal 
to the individual teacher, such that the teacher finally began sleeping overnight at school, fell into depres-
sion and committed suicide, this was the fault of the individual teacher her or himself. S/he had been “weak” 
(yowai). The work environment of the “public servant” (kōmuin) and school teacher was thus part and par-
cel of the deteriorating labor conditions that afflicted the market at large. On this note, while suicide neces-
sitates a moment in which the violence of the social is literalized in killing the self, its act can be considered 
together with the social phenomenon of karōshi or “death from overwork.” See Kudomi Yoshiyuki and 
Satō Hiroshi’s Shinsai Kyōshi wa Naze Oitsumeraretanoka – Kunō to Zasetsu Kara Shitsubō to Saisei o 
Motomete (Tokyo: Kokubunken, 2010). In fact, the workplace of the public school teacher made visible the 
systematic breakdown of social relations through the implementation of state reforms, and significantly, it 
disclosed the youth, or future national population, as the object of such reform. It was a matter of course, 
then, that the symptoms of excessive socialization which appeared among teachers could be found among 
students. In the competitive environment of school, suicide from “bullying” (ijime) was as unlikely to be 
acknowledged among children as among teachers. Indeed, it was not unusual for teachers to be involved in 
the bullying of students, if only by turning the blind eye. Thus, the issue of “bullying” (ijime) momentarily 
emerged into visibility when a 13-year-old leapt to his death in Otsu, Shiga prefecture in 2013, and it was 
discovered that the student had been made to perform his own mock funerals by his peers, and to practice 
suicide. 
57 Maurice Blanchot, The Writing of the Disaster, pg. 15. 




agreeing to stand half-way through the Kimigayo. Having said “I am sorry” (gomennasai) 
to her students, the day of the ceremony approached.59 
For Nezu, the act of standing half-way was to trigger the hallucinatory specter of 
mechanized warfare, doubling – in coincidence – the image of “order” (chitsujo) with the 
impossible memory and futurity of slaughter in World War II. As the form of a “trigger” 
(hikigane), the act triggers the memory of this half-way moment before pulling the trigger 
on yourself and the other.60 But before Nezu knows it, the song has been sung: 
On the day, “the opening words,” standing to “all rise,” “bow.” When eve-
ryone was facing the “Hinomaru” and bowing, I shifted 90 degrees, and facing the 
students, I did not bow … 
After the “bow,” “singing the anthem in unison” without sitting. The MC 
says, “after the prelude, please sing in chorus.” I was still standing. At only the 
MC’s words, my chest is beating wildly. It felt like my heart would jump out. The 
torment is unbearable. At some point, the figure was floating in my head of a se-
pia-colored, first-year soldier ordered by a senior officer to “charge.” In front of 
the first-year soldier there is tied up a Chinese prisoner of war. It was an image I 
had seen in a collection of photos or other of the Japanese army that had invaded 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Ibid, pg. 172. 
60  Like the English “trigger,” the Japanese word, hikigane (trigger), can be translated as “gun trigger,” 
“gunlock,” or “firing mechanism.” However, the term can also be used metaphorically to signify “an act 
that sets in motion some course of events” (nanika no kōi o ugokashihajimeru kōi). Located as the split 
subject between the social force of the ceremonies and her self, Nezu may not have had to “pull the trigger” 
(hikigane o hiku). However, the mechanism of the ceremonies has triggered the hallucinatory specter of 
murder. See “Hikigane,” weblio, 30/8/2015. 
Walter Benjamin writes thus of the role of “shock,” “catastrophe” – or, in this case, violence – in 
triggering “mémoire involuntaire” through the trace of memory (Benjamin, “On Some Motifs in Baude-
laire,” in Illuminations, trans. by Harry Zohn, ed. by Hannah Arendt (Schocken Books: New York, 1968), 
pg. 169, 186). Not quite the grandiose dialectical image, which would “blast a specific era out of the homo-
geneous course of history,” (Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” in Illuminations, trans. by 
Harry Zohn, ed. by Hannah Arendt (New York: Schocken Books, 1968), pg. 263), Nezu’s image discloses 
the “gap” in which the critical force of the dialectical image consists (Susan Buck-Morss, The Dialectics of 
Seeing: Walter Benjamin and the Arcades Project (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991), pg. 62). The half-way 
automaticity of the act of standing triggers, as Žižek writes, a “short-circuit between present and past: their 
synchronization occurs at the level of the autonomy of the signifier – what is synchronized, superimposed, 
are two signifiers’ networks, not two meanings” (Slavoj Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, pg. 141). 
 Here, too, the mythic density of the phrase or gesture of standing is disclosed as one in which the 
effectivity of language assumes the force of killing. The act of standing, as Nezu herself explained to me, is 
an act of killing. Thus, James T. Siegel writes: “Bullets were words and words were bullets, when language 
was the sheer effectiveness of transmission” (Fetish, Recognition, Revolution (Princeton: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 1997), pg. 229). Yet even in killing, “when the foreign has been eradicated, there is still some-
thing left. The “madness” of the revolution is the disgorgement of the foreign no matter what nationality 
holds it. But even in disgorging it, it finds it again; killing continues. Beyond exchange, there is still re-
sponse. When all signals have been exhausted, nonetheless there is something to be sensed” (Ibid, 225). 
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China. Some of the students are staring at me. It became white in front of my eyes, 
and it felt as if I was going to fall over. It was a long long time. “I never should 
have promised to stand.” While regretting, and putting power in my legs so I 
would not fall, I waited for the lyrics “until the pebbles” to come, when I had told 
the assistant principal that I would sit. Sitting when it came, I relaxed thinking, 
“ahh, thank god I did not have to pull the trigger.” 
The assistant principal came to my side right away, bending his body 
down, and spoke without haughtiness in the base of my ear: “Nezu sensei, there is 
a work order out, so please stand.” For a moment, I raised my hips from the chair, 
and sat again. The assistant principal who was about to leave me, said the same 
thing again. While we were doing this, the Kimigayo ended.61 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  



















Yama: City of Highs and Lows 
 
 The world of Sanya and its day laborers takes us from the tennō (emperor) to the 
catastrophe of Japan’s postwar economic performance, and to Okinawa. For many of the 
men I write of were born in 1950s Okinawa, under U.S. administration.1 Their lives begin 
at once with the blue skies and ocean which have transformed Okinawa into a tourist spot, 
and in abject poverty. They begin with memories of taunting U.S. soldiers, hoping maybe 
to get a dime, of catching fish on the way home from school, of stealing sugarcane from 
moving trucks, of playing on the giant slides of empty shipyards, of domestic violence, of 
parental divorce, suicide, thatch roof homes, storms, of a mother doing construction work 
with a baby strapped to her back, and of the final farewell which would lead them to seek 






















                                                
1 Japan officially handed Okinawa over to U.S. control under the 1952 Treaty of San Francisco, only to be 
returned in 1972. However, the islands of Okinawa continue to be overrun by U.S. military bases. 
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Every great city has one or more slums, where the working class is crowded together. 
True, poverty often dwells in hidden alleys close to the palaces of the rich; but, in general, 
a separate territory has been assigned to it, where, removed from the sight of the happier 
classes, it may struggle along as it can. 
- Engels, The Condition of the Working Class in England 
 
Instituted by the unity of soul and body, madness turned against that unity and once 
again put it in question. Madness, made possible by passion, threatened by a movement 
proper to itself what had made passion itself possible.  






 The old day-laborer district of Tokyo, Sanya, or Yama, as veterans of Sanya call it, 
has long since passed its heyday as the hub for construction workers servicing the central 
metropolis and its environs.2 Accounts vary from person to person regarding when work 
started to grow scarce in the area. Five years, ten years, fifteen years, twenty years ago … 
But the story everyone tells is one of excess. There was once so much work, and so many 
workers, that the main thoroughfare of Sanya, Namidabashi, was blocked every morning 
by throngs of labor contractors and laborers seeking work. Between six and eight, from 
Monday to Saturday, the 500-meter stretch of Namidabashi was so packed with workers, 
contractors and contractor’s mini-vans, that cars could not pass through. In fact, there was 
such an excess of work available that you could take your pick, going from contractor to 
contractor, asking about the work and wages, and settling on your own preference.3 Such 
                                                
2 Yama derives from an alternative reading of the ideograms that compose Sanya. The ideogram for “San” 
– 山, or mountain – can be read as “Ya,” while the ideogram for “-ya” – 谷, or valley – can be read as “ma,” 
to compose “Yama.” As “Yama,” Sanya takes on a local connotation: a city of mountains and valleys, or of 
highs and lows. 
3 Ōyama Shirō writes in A Man With No Talents: 
“Looking back, I can say that the first six-year period, during the bubble era, was a golden age for 
us day laborers – just as it must have been for real estate speculators. 
In those days, it simply wasn’t possible to step out of my doya in the morning with the intention of 
finding work and not come away with a job. Indeed, I’d be hailed by several agents who recruited workers 
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was the surfeit of work and workers that even drunkards sleeping on the sidewalk would 
be hauled into the backs of mini-vans by contractors seeking to fill their quota of workers 
for the day, and thereby, to maximize their cut of the workers’ wages. Likewise the “daily 
wage” (nittō) paid an exorbitant amount of money. It was not unusual for a scaffolder, or 
tobi, to earn the equivalent of two thousand dollars in less than one week. However, upon 
returning from the construction site where the tobi had passed the nights in a sleeping bag 
hoisted high alongside a skyscraper, the entirety of these wages was squandered on food, 
liquor, women and gambling in a display of camaraderie and generosity as superabundant 
as the labor market from which his wages had originated. In fact, after these expenditures, 
it was quite common for men to incur debts to local eateries, or to their friends.4 
Thus the cycle of “work” (shigoto) and “play” (asobi), of monetary accumulation, 
bankruptcy, and dependence on others would perpetuate and repeat itself. In the mythical 
heyday of Sanya, laborers disposed of their money – reaped from the exhaustion of their 
bodies – with a recklessness that seemed to signify inexhaustible funds; squandering it to 
the point of indebtedness in activities as destructive as the labor in which it was obtained. 
While the high-rise buildings and fancy apartment blocks of Tokyo still stand, Sanya, and 
the men of Sanya who built this Tokyo have been reduced to dilapidation, age and illness. 
Today, practically every overnight housing unit/hotel expressly built to house the laborers 
                                                                                                                                            
off the street on my way to the main drag around Namidabashi intersection, where most of the recruiting 
takes place” (17). 
4 For an in-depth account of Sanya’s history and geography as a “yoseba” – or gathering place for laborers 
– see Edward Fowler’s San’ya Blues: Laboring Life in Contemporary Tokyo. Even in 1996, Fowler writes: 
“Because it is not being replenished, the pool of men making a living today as day laborers in San’ya has 
dwindled considerably and the population is growing old. Whereas half or more were still in their thirties or 
younger in the 1960s, better than half were over fifty in 1990. More than two-fifths of the day-laborer pop-
ulation have lived in San’ya for at least ten years, and a substantial number have made it their home for 
decades. Those who migrated from the farms to San’ya in the mid-century are sticking it out in the yoseba 
rather than returning to the provinces. The increase in average age has brought with it an increase in job-
related injuries, illness, and the death rate. Yet signs that San’ya has passed its prime notwithstanding, no 
one is predicting that the yoseba will disappear completely” (42). See also “Yama” Seisaku Jōei Iinkai, 
Yama: Yararetara Yarikaese (Saitama: “Yama” Seisaku Jōei Iinkai, 1986), pg. 14 – 15. 
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of Sanya – the doya; and the back-streets along which the doya are lined, the doyagai – is 
fully occupied.5 The famous Palace Hotel stills stands along Namidabashi, and countless 
small doya with the characteristic two sideways, rectangular window slats per floor – one 
for the top bunk, one for the bottom – can still be found lining the doyagai.6 But many of 
the doya, particularly those flanking the main street of Namidabashi, have been converted 
into cheap, shiny hotels catering to tourists and Japanese businessmen. Meanwhile, in the 
back alleys, the aging tenants of the old doya no longer do construction work to earn their 
livelihood, but are mainly supported by state “welfare” (seikatsu hogo). Akia, a veteran 
of Sanya and friend I met volunteering at an NPO, and who initiated me into the world of 
Sanya beyond the NPO, says at least one person passes away every day in Sanya. Indeed, 
ambulances are a common sight in Sanya’s backstreets, as are drunken bodies passed out 
on the cement amidst the garbage and smell of piss. In fact, in 2012 the 500-meter stretch 
of Namidabashi is empty between the hours of six and eight. If anyone can be seen going 
to work, it is but a few solitary figures, seeming stragglers, heading toward Minami-Senjū 
train station between seven and eight. They would be inconspicuous and unidentifiable, if 
it was not for their stuffed backpacks, suggestibly loaded with a workman’s tools, or their 
standard-issue “work clothes” (sagyō fuku). The only other figures to be seen in the early 
                                                
5 With the exception of institutions like the Palace Hotel, which could house hundreds of laborers, the doya 
is usually two stories tall, with a single corridor running along each floor. No larger than 1.5 x 2.5 meters, 
single rooms flank each side of the corridor, separated by thin wooden walls. Each is equipped with a mini-
TV and airconditioner. Toilets and a common bathing area are shared among residents, who must observe 
designated bathing hours. Depending on the doya, there may also be gas stove available, but residents must 
pay for every minute of usage. Electrical sockets are most often blocked, as residents are not allowed to use 
electrical appliances. So too, many old doya have a curfew. The daily price for a room ranges from ¥1,800 
– 3,000 ($18 – 30 USD); the monthly total of which exceeds rent for a reasonable apartment. However, the 
residents on welfare must have permission from their ward to relocate to an apartment, and those who work 
must have guarantors, and be ready to deposit approximately four times the monthly rent (as Japanese real 
estate agents ask) in order to move into an apartment.  
6 The doya used to be, and ostensibly still are, run by the local yakuza. To increase profits in the heyday of 
Sanya, the use of space was maximized to fit four, if not eight or sixteen men into the bunk beds of a single 
room. With the disappearance of construction work, most doya have since been converted into single room 
occupancy. 
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morning Namidabashi are a small crowd of middle-aged men sitting on chairs spread out 
in front of a cheap, open-aired sushi bar, drinking from pint glasses of shōchu mixed with 
oolong tea, green tea, or water and ice. On the corner of Namidabashi and a narrow side-
road, the sushi bar only opens in the early mornings, rotating its hours with the next-door, 
hole-in-the-wall drinkery run by Mutō-san, to which the customers return in the evenings 
to drink and gamble on “boat-races” (kyōtei) screened on a small TV, standing on a shelf 
in the upper left corner of the box-like, all but bare necessities bar counter. 
 
 Sanya has acquired the reputation of being that place where backpackers on a 
shoestring come to stay, or where good-for-nothings on welfare blow away public funds 
on liquor and gambling. With the strained national economy, the negative image of Sanya 
has only been compounded in recent years by mass-mediated incidents of people abusing 
the welfare system to their advantage.7 During the two years I lived in Hashiba, adjacent 
to Sanya, I was reminded countless times by friends, family, and others outside Sanya of 
what kind of environment, and what type of person is encountered in Sanya. One person 
simply winced when I said I was living close to Minami-Senjū station. A friend could not 
divorce Sanya from the image of being “dangerous” (abunai), and insisted that she would 
“absolutely not go” (zettai ikanai); adding that the situation of people in Sanya was “their 
own fault” (jikosekinin): a burden to society and others who work to support themselves. 
                                                
7 Consider the 2012 case of the TV personality, Yoshimoto Jun’ichi, whose family was accused of “deceit-
ful receipt” (fusei jukyū) of welfare on account of his high income. In another mass-mediated instance, the 
mayor of Osaka, Hashimoto Tōru, argued that city bus drivers should have their pay reduced by 38% on 
account idling. Bus drivers, he argued, spent most of their time taking breaks as they waited for their next 
scheduled trip, and should not be paid for this time. See livedoor Blog, “Nihon Keizai o Boroboro ni Suru 
Hitobito,” 28/11/2011. Such incidents merely form part of a discourse which bashes the so-called abuse of 
state funds, although resentment is rarely if ever expressed towards state bureaucrats and politicians who 
ran the economy into the ground to begin with. Of course, such a discourse is not exclusive to Japan. Con-
sider, for instance, the conservative discourse critical of welfare-recipients in the U.S.  
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Making objects of the men in Sanya, a psychologist observed that their habits of drinking 
and gambling exhibited pathological characteristics of “addiction” (izonshō). But perhaps 
the most virulent of all preconceptions – by individuals who had never been to Sanya, or 
for that matter, to its counterparts of Nishinariku or Kotobukichō in Osaka and Yoko-
hama – was that Sanya had simply become a place where foreign backpackers come to 
sleep; as if Yama, which did not exist to begin with, had been wiped off the map and out 
of history. Whether consciously so or not, these reactions suggest that Sanya occupies a 
taboo place in the Japanese imaginary, and that it is inextricably linked – in imagination 
and actuality – to practices and signifiers long ago relegated to the margins of modern 
Japan. Sanya is located in a marginal section of the pre-moden “low-city” (shitamachi), 
where the “commoners” (shomin) of the Edo period once lived. A little more knowledge 
of the area reveals that Minami-Senjū station stands next to a former execution ground, 
and that Sanya is flanked to the south by Imado, an old neighborhood for “outcastes” (bu-
rakumin), and to the southwest by Yoshiwara, the largest red-light district of the Kantō 
region.8 The day laborer of the modern construction industry is located next door to the 
hub of Japan’s sex industry. And while discrimination against burakumin, eta or hinin – 
literally translated as “non-human” – informs decisions regarding hireability and mar-
riageability, Sanya has become a space of the unsanitary, of the dying, and of the dead, 
whom it was and still is the role of burakumin to dispose of. 
But every one of the above preconceptions is true in a certain sense. Sanya can be 
dangerous since the men fight in Sanya; on occasion there are stabbings, and at least once 
                                                
8 Like Sanya, the day laborer district of Osaka, Nishinariku, is located next to the old red-light district, and 
to the neighborhood of “outcastes” (burakumin). See Ōyama Shirō’s A Man With No Talents, pg. 2 – 3, for 
a comparison of Nishinariku and Sanya, as they were both in the 1980s and 1990s. 
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per year, a murder of or by an acquaintance.9 So too, the Sanya man can be found drink-
ing from 5 AM, sometimes to the point of death, and gambling whenever the chance pre-
sents itself. What accounts for the necessity of such reactions, however – and no doubt 
also, the joy of the psychologist working in Sanya – is the normative violence by which 
the social requires and establishes itself vis-à-vis that which it is not. Hence one need not 
have been to Sanya in order to judge it; one must merely know what it stands for, the as-
sociations it triggers, and its impropriety. In an analogue, Michel Foucault discloses the 
divisioning practices by which reason, in complicity with the political and medical, is es-
tablished in the discursive constitution of unreason. As in “The Great Confinement,” an 
economic principle dictates the confinement and conglomeration of certain types of indi-
viduals in Sanya: the criminal, the disabled, the psychotic, the terminally ill, the addict, 
the unemployable, and yet other marginal figures to modern Japan, like the burakumin, 
the Okinawan, the Chinese, or the Korean.10 
In an uncanny reversal, however, Sanya reveals itself as a mirror-image of society 
otherwise hidden from view by a certain visor effect.11 For in the containment of unusa-
ble, economically unprofitable elements from general society, these same elements have 
                                                
9 This crime rate is significantly low in comparison to other nations! Yet, in a nation that still lauds itself in 
on its “public safety” (chian) and in which murder makes headline news, both the proximity of murder (of 
or by an acquaintance) and the fact that these murders go unreported by the mass media disclose a structure 
in which murder in Sanya marks a departure from the norm. 
10 In observing that “it has rarely been made clear what their status, what the meaning was of this proximity 
which seemed to assign the same homeland to the poor, to the unemployed, to prisoners, and to the insane,” 
Michel Foucault identifies an “imperative of labor” in Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in 
the Age of Reason, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Vintage Books, 1988), pg. 39, 46. Confinement, he 
writes, “constituted one of the answers the seventeenth century gave to an economic crisis that affected the 
entire Western world: reduction of wages, unemployment, scarcity of coin” (Ibid, 49). See Fowler’s San’ya 
Blues, pg. 15, for a list of some of the economic downturns that led to the concentration of a heterogeneity 
of men in Sanya. 
11 Writing of the commodity-form in Specters of Marx, Jacques Derrida says of the “visor effect”: “This 
Thing meanwhile looks at us and sees us not see it even when it is there. A spectral asymmetry interrupts 
here all specularity. It de-synchronizes, it recalls us to anachrony ... to feel ourselves seen by a look which 
it will always be impossible to cross, that is the visor effect on the basis of which we inherit from the law” 
(6 – 7). See also Ch. 2. 
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been recycled in a way that has accelerated death: set to work at the most menially de-
manding of tasks, and more significantly, by confining their expenditures to momentary 
liquor and gambling. In Sanya, a man who can no longer be used at work is flat-out 
called “unusable” (tsukaenai). Sanya gives the lie to general society, and perhaps this is 
what is most unsettling about the images it calls forth. In fact, during the heyday of the 
1980s bubble economy, it was the “smell” (nioi) of Sanya that triggered immediate re-
pugnance, of urine and faeces in the sidewalk gutters, and of piles of uncollected gar-
bage.12 To act as if places like Sanya do not exist, displaced by the backpacker culture – 
or, as Akia phrases it: “to put a lid on what stinks” (kusai mono ni futa o) – is, in effect, to 
instantiate the structure that consigns Sanya to oblivion, and to death. Thus, every veteran 
to Sanya knows that the murders and deaths that occur in Sanya are not reported in the 
media. It used to be that the bodies of deceased men in Sanya, anonymous in the official 
registry and with no kin to claim them, were appropriated by hospitals for experimenta-
tion, only to end up as skeleton specimens in university classrooms.13 
Now that the chapter appears to be closing on Sanya, it would constitute no less of 
an injustice to claim that its story is finished. For the social structure that consigns Sanya 
to death is alive and well in this claim, and the reality that faces Sanya now is none other 
                                                
12 Ōyama Shirō writes of the smell of bodies in Sanya’s doya in A Man With No Talents. Back in the day: 
“The aforementioned piercing, organic stench, which materializes in a week to ten days, not only 
has a limited range but also tends to dissipate once it has attacked the olfactory sense. The “wafting odor” 
that kicks in after a month’s time, on the other hand, is both pervasive and persistent. It never seems to let 
up. 
The body odor of street people who slept in the bunk next to me or below me during the long holi-
days was unmistakably of the “wafting” variety that has a month in the making. It originated in the men’s 
bodies, to be sure, but its center of gravity, so to speak, had shifted to the garments, with the result that 
bathing did nothing whatsoever to relieve the smell” (8).  
13 See “Yama” Seisaku Jōei Iinkai, pg. 18. 
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than the catastrophic after-effects of untrammeled commodification, and of the excessive 
life-styles of “men” (otoko) with nothing to lose but their dignity.14 
 
 No doubt, the men in Sanya have grown circumspect in their spendings after their 
primary source of income, construction work, all but vanished. But the old sign warning 
drivers to beware of drunk men sleeping on the street still stands, slightly askew, by the 
corner of Namidabashi and Meiji-dōri. The entryway to the Iroha arcade, between the old 
liquor store, Nodaya, and the once militant union for day-laborers and homeless, Sōgidan, 
is littered with one-cup sake cans and liquor bottles, spewing out of temporary, aluminum 
trash cans alongside piles of garbage, and here and there, someone passed out drunk, like 
a dead, stray body enveloped by the smell of piss rising from the street. From almost five 
in the morning until late evening, a small crowd can be found drinking there, its members 
switching in and out as the day progresses. 
Just a few meters inside the canopy that covers Iroha arcade, a two-by-two meter 
mat has been placed in front of one of the many shuttered stores. The cardboard mat, kept 
in place by red traffic cones when nobody is there, marks the spot where Pin-san runs his 
gambling joint. In the afternoons and early evenings, four to five figures huddle silently 
over a deck of hanafuda (flower cards) spread out on the mat, divining that winning eight 
or nine of Oichokabu, in plain sight of policecars that silently circulate the streets.15 Pin-
san, a diminutive person dressed in tweed pants, collared shirt, and his signature Scottish 
touring cap, reputedly also runs the distribution of drugs in Sanya; consisting primarily of 
                                                
14 The deregulation of labor and the handing over of “responsibility” (sekinin) to the individual worker have 
constituted naturalized conditions of survival in Sanya for decades. At the moment preceding its disappear-
ance, Sanya exposes the truth of surplus extraction and presages the fate of neoliberal reforms. 
15 Hanafuda, or traditional Japanese playing cards, are designed with flowers or leaves denoting each sea-
son. Popular games include Koi Koi, or Oichokabu, the latter of which revolves around winning with “9.” 
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injected “amphetamines” (kakuseizai). For whatever reason, his hands are always covered 
in bandaids and sores. 
Beside Pin-san often sits Yamagishi-san, a man who shows that he has been in the 
yakuza for years by allowing his traditional, elbow-length tattoos to emerge from below 
the sleeves of his T-shirt. If there is any doubt, the scar of an old knife wound across his 
cheek reinforces this image.16 Indeed, the silent gesture of slashing a forefinger across the 
right cheek, accompanied only by the word “this” (kore), means mob. For while many in 
Sanya are very well acquainted with, if not actual or past members of the mob, the word 
“yakuza” is not lightly spoken, but indicated with this gesture. An incorrigible gambler, 
always upping the stakes, and bad boy of intimidation and vulgar ostentation, Yamagishi-
san also makes a show of his money. Having won repeatedly at the horse and boat races, 
Yamagishi-san would sport a wallet stuffed with ¥10,000 bills (approximately $100 US), 
so that the wallet was brimming with a wad two to three centimeters thick. A few weeks 
later, however, the bills were no longer in his wallet since, he matter-of-factly said, they 
had been put in his savings account. Yamagishi-san, moreover, was rather careful in his 
use of money; saving his public spending for moments in which everyone could be wit-
ness to his lavishness, and thereby, going counter to spontaneous generosity – still to be 
seen on Sundays, when the main horse races are screened – of winners publicly and help-
lessly announcing their winnings, followed by cash gifts and expenditures such that the 
winners were frequently left penniless by the end of the day. And Yamagishi-san seemed 
to seize every opportunity to use his “outlaw” (autorō) appearance and manner, some-
times purely for the fun of it, by intimidating outsiders to Sanya. When, during the course 
                                                
16 Like the severed tip of the pinkie, the scar of a knife wound on the cheek may connote yakuza affiliation. 
Slashing the cheek or severing the pinkie may be undertaken to compensate for infractions against organi-
zational rules. 
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of a taxi ride with Yamagishi-san and two others, the taxi driver expressed uncertainty 
regarding where we wished to go, Yamagishi-san took the opportunity to harangue the 
driver with a string of invectives lasting the entirety of our ten-minute journey. “You 
don’t know where it is? It’s on your fucking tab then!! I’ll fucking kill you, you hear!?!” 
(Doko daka wakattenno ka? Omae, jibara dazo!! Bukkorosu zo omae, kītenno ka!?!). 
Meanwhile, the two others told the taxi driver where to go, tiredly remarking to Yamag-
ishi-san to “let it rest” (Omae, mō yamero yo). When we finally got out of the taxi, 
Yamagishi-san himself paid the fare from his bulging wallet, while in the tram ride af-
terward, he made such a loud mockery of our group that oncoming passengers scurried 
past us for the end of the compartment. Nor, for that matter, did Yamagishi-san’s intimi-
dation tactics merely amount to the empty tantrums of an adolescent fifty-year old. The 
threat of physical violence that they implied was real. One time, an older woman had to 
restrain him with the plaintive words, “you’ll kill him” (koroshichau yo), as he continued 
to beat an already blood-bespattered and unconscious man. 
Though Yamagishi-san was former mob, and through his connection with Pin-san, 
undoubtedly felt connected to – and therefore entitled by – the local yakuza organization, 
the Kanamachi-ikka, the arrogant behavior he exhibited was precisely the kind that could 
land him in serious trouble with other prominent figures in Sanya.17 In fact, it had “been 
agreed in advance” (hanashi tsukerareteru) that Yamagishi-san, a “member” (membā) of 
Matsuda-san’s “group” (gurūpu) – though membership was far from formalized, and was 
                                                
17 After Pin-san was arrested in Spring 2014, Yamagishi-san was “barred” (tachi iri kinshi) from entering 
Sanya by the Kanamachi-ikka. Yamagishi-san committed the indiscretion of mentioning to the Kanamachi-
ikka – a subsidiary of the Yamaguchi-gumi – that he had previously had dealings with the Sumiyoshi-kai; 
an adversary of the Yamaguchi-gumi. Ousted from Sanya, Yamagishi-san went to work at Fukushima 
Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. After I left Sanya, many members of the Matsuda-san group similarly went to 
work at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. 
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decided, if anything, in practice and talk – would not “lay a hand” (te o dasu) on Ichi-san 
or Moto-san of the “Okinawa-group” (Okinawa-gumi).18 On numerous occasions, it had 
been the very abuse of iconography associated with the mob that had triggered Moto-san 
or Ichi-san to go on a rampage, putting the other party in place by “beating the hell out of 
them” (boko boko ni suru). Coupled with a haughty attitude, the revelation of traditional 
body tattoos could prompt rage, and possibly, long-term hospitalization, and the ousting 
of the other person from Sanya.  
Yamagishi-san’s style of vulgar ostentation must, in effect, be counterposed to an 
other type of self-conduct to which deference was accorded in Sanya. This opposing term 
can be located in the senior figure of the Okinawa-gumi, Izukenji-san, and his partner, 
Emi, or “Nē-san” (older sister), as everybody addressed her. Like Yamagishi, Izukenji-
san was once a member of the yakuza, yet he did not flaunt it. Though it was difficult for 
Izukenji-san to dissimulate the fact that he was once in the mob – since he was missing 
three fingers; two from below the middle joint and one from above it, indicating that they 
were cut no less than five times – I spent almost an entire year working with him, moving 
in and out of changing rooms, without once noticing (as someone later pointed out to me) 
that Izukenji-san’s body was covered in tattoos. No matter how hot it was, Izukenji-san 
always wore a white, cotton, long-sleeved shirt thick enough to conceal his tattoos. It was 
from intimate friends that one learned that Izukenji-san had been “head” (kashira) for a 
famous yakuza leader in Fukuoka, known by anyone with the slightest knowledge of the 
mob, or that Izukenji-san was on the list of individuals against whom the local mob, the 
Kanamachi-ikka, was not permitted to raise a hand. Contrary to common lore that the 
                                                
18 In fact, many “members” (membā) of the Okinawa-gumi objected to being referred to thus, although they 
clearly constituted a group – working, drinking, gambling, and fighting together – in their daily actions. 
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mob cut their finger over contraventions committed by the individuals themselves, it was 
said that Izukenji-san had lost his fingers to take blame for those working under him. In 
Akia’s words, this made Izukenji-san an “incredible person” (sugoi hito). Izukenji-san 
and Nē-san were thus recognized for their effortless tact and elegance, discretion, and the 
humility with which they interacted with everybody, demonstrating the same modesty 
and deference regardless of social difference. Combined with the aura of Izukenji-san’s 
past, the actual conduct of Izukenji-san and Nē-san operated as cause and source of the 
esteem with which they were regarded. Izukenji-san and Nē-san took care of everyone, 
inviting them home for endless meals and drinking, being present when someone was put 
in jail, and always showing consideration, such that it was said that “everyone is indebted 
to” (minna sewa ni natteiru) them. One word from Izukenji-san, who had himself made a 
practice of the dictum that nothing is more important than one’s “buddies” (nakama) – 
and potential schisms within the group were resolved. Even other senior members, like 
Ichi-san – a burly, 57-year-old, no-nonsense worker who circulated and, through his very 
presence at the construction site, ensured the availability of work for everybody – would 
set aside differences and make peace, if so asked by Izukenji-san. 
In their power to resolve constitutive and seemingly insuperable tensions between 
individuals and individual factions, Izukenji-san and Nē-san occupied a mythical place in 
the atomized social world of Yama. In the absence of Izukenji-san and Nē-san, social re-
lations in Sanya might have split and devolved on the economic principle of every man 
for himself, devoid of hierarchy, deference, generosity and “buddies” (nakama). Contrary 
to Yamagishi forcibly pulling rank for his own purposes, against whomever, and abusing 
the iconography of the yakuza world, Izukenji-san actualized a principle of selflessness in 
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the name of individuals he cared for, and for those to whom he held social obligations. 
Like the Caduveo face painting of which Claude Lévi-Strauss writes in Tristes Tropiques, 
the deference given to Izukenji-san and Nē-san – as symbols of sociality par excellence – 
actualized the dream of a group of individuals “ardently and insatiably seeking a means 
of expressing symbolically the institutions it might have, if its interests … did not stand 
in the way.”19 Only, in the case of Sanya, it was the principle of masculine sociality itself 
which was sought, so that the quality of person, status, and their history were repeatedly 
emphasized in an insistent and pervasive reversal of the commodity-form; that is, until 
the economy – or liquor – drove a shaft between individualized men once again. Much as 
Izukenji-san formed a counterpoint to the loud and self-centered Yamagishi, and much as 
Izukenji-san was loosely a “member” of the Okinawa-gumi – working and drinking with 
them – his person transcended any exclusive affiliation. It was common practice for him 
and Nē-san to invite everyone home, thence unifying the Okinawa-gumi with the Matsu-
da-group, and in the embrace of hospitality, imposing peace on individual tensions. 
However, such gatherings were almost exclusively and constitutively reserved for 
men. While the absence of romantic engagements with women produced the appearance 
that there were no women the men would have brought along anyways, one day Izukenji-
san himself expressed the gendered basis of these gatherings. When Mito-chan – the only 
worker with continuous romantic endeavors! – suggested that he bring his girlfriend 
along to introduce her to me, Izukenji-san dismissed the suggestion, asking rhetorically 
why Mito-chan would bring his girlfriend to a gathering “of men” (otoko no). A notable 
                                                
19 Claude Lévi-Strauss, Tristes Tropiques, trans. John and Doreen Weightman (New York: Penguin Books, 
1992), pg. 197. In writing of a constitutive (and ultimately insuperable) contradiction and opposition at the 
heart of the binary social system of moieties, Lévi-Strauss suggests that the Caduveo dream of its resolution 
in the form of their art. I consider both the individualizing effect of the economy and sexual difference as 
the constitutive basis of the masculine sociality of otoko. 
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exception was made to this rule when my (foreign) partner and woman was invited home, 
wined and dined with the guys, and to whom Izukenji-san paid exceptional hospitality, 
virtually ignoring my presence beside her. However, much as Izukenji-san’s attentions 
were (also) indirectly addressed to myself, it was Nē-san’s presence in the adjacent room 
and kitchen that established Izukenji-san’s eminently self-effacing authority. While her 
place among the guys must be distinguished from the women proprietors of the snackbars 
and eateries they frequented in the evenings, the attentions of these women was necessary 
to establish the trope of the otoko. While Izukenji-san was deferential and respectful to all 
and sundry, regardless of gender, the hospitality of an otoko could not take place save on 
the ground of sexual difference. 
It was such visible practices, and the deference with which Izukenji-san treated 
everybody – be it the owner of an izakaya (who, of course, knew him) or the homeless by 
Iroha – that earned Izukenji-san the praise, given behind his back and never to himself, of 
being a “man’s man” (otoko no otoko). However, it was not simply the trope of being a 
“man” (otoko), but of embodying the vanishing values of a specific world of men, namely, 
those of the old yakuza, which earned Izukenji-san his respect and donned him with the 
inescapable aura that attached to his person no matter where he went. On this note, it was 
common for the men in Sanya to describe their relationships with yakuza terms: shatei or 
“younger brother,” and aniki or “older brother.” When I asked Ichi-san why, aside from 
everyday conduct, such high esteem was given to Izukenji-san, his response was brief to 
the point of being hasty, as if he did not want to be caught in an indiscretion. First, he re-
counted the circumstances under which he met Izukenji-san. More than a decade ago, 
Moto, a “younger brother” (shatei) to Izukenji-san, had challenged Ichi-san to a fight: 
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“you wanna take me on?!” (ore to yaru ka?!). It was Izukenji-san who put a stop to this 
by interjecting himself between the two, insisting that Ichi-san was the senior figure, and, 
that Moto back down. Second, Ichi-san made direct reference to Izukenji-san’s former 
life in the mob by stating that Izukenji-san “knows everything about such things” (sōiu no 
zenbu shitteru) concerning the intricacy of hierarchy in the mob world. It is, of course, no 
coincidence that Izukenji-san, guarantor of sociality and honor in the “lawless zone” 
(muhō chitai) of Sanya, embodies in practice the knowledge that is ascribed to his mythic 
past. The trope of the “man” (otoko) would reinstate sociality where it is lacking, but also, 
as will be seen below, threatens to undo the propriety of “general society” (ippan shakai) 
by exceeding the negativity (and shame) that would confine Sanya to Sanya. 
 
 The force of being a “man” (otoko) renders the lives of the old-guard Sanya man, 
and almost any active construction worker, mutually exclusive to, and indeed, antithetical 
to the philanthropic mission of certain non-profit organizations that operate in Sanya. The 
notion that the men in Sanya need help – that they cannot take care of themselves – could 
not run more counter to the “self-reliance” (jiritsu) predicated by this ideal. Of course, for 
those on welfare, the contradiction of asserting masculine independence consisted in their 
dependence on state funds. But it was precisely this dependence that was relegated to the 
outside of Yama in the performance and assertion of masculine self-reliance. By the same 
token, the once-powerful, militant labor union for day laborers and the homeless, Sōgidan, 
has acquired the trappings of asinine ideological interests which could not be further from 
the imperative to look after oneself and one’s group: prancing down Namidabashi every 
Friday morning with a red flag and speakerphone, preaching the renunciation of war and 
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liberation for workers across the world. Participating in a demonstration, or lining up for 
takidashi (food hand-outs) fell outside the purview of individuals even remotely affiliated 
with the workers of the Okinawa-gumi or Matsuda-san’s group.20 Izukenji-san was not 
even aware that the oldest non-profit organization in Sanya, Sanyūkai, operated a medical 
clinic offering free services. His lack of basic knowledge testified to the split between the 
adjacent worlds of the active construction worker and of Sanyūkai, hidden in an alleyway 
only 100 meters from Muto-san’s hole-in-the-wall where the guys would come to drink. 
 But a medical clinic offering free services would have served the needs of no one 
more so than the active construction worker. Along with the homeless men and women –
though primarily men, except two or three women who resided with men – living in blue 
tents alongside Sumida river, individuals without recourse to welfare or health insurance 
were most likely to be found among the active construction laborers in Sanya. At least a 
quarter of the active workers I became close to were receiving welfare, including Izuken-
ji-san, Shokawa-san (both 60), Misaaru or Akia (in their mid-50s), none of who declared 
their income, and thus, were both illegally supplementing their meagre welfare (approxi-
mately ¥100,000 per month; $1,000 USD) and running the risk, if found out, of altogether 
losing this support.21 The latter prospect was dire, as it would most certainly leave some 
on the streets, and others working excessively with a sick body which was bound to shut 
down. Notably, no one save Akia – who had a brain tumor and was strictly forbidden by 
                                                
20 Individuals who had failed to succeed as radical leftists also came to Sanya. Ōyama Shirō describes one 
such man in A Man With No Talents: “I believe he was deeply hurt by the fact that the radical leftists he 
associated with never took him seriously or offered him the kind of position in their infrastructure he felt he 
deserved. He found himself unable to play the role of the foot soldier with men young enough to be his 
children in order to reactivate his political career in San’ya; yet at the same time he couldn’t face old age as 
a common day laborer. Both prospects were equally unbearable to him. Was this not how his despondency 
manifested itself: in the form of these early-morning bellows in front of the Center?” (50). 
21 Welfare recipients were required to declare income so that their welfare could be calibrated accordingly. 
For more details, see Tōkyō-to Fukushi Hokenkyoku, 1/12/2014.  
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doctors to do manual labor – expressed shame at receiving welfare (other people’s tax 
money, he said); the others seemed to echo Ichi-san’s explicit principle that “you take 
what you can get” (toreru mono wa toru), since it would have been well-nigh impossible 
for the worker in his fifties or sixties to earn a living at manual labor, given the scarcity 
of construction work, and the fact that many of the guys were physically ill. Others, like 
Moto-san, Nori-san, Kuma (in his 70s), Ichi-san, or Ma-chan were all registered on the 
“abure” system, which was designed specifically to sustain the livelihood of day laborers, 
and received a maximum of ¥50,000 per month ($500 USD); given that they worked.22 
Then, there was Mito-chan and Matsuda-san (and Ichi-san, after he took over from his 
younger brother, Mito-chan), the respective tehaishi (contractor) of the Okinawa-gumi 
and Matsuda-group who were said to to earn up to ¥500,000 ($5,000 USD) per month, 
solely from providing their employers with workers.23 And finally, there were people like 
Mako-chan, Te-chan (who lived in a tent by the river), Miyasawa-san (who traveled be-
tween Sanya and Nishinariku in Osaka, depending on work availability; faking the loss of 
his ticket upon arrival, so that, by explaining to station staff that he had traveled from the 
closest station, the trip could be made for ¥150 ($1.50 USD)), Riku-san (who refused to 
seek any help from the state, and to everyone’s surprise, decided to cut off state aid when 
                                                
22 For those whom the ward approved and registered, the “abure” system required that day laborers work at 
least 13 days every month, in return for which they were guaranteed 13 days on which the ward gave them 
¥7,500 ($75 USD). See Ōyama Shirō, A Man With No Talents, pg. 25. Workers approved by the ward were 
given a “pocket notebook” (techō) in which to receive stamps from their employers as proof of having 
worked. In The Proletarian Gamble: Korean Workers in Interwar Japan (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2009), Ken C. Kawashima writes of the individualizing effects of a similar system for Korean day laborers 
in interwar Japan. With reference to the so-called Unemployment Emergency Relief Program (UERP), 
Kawashima says: “In sum, therefore, the implementation of the work book registration system not only 
functioned to separate unemployed Korean workers from unemployed Japanese workers, but also produced 
individuals as effects of registration. Registering with the UERP was a mechanical function of marking, 
coding, stamping, registering, and, most of all, producing labor power in the form of individuals for the 
purpose of inaugurating them into exploitative regimes of wage labor that the UERP coordinated, specifi-
cally (as we will see shortly) in the public works industry” (180). 
23 See chapter 5. 
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it turned out he didn’t have cancer), the 28-year-old Kami-kun (who earned his living 
flat-out, working five days every week and spending the rest of his time at slot machines), 
the two who worked for Chishima for ridiculously cheap wages (having gone in debt to 
the yakuza, the pair had been housed in a “dorm” (ryō) or more specifically, a takobeya, 
to work off their debt), and the countless other nameless figures – oftentimes picked off 
the street or the environs of Minami-Senjū station – who Matsuda-san would use as con-
venience demanded, slashing half their wages in the process.24 Of course, it was entirely 
possible for some of these individuals – save, perhaps, for Mako-chan (who seemed to be 
running from the law), or the two working off their debt to the mob – to work the system 
to earn welfare benefits, and for Kami-kun to get on the abure system. However, 
Miyasawa-san, like many others, did not wish to have his whereabouts known to his fam-
ily in Okinawa, and the first thing the ward office would do would be to contact his next-
of-kin. As for Kami-kun, he couldn’t have been bothered to register himself for the abure 
system, though even he, after two years, was feeling the toil of working every day.25 At 
                                                
24 Takobeya – or “octopus-rooms” – were so named for the inhuman conditions under which laborers were 
crammed into a single dormitory. The term derives from forced labor practices in Hokkaido, dating back to 
the late 1800s. 
25 Suffixes to Japanese names function widely to indicate hierarchy or intimacy. Among the day laborers in 
Sanya, such hierarchy was primarily a reflection of age. Men of the same age might refer to one another as 
dōkyūsei (classmates). In such cases, they often eliminated the addition of a suffix to the name, referring to 
the other simply as: Misaaru or Ichi. Even the difference of one year in age could prompt someone to add 
the suffix “-san” to the name – indicating that so-and-so was of senior status – or “-kun” to show that so-
and-so was younger. However, the addition of such suffixes – or, for that matter, the choice of using sur-
names or first names – was equally a matter of the preference of the individual addressed. Mito-chan, who 
was fifty, preferred to be called Mito-chan by me, who was twenty years younger than him. By adding the 
suffix “-chan” – usually reserved for children – a certain familiarity was effected between Mito-chan and 
myself. Of course, Akia, who was Mito-chan’s senior by five years, simply referred to Mito-chan as Mito 
(first name), whereas others, such as Kami-kun – who worked under Mito-chan – referred to Mito-chan as 
Uesato-san (surname plus suffix). Such matters were complicated, again, by the fact that many of the work-
ers I knew came from Okinawa, and therefore employed the suffix “-bō” – like “-chan” – to signal intimacy 
with the younger. Thus, Ichi-san, who was Akia’s senior by one year, referred to Akia as Nori-bō; a combi-
nation of Norio, Akia’s first name, and the suffix “-bō.” Akia, in turn, referred to Ichi-san as Ichi-san. But 
because there was one week of the year when Akia and Ichi-san were of the same age – a week during 
which Akia referred to Ichi-san simply as “Ichi!” – Akia then performed their equality to comic effect for 
everyone by calling “Ichi!” into line. No one referred to Izukenji-san except as Izukenji-san. 
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some point, the inevitable was bound to happen: namely, injury at work, for which con-
struction companies were most unlikely to compensate workers, and in particular, day 
laborers. 
 
 People would start gathering in the narrow, 25 meter back alley that flanked the 
entryway to Sanyūkai at ten every morning, slowly amassing over the next two hours as 
they stood or sat on white plastic benches lining the alley, until lunch was served on the 
second floor at noon. Almost without exception, this amorphous gathering of people was 
comprised of men in their fifties or above; though, on occasion, and later towards noon, 
someone younger in their thirties or twenties might appear. And sometimes, Yasuko, who 
lived in a tent in the nearby Tamahime Park, made her way out to the benches, asked for 
tea from the reception area at the top of the five stairs leading up to the entry, and sat 
back down to chat loudly and indiscreetly about whatever she wanted. She has an unmis-
takable presence, with nasal voice and bulging layers of homeless clothing. Otherwise, it 
was very rare, indeed, to see any women at Sanyūkai, and if they did come, it was for an 
appointment with the doctor on duty that day, after which she promptly disappeared. Or 
else, it was in the accompaniment of a man, like the homeless, tanned, and meek woman 
with glasses who seemed to push her bearded father around in a wheelchair all day, the 
two of them spending nights in the streets of Asakusa.26 Not once, during the year and a 
half I volunteered at Sanyūkai, did I see anyone but the regular crowd of men rise to the 
second floor to eat. Thus the crowd outside would sit and wait for lunch. Some would 
smoke, dropping ash in the aluminum ashtrays interspersed beneath the benches, while 
                                                
26 According to Akia, there used to be many characters like Yasuko in Sanya, characteristically brash, loud, 
and moving in and out of jail on account of petty misdemeanors, as Yasuko, in fact, did. Two or three non-
profit organizations in the environs of Sanya welcomed women with nowhere to go. 
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others still engaged in inconsequential conversations. Favorite topics included the latest 
news, the weather, sports, and perhaps even – although the subject of gambling was con-
sciously avoided – the latest horse races. The generic character to be seen was that of a 
man in his mid-fifties, dressed in grayish pants, a plain collared shirt (with an equally 
plain vest or jacket in Winter), and low-budget, black plastic shoes or jogging gear. Most 
often, this figure would be silently hunched over on the benches, solitary. Given the sig-
nal for lunch, he would walk upstairs, eat without uttering a word, maybe even bow in 
passing to the staff downstairs, and head home. At one o’clock, when the Sanyūkai kitch-
en stopped serving lunch, the alley outside would often be empty.  
 A clear hierarchy structured the provision of meals because it was none other than 
the head of Sanyūkai, Jean-san, who decided and indicated that someone would be given 
a meal. Once lunch had been prepared upstairs, he would do this by walking the alley and 
signalling to individuals with his index finger, most often also calling them by their name, 
to go up and take their lunch. Because the tatami room upstairs only seated twelve, six at 
each table, only twelve men could go up at a time, and Jean-san would have to repeat the 
process of signalling individuals to go up. The tatami dining room always had a small TV 
switched on (usually to the NHK news) during lunch time. Its walls were decorated with 
posters and photos of Sanyūkai’s past, some Christian missionary artwork, colored pencil 
drawings of children’s anime figures (by Ai-chan; one of the men outside, who professed 
to always being mistaken for a woman), and collections of four-leaf clovers collected by 
Aoki-san who lived in a tent by Sumida river (and claimed that trillions, literally trillions 
of ants paraded through his tent every Summer). One wall of the dining room was stacked 
waist-high with donated rice bags, many from Fukushima. Another led to the staircase up 
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and downstairs, and would become so crammed with shoes that there was hardly space to 
walk. Lastly, there was a toilet adjacent to the dining room, a small closet, and a doorway 
and counter opening onto the two by five meter kitchen where the cooks, almost all 
women, would stand and chat after having served the meals. When one group had fin-
ished eating, which, for some regulars involved thanking and flirting with the cooks when 
giving back the dirty plates, the next round was sent up to eat, often clashing with down-
coming traffic on the narrow staircase. Finally, Jean-san would go up to eat and sit at a 
table surrounded by the regulars he appeared closest to – called the “Jean-san group” 
(Jean-san gurūpu) by the kitchen staff – which invariably included Izumi, Januma, Imai, 
and Akia. Those who, for whatever reason could not make it up the stairs (maybe they 
were in a wheelchair), or were truly homeless – and thus, were not asked upstairs, osten-
sibly, for hygienic reasons – were given bentō boxes to take with them. It rarely hap-
pened that there was not enough food to go around, since the number of people outside 
would rise and fall with the time of month; enabling the staff to anticipate how many 
meals to prepare. In the mornings, Jean-san would give the kitchen staff a number that 
varied from 20 – 30 at the beginning of the month, to 60 or so at the end of the month, 
when everyone’s allowance from the state had all but run out. 
This daily gathering of men outside Sanyūkai produced a spectacle of need, and in 
so doing confirmed the necessity of the service Sanyūkai provided. The kitchen staff kept 
track of the number of individuals who came to eat every day, commenting, as they wrote 
the numbers down on the fridge calendar, that there “were not so many” (sukunakatta), or 
“a lot” (ōkatta) on that day. Likewise, the rare occasions when there were so many people 
outside that Jean-san had to lower his head and turn the last away, became the subject of 
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much gossip. But with the exception of the one or two homeless who came to eat, and as 
the Sanyūkai staff confessed in interviews, almost all the people waiting outside were re-
ceiving welfare payments, and the same went for the group of people who frequented the 
clinic.27 It should be added that, with the occasional exception of Akia, virtually none of 
these men were active construction workers: a separate social formation on the other side 
of Sanya. In other words, everyone who ate lunch at Sanyūkai (many of them daily) were 
receiving a monthly allowance of approximately ¥100,000 ($1,000 USD), and as welfare 
recipients, already had access to medical care from hospitals and doctors, gratis. For these 
men, Sanyūkai provided an additional, albeit not necessarily unnecessary, aid in getting 
through the month by easing the constraint of welfare. In an online Sanyūkai blog entitled 
“Daily Events” (Hibi no Dekigoto), it is with regard to these men outside that a long-term 
staff member declaims on the mission and everyday task that faces the staff: 
What can we ourselves do for the person, right in front of us now, “with difficulty” 
in some aspect? What can we do for this person that will be “most for their own” 
good? While listening to their talk one by one, we ourselves respond through trial 
and error.28 
 
What enables this line of inquiry, materialized by the threshold at the top of the five stairs 
leading up to the Sanyūkai entryway – to the right of which the enclosed clinic is located 
behind yet another partition – and the knee-high table from behind which a staff member 
serves tea, is the division of “we” or “us” (watashi tachi) from “this person” (kono hito). 
From inside the back alleys of Sanya, Sanyūkai reinstantiates the structure of divisioning 
that confines Sanya to Sanya. And what is at stake in this “consultation” (sōdan) work, to 
which the staff member refers, is a coincidence between the individual need – this person 
                                                
27 According to the staff, 80% of the individuals who frequented Sanyūkai were welfare recipients. 




is “with difficulty” (komatteiru); otherwise s/he would not have come to Sanyūkai – and 
what Sanyūkai can “do for” (shiteageru) this person. Notably, the direction of “doing for” 
(shiteageru), or simply “giving” (ageru), is as unidirectional and downward as the act of 
serving tea. Gifting functions, above all, to confirm the place of Sanyūkai staff as provid-
ers of that which the men outside desire. Sanyūkai desires to be desired; as Lacan says, to 
be “the Other’s desire.”29 However, this question – what does the other want from me – is 
posed from both sides. Even before the person ascends the steps to the Sanyūkai entry, 
the question has been posed – “What can we ourselves do?” (watashi tachi to shite nani 
ga dekiruka?) – and the individual must be able to answer, that is, to be recognized by 
Sanyūkai. S/he is, in effect, interpellated into a structure of desire, in which s/he – as a 
lacking individual “with difficulty” (komatteiru) – is “right in front of” (me no mae ni) an 
institution that designates itself in terms of the collective “we” (watashi tachi). This is the 
structure of shame, and thence the Sanyūkai staff member continues: 
It’s not just people who come for the clinic; people who somehow want to get off 
the street and return to a normal life-style come over and over for consultation.30 
 
People not only come to Sanyūkai when they need medical services: they come, and they 
come “over and over” (tsugi tsugi) desiring the “normal life-style” (futsū no seikatsu) that 
Sanyūkai can provide. Notwithstanding that many homeless wanted to get off the streets, 
whether or not they desire the return to a “normal life-style,” replete with work, family, 
bills, and the alienation of a one-bedroom apartment was rather questionable. In fact, the 
homeless by Sumida river had aleady turned down the offer – made by Sumida and Taitō 
                                                
29 See Jacques Lacan, “The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian Uncon-
scious,” pg. 690. 
30 Sanyūkai, “Hibi no Dekigoto.” The Japanese text reads: “きます。またクリニックにくる人達ばかり
で はなく、路上生活からなんとか普通の生活に戻りたいと相談にくる人達も次々とやってきま
す。” See the Introduction for an extensive discussion of shame in Japan. 
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wards, in an effort to clean the river area – to move into apartments.31 Aoki-san seemed 
quite content with his trillions of ants every summer, showing his face at Sanyūkai every 
few weeks, watering his many plants, and walking the stretch between Tamahime and his 
blue tent, ladent with water bottles. As for Te-chan, the tobi (scaffolder) who also lived in 
a tent by the river, he was clearly saving money to repay his debts, although he was later 
diagnosed with cancer; as other homeless before him had also been, holding out until it 
was too late. The general desire was nonetheless ascribed to the homeless of wanting to 
return to a “normal life-style,” from which their life-styles departed. The “consultation” 
(sōdan) by Sanyūkai emerged as the site at which lack was produced, internalized, and 
individualized through a process of “listening” (kikinagara) that uncovered the preexist-
ent needs of the individual. 
However, more often than not, what the Sanyūkai staff encountered was the mere 
mimesis of the desire to be “normal” (futsū), since proximity to the institution came with 
its benefits. Whether the men outside truly desired – or needed – the meal upstairs or not, 
Sanyūkai staff and regulars themselves postulated that many were pretending. On the one 
hand, then, Sanyūkai could not do enough to be desired, and on the other, the men outside 
had to perform their desire before an institution that doubted them. Their state of lack, or 
being “with difficulty” (komattairu) required an impossible confirmation that would give 
necessity to the existence of Sanyūkai. 
 The spectacle of the crowd gathered outside Sanyūkai, waiting for lunch, served a 
dual purpose. By giving themselves to be seen waiting two hours for a meal – showing up 
on the dot of noon would have been outright shameless, and would certainly not have se-
                                                
31 See Tōkyō-to Fukushi Hokenkyoku, “Hōmuresu Taisaku,” 13/9/2015. Ostensibly, the number of home-
less within Tokyo was reduced from 5,500 to 2,600 between 2004 – 2008. In the absence of a follow-up 
study, however, it is likely that the eyesore of blue-tents along Sumida River was simply dispersed. 
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cured strangers to Sanyūkai a meal – the individuals outside invested a proper amount of 
time in a shameful place that validated Sanyūkai as provider. And by doing so, they got a 
meal. For the image of shameful docility was said to consist in a mere mimesis of shame 
when the men who had just eaten left Sanyūkai, making a beeline for a second free lunch 
at a second non-profit organization: going from curry at Sanyūkai, to udon noodle soup at 
Tamahime park. Indeed, there were certain rules that had to be observed at Sanyūkai, the 
contravention of which could earn one a bad name, and with it, the loss of one’s privileg-
es. The staff had implemented a “no drinking” (sake kinshi) policy during work hours, in 
accordance with which anyone drunk or drinking was frowned upon; and if obstructively 
drunk, was ousted from the Sanyūkai alleyway. There was an implicit, additional proviso 
to this policy – under the condition of which one could remain at Sanyūkai – namely, that 
fighting was not tolerated (in the interest of safety). If fights occurred, which regulars and 
and staff said they did much less over recent years, they were broken up; in fact, when a 
member of the staff was punched by a newcomer, the police was summoned. Thus Fuka-
da-san, a decades-old volunteer at Sanyūkai and resident of Sanya, noted how differently 
some people behaved when they were not at Sanyūkai. In contrast to the figure of obse-
quious helplessness they presented at Sanyūkai, these men would start brawls, and “act 
violently” (abareru) when they were in other parts of Sanya. It was as if their behavior 
conformed to the geographic location of Sanyūkai, on the other, opposite side of 
Namidabashi from Iroha arcade. Yet, when members of the Kanamachi-ikka passed 
through the narrow alley, as if it belonged to them in their sharp business suits and shiny, 
expensive black shoes, silence would descend on the alley in a reminder that, perhaps, the 
alley was not Sanyūkai’s to begin with. None of the staff, for that matter, ever ventured 
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beyond the confines of Sanyūkai and into Sanya proper. However, it was to the staff of 
this sanctuary from Sanya within Sanya that the men outside had to present an idealized, 
pliant and docile image of themselves as was desired, and thus to rise in favorability. 
Waiting two hours might have secured a stranger a meal, but additional steps were neces-
sary to become known by name and gain access to additional privileges – such as Friday 
and Saturday parties, when alcohol was also served – that intimacy with the staff all but 
guaranteed. 
 Akia, another volunteer of three years, said that the ritual of waiting might as well 
be abolished in favor of a token system. This way people could pick up a numbered ticket, 
come back for lunch, and go home without the headache of having to wait two hours. But 
such a system would have gotten rid of that non-relation – each side aspiring to match the 
“the Other’s desire” – in which Sanyūkai’s social world consisted, and would have over-
turned the hierarchy whereby Sanyūkai, the apparent provider, ultimately emerged as the 
dependent party.32 Because it was not shame, but shamelessness that was necessitated by 
the process of waiting two hours outside. Thus, the active construction worker never went 
to Sanyūkai. To endure the shame of the two-hour wait, one could “know no shame” 
(haji shirazu).33 
 
                                                
32 Jacques Lacan says: “there’s no such thing as a sexual relationship” (il n’y a pas de rapport sexuel). See 
Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: On Feminine Sexuality, the Limits of Love and Knowledge, 
Book XX, trans. Bruce Fink (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1998), pg. 5, 20. 
33 Contrary to the sensibility of haji (shame) that constituted the otoko (man) – that is, as an affirmation of 
shame that held shame at bay, but that also ran the risk of expunging it – the shamelessness of “knowing no 
shame” (haji shirazu) entailed an overcoming by conforming to the normative. See the Introduction. In the 
mode of shamelessness that Lacan discusses in Television, however, the shamelessness of those waiting for 
a meal also suggested the sheer encompassment by the equivalent comodity-form, and the lack of a singular 
master signifier. See Jacques-Alain Miller, “On Shame,” pg. 23. 
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 Outside Sanyūkai, on the opposite side of Namidabashi, the construction workers 
of the Okinawa-gumi – with whom Akia, himself from Miyakojima, was especially close 
– would take issue with the attitude and arrogance of Sanyūkai disclosed in the phrase: to 
“do for” (shiteageru). Having neither computer proficiency, nor access to the internet via 
their cellphones, the guys had not picked this phrase up from Sanyūkai’s blog, happening 
merely to use it to depict the activities of the NPO. With no small degree of offensiveness, 
the workers would flip the phrase – already redolent with condescension, in that the verb, 
“to give” (ageru), inscribed an hierarchical relation in which the giver goes out of its way 
to do something for the other – to restore a proper order of things, saying: “It isn’t “doing 
for,” is it! It’s “being allowed” to!!” (Yatteageteru jya nē daro! Sasetemoratteru daro!!). 
In their eyes, Sanyūkai was “arrogant” (gōman) in entering upon their turf and presuming 
to do something for them. Rather, Sanyūkai was “being allowed” (sasetemoratteru) to be 
in Sanya. In permitting its presence, it was, rather, the residents of Sanya who were doing 
something for Sanyūkai.34 
 On a hot summer morning, Akia brought some of these members of the Okinawa-
gumi to Sanyūkai for medical check-ups. Rather than wait in the alleyway for their names 
to be called – that is, together with the regular crowd waiting for lunch – Akia, Moto-san, 
Shokawa-san, and Ichi-san removed themselves a distance of some 20 meters to the end 
                                                
34 Ōyama Shirō expresses a similar sentiment in A Man With No Talents. Of Christian volunteers in Sanya, 
he writes: 
 “… What I sense from such people’s “good deeds” (what Christians call putting their love into 
practice) is utter shamelessness, and I can’t help feeling repulsed. 
 These Christian volunteers depend in a far more profound way on San’ya – as objects for their 
“good deeds” (that is, relief work) – than San’ya men do on the volunteers, yet the famous grandma and her 
ilk seem all too oblivious to this fact. If, for example, the government were to conduct relief work on a 
wider scale, San’ya men would no longer need these people; the volunteers, on the other hand, will always 
require San’ya men as their very own “needy” and as living proof of their own spiritual redemption. 
 The fact that these volunteers seem to feel no shame at the hypocrisy of their “good deeds” is, I 
believe, a huge failing on their part. Isn’t their obliviousness to this fact the reason they are regarded as 
complete outsiders here in San’ya?” (97). 
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of the alley, where they stood facing one another, leaning against an electric pole, sipping 
green-tea shōchu from cans. Every once in a while, the fat and round Izumi, ensconced as 
always at the bottom of the entryway steps, would shoot a quick, nervous look at the guys 
from Okinawa. Jean-san, too, would turn to look at their figures down the road, muttering 
“Okinawa-gumi.” For Akia, the visitation and personal entourage functioned as a double 
demonstration of his influence. On the one hand, Moto-san, Shokawa-san, and Ichi-san 
would recognize his pull at Sanyūkai, which enabled him to set up appointments for them 
without the routine hassle of having to approach and ask the staff personally. On the other 
hand, Sanyūkai was made to witness the other world – of construction workers, masculin-
ity, muscle, and flagrant disregard for Sanyūkai etiquette – to which Akia was connected, 
and by which Sanyūkai appeared to be disconcerted, if not also threatened. Akia acted as 
the guarantor that the guys would be seen in the clinic, regardless that they were drinking. 
In fact, the Christian nurse had popped her head out of the clinic earlier in the morning to 
kindly ask the guys to hold off alcohol, since they were – “for once” (sekkaku) – getting a 
check-up, and there was no reason for it to be wasted. Nonetheless, there the four of them 
stood with shōchu in their hands (except for Akia, who had refrained). And because they 
stood at the far end of the alley, when each of their turns came the Sanyūkai staff member 
called their names from inside the entryway – as he usually did – but for lack of response, 
stuck his head out the entryway and tried once again – “Shokawa-san, please come in!” – 
only to have to put his slippers on in final frustration, shuffling into the alley to call their 
names one last time. Oblivious and caught up in their conversation, yet somehow certain 
that someone’s name had been called, Shokawa-san then looked at me, pointing stupidly 
at his own face with his index finger – saying “me?” (ore?) – waiting for a confirmation. 
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When I had confirmed with the staff that Shokawa-san’s name had been called, the latter 
set aside his drink, and, sporting what appeared to be the best demeanor he could muster, 
dawdled down the alleyway, climbed the stairs into the clinic, and bowed profusely as he 
crossed the threshold. Next came Moto-san, carrying the weight of his upper body up the 
stairs, bowing curtly at the threshold, and crossing into the clinic. 
 Asides from the consultation itself, the medical check-up could obviously not take 
place because the guys all had alcohol in their blood. This became the subject of gossip at 
Sanyūkai in the days after. What was this behavior, to show up at the clinic drinking? 
 
 Akia and the members of the Okinawa-gumi embodied the after-life in the present 
of Sanya, as it had been in its heyday. The group, or gumi, was composed of both a group 
of men that worked together for various construction companies – and for whom Mito-
chan acted as tehaishi (contractor); though it was really his older brother, Ichi-san, who 
had the reputation and connections which secured work availability – and a loose group 
of drinking buddies whose central figures, many of whom were from Okinawa, pulled a 
slew of other figures into its orbit.35 Thus, Nori-san and Moto-san were both central 
members of the Okinawa-gumi, but were employed as tobi for a separate company. 
Shokawa-san, too, had another buddy, Osawa-san, who provided him with work as a tek-
kinya (steelworker). At night and especially on Sundays, when everybody got together for 
the horse races, sometimes even going to the Okinawan restaurant in Asakusa, Gajū-
Maru, the members of the Okinawa-gumi could be found drinking here and there in 
Sanya, be it Oiwake, Iseya, Hikari-Sushi, Chūfukuro, or on the street by Mutō-san’s hole-
in-the-wall. Nor, for that matter, were the working arrangements set in stone. Anyone 
                                                
35 Unlike “group” (gurūpu), “gumi” carries the connotation of a gang, or of mob affiliation. 
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could work as a dokata (navvy) with Ichi-san, and if work was scarce for the others (and 
they needed the money), it was not unusual for Mito-chan to send Shokawa-san, Moto-
san or Nori-san to work as navvies with Ichi-san and the other regulars. 
 Akia himself did not go to work at first, having recently become intimate with the 
Okinawa-gumi through an encounter at a Sanya drinkery, where he noticed that Misaaru, 
Ichi-san’s cousin, was speaking with a Miyakojima accent; an island off Okinawa proper, 
where Akia, too, was born. Nor had Akia been long in Sanya on this occasion, returning 
to it after several years in Kotobukichō, Yokohama, where he had put himself to use at an 
illegal gambling joint. The suicide of a close friend, and the fact that his face had become 
too known in Kotobukichō prompted his return to Sanya, where he had first come to seek 
work some fifteen years earlier, when he had been put on probation for in-fighting by the 
Nibikikai; a now defunct mob organization for which Akia had worked ten years, special-
izing in kiritori (money-collecting). Although he had not told anyone of his past, this past 
was, in a strange way, part of what made his personality so attractive to others, especially 
at Sanyūkai: never showing “weakness” (yowami), and fearlessly staking himself and his 
reputation for those around him. When he tried to kill himself, it was also this machismo, 
however, turned ludicrous, that led him to repeatedly assert that he would have succeeded 
had the knife been sharp. Inside the last few years, Akia had, in fact, been diagnosed with 
a brain tumor that could not be extracted. Together with other physical ailments, this both 
prevented him from engaging in any form of strenuous physical labor – working, that is – 
and required that he be on medication all the time. Hence, I first met Akia at what would 
otherwise have been the unlikeliest of places, namely, Sanyūkai, where he volunteered to 
keep himself busy. As he himself said: to “do his best” (gambaru). At the time of our first 
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meeting, Akia was 54 years old. Standing some 160 cm, with a slightly protruding belly, 
but stocky, stout build, Akia’s physique bespoke his younger days when, as he put it, his 
arm muscles had been “bulging” (kachikachi). At the time of our meeting, Akia had also 
been sober for an entire year. On account of his health, he had been told by doctors to ab-
stain from liquor. However, this was to change drastically after a concatenation of events 
which included a falling out with Jean-san, and the passing away of Akia’s “older sister” 
(ane), for whom – though he did not say so – Akia was not able to mourn because he did 
not have the funds to travel to the funeral in Okinawa. And even if he had had the money, 
he might not have been welcome. 
 The most painful things were left unsaid in Sanya. Indeed, the precipitating, struc-
turing events that had originally prompted individuals to come to Sanya – unemployment, 
crime, illness – were not delved upon, but passed over in conversation over drinks in a 
moment of pregnant silence. The guys, be it at Sanyūkai or in the Okinawa-gumi, rarely 
if ever mentioned what effectively kept them in Sanya, namely, the absence of a family 
or a wife, children or parents. Their “connections” (en) with spouse, children, and parents 
had “been cut” (kittearu) years, if not decades ago. One exception to this rule was Mito-
chan, himself a relative newcomer to Sanya three years earlier, where he had come to join 
Ichi-san after leaving his wife and grown kids. Every month, Mito-chan would send 
money to his mother in Okinawa, and throwing guilt on Ichi-san by reminding him of this, 
Ichi-san would retort: “who would send money to that bitch?!” (ano babā ni dare ga kane 
o okuru ka?!). So too, Akia would occasionally say of Okinawa that he had “left Okina-
wa behind for good” (Okinawa o suteta).36 
                                                
36 Reminiscent both of the corner at which Akia stood at Sanyūkai, and the entryway to Iroha arcade, where 
men congregated over drinks, Elliot Liebow writes in Tally’s Corner: A study of Negro Streetcorner Men 
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 One day, after returning to Sanyūkai from a couple weeks abroad, I found Akia as 
vivacious as ever, typically transforming the daily atmosphere by exercising his penchant 
and skill of making others laugh at his inanities. But while I had been gone, he had gotten 
into a fight in Iroha arcade, and wore a chest strap to hold his fractured ribs in place. As it 
turned out afterward, his injuries included a fractured disk in the spinal column, in spite 
of which he continued volunteering at the non-profit organization, overseeing its menial 
tasks by hauling luggage back and forth. 
As Akia explained what had happened, he had “lost it” or “gone amok” (abareta) 
in Iroha arcade after learning that his older sister had passed away. He had let a sarcastic 
comment slip about someone at a drinkery, after which he was confronted by the man and 
two others, demanding that he compensate for his words. When I noted it might not have 
been necessary to fight over this, Akia explained that with some people “it doesn’t matter 
how much you apologize” (ikura ayamattemo). The three men had not backed down even 
after Akia apologized. What they wanted was “money” (kane). Refusing to lower himself 
to this demand – what Misaaru would later describe as a “man’s dignity” (otoko no iji) – 
Akia had promptly taken the matter outside and woken up in the hospital. He said he was 
pretty sure he had taken one of the guys down, though there had been three of them. Akia 
                                                                                                                                            
(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1967): “The streetcorner is, among other things, a sanctuary 
for those who can no longer endure the experience or prospect of failure. There, on the streetcorner, public 
fictions support a system of values which, together with the value system of society at large, make for a 
world of ambivalence, contradiction and paradox, where failures are rationalized into phantom successes 
and weaknesses magically transformed into strengths. On the streetcorner, the man chooses to forget he got 
married because he wanted to get married and assume the duties, responsibilities and status of manhood; 
instead, he sees himself as the “put-upon” male who got married because his girl was pregnant or because 
he was tricked, cajoled, or otherwise persuaded into doing so. He explains the failure of his marriage by the 
“theory of manly flaws.” Conceding that to be head of a family and to support it is a principal measure of a 
man, he claims he was much too much of a man to be a man. He says his marriage did not fail because he 
failed as breadwinner and head of the family but because his wife refused to put up with his manly appetite 
for whiskey and other women, appetites which rank high in the scale of shadow values on the streetcorner” 
(139). 
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whisked off the suggestion that the men were still around, saying that they were probably 
scared, “hiding somewhere” (dokka kakureteru). The police had, in fact, asked Akia if he 
remembered who had done this to him, to which he had feigned ignorance. Pointing to an 
old knife wound on his throat, he added that he had not informed on the person who had 
done this either. That was what it meant to be a “man” (otoko), and he had a reputation to 
uphold in Sanya. 
 My first real encounter with this world of Sanya, of fighting and reputations, took 
place on the eve of the yearly Sumida river fireworks festival: 
I thought I’d catch Akia and his buddies by the corner drinkery, but it was closed. 
When I then headed over to Iroha, there was Akia standing beside Mito-chan in 
the middle of a small crowd, beside the entryway to Iroha, under the roof beside 
the gambling sheets. Akia standing there in his sports shorts, brown slippers, and 
white plain T-shirt. Sushi had been put out for the guys on the gambling sheet, 
and Akia was helping himself. Some mama-san had laid it out. The fireworks were 
over. The corner drinkery had been closed early because of the fireworks, they 
said, and they’d been watching it from the street. You could see it even better 
from there, Akia said, raising his arms big to show the fireworks. He’d been 
drinking, but not that much. We all headed to Oiwake afterwards, and a regular 
party was going. Mito-chan’s brother – who ended up sleeping at my place – was 
sitting by the far end of the counter, having just ordered curry. He said he didn’t 
want a drink because he’d eat curry and then just head to sleep. I gave him a 
glass of beer nonetheless. The karaoke was going. Around ten guys – more, twelve 
or so – were sitting at the two tables across from the counter. Mito-chan’s older 
brother had been working all day, in the heat, Akia had said. I learned a lot of 
new names last night. Makoto-san – or Mako-chan – with the real downcast, 
somber eyes, but kind looking. He recalled how he’d spat blood, how blood had 
come out everywhere, from his nose, his mouth, his piss. He “thought he was go-
ing to die” (shinu ka to omotta). So he’d gone to Sanyūkai, because he has no in-
surance card or anything. He’d said that twice: that he has no insurance card. On 
that day, the doctor hadn’t been there and only Obara, the psychologist, was 
there. Makoto said he was on real good terms with Obara. But on that first day, 
since the doctor hadn’t been there, they had started asking about his parents. 
He’d broken down in tears. The conversation – with Akia at our side – continued 
on toward how Makoto-san has come through his work seeing people around him 
reach that point where they cannot continue to work anymore. Their bodies won’t 
hold. They’re at their limit. He’s seen this happen around him repeatedly. Coming 
up real close to my face, he ran his finger along his cheek to delineate the yaku-
za’s cut, and said, those he works for are primarily of that sort. The place was re-
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al lively while we were having this conversation. Someone came over to me, then, 
and showed me photos of Makoto-san naked. Makoto-san had just said, indicating 
beneath his shirt … that because he’d been working with the mob, or for the mob, 
he had tattoos. The photos on this other guy’s phone showed Makoto-san from the 
back, covered from the hips to the neck. He had actually said it with a sad expres-
sion, that he’d covered his body in tattoos. Akia started speaking … saying to Ma-
koto-san, “you’re at the limit” (genkai), and why don’t you “make it easy for 
yourself” (raku ni shite). Suggested that Makoto-san come to Sanyūkai, where 
they would get him registered, etc. Akia had said to check out Makoto-san’s head, 
which was, indeed, covered in scars. He’d been through a lot, Akia seemed to say. 
I think he used the word “bullied” (ijimeraretekita). But this person, Makoto, 
“can see things” (mono o mieru no), like Akia can. Here, in this world, you meet 
people who can see, Akia seemed to say. Makoto nodded … Makoto had a wooden 
cross around his neck that he’d been given by some priest. He held it up between 
his fingers. Akia said Makoto wouldn’t give that up for a million yen! Makoto 
nodded … right after we’d gotten into the place, Akia had pulled me from the 
counter to introduce me to the guys by the table. There were so many, I’d been 
shy and tried to avoid. But Akia headed straight in and introduced me in front of 
everyone to Izukenji-san – later, I learned, the don of the neighborhood – saying 
who I was, what I was doing, and, bowing his head, saying: “yoroshiku one-
gaishimasu.” A couple of times he said it. It was Akia’s way of saying “I vouch 
for this guy,” and of using his credentials for me. Now, I can’t let Akia down ei-
ther. In any case, I think I was acknowledged by Izukenji-san, as the talk turned to 
another person who had also come to Sanya to work and write on it. Izukenji-san 
was wearing what might be mistaken for pyjamas elsewhere, but white thin cotton 
top and matching bottom, with a zip-up – open – at the neck. Like something 
you’d wear before going to sleep, just out of the bath. He had a lean, slightly sal-
low face, but good complexion and kind-looking. Later, Akia said – whispering to 
me behind his upheld palm – that this is an “incredible person” (sugoi hito nano). 
With real emphasis. “Just look at his hands” (te o mitegoran), he said. And sure 
enough, Izukenji-san was missing three fingers. One on his right hand. Two on his 
left. Akia said he had not done this on account of himself, but that he had done it 
to take the fall for those under him. That’s why, Akia said, that people bow their 
heads to him when he walks down the street. Makoto agreed with Akia when he 
said that “he’s a real gentle person” (yasashī hito nanyo). 
 
It was real crowded, and at the very beginning, they’d gotten an arm wrestling 
match started … this guy – Sho something was his name – was apparently real 
strong – everyone said so – so the guys took turns. Everyone, including Akia, lost. 
The guy saying “Come on! Come on!” (Koi ka! Koi ka!). A real show. This one 
big guy, though – looked like a boxer with big nose and hefty upper body; whom, I 
was explained, likes bright colors like yellow or the red shirt he was wearing – 
won. Kept showing off his muscles, flexing them jokingly, saying he’d won against 
the guy everyone had lost to. When the other tehaishi – Matsuda-san – showed his 
face at the entryway, though, this big brawly, joking guy sprang to his feet within 
an instant and charged. Before I knew it, two or three guys – Izukenji-san re-
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straining the boxer – had gotten in between the two, to keep them from fighting. 
Akia said this happened hundreds of times and just kept talking.  
 
When we left the place, everyone followed Izukenji-san and two others – a curly 
haired woman who was also drinking in there and a man called “bōryokudan no 
yatsu” (the gangster guy) – to the cab and bowed to him before he got in. Akia ef-
fusively. Like watching the mob leader step into the cab with his entourage, and 
those below him bowing away.37 
 
                                                




 The Day Laborer 
 
 The working day starts early for construction workers in Sanya. Most construction 
sites begin the day with “radio calisthenics” (rajio taisō) and a general meeting at 8 AM, 
by which time laborers must have changed into their work clothes, and be ready to work. 
This means that workers must arrive in the changing rooms by 7:30, and that, depending 
on the location of the construction site, some of which can be up to two hours from Sanya, 
workers have to leave their apartment or doya between 5:30 and 7:00. Solitary figures on 
the early-morning train platform, they head to work before the morning rush hour – often 
in the opposite direction from central Tokyo, because the up-and-coming residential sites 
are to be found in Chiba or Saitama – and by the time they get back to Sanya, over twelve 
hours will easily have passed. If they have work again the next day, this leaves them with 
three to four hours to drink, eat, and maybe even go to the local sento (bathhouse). 
 Sanya itself still moves to the rhythm of the construction worker’s work day. As a 
strange but telling survival from the days when Namidabashi was thronging with laborers 
looking for work, the “asa ichi” (morning market) or “thieves’ market” (dorobō ichi) – as 
it is also called, since many of the objects on sale are said to be stolen – thrives between 
6:00 and 7:00 every morning, from Monday to Saturday. Within this hour, the side-streets 
flanking Tamahime park are lined with a row of temporary stalls, and a thin crowd of 
men saunters through them. Practically any kind of second-hand object can be found on 
sale in these back streets. Certain stalls specialize in clothes – T-shirts, collared shirts, 
pants, and jackets – others in decorative trinkets disposed of long ago by their former 
owners (be it porcelain statues, a plastic doraemon, glassware animals) all with that dusty, 
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worn look of having been through the trash. Other stalls specialize in used magazines, 
porn magazines, DVDs, CDs, VHS and music tapes, and still others specialize in handy-
man tools, and yet others in obsolete electronic goods, including tape recorders, CD play-
ers, analog box TVs, mini handheld TVs, and radios, switched on to air the morning news 
against the sound of static. A Macbook might even be found on sale amidst the curios and 
bric-a-brac, all sharing the musty air of having long ago fallen into disuse. 
The entire morning market is illegal. Normally, stall owners require a permit from 
the police to run stalls in a public space, but none of the stalls of the asa ichi have applied 
for this. Instead, stall owners of the asa ichi pay a percentage of their monthly earnings as  
protection fee to the Kanamachi-ikka, which presumably manages the extra-legal aspects 
of the market, so that it can persist. Underneath this umbrella of protection from the local 
mob, another black market flourishes: namely, the market for prescription medication, so 
that the Sanya man can peddle the surfeit of medication he receives from the hospital, or 
purchase medication for high blood pressure or pain killers, depending on what is laid out 
for sale. Only once during two years was the morning market raided by the police, a few 
days after which the stalls were up and running once again. 
For a surplus profit, the morning market merely formalizes an array of barters and 
exchanges that occur between the men in Sanya everyday. It was common for the guys to 
circulate DVDs between themselves, to give work clothes to each other when the size did 
not fit themselves, and to take over any miscellaneous objects that had become redundant 
for their owners. So too, it was common for the sick on welfare – for whom medication 
was free – to distribute their pills liberally to their buddies. After a routine visit to the 
hospital, pain killers, pills for high blood pressure, sleeping pills, stomach pills, and what 
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not were handed out as promised. The next day, so-and-so might come along, exclaiming 
that such and such pill “worked” (kīta), sticking his palm out in a demand for more. 
Once and if the exchanges left the sphere of friendship and gifting to make it onto 
the black market – where objects took on the character of commodities proper – the trick 
was to turn a monetary profit from objects that had far passed their date of obsolescence. 
In form, this was no different from the labor market of Sanya, whose labor was composed 
of men in their fifties or sixties or older, almost all on welfare, and mostly bearing some 
kind of physical ailment, suggesting that they should not be working at a construction site 
in the first place. It was thus no coincidence that the content of work circulated to Sanya 
workers was, as Akia put it, of the sort that no one else wanted to do; nor was it a coinci-
dence that, shortly after the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant disaster, posters had 
been put on electric poles in Sanya advertising work cleaning “rubble” (gareki) in Fuku-
shima prefecture.1 Like the objects for sale at the asa ichi, the workers of Sanya had been 
disposed of once, and could readily be disposed of altogether. Oftentimes, the circulation 
of second-hand objects would occur side by side with liquor and work. When workers of 
the Okinawa-gumi came back from work between 18:00 and 19:00 to report to Mito-chan 
– dirty, tired, and with a can of beer, one-cup sake or plastic cup of shōchū in their hand – 
Mito-chan would be well into his third or fourth mizuwari (shōchū with water and ice) in 
front of Mutō-san’s, gambling on kyōtei (boat-racing) with one eye, writing down names 
of workers with another – as he assigned them to different sites – and self-medicating his 
                                                
1 In May, 2011, the story of a worker from Sanya’s counterpart in Osaka, Nishinariku, made headline news. 
The worker had applied for the job of a dump truck operator in Miyagi Prefecture, but discovered on arrival 
that his newfound work entailed working within the compound of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. 
See Rocketnews 24, “Osaka Nishinariku no Rōdōsha/Miyagiken no Untenshu no Kyūjin ni Taiō Suru to 
Fukushima Gempatsu he Tsureteikareru,” 9/5/2011. It was said in Sanya that this incident put a stop to fla-
grantly disingenuous efforts to contract labor from day laborer districts. 
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perennial stomach ache by dropping pain-killers filched off Akia. Thus, the working days 
would repeat. 
If they did not say so in so many words, the daily life-style of the guys attested to 
the fact that they privileged excess, liquor and “money” (kane) over “health” (kenkō), and 
sacrificed the latter for the former. Moreover, the guys were well aware of the low regard 
in which they were held: pinpointing the “problem” (mondai) of Sanya to “disposability” 
(tsukaisute), and observing straight-out that they were considered akin to “human garbage” 
(ningen no gomi). Nonetheless, a real hiyatoi (day laborer) – such was the dominant code 
of conduct … – put “money” (kane) before “health” (kenkō). 
 But it was not just their bodies, but their lives that were staked in the determina-
tion to persist in their expenditures: an exchange or gamble in which the day laborer 
emerged as the losing party. Hence, in “The Working Day,” Marx begins by pointing out 
the limits of the working day and the insatiable drive of capital to “valorize itself” in the 
production of “surplus value.” It does so by extending the work day to its “maximum lim-
it,” and paying the worker only enough to ensure his or her daily reproduction. And, 
though that peculiar commodity of labor power as time contains an irreducible excess in 
the worker, who raises her or his voice to object, the equivalent form of surplus extraction 
goes unquestioned.2 The “exchange of equivalents” masks the process through which the 
capitalist appropriates a “portion of the labor of others” without equivalent, and thereby 
arrogates the right “to appropriate the unpaid labour of others or its product.” The act of 
exchange – “post festum,” Marx writes – has always-already produced capital as an “alien 
                                                
2 Marx, Capital, pg. 341, 348. 
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power that dominates and exploits.” In doing it, exchange actualizes the machinery of 
domination.3 
As a matter of course, every one of the guys in the Okinawa-gumi had complaints 
relating to work. However, as a matter of necessity, it was only when they had come into 
an other source of income – like winning at the races, which might prompt a short week’s 
absence – that the guys ceased to work. The construction site might be too far away, like 
Kami-Fukuoka in Saitama, which was two hours by train, or the subcontracting company 
might be unreasonable, like Ōmaki, which never let its workers take breaks on time. The 
content of work could be physically grueling and pointless, as well, as at one construction 
site where the top Hasekō coordinator demanded that every single rock be cleared off the 
ground before cement could be filled in. Consequently, navvies spent all day lifting rocks 
in the blistering summer heat. But no one complained directly, except under his breath 
and among themselves, and Ichi-san – who would recall how it used to be, in the “bubble” 
(baburu) economy of the ‘80s, that laborers would walk out en masse – seemed to accede 
to ridiculous demands knowing that too much backtalk might cost everyone their income. 
Shigoto (work), moreover, was what a “man” (otoko) did, and shigoto did not refer to just 
any kind of work, but work in which one “moved the body” (karada o ugokashite). As I 
was to learn when I asked Ichi-san, and Akia before him, whether they would ever bring 
a “woman” (onna) to work, the response was an immediate no. Realizing that I might be 
asking if I could bring someone along, Ichi-san notably pulled back, only to respond that, 
yes, there were some carpenters who worked as families, and that I could bring someone 
along as long as I took care of her. Otherwise, the response was unequivocal. They would 
let me carry her burden, but I could not recommend a woman for work in my absence. 
                                                
3 Ibid, pg. 729 – 730, 716. 
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The laborers of the Okinawa-gumi were exclusively men. Referring back to his own ex-
perience one evening, Akia asked Ichi-san:  
Akia: What would you do if you couldn’t work? (Shigoto dekinakattara dō suru) 
Ichi-san: I’d kill myself. (Jisatsu suru yo) 
 
Work, or the ability to earn a daily wage through the exertion of the body – labor power –
determined the worth of a man.4 Though he did not say it on this occasion with Ichi-san, 
Akia had, in fact, tried to take his own life years earlier, when he had been deemed unfit 
to work by his doctors.5 He would recount how it used to be, in Sanya, that recipients of 
welfare were frowned upon and outright excluded from social activities. Now, of course, 
all of this had changed and Sanya had become a “town of welfare” (fukushi no machi). 
Yet, by a certain irony, it was welfare that enabled the Sanya man to persist in his excess-
driven life-style, while the worker with neither welfare nor insurance had to earn his 
room and board from day to day. 
For the guys on welfare, the sale of their labor was akin to making a surplus off an 
object on the black market. The income from working – ¥12,500 ($125 USD) per day for 
the Okinawa-gumi – constituted cash in excess of their monthly allotted allowance by the 
state: something extra. In fact, as Imai at Sanyūkai said, just about when Akia had started 
working with the Okinawa-gumi, it was “illegal” (ihō) not to “report” (shinkoku) earnings 
in excess of one’s welfare provision. The reason for this was that monthly allowances had 
                                                
4 Writing of the 1950s when he grew up, Miyazaki Manabu says in his 1995 Toppamono: “Compared with 
nowadays, it was a much more macho era. The idea that a man should live like a man was an omnipresent 
value – an obsession, if you will – upon which most men modeled their conduct. Evading one’s responsibil-
ities or acting in a cowardly fashion was abhorred and disdained. At the same time, there was a deep-rooted 
belief that a man should live by the sweat of his toil. I think this was something that was more strongly felt 
in the Kansai region of western Japan. Physical labor, such as construction work, was far more respected 
than it is today” (40). 
5 Suicide in Sanya had, in fact, assumed an almost mythic status. As I was told one day by the psychologist 
who worked at Sanyūkai, suicides in general society ostensibly had social connections that they could have 
availed themselves of, whereas the Sanya man literally had no one. Suicide in Sanya constituted the apogee 
of social alienation. 
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to be recalibrated in accordance with one’s income. But, paradoxically, reporting income 
in excess of welfare could result in a diminution of one’s total monthly finances – welfare 
was reduced by a larger amount than one earned! –  a fact which functioned as a veritable 
disincentive to report one’s earnings.6 On the other hand, there was a real risk involved in 
not reporting earnings, because welfare was instantaneously cut if the failure to do so was 
confirmed. The “ward office” (yakusho) could find out about this by two routes. The first 
usually involved someone unknown in one’s immediate environment who had acted as an 
“informant” (chinkoro), and told the ward office that so-and-so was working. The second 
involved the ward office sending an employee out to confirm whether this was true or not, 
which could take the form of an undercover operation – ward employees were said to spy 
on a variety of trangressions, including alcohol consumption, pachinko, and keiba (horse-
gambling) – or a home visit. Those on welfare who worked led a stealthy existence, wary 
of the ever-watchful eye of the state, and of their neighbors in the doya, who might notice 
their early morning departures, their heavy bags and their late returns in the evening. And 
everybody had heard stories of others losing their welfare because someone had reported 
them. One day, Akia was accosted in front of his doya by four employees of the ward 
who questioned him as to whether or not he had been working. In fact, Ichi-san had been 
receiving welfare until the ward discovered that he was working on the side; now, he had 
become “envious” (netamu) of others on welfare, Akia would say, and spent their money 
as if it was public property. As a tacit rule, Akia or Shokawa-san (both on welfare) could 
                                                
6 See Tōkyō-to Fukushi Hokenkyoku, 1/12/2014. Though it was not immediately apparent from the welfare 
system itself, everyone in Sanya was aware that declaring income could result in an overall diminution of 
funds. Like the conservative discourse that vilifies welfare-recipients who spend their income on alcohol or 
drugs, this contradiction is familiar in the U.S., if not in other nations. Rather than observe the contradiction 
of this system, then, it should perhaps be noted that it functioned precisely to deter welfare-recipients from 
declaring their extra income, and thereby, placed them in a situation in which they were always threatened 
by the state. 
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be turned to for funds – that were never returned – but by the end of the month, they, too, 
had run dry in frustration. Whether on or off welfare, there never seemed to be enough to 
go around, but the worker without welfare or assistance of the “abure” system, was by far 
the most disadvantaged. 
The periodical nature of work for the Okinawa-gumi made it almost impossible to 
sustain a reliable income without welfare, except for a few core workers. For one, nobody 
ever knew for certain how many workers would be called to work the following day. This 
decision came by phone every day around 4:00 or 5:00 PM, from Hasekō’s subcontractor, 
Chishima’s middleman, Obara-san, who, in turn, paid Mito-chan a monthly fee to secure 
workers. Secondly, there were periods of time – sometimes months – when there just was 
very little work; be it because Ichi-san’s troupe had fallen into ill-repute, because Hasekō 
had chosen to go with competitors, or because there was no construction in progress. And 
even if there had been enough work to go around for everyone, work as a dokata (navvy) 
was so taxing that only the youngest or fittest could manage five days per week, a stretch. 
Ichi-san himself seemed to manage this only by directing work and abstaining from hard 
physical tasks as much as possible. At age 28, even the youngest of the group, Kami-kun, 
said he could work a maximum of four times per week. For lack of a contractual relation-
ship with employers, flexibility was required of the Okinawa-gumi, which had to provide 
workers in accordance with fluctuating demand. Too many consecutive days of work was 
as much a problem as too little work. In tacit recognition both of the shifty nature of work 
availability and the necessity (to capital) of an idle pool of labor – Marx’s “reserve army 
of labor” – Taitō ward had, in fact, instituted a system to compensate laborers for days on 
which work, as the guys would say, was not “circulating” (mawatteiru). The “abure” sys-
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tem required day laborers to work at least 13 days per month – for which their employers 
signed off in a stamp book; at times, even if they were not working – in return for which 
they were guaranteed 13 days on which the ward provided them with ¥7,500 ($75 USD).7 
This was not sufficient, however, to carry workers through thirty days when there was no 
work at all; by mid-month, the money would be gone. Thus, the troupe would wait for an 
other dose of work no one else wanted to do; or once the foundations of the buildings had 
been dug – by dokata (navvies) – and the tobi, tekkinya, and daiku (carpenters) had taken 
over the upper stories, for the two or three days per week when the dokata were called to 
do the cement. Alternatively, they would wait for April, when the new fiscal year arrived, 
and construction companies invested in new sites. In prolonged dry spells, the guys were 
starved for work. 
The provisional conditions of work availability forced the necessity on the laborer 
of shifting from tehaishi (contractor) to tehaishi to stay off the street. If work grew scarce 
under Mito-chan, the individual worker had no recourse but to fall back on himself, either 
to secure an other means of income, or to borrow money. In this respect, the maintenance 
of individual reputation and personal connections assumed paramount importance for the 
Sanya man. The reputable worker was not only reliable – meaning that he showed up for 
work as promised; like the borrower was considered good for his word to return what he 
                                                
7 Marx, Capital, pg. 782. Operated by the ward, the abure system was described by some day laborers as 
approaching obsolescence. While it had provided the city as a whole with a steady, readily available supply 
of workers when construction workers had been in high demand, it no longer fulfilled this function with the 
disappearance of construction. Hence, it was said that, in the eyes of the “city” (shi) authorities, the abure 
system of the “ward” (yakusho) constituted an anachronism that had outlived its original function. Workers, 
of course, made ready use of the system. If workers were on good terms with their immediate superiors at 
the work site, they could receive stamps for individuals who were not working that day. Ichi-san carried the 
stamp books of other individuals to work and had it stamped by Itō-san of Chishima, at the Hasekō site. To 
collect their ¥7,500, workers presented the stamp book at the Tamahime Rōdō Shucchōsho (Tamahime 
Labor Branch Office) at 7:30 in the morning. While this system might have been approaching obsolescence 
in 2012, see Fowler’s San’ya Blues, pg. 39 – 41, for a list of the historical state policies that led to the con-
centration of an excess supply of labor in Sanya. 
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borrowed – but possessed vast experience and commanded a versatile repertoire of skills. 
Such a reputation could secure work both for oneself, and one’s buddies. Hence, Ichi-san 
knew all about work as a navvy, and having worked in other fields of construction in the 
past, he was able to perform and direct a range of tasks beyond the immediate demand of 
the workplace. On one occasion he even maneuvered the excavator, grinning from behind 
the wheel because he did not have a license. In short, if Ichi-san was on site with his own 
troupe of guys, the director of the site could expect tasks to be completed expediently and 
without any fuss. For this reason, Ichi-san said, it was necessary for him to be physically 
present at the construction site, and to leave the work of tehai for Mito-chan.8 
For those who had acquired an established reputation, like Ichi-san, the necessity 
of self-reliance presented itself in the guise of “freedom” (jiyū). For all the headache that 
the inveterate drinker, womanizer, and braggart that Mito-chan was – who, on top of this, 
had brought along their salaryman-gone-insolvent cousin, Misaaru, unversed in the ways 
of Sanya – Ichi-san would scornfully say that he had been “free” (jiyū) before Mito-chan 
came because it had just been about “himself” (jibun). With both Mito-chan and Misaaru 
in Sanya, Ichi-san was held accountable for them in spite of himself, and – though he was 
loath to admit it – felt obliged to look out for them. However, what Ichi-san expressed as 
                                                
8 In Toppamono, Miyazaki Manabu writes of the construction world in the late 1970s. Though not precisely 
the world of the hiyatoi (day laborer), who moves from tehaishi to tehaishi, Manabu says: 
“But despite its importance, the industry is for the most part built on the physical labor supplied by 
marginalized members of society – the poorly educated and the discriminated against. It’s a fascinating 
world to be a part of – boisterous, vibrant, frenetic – but at the same time, one in which old habits are deep-
ly ingrained. The best illustration of the way it works is to think of a pyramid with a handful of giant gen-
eral contractors at the apex who subcontract the work to those below them. Every industry has its own sub-
contracting system, but what makes the construction industry unique is the extent of its stratification, with 
subcontractors feeding off subcontractors, and so on down the line. Tiny sub-sub-subcontractors, who eke 
out a living by clinging to some part of the pyramid, account for 99 percent of the industry. 
This highly stratified structure is directly reflected in the industry’s close-knit system of hierar-
chical ties. The contractor-subcontractor relationship very much resembles the oyabun-kobun (boss-
follower) bond in the yakuza world, in that it requires absolute loyalty to the boss. The same is repeated 
further down the pyramid between subcontractor and sub-subcontractor, and so on. Those in the subordi-
nate position regard the job as something they have been allowed to do” (208). 
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“freedom” (jiyū) of “self” (jibun) disclosed an objective necessity of the economic order 
in Sanya that might render Ichi-san as redundant as it already had other workers marginal 
to the Okinawa-gumi. When work was scarce under Mito-chan, some laborers obviously 
had to seek work elsewhere.9 
But Mito-chan would take it personally and get angry when workers under him, 
for whatever reason – perhaps even on a whim – switched over to another tehaishi. Ichi-
san would say of Mito-chan, who had only been in Sanya three years – one working as a 
navvy, two as a tehaishi – that he “does not understand” (wakatteinai) that it was normal 
for individual workers to switch tehaishi as they wished. It had always been thus in Sanya. 
And this was not only social convention: the logic of the market dictated such practice.10 
However, Mito-chan, the tehaishi of the Okinawa-gumi, and Matsuda-san, the tehaishi of 
the Matsuda-group, had set up a work relationship such that each would borrow workers 
from the other. If, one day, Matsuda-san was short of workers, he would ask Mito-chan, 
and vice versa; and the terms of payment for each worker would adhere to the standard of 
the group from which they originated. Such an arrangement between the two tehaishi 
                                                
9 As Friedrich Engels writes in The Condition of the Working Class in England (New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1993): “It offers him the means of living, but only for an ‘equivalent’ for his work. It even 
lets him have the appearance of acting from a free choice, of making a contract with free, unconstrained 
consent, as a responsible agent who has attained his majority” (Engels, 88).  
10 On the note that many members of the Okinawa-gumi hailed from Okinawa and that Matsuda-san was of 
burakumin descent, in The Proletarian Gamble, Ken C. Kawashima writes of Korean day laborers during 
Japan’s interwar period: “The problem of (institutionalized) racism and discrimination, for example, should 
therefore be approached in ways that are critical of how this separation becomes targeted by institutional 
forms of power that stratify and segment surplus populations. Certain surplus populations experience the 
separation in different ways, and in different distances from capital. This is the reason Marx specified the 
relative surplus population in terms of differing strata of the industrial reserve army. The point, however, is 
not simply that certain strata of the surplus population are at the bottom while some are not. Nor is the ul-
timate point that certain strata experience the contingencies of exchange more severely or acutely than oth-
er strata. Rather, these various and particular historical stratifications conceal and hide the common and 
universal condition of members of the proletariat having to sell their labor power as a commodity on the 
market, but with no guarantees of exchange. In other words, while the surplus population is organized (and 
often managed) in terms of particular strata, these strata conceal what is universal and common to all labor 
power, namely the unique proletarian risk” (211 – 212). 
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made it impossible to switch between groups, and – to the eventual demise of both Mito-
chan and Matsuda-san – produced the appearance and belief that a specific group of indi-
viduals belonged to one and not to the other. Because it was always an option to get out 
of the Matsuda/Mito-chan duo, and seek work from someone else. Mito-chan finally as-
sumed such an attitude of self-importance that he demanded a finder’s fee from anyone 
who went to work for an other tehaishi, because, presumably, Mito-chan had facilitated 
the connection in the first place. When Shokawa-san – Mito-chan’s senior by ten years 
and veteran tekkinya – was exposed to such proprietary behavior, Ichi-san at long last ex-
ploded. 
That workers were at liberty to switch tehaishi – if they could find other means of 
income, that is – sometimes made it difficult for tehaishi to maintain an available pool of 
labor, and this problem of reliability was compounded by the low work ethic to be found 
in Sanya. Ichi-san would repeatedly lament that if only he could get together a steady and 
reliable group of laborers, it would be possible to really get work and business going, but 
the paucity of work availability was mirrored in the inconstancy of workers. Matsuda-san 
especially seemed to suffer from temper tantrums because workers simply did not show 
up for work as promised. This was called to “open a hole” (ana o akeru) in the number of 
workers requested; news of which would reach the tehaishi when the others arrived at the 
the construction site, but could not find or reach so-and-so. Then, Matsuda-san or Mito-
chan, hung-over from the night before, would have to get on the phone either to reach the 
individual in question, or to find a replacement. But it was usually to no avail. The repeti-
tion of such instances made it near impossible to build a reputation at the workplace such 
that demand for the troupe remained continuous, and it was the tehaishi that felt the brunt 
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of this drop in reputation. Yet the group suffered as a whole, as well, because work might 
not be circulated to them in the future, or because the directors realized that certain tasks 
could be performed with one less person and, as a result, decided to lessen the number of 
workers in the future. Of course, the tehaishi, Mito-chan and Matsuda-san, bore no small 
responsibility for opening holes, particularly when this resulted from over-extending their 
obligations to various subcontractors. The reputation and income of the tehaishi stemmed 
directly from the number of contractors he provided laborers for, and Mito-chan bragged 
of receiving payment from three out of five subcontractors – Shinkō, Chishima, Ōmaki – 
operating in Sanya. In addition, he provided workers to the other two subcontractors as a 
favor; a relation that could easily evolve into an obligation if Mito-chan – as he was wont 
to do – decided to pocket an extra paycheck every month. On the one hand, this increased 
work availability, but did so for a group of workers whose dependability was erratic at its 
best. Mito-chan had to cultivate a list of connections that exceeded the maximum number 
of workers needed on any given day, which ranged from zero to twenty. And there were a 
number of reasons why someone might not be able to, or agree to go to work when Mito-
chan asked them. Some guys were not picking up their phone, or did not have one. Others 
might have switched to another tehaishi since work had been scarce with Mito-chan. But 
most often, they simply did not want to go; leading to a comical exchange between Mito-
chan, pressured to fill his quota, and an other buddy who had just gotten back from work, 
started drinking, and begun feeling good about the next day off. Someone might not want 
to work because they had worked all week and were tired. Someone else might have won 
at the races. Still others declined because, by the time Mito-chan – who was also drunk – 
got around to phoning them, they could not fathom the prospect of waking the next day. 
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It was common lore in Sanya that it happened to everybody, even Izukenji-san, 
that they occasionally missed a day of work. To a certain extent, this could be anticipated 
and forestalled by the tehaishi, who could force so-and-so to take a day off and rest, so as 
to prevent them from making promises they could not keep the next day. Mito-chan knew, 
for instance, that the lean and seemingly tireless 57-year-old Riku-san – who ran the 
show at work with Ichi-san – would eventually hit his limit and go on a drinking spree for 
days on end, sleeping outside in the Iroha arcade. Mito-chan would have a replacement 
ready for this eventuality. But even Ichi-san, who liked his shōchū as much as the others, 
would sometimes show up for work late, or not at all. Akia, Nori-san, Moto-san, Shoka-
wa-san, Kami-kun, Riku-san and Misaaru all had days when they neglected to show up 
for work as promised. At the construction site, workers from Sanya effectively had a rep-
utation for unreliability. When it was observed in the changing rooms one day that the 
dokata were a man down (Ichi-san) for the day, the identity of the culprit was confirmed 
by a rhetorical question – “Yama?” – and a nod. On one occasion, Ichi-san had spent the 
entire previous evening persuading Shokawa-san to work since they were a man short, 
but upon arriving at the station in the morning, Shokawa-san – who had long been suffer-
ing from backache – changed his mind, making a U-turn back to his doya. Flaking thus 
on prior promises to work was referred to as tonko suru, and supposedly, the work of 
tehai (contracting) in the heyday of Sanya had taken place in the mornings because that 
way, tehaishi could ensure that workers were actually awake, sober, and prepared to work. 
The real problem was not that the guys would drink every evening: that occurred without 
exception, though many would keep it moderate if they had work the next day, which 
could make them too hung-over or drunk to wake at 6 AM. In fact, everyone worked with 
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a hang-over. Ichi-san would note that by the time work finished at 5 PM, the hang-over 
would just be starting to wear off. The real issue was that everyone knew they that they 
were, in any case, “disposable” (tsukaisute) labor from Sanya, and that they were em-
ployed as means to conclude the most disagreeable part of construction work, sacrificing 
their health in the process. Akia would say over and over again of going to work – and of 
liquor – that “it only destroys the body” (karada ga kowareru dake). Nevertheless, as if 
to contradict himself, “work” (shigoto) was what a “man” (otoko) did: a discourse that 
emerged out of work as an act of production in negation, and that thereby negated the 
negativity of death in which individual value was measured exclusively in terms of the 
“daily wage” (nittō), for which one paid with one’s life.11 It was as if, at the taboo mar-
gins of the modern nation, workers in Sanya were exposed to the brute mechanism of 
capitalist surplus-production on the body, and in a seeming reversal of what Marx terms 
the “fetishism of the commodity” – in which “the social relation between men” assumes, 
through the act of exchange, the “fantastic form of a relation between things,” commodi-
ties, or laborers caught in a certain “value-relation” – supplemented this monetary rela-
tion with a discourse on being a “man” (otoko) that both sustained the objective order of 
work – for a “man” (otoko) goes “his own way” (jibun no michi) – and replaced it with a 
principle of sociality, hierarchy, and honor of the marginal outlaw, embodied in the figure 
                                                
11 In Kojève’s reading of Hegel in Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of 
Spirit, the possibility of satisfaction inheres in the slave who has to “impose himself on the Master and be 
recognized by him.” It is only the slave who has “experienced” the truth of “pure negating-negativity and 
of Being-for-itself.” For, the constitutive “fear of death” enables the slave to realize that nothing can “ex-
haust the possibilities of human existence.” Indeed, it is the exposure to death – the “absolute liquefaction 
of every stable-support” – that constitutes the condition of possibility for “pure Being-for-itself,” and “Self-
Consciousness.” The potential for history therefore resides in the slave, but does so through an experience 
of death that engenders an awareness that human action – of “negating-negativity” – can alter the stuff of 
the “I,” and with it, render the time of history one of “becoming.” Qualitative time – the time of gambling – 
would constitute the “form” of this “becoming” (4 – 22). 
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of Izukenji-san.12 The narrative detour of being a “man” (otoko) held the contingency of 
death, materialized daily in the social arbitrariness of the exchange-relation, at bay. So 
too, the veteran worker was called a “skilled” (ude ga tokui) “artisan” (shokunin). And 
with a statement which pardoned the occasional act of ditching work  – “this is, after all, 
Yama …” (Yama dakara …) – the Sanya man disclosed the truth of productivity and dis-
cipline to consist in expendability. What was the point, after all, of going to work? 
Yet there was a difference between feeling guilty and shamefaced for failing to go 
to work one time, and blazing a trail of failures. Some guys developed a reputation of not 
showing up for work, leaving a string of irreparable relations behind as they hopped from 
tehaishi to tehaishi. Like debts that could not ever by repayed, such burnt bridges eventu-
ally prompted individuals to vanish from Sanya. But the scarcity of work, and low wages, 
similarly prompted workers to leave. 
Mako-chan, for instance, simply vanished from Sanya overnight. Although he had 
been speaking of plans to join the yakuza, everyone had been witness to his deteriorating 
physical condition from overwork and liquor. Stumbling around town drunk, with a black 
eye from fighting and leaving his wallet lying about, Matsuda-san – his tehaishi – had to 
implore him, at the very least, to put his valuables in his room when he was drinking. Yet 
it was common knowledge that, like for everyone else in the Matsuda-group, ¥2,000 ($20 
USD) was docked from Mako-chan’s pay as pinhane (finder’s fee) for Matsuda-san each 
time Mako-chan went to work. With only ¥8,000 – ¥9,000 left for daily expenses, Mako-
chan was just barely eking out enough to pay for his transportation, meals, drinks, and his 
doya (which he paid by the day). Ichi-san said that Matsuda-san had “been like that from 
way back” (mukashi kara sō). Of course, taking pinhane, commission, or finder’s fee was 
                                                
12 Marx, Capital, pg. 163 – 165. 
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what the work of a tehaishi was all about: the surplus or excess pocketed from the rent of 
each laborer. Mito-chan and Matsuda-san were pimps of the construction trade. However, 
unlike the objects on sale at the asa ichi, it was generally (albeit tacitly) recognized in the 
Okinawa-gumi that Matsuda’s “system” (shisutemu) of extracting surplus from everyone 
was excessive. There were certain limits to be observed. Even if Mako-chan had assented 
to the conditions, the deduction was far from fair, and Mako-chan consequently emerged 
as the symptom or “internal negation,” as Žižek says, of the symbolic order of equivalent 
exchange.13 Indeed if Mako-chan, who was situated relatively high within Matsuda-san’s 
hierarchy of workers, was docked ¥2,000 per day, it was not unheard of that Matsuda-san 
would take half the pay of some homeless guy given a day of work. Hence, the subject of 
Mako-chan had become “taboo” (tabū) in the days following his disappearance, because 
it suggested that Matsuda-san – who was enraged – had brought the matter upon himself. 
And it happened on a number of occasions that members of the Matsuda-group vanished. 
One man had been entrusted with the wage of six or seven others, pocketed the cash, and 
left without a word. It was similarly a regular occurrence that guys in the Matsuda-group 
would not show up for work. If this occurred repeatedly, as it did in the case of Kon-chan, 
everyone would begin to wonder when Matsuda-san’s fuse would blow. Damage control 
involved beating the culprit with a “metal baseball bat” (kinzoku batto) that Matsuda-san 
and Mito-chan had stowed away in a storage space by Mutō-san’s hole-in-the-wall, along 
with the construction worker’s gear (safety-belts, helmets, chainsaws, tools, etc). Physical 
violence constituted a recognized means of meting out punishment and reestablishing au-
thority. Thus when Mako-chan phoned Matsuda-san a year later and reappeared in Sanya, 
Akia had to ask Matsuda not to beat Mako-chan. But Mako-chan showed up walking on a 
                                                
13 Slavoj Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, pg. 23. 
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cane. During his absence, he had suffered a brain hemorrhage, and lost mobility in half 
his lower body. People said it had been the “liquor” (saké). Having gotten on welfare and 
relocated to another ward, Mako-chan rarely came to Yama afterwards.14 
The demise of the Matsuda-group came when Matsuda-san suddenly disappeared 
from Sanya. Over the years, Matsuda-san had effectively built quite a reputation for him-
self as a tehaishi in Sanya, with the guys and workers, the Kanamachi-ikka, and even the 
police. He himself stayed in a cheap, ¥2,000 doya by Iroha arcade, cutting a stocky figure 
as he could be seen after 2 PM, cycling about Yama on a mama-chari (mother’s bicycle) 
in jeans, beach sandals and a plain collared shirt or T-shirt. He had silver jewelry hanging 
around his neck, showing through the opening at the top of his shirt, and never seemed to 
go anywhere without his cellphone. Over the years, he had also gotten fat about the waist, 
which lent him a comical air, paired with a quick-witted, almost nasal voice and laughter. 
He was always on the phone, and always rushing off to attend to matters that required his 
immediate attention. Unlike Mito-chan, whose workers were paid at the construction site, 
Matsuda-san paid his guys upon their return from work; sporting this cash in a bundle of 
¥10,000 ($100 USD) bills strung together with a rubber band, which was entrusted (albeit 
in an envelope) to someone close if Matsuda-san was not around to pay workers himself. 
In effect, Matsuda-san acted the part of the boss-caretaker, and it therefore came as little 
surprise when he announced the opening of his own construction company in spring 2013 
– the Sanja Kensetsu, with an office right off Iroha arcade, next to the run-down drinkery 
                                                
14 In A Man With No Talents, Ōyama Shirō writes of individuals in Sanya vanishing: “... here a man who 
had showed up two or three times a week for years on end might suddenly disappear and never again be 
heard from again. No one in San’ya is going to tell you, “This is my last day here. I won’t be coming to the 
Center any more. Thanks for everything.” You might ask around about someone (“I haven’t seen Mr. So-
and-so lately. Do you know what’s happened to him?”), but nobody will know a thing, and after a while all 
talk about him stops. This is the way people around here disappear from the scene” (34). 
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with mice, Kiyoshi – replete with an invitation list and formal invitation letters. Everyone 
attended the opening event at a karaoke bar off Namidabashi. However, in the following 
months, Matsuda-san increasingly ceased picking the phone up when Mito-chan or Ichi-
san called for workers, relegating this task to one of his innumerable minions at the office 
(on the office number). He started traveling, mixing business with pleasure, and A-4 size, 
cheap, colored ink-jet photos of Matsuda-san started appearing here and there in Sanya – 
on the inside walls of Oiwake, in front of a take-away bentōya (lunch-box store) – posing 
in baggy working pants and baseball cap before a primordial, tropical tree on Yakushima 
island. Yet another poster showed Matsuda-san standing and smiling in front of his office, 
with the tacky slogan “to work = life” (hataraku = inochi) printed alongside his cellphone 
number. Matsuda-san also began going to Fukushima to engage with nuclear decontami-
nation work – having discovered, he said, a rock-formation that accelerated the process of 
decontamination in soil – repeatedly appearing in a business suit in Iroha arcade, tired out 
after a day on the bullet train. And Matsuda-san started hanging out with professors from 
Tōdai (Tokyo University), conversing with them on decontamination. And alongside this, 
he seemed to be engaged in a project to export water-cleansing equipment to Burma, and 
was actively enlisting Akia – who just shook his head in private, and politely deferred the 
matter in public – to act as head of a new NPO in Sanya. Yet, everyone in the Okinawa-
gumi knew from the beginning that Matsuda-san had been prone to spread himself thin as 
a tehaishi, and that regardless of his extensive connections, he tended to use an especially 
unreliable labor base. The set-up with Mito-chan did not improve matters either, because 
Mito-chan would only take ¥500 as pinhane, contrary to Matsuda-san’s minimum ¥2,000. 
Hence, when a Matsuda-san crew member worked side by side with Mito-chan’s guys at 
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the same construction site, the former was made painfully aware that they were doing the 
exact same work as the latter, but were receiving one-fifth less in pay. In the absence of a 
contractual relationship, Matsuda-san treated his workers as if they were his. Less than a 
year after the inauguration of Sanja Kensetsu, however, Matsuda-san’s crew consolidated, 
objected to his conditions of labor, and refused to work. Shortly thereafter, Matsuda-san 
disappeared from Sanya. Everyone knew he had fled, because the Kanamachi-ikka sent 
its people out looking for him, asking everyone if they had seen Matsuda or knew where 
he was. Matsuda-san had, in effect, disappeared with a debt of ¥30,000,000 (approxi-
mately $300,000 USD) to the Kanamachi-ikka; a sum that would cost him his life if they 
located him. 
“Matsuda is over” (Matsuda wa owatta), as Akia had, in fact, predicted from the 
very beginning. Ichi-san, too, had virtually predicted this eventuality, as he reiterated the 
principle of the individual in Sanya to Izukenji-san – who had thought Matsuda would 
become someone with whom he maintained “connections” (en) – stating that the collapse 
had been bound to happen, because the enterprise had been based on making a claim to a 
certain informal network of workers as one’s own. But the Sanya man moved about at his 
own whims. And in the absence of a formalized contractual relationship that dissimulated 
the exploitative relationship of the tehaishi to the day laborer, the ultimate availability of 
other means of income would crumble any attempt at forming an hierarchical institution 
in the name of self-interest. Matsuda-san had, in effect, sought to merge Yamagishi-san’s 
style of exhibitionist yakuza self-interest with the hierarchy embodied by Izukenji-san, 
but the objective and individualizing order of the economy was to prevail. 
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But the non-contractual, informal, and personal relations between the tehaishi and 
his workers also made for an economy of favors and obligations which far exceeded cash 
compensation for services. This was especially the case under Mito-chan when work was 
abundant. The provision of work would itself assume the form of a gift, in that Mito-chan 
was thinking of the well-being of the worker by giving him work. When ten or more guys 
were being sent out regularly, Mito-chan was able to expand this thoughtfulness beyond 
the core workers in the Okinawa-gumi – that included Ichi-san, Izukenji-san, Riku-san, 
Kami-kun, and Kuma – to anyone who both required work (non welfare-recipients), and 
was recognized as “usable” (tsukaeru) at the workplace. Thus, when I started working the 
first thing Mito-chan told me was that if I desperately needed work, I could call him and 
he would make it happen. He said he kept track of who worked how many days per week, 
and how much they needed to get by. Of course, Izukenji-san constituted an exception to 
the rule that the core members were off welfare, and he had grown frail over the years, so 
that hard manual labor had become an increasing challenge for him. Perhaps it was for 
this reason that he seemed to put all the more heart into the tasks he was assigned. A pure 
principle of seniority in the network of social relations (of Sanya) necessitated his regular 
inclusion in the work troupe – naturally, Izukenji-san and Nē-san also wanted the work 
and money – although Izukenji-san was subordinate to Ichi-san at the workplace itself. 
Izukenji-san was unquestionably included in the every-man-for-himself market logic of 
labor which would ultimately work to unravel any sense of sociality and group cohesion. 
By the same token, Mito-chan – the unscrupulous tehaishi – emerged as caretaker of the 
group of workers as a whole, despite the fact that economic necessity would one day lead 
the group to disband. Akia always did say: “just watch, it won’t last” (mitero, tsuzukanai 
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kara). But, likewise, he would say of Mito-chan that he had a “genuinely kind” (hontō ni 
yasashī) side; akin to Izukenji-san’s hospitality, this aspect of Mito-chan’s personality 
appeared unmotivated by immediate self-interest. Ideally, Mito-chan thus rotated workers 
by taking into consideration the fatigue and financial viability of “everyone” (minna), and 
thereby ensuring income for core workers without overwork. On the other hand, the guys 
tried to make sure to go, since “opening a hole” (ana o akeru) put the income of everyone 
at stake, and served as a direct rebuff of Mito-chan’s consideration. Work was inscribed 
in a network of obligations on which the financial viability of the group as a whole and of 
Mito-chan, depended. Mito-chan’s reputation as tehaishi was heightened with that of his 
workers, which, in turn, enabled him to provide more work. However, this generosity was 
inscribed side by side with an egotism, the propensity toward which resided in both Mito-
chan’s personality, and the economic logic of being a tehaishi. Of course, Izukenji-san 
never permitted egotism to rear its head, and therein resided his undeniable respectability, 
authority, and power. But Mito-chan would outright state that the way things worked was 
that his own reputation would “rise” (agaru) in accordance with the quality of work done 
by the guys he sent to work. Via the vine of subcontractors above Mito-chan, news would 
reach him regarding the performance of his workers, leading Mito-chan to have favorites. 
Kami-kun’s tireless proficiency at all tasks reflected well on Mito-chan – subcontractors 
put in requests for Kami-kun – and led Mito-chan to send Kami-kun to sites that were of 
most significant income for the group. When Kami-kun’s only next-of-kin passed away, 
it was Mito-chan who did the rounds, collecting money from everyone to pay for Kami-
kun’s absence from work and the shinkansen (bullet train) back and forth. In another sim-
ilar incident, Mito-chan moved in with his girlfriend at the time, and in his absence from 
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his own room, decided to give it (all expenses paid) to an 18-year-old youngster who was 
having domestic problems. Assuming the role of a sort of father-figure, Mito-chan urged 
the young man to take advantage of the place and to go to work, but the set-up ended in a 
disaster when, having neglected to take care of the room, the 18-year-old was kicked out 
by Mito-chan; clothing, luggage, and everything, hauled into a garbage can on the street. 
The scale of Matsuda-san’s operations enabled him to act in a much more official 
capacity on behalf of his own crew, and the Okinawa-gumi. Whenever someone ended up 
in the local, three-story police box off Namidabashi – called the “mammoth” (mammosu) 
of old – it was Matsuda-san who stepped in and, when possible, used his reputation to fix 
a release as soon as possible. This could be achieved when two parties had been fighting. 
As it occurred when Akia and Shokawa-san were held in custody for two weeks because 
the other individual refused to drop suit, Matsuda-san met with police officers outside of 
visiting hours, and convinced the other party (with whom he was acquainted) not to press 
charges. This relieved everyone, including the local police, of the headache of prolonged 
detention and prospective jail-time. For it was common practice for the police in Yama to 
let matters like fighting slip; brawls happened all the time, and so long as these were con-
fined to Sanya, the police preferred to “act as if they had not seen” (mite minu furi). Thus, 
Matsuda-san created indebtedness with the police, and with the Okinawa-gumi, too, who 
would have been hard put to find someone else to intervene. Yet, contrary to Mito-chan’s 
moments of generosity, which had the air of disinterest to them, Matsuda-san’s every act 
appeared in retrospect to have been motivated by some calculation of self-interest. When 
Matsuda-san received word that my partner was in town, he promptly put in a reservation 
for us to drink and dine – on the house – at the members-only bar on the 28th floor of the 
 272 
Asakusa View Hotel. By far the tallest and most opulent building in the Asakusa area, 
this was an invitation that was eagerly and genuinely presented, yet could not be turned 
down without causing insult. There was nothing to do but accept, for even Akia said 
“there is no problem” (mondai nai), and so we stepped into a dimmed bar with a pano-
ramic view of Asakasu and the Skytree. A waiter approached in tuxedo, presented us with 
menus, and proceeded to set up a table before us, on which he lined six 1.5 liter bottles of 
shōchū ordered from Kyushu. Taken aback by the ghastly juxtaposition of five-star luxu-
riousness to the world of Sanya, we were left to wonder how the connection between the 
disparate worlds was sustained. 
Mito-chan, too, had his way of showing off his largesse, albeit in a more down-to-
earth, if unrefined, vulgar, and innocent way. For Mito-chan would brag outright of how 
he had “become famous in this town” (kono machi de yūmei ni natta) after rumors spread 
of his fighting exploits, and how, one day, the crowd by Mutō-san’s hole-in-the-wall had 
parted like the ocean before him. Indeed, Mito-chan dominated the scene in front of 
Mutō-san’s place when he worked; transforming the street into a reception ground for the 
troupe as they got home, bought drinks, reported how it had gone to Mito-chan, and were 
assigned sites for the following day. Notably, Matsuda-san, too, was known in Sanya for 
never having lost in a fight, but his manners were crafty, functional and sober, as opposed 
to Mito-chan, who perorated on having become the most well-known tehaishi in the area. 
Lifting the fingers of his hand to demonstrate how many subcontractors he had pocketed, 
Mito-chan would continue on – oblivious of Ichi-san’s frown – drinking mizuwari all the 
while he acted as monopolist. To make matters worse, Mito-chan was also an incorrigible 
and successful womanizer; to the comical bewilderment of the Okinawa-gumi, all of who 
 273 
wished for romance, yet could not fathom how Mito-chan managed always to have some 
affair going (and once even with a graduate of Tōdai!). And he was a terrible spendthrift, 
carelessly spending money as a sign of abundance, and frequenting Yoshiwara, where he 
could easily blow ¥50,000, ¥60,000 ($500, $600 USD) in one evening. 
If not egotism, projecting the image of an intimidating personage was, in fact, part 
and parcel of the tehaishi role. Mito-chan’s most important job was to make sure that the 
correct number of workers went to work, and to ensure this, it had to be made known that 
there would be consequences on failure to show. This was specifically the case with new 
and unknown workers, with who Mito-chan would initially meet to lay down the terms of 
work. This included a warning of how angry he would become if they failed him, but also 
an explanation of the benefits they would receive (more work) if they performed well. At 
times, particularly with younger workers in their early twenties, Mito-chan made it sound 
like he was offering them an opportunity of a life-time, explaining how they could slowly 
work their way up. And he was forgiving, as were the other guys, when 18-year-olds had 
trouble getting up in the mornings, and did not make it to work. But ultimately the failure 
to comply had negative consequences for the Okinawa-gumi as a whole, and on occasion, 
Mito-chan, too, meted out physical retribution – the “chokehold” (kubishime), he called it 
– before giving somebody a last chance. One did not go back on promises made to Mito-
chan. 
However, Mito-chan finally accepted money from so many subcontractors that he 
had trouble meeting the daily demand for workers. This happened much to Ichi-san’s dis-
tress, because it overworked the group, and because, by foregoing the money, Mito-chan 
could have maintainted the relation at the level of favors that would have increased work 
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without forming any obligations. Combined with Mito-chan’s liquor habit, which started 
when he woke in the afternoon and easily approached two liters of shōchū per day, Mito-
chan – like Matsuda-san – finally became accountable for services that he was not able to 
provide. He was earning the money that had always been the sure sign of his social status 
and success in Sanya. Every worker paid him ¥500 ($5 USD) as pinhane from their daily 
wages, in addition to which he received a minimum of ¥50,000 ($500) per subcontractor 
as a flat monthly fee. He was in the habit of bragging that his income exceeded ¥400,000 
($4,000 USD) per month. Alas, Mito-chan’s drinking habit would force him to renege on 
his promises to subcontractors and the Okinawa-gumi, spelling his downfall as tehaishi. 
 
Unlike the old days when tehaishi lined up at Namidabashi in the morning to pick 
their workers, Mito-chan and Matsuda-san concluded their work between the hours of 4 
PM and 7 PM the previous evening. Except on Saturdays, Mito-chan received a call from 
subcontractors between 4 PM and 5 PM – when construction sites concluded the day, and 
put in requests for a specific number of workers for the next day – after which Mito-chan 
began his work of tehai (contracting). In addition to the number of workers required, the 
subcontractors informed Mito-chan what type of worker (dokata, tobi, tekkinya) to assign, 
and what kind of work they would do. The Okinawa-gumi was composed mainly of guys 
who worked as dokata (navvies) – although Ichi-san had worked as a daiku (carpenter) in 
the past, and Izukenji-san as a tobi (scaffolder) – so requests came primarily for dokata. 
But if tobi were also needed, Mito-chan had acquaintances at hand. It was important that 
Mito-chan assign workers to sites who could be “used” (tsukaeru) at the tasks assigned to 
them for the day. To ensure this, Mito-chan generally paired inexperienced workers with 
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experienced workers, so that the latter could instruct the former. For example, if konkuri 
(cement work) was scheduled, it was necessary that at least two workers knew how to use 
the “vibrator” (vaibu) that enabled the concrete to flow on the top floor, and that, at least 
one worker knew how to take care of things on the floor below, as cement seeped through 
the walls and often spilled out the cracks. Three extra workers were then required: one to 
join the worker on the floor below, one to hold the heavy wires of the vibrator, and one to 
clean the steel rods protruding from the top floor. In order to do his work well, Mito-chan 
consequently had to possess proficient knowledge of the skills required of specific tasks, 
and had to know who of the guys could do what. But Mito-chan had only worked for one 
year as a dokata alongside his brother, Ichi-san, who had three decades of experience. As 
a result, Mito-chan was criticized for lacking the expertise necessary to do his job, and as 
he expanded his obligations to subcontractors, came into the habit of pairing any number 
of inexperienced workers with Ichi-san (or somebody else with experience), such that the 
latter was overburdened. Grouping newbies with Ichi-san emerged as a quick-fix solution 
of fixing numbers for the following day – for, as Mito-chan would say, Ichi-san cut such 
an intimidating figure that everybody would “listen to” (iu koto o kiku) him – especially 
as Mito-chan got progressively drunk and desperate to settle the tehai. It was not unusual, 
however, that the tehai continued late into the evening, and that – as a last resort – Mito-
chan had to wake up early in the morning to scout a stranger lingering by the train station. 
Otherwise, Mito-chan did not show his face in the mornings, except on the rare occasion 
when he had to introduce new workers. Yet, even this became more and more infrequent 
as Mito-chan preferred to sleep in until the mid-afternoon. 
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As a rule, Mito-chan could be found at a designated spot in Sanya, from which he 
did his tehai. By making it known where he would be between 4 PM and 7 PM, by which 
time the tehai had generally concluded, Mito-chan made himself available to anyone who 
wished to seek him out in person, and to workers who did not have a cellphone. This also 
allowed Mito-chan to welcome workers back, to check in with them as he assigned them 
new sites or gave them a day off, and to collect his ¥500 pinhane, or, for that matter, any 
money he had lent to workers so they could pay for their transportation and lunch. Sitting 
in a designated spot also allowed Obara-san – Chishima’s middleman – to find Mito-chan 
easily to hand him the transportation fee for the following day (a flat ¥500 per person: the 
same as Mito-chan’s pinhane, which, in sum, also constituted his daily liquor allowance). 
However, the meeting point for Mito-chan and his crew was more than simply functional, 
because it condensed – emblematized in the figure of the tehaishi – the excesses of work, 
alcohol, and gambling. During the spring, summer and early fall – and with the exception 
of that brief period when the 70-year-old Mutō-san was jailed for running an illegal gam-
bling operation – this meeting point where all the returning workers of the Okinawa-gumi 
congregated after work was on the narrow street in front of Mutō-san’s hole-in-the-wall. 
A one-minute walk from Mito-chan’s doya, Mito-chan would arrive around 4 PM, pull a 
wooden stool up, and wait for the phone to ring. Dressed in flip-flops, shorts and a T-shirt, 
he would sit with a glass of mizuwari (Mutō-san’s cheap Daigoro shōchū with water and 
ice) placed on the ramshackle table beside him, alongside two sheets of paper: one of that 
day’s statistics on kyōtei (boat-racing) and the other – after he had received calls from the 
subcontractors – a list of construction site locations with numbers written in parentheses 
next to them. Mito-chan would move his eyes, distracted, between the box-TV in the up-
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per left-hand corner of Mutō-san’s hole, and the race stats. Eyeing the races and shouting 
at the regular drunks – of which there were always five or six, lounging about chatting, in 
their own worlds (talking to themselves), or passed out on the cement – to get the hell out 
of his way if they blocked his field of vision, Mito-chan would shift back to the statistics 
after the races concluded, talk to Akia or pick up the phone. Every time he shifted to pick 
up the statistics, or to fill another name in on his list of workers, Mito-chan would put on 
his sharp-looking, red reading glasses, which made his face look distinctly like that of an 
out-of-place accountant on the grimy street. Every once in a while he would receive a call, 
or put one in, almost just like he placed ¥500 bets with Mutō-san behind the counter, who 
wrote the numbers in his ledger. Sometimes tehai ended with one phone call, as when the 
number of workers and locations matched up with the day that was just concluding. Then, 
Mito-chan could put in a single call to the guys, who were still at the construction site, to 
tell them to repeat the routine the next day. More often, however, the tehai continued into 
the evening, as dusk fell and the troupe started getting back; sometimes alone, sometimes 
in pairs or groups, dirty, tired and carrying backpacks laden with clothes, tools and safety 
belts.  
The street by Mutō-san’s place would then transform into a veritable thoroughfare 
for workers, especially when Matsuda-san was also doing his tehai from the same place, 
trading workers with Mito-chan. At Mutō-san’s, the returned guys would obviously have 
another drink (their second, at least, after work), standing about, sitting on a chair if they 
could find one, or on the ground in small groups. They would buy drinks for one another, 
which called for reciprocity, and they would gamble before splitting up and departing for 
the next drinkery. After he started working, Akia would always observe of this daily cel-
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ebration – as he would of every occasion with the guys – that he was left without a penny 
after all the rounds of drinks and gambling. “No matter how much, there is never enough 
money” (Ikura kane ga atte mo tarinai). Ichi-san, too, would make an unknowing gesture 
as to where exactly all the money went, raising his palms upwards to the sides, and tilting 
his head. The only way not to spend the entirety of the “daily wage” (nittō) from that day 
was to go home. 
Alongside all the drinking and gambling, it was normal for confrontations to take 
place, fights to break out, and for the police to pay the crowd a visit, if only to warn them 
that complaints had been issued, and to be careful not to block the passage of cars. As the 
police were well aware, the entire conflagration of activities – beginning with Mutō-san’s 
kyōtei (boat racing), for which he had no license and was backed by the Kanamachi-ikka, 
which also made the gambler him or herself criminally reprehensible, to the drinking and 
working while on welfare – was illegal. This was likewise the case for the drinkery, Oi-
wake, where Mito-chan would do his tehai during the winter months and where kyōtei 
bets were also accepted, backed by the Kanamachi-ikka. Hence the obligation befell Mi-
to-chan and Matsuda-san to pay the Kanamachi-ikka monthly for the right to work in 
their “territory” (nawabari). As a matter of pride, Mito-chan was thus “sworn brothers” 
(kyōdaibun) with a man in Kanamachi-ikka, and once every month, the Kanamachi-
ikka’s shiny black van could be found parked outside Oiwake, in which a driver in a 
black suit waited to pick Mito-chan up. But the Okinawa-gumi declined to take on work 
directly from the Kanamachi-ikka, as it entailed too many “complications” (mendōkusai). 
Indeed, when rumors started to circulate regarding well-paid work at Fukushima Daiichi 
Nuclear Power Plant, this work was to be acquired through the Kanamachi-ikka. 
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At the construction site, work starts at 8 AM. But workers start arriving as early 
as 7 to sit, smoke, read the sports newspaper (which contains the gambling statistics) and 
to while away the time that remains after changing to work clothes. If it is their first time 
at the construction site, they try to arrive especially early, to stay on the safe side, and few 
of the guys – except for 28-year-old Kami-kun, who would commute in his work clothes, 
or Ichi-san when he’d had a late previous night – would arrive late or last minute to work. 
There is almost always time for a cigarette, a nap, light breakfast and maybe even a quick 
game of Koi Koi with the hanafuda (flower cards). 
At 8 AM, the general meeting starts in a clearing by the changing rooms with “ra-
dio calisthenics” (rajio taisō). Introduced in 1928 to commemorate emperor Hirohito, the 
very same cheery music with instructions airs across construction sites in Tokyo (and, no 
doubt, all of Japan) at 8 AM every morning. The crowd of workers do their stretches in 
construction gear in sync with the music, facing a central platform before which the over-
seers, identifiable by their green denim clothes, also do their stretches. Of course, at most 
sites, the workers and overseers alike do their calisthenics half-assed; but not doing them 
at all is not an option. Ichi-san merely points his fingers downwards, wriggling them with 
his back upright, when he is actually supposed to be reaching for his toes. The exertion is, 
in any case, impossible for him since he is as stocky and round as a bowling ball. He just 
wiggles his arms by his sides like a penguin. However, at some construction sites, the cal-
isthenics take on an explicitly disciplinary function. As if to put me in place before work 
began, one work leader slipped up to me from behind during the calisthenics, and told me 
to do them “firmly” (shikkari). At another construction company, it was daily practice to 
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line workers up for calisthenics according to specialization – navvies, scaffolders, carpen-
ters, electricians, machinists – all seated in separate rows on dinky little plastic chairs be-
fore and after calisthenics. During the stretches, one of the foremen would walk around, 
watching the workers, sometimes telling them to bend their knees properly; at this site, it 
was also the foremen who decided when workers could take breaks. At another site, it 
was explained to me that the top foreman was so strict he would single out workers who 
were not doing the stretches seriously, and make them repeat the exercises alone after the 
morning meeting. Hence, once the morning meeting concluded, a solitary figure might be 
doing the calisthenics alone to non-existent music. 
The morning meeting begins after the calisthenics. Workers pick up their helmets, 
safety-belts, equipment, and line up in the queue of their profession. They self-identify in 
accordance with their professions, referring to each other as: navvies, scaffolders, carpen-
ters, operators, electricians. At some sites, new workers are made to introduce themselves 
on a microphone in front of the other workers, stating their name and subcontractor. Then 
the foremen take turns outlining the tasks for the day and the safety precautions that need 
to be taken. They explain where the heavy machinery – excavators, dump trucks carrying 
away soil, cranes, cement trucks – will be moving. On rainy days, the slipperiness of the 
soil and the danger of falling into the trenches is emphasized. In the summer, when it gets 
as hot as 35 degrees celsius, workers are asked to take precautions against heat stroke, to 
keep well-hydrated, and reminded how many workers have already been carried off from 
heat-stroke. If an accident, or death, has recently occurred at a company site, workers are 
also urged to ensure “safety” (anzensei); in 2012 alone, 1,500 people died in accidents at 
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construction sites in Japan.15 Once the foremen have spoken, workers gather in groups of 
four or five to go over the tasks of the day again, to reiterate the safety precautions, and to 
verify that everybody’s safety gear is in order. The foremen walk about as this takes place, 
listening in. As if this were not enough, a single worker is finally called in front of every-
one – a prospect many of the guys dreaded: public speaking – to summarize the tasks and 
safety precautions. At last, once this is all done, everybody retires to the changing rooms 
for a quick rest and smoke before actual work starts at 8:30. Workers are only spared this 
“morning assembly” (chōrei) when “cement work” (konkuri) is scheduled; navvies must 
then be ready once the concrete trucks arrive, and prepare during the morning meeting.16 
The haphazard means of approving the medical condition of workers are revealed 
at an additional introductory meeting for new workers after the morning assembly. It is at 
this meeting that workers are required to submit their blood pressure readings to undergo 
approval for work. Because the foremen do not observe the laborers when they take their 
blood pressure (the monitor is in an other room), it was common practice for everyone in 
the group who had high blood pressure – almost all of them – to submit a false reading. If 
the upper reading was above 160, workers were denied permission to work. Consequently, 
when the guys would arrive at new construction site en masse, the first matter of business 
was for the 28-year-old Kami-kun or myself to take four or five readings, and hand them 
out to the troupe. It would have posed a problem for both workers and foremen if most of 
                                                
15 See Kensetsugyō Rōdō Saigai Bōshi Kyōkai, “Kensetsugyō ni Okeru Rōdō Saigai Hassei Jōkyō,” 
13/9/2015. 
16 The division of workers at the construction site into foremen (managers) and manual laborers recalls The 
Principles of Scientific Management (New York: Dover Publications, 1998) laid out by Frederick Winslow 
Taylor: “The writer asserts that as a general principle (and he proposes to give illustrations tending to prove 
the fact later in this paper) that in almost all of the mechanic arts the science which underlies each act of 
each workman is so great and amounts to so much that the workman who is best suited to actually doing 
work is incapable of fully understanding this science, without the guidance and help of those who are work-
ing with him or over him, either through lack of education or through insufficient mental capacity” (7 – 8). 
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the workers were disqualified from work on account of high blood pressure. The foremen 
thus turned a blind eye to fake blood pressure readings. By so doing, they retrojected any 
responsibility for health consequences on the individual him or herself: everyone worked 
at his own risk. Indeed, no one even raised an eyebrow when six men in their mid-fifties 
presented identical blood pressure readings of 120/80. 
Thus, three to four times per week, the guys in the Okinawa-gumi were consumed 
by the work of a dokata (navvy) involving a number of tasks that, at least in theory, could 
be done by anyone. Work as a dokata required no license, and paid less than many of the 
other lines of construction work. Many in the troupe did, in fact, have licenses to work as 
tobi (scaffolders) – which paid more on account of the danger for which the tobi took full 
responsibility – yet, somewhat reluctantly, they would recount that anyone could work as 
a dokata, regardless of age and physical condition.17 That is not to say, however, that the 
work of a dokata was not physically demanding; in fact, it was precisely its menial nature 
– which actually demanded more physical strain of workers – that qualified dokata work 
as the end of the line. With the exception of the 28-year-old Kami-kun, almost everyone 
who worked as a dokata appeared older and less fit than workers in the other professions. 
The tobi requires the agility, balance, and fearlessness to work high along the scaffolding 
of buildings. The tekkinya (steelworker) needs the sheer upper-body strength to bend and 
carry steel reinforcements to his will. But the dokata must be able to use the shovel, carry 
things, clean, and sometimes, operate equipment like the chainsaw, the concrete vibrator, 
and electronic depth gauge. Very little specialization was required of the dokata – anyone 
could jump in and work if there was one person present to direct work – and, unlike older 
                                                
17 Tobi (scaffolders) were said to assume complete financial responsibility in the event of accident at work. 
For this reason, they were paid around ¥17,500 (175 USD) per day; approximately ¥5,000 more than other 
professions in the construction business. 
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tobi, the dokata never commented on becoming unable to keep up with younger workers. 
In a typical reversal of hierarchies, Akia accounted for a seemingly non-existent ranking 
system between various workers at the construction site: that the most important part in a 
building – of anything for that matter – was the “foundation” (kiso), and that, in this sense, 
dokata do the most important work. As if he were speaking of Sanya itself, he added that, 
as a dokata, Ichi-san does not take crap from anyone on the construction site.18 
Work as a dokata did, however, involve a range of tasks which varied in intensity 
of physical hardship, danger, and technical expertise. Perhaps the simplest task was “dig-
ging holes” (ana hori), for which no instruction whatsoever seemed necessary, except for 
knowing how to pace oneself and pause. This task was also considered as one of the most 
demanding, and entailed digging in places – corners – that the excavator could not reach. 
In this case, human labor power filled in for the machine, and the work was consequently 
given to younger members of the troupe, like Kami-kun or myself. It was work – like all 
the other tasks – in which the earth was destroyed, and human labor was expended to lay 
the foundations of a new building. At the age of 56, Misaaru would hence explain that, in 
order to get through the day – especially when he was doing hard, physical labor – it was 
necessary for him to pace himself in accordance with the break periods held from 10:00 – 
                                                
18 In A Man With No Talents, Ōyama Shirō writes of a certain hierarchy among laborers in Sanya. While 
his description accords with the status of Moto-san and Nori-san in Sanya – both respected tobi (scaffold-
ers) – Ichi-san was a former carpenter, and Shokawa-san was an ironworker. Ōyama writes: 
 “Tobi are the aristrocrats of San’ya. In the same way that it is possible, in Europe, to distinguish 
the aristocracy from the common folk by how they look, so it is possible to distinguish tobi from common 
day laborers by their appearance (their faces more than their physique). The training required to nurture 
their skills to a level worthy of their calling and the confidence gained through having those skills recog-
nized by their peers give them a commanding presence and bestow on their countenance a certain poise. All 
in all they cut a very dashing figure. There is a certain crispness about their movements and indeed about 
their entire demeanor. I would imagine that their individual abilities vary considerably, but the best have a 
truly unmistakable aura about them. One can tell at a glance: yes, this man, without question, is a tobi. 
 Carpenters and ironworkers are not employed as day laborers or as contract laborers, so there are 
none in San’ya. Here, the word shokunin – skilled worker – means only one thing, and that is tobi” (61). 
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10:30, 12:00 – 13:00 (lunch) and from 15:00 – 15:30. It was the thought and certainty of 
an upcoming break that enabled him to continue, a little more, until the next break. Thus, 
time passed. Time was the abstract measure of bodily expenditure: but a specific form of 
time – unconcerned with immediacy – and oriented towards the future in a future anterior 
mode in which the work day, like the portions of the day, will have ended.19 At least one 
person had to bring either a wrist-watch or phone out to work, so the guys could ask each 
other – as often as every five minutes – if it was time for break yet. The alternative was to 
wait endlessly for the other workers to lazily head back to the changing rooms in droves; 
but when there was a watch, one could get a headstart. In the summer, when it was almost 
a regular occurrence for workers to be hospitalized from heat-stroke, the stretch between 
13:00 and 15:00 was especially long. Then, it was better not to look at the watch, to stick 
it out, and be relieved that time had passed when one finally looked at the watch. 
Direct exposure to the sun, heat, and seemingly endless swathes of time was most 
intense when konkuri (concrete work) was scheduled; a task, moreover, that involved the 
highest degree of technical expertise and, hence, the clearest hierarchy in the division of 
labor among the dokata. Six navvies were required to lay the concrete floors of the high-
rise apartment blocks built by Hasekō. Two of these took turns operating the vibrator that 
released the cement; a heavy, plug-like object which had to be lugged around and dipped 
into the cement along the crevices of the walls and on the slabs of the floors, to even it all 
out. The dokata who did this work – and there were only three or four in the troupe who 
knew how – had to read the texture and height of the cement, match the movement of the 
man holding the cement pump, and anticipate how everything would even out when they 
came back from the other side. When dumping the vibrators inside the walls, this dokata 
                                                
19 Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, pg. 81. 
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had to gauge from the sound and feel of the vibrator how much longer it had to be kept in 
place, releasing just enough. One dokata brushed the protruding steel reinforcements of 
the walls with water, so that excess concrete would not stick to them. Yet another dokata 
double-tasked, holding the wires of the vibrator so the dokata operating it did not have to 
heave about them, or the generator attached to them, and – as the concrete approached the 
margins of the floor – shoveled cement to even out the edges. The remaining two navvies 
stayed on the floor below, in the belly of the building. As concrete poured into the walls – 
bolts and screws shaking from the vibrators and making a racket of noise, as if a drill had 
been plugged inside; joined by the regular spout of the cement tube reaching up alongside 
the outside of the building like the neck of a beast – these two dokata hammered away on 
the bottom of the walls to make sure the concrete made it down, and while the floor slabs 
were completed, cleaned up any excess cement that had spilled through the fissures in the 
walls and ceiling above. This latter job could be quite dangerous, because it could happen 
that the carpenters had not sufficiently secured the wooden frames of the walls. The sheer 
weight of the raw cement filling the walls could then cause the wooden mold to break and 
collapse on the dokata. This was not a big issue when there was space behind the dokata, 
but if work was in the cellar, the dokata had to crawl into a crevice between the wall and 
the surrounding soil. If the navvy was in the crevice when this wall collapsed, he would 
be buried in a deluge of raw cement, wood, steel reinforcements, wires, and bolts. Hence, 
the dokata had to know – from the sound of the hammer on the walls – when the concrete 
had risen above the waist, and climb out immediately. Needless to say, the navvies on the 
bottom floor were covered with cement by the end of the day; a prospect that the navvies 
holding the vibrators could prevent, depending on their ability to establish a rhythm with 
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the man holding the pump. On days when konkuri was scheduled, every single movement 
of the worker was, in effect, matched to the rate at which the machine on the ground floor 
spouted out cement. If the concrete mixers did not arrive on time, work was stalled. This 
allowed everyone to take a break, “escape” (nigeru) to the shade in the summers, but was 
also vexing as workers wanted to be done. On the other hand, when the mixers were lined 
up downstairs, work continued non-stop; except for lunch, breaks were not given on days 
when konkuri was scheduled. By this same token, the dokata had to keep up with the man 
lugging about the concrete spout, who – in accordance with the bulky weight of the spout 
– did not shy from showering the inexperienced navvy with an unsparing string of invec-
tives. In turn, the man who operated the spout connected to the concrete truck below had 
to match his movements to the pulse of the machine that pummeled concrete with beastly 
force, reigning in the end of the spout, and directing it with ropes. However, the machine 
and tube had a life of their own. 
The force of the concrete pump and the superhuman tube extending from it harbor 
the specter of accidents that overhangs the working day. To begin with, the concrete itself 
contained chemicals that could burn straight through bare skin, leaving gaping sores. Sure 
enough, prolonged exposure to concrete would eventually wear down any working gloves 
and clothes. Workers protected themselves against direct exposure with proper work gear, 
but accidents could not be predicted. One day, the elevated tube connecting the concrete 
in the truck to the workers split in half right above our heads, writhing and spewing ce-
ment like a broken exhaust pipe. Everyone fled from the sight to clean themselves up, but 
it did not require much of an imagination to know that the tube, filled with cement, would 
have broken somebody’s neck if it had fallen on their head. Contact with the force of the 
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machinery would have been deadly. Indeed, during the process of work, the senior work-
ers would give brief, but deadly serious instructions regarding dangers of the tasks at 
hand, the malobservance of which would have real consequences. The cement pebbles in 
the air, for instance, petrified in the lungs: it was best not to breathe it in too much. And if, 
during the summer, one started to feel dizzy – symptoms of heat-stroke – one should go 
inside regardless of work and sit under the airconditioner. Of course, when real accidents 
occurred, it became the subject of awed gossip, triggering workers in the changing rooms 
(or back in Sanya) to recount a series of other, similar experiences. The former tobi, Iwa-
chan, who was as frail as a stick and could hardly walk – yet was in his early fifties – had 
once fallen from a height of several stories, puncturing his ribs and breaking all sorts of 
other bones. Other younger tobi had been paralyzed from neck down. The long and short 
of it was that if you got in an accident, “no one is going to look after you” (dare mo 
mendō mite kurenai). And this dictum of the workplace, where men were made to assume 
almost complete “self-responsibility” (jikosekinin) for their bodies, was carried over into 
the everyday life of Sanya, where physical confrontations and illnesses were regarded as 
self-incurred. Sanya constituted proof that no one would look after you, save, finally, the 
state, into whose hands the deriorating health of laborers handed them over, at a forfeiture 
of their masculinity. It was said that: “You protect your own body by yourself” (Jibun no 
mi wa jibun de mamoru). However, the days constituted an alternation between the self-
destruction of drink and that of work. In the changing rooms, workers would puff away in 
breaks, inundating the room with smoke. 
Following on konkuri, negiri (excavating the foundation) required most direct co-
ordination between the dokata and machinery. Negiri was, in fact, what a dokata did, and 
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dokata were in highest demand when the foundation of buildings was being laid. At such 
times, there was work for dokata every day – unlike twice or thrice per week, when only 
konkuri on the upper stories was left – as the construction site had to be excavated before 
any other work could proceed. Dokata were thus busiest at the beginning of the financial 
year – April 1st in Japan – when construction companies invested capital in new buildings. 
Then, the dokata would come to the construction site in the absence of scaffolders, steel-
workers, carpenters, or electricians, and transform the soil beside an excavator. Of course, 
digging holes was part of negiri which fundamentally involved doing the work – securing 
the walls of the earth – that the excavator could not do with its square beak. Working side 
by side with the excavator entailed that the dokata had to be constantly aware of the loca-
tion of the excavator up above, moving ceaselessly back and forth, humming and circling 
without rest – it was said machinists could operate the excavator for hours without rest – 
as it dug further and further along the floor plan of the building. Down below in the holes 
dug by the excavator, the dokata kept up by leveling out the height of the ground (with a 
shovel), cleaning the margins, and securing the walls of the hole with wooden boards and 
pipes plunged into the ground, so that the walls would not crumble (under rain and such). 
Using an electronic depth indicator, one dokata – usually Riku-san or Ichi-san – read the 
floor-plan, and with a spraycan, indicated the places that required more digging and those 
that were alright. Two other dokata did the remainder of the work. Sometimes, the depth 
of the hole dug by the excavator required one of the navvies to take a spade to correct the 
depth. Otherwise, the remaining two navvies cleaned the insides of the excavation dug by 
the excavator, evening out the surfaces. The subordinate carried wooden boards and steel 
pipes to secure the sides of the excavation. Due to the weight of the pipes and boards, this 
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required several trips back and forth from the storage area, killing time. Once the depth of 
the pit had been established and the pipes and boards collected, the dokata signaled to the 
machinist that they could go ahead and secure the walls. This last work required speed 
and nimble fingers on behalf of the dokata, who had to work with, keep up with, and stay 
out of the way of the excavator. First, the navvy must place the wooden boards up against 
the sides of the hole, nailing the edges together so they reach across horizontally and ver-
tically. Then, the dokata signals the machinist and begins putting the pipes in place. This 
requires that the dokata place the pipe so that it leans against the wooden boards, placing 
pressure against them to hold the soil behind in place. Depending on the size of the hole, 
there are usually eight pipes per side. Because the machinist above cannot gauge the dis-
tance to the pipes with his eyes, the navvy must hold the pipe in place with one hand, and 
with the other, instruct the operator to move the beak of the excavator forward and down, 
so that it clasps onto the tip of the pipe. At this point, the navvy must “run out of the way” 
(nigeru) because once the beak bears down on the tip of the pipe, the pipe is plunged into 
the ground with enough force to split it wide open. If a finger is caught between the beak 
and the pipe, or if a foot is stuck under the pipe, the force of the excavator will take it off. 
And sometimes, just when the excavator releases its hold, the pipe bounces back towards 
the face of dokata, shredded across the tip. 
The prevention of accidents required attention to the contingent – fingers balanc-
ing the steel pipe – yet, at the same time, a deadening to possible penetration by the me-
chanical, alien force of the machinery. Thinking too much about the ever-present possi-
bility of accidents would have made work impossible and a certain investment was need-
ed to block out this possibility. The scaffolder knew what would happen if he fell from a 
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height of twenty stories – looking down, he would think: “If I fall from here, I will die …” 
(Koko kara ochitara, shinunda na) – but nonetheless continued walking without the im-
pediment of safety gear. The possibility of accidents had to be bracketed, as if it did not 
exist. During my first week at work, before I myself had become desensitized, I wrote as 
follows of negiri: 
What the machines cannot do, we fill in. I remember being scared of the crane on 
the first day. Of working so close to it, having to align pipes to the boarded walls 
of craters, down in the bottom … holding the pipes in place while the crane put its 
snout to the top of the bar, and pushed it down. Incredible power. Super-human. 
Pushing that bar into the ground, two or three meters with no effort at all. Ichi-
san always saying immediately after the snout was placed and ready to push 
down: “run away” (nigete). Yesterday, I realized why. The crane pushed down 
and because the pipe got stuck momentarily … the snout ripped straight through 
the metal. Put a huge gash in the top of the pipe. The day before, the crane was 
carrying one of those metal boards placed on the ground, across which vehicles 
drive. Ichi-san said they weigh 1.5 tons. He added that if the driver is good, he 
can stack up to two boards at once, and carry them thus. Yesterday, Ichi-san said: 
“look” (mite): the big crane was carrying the small crane up to a different level. 
When we put metal bars in place, for “stopping the mountain” (yamadome), we 
move to match the progress of the crane. We don’t move at our own pace. We 
move so that the crane can move quickly on to other work.20 
 
The work of negiri also involved the task of inserting wooden walls between giant 
H-shaped bars that had been driven into the ground beforehand. These bars were aligned 
with the floor-plan of the future building, separating the walls and supporting the building 
from the corners. The excavator would begin by digging along the edges of the building, 
uncovering the H-shaped bars, separated by 100 – 150 centimeters. When two meters had 
been uncovered, the dokata would step into the pit, armed with spades and crowbars, take 
away a thin layer of earth from behind the H-shaped bars, and insert thick wooden boards 
behind the H-shape. The H-shape of the bars prevented the boards from falling out, as the 
dokata worked from the bottom up, filling in soil behind the boards. Once two meters had 
                                                
20 Sept. 25th, 2012, edited journal entry. 
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been completed, the excavator would come back and dig another two meters, and thus the 
task was repeated until the wall was as deep as 10 – 20 meters. This was demanding work 
especially when the earth was rock-hard clay, or if it had been raining and work was done 
in knee-deep water. Sometimes, a water-pump had to be dumped into the water to enable 
work. Regardless, soil and dust particles flew everywhere as the dokata cleared the walls 
of soil, and at least one span had to be kept open between the dokata, because sometimes 
the crowbars would slip when they struck out to the sides. Two dokata would thus remain 
down in the pit. There they would also measure the distance between bars and call up to a 
third dokata – usually Ichi-san, who shirked work in the pit – who would cut the wooden 
boards to the right length with a chainsaw, and throw them down as they were concluded. 
These boards were heavy, especially when wet, and the dokata had to communicate with 
one another so that they were thrown safely. Once the boards were all down in the pit, the 
dokata wedged them behind the H-shaped bars, moving along the side of the wall to start 
another span as the excavator came in to dig further down where they had left off. But the 
earth behind the dokata was not held in place by anything. 
Once, after it had rained, this section of the excavation caved in on top of Izuken-
ji-san, leaving him knee-deep in soil. Alarmed and immediately to the rescue, Ichi-san 
and others laughed over the incident afterwards, observing that one cannot move once the 
soil gets to knee-level. 
Finally, the most demanding of all tasks was to work as tobi no temoto (at the side 
of the scaffolder). After merely one day as tobi no temoto, Misaaru swore to Ichi-san he 
would never do it again. Akia also complained endlessly of the one day he had worked – 
with Misaaru – as tobi no temoto. Keeping up had forced him to flee from the work, and 
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to throw up from over-exertion. After this incident, it was decided in the troupe that work 
with scaffolders would only be given to the younger crew, like Kami-kun or myself. Like 
digging holes, the work itself was straightforward. The dokata had to assist the tobi when 
the scaffolding around the building had to come down, forming the last link in the human 
chain of tobi extending up alongside the scaffolding: receiving and handing on the pieces 
as they had been dismantled. Standing at ground level, the dokata had to work faster than 
the tobi since they had to carry off the pieces – which were quite heavy – and be ready to 
receive the next one. It was pure stamina work for the dokata, who had to match both the 
youth and speed of the tobi with their electronic screwdrivers. It was also non-stop, as the 
pipes, bolts and metal walking boards just kept coming. 
At around 16:30, the troupe started to make preparations to leave the construction 
site. If Ichi-san was on site, this last period of time was preceded either by his looking at 
the clock repeatedly (every couple of minutes) or his asking repeatedly what time it was 
of the person who had the watch. Hence, getting ready to leave with Ichi-san started – as 
everyone knew – around 16:15, with a pretense to working and waiting for 16:30, when it 
was actually considered legitimate to start packing up.21 
As if it were part of work itself, Ichi-san did anything possible to end the working 
day early. He was always in a hurry to get home: the first out of the changing room, rush-
ing to make it on the earliest train, and practically jogging to transfer trains. For a certain 
period of time, he even got in the habit of buying confectionary at a cake store on the way 
                                                
21 Of slacking or “soldiering,” Taylor writes in The Principles of Scientific Management: “Underworking, 
that is, deliberately working slowly so as to avoid doing a full day’s work, “soldiering,” as it is called in 
this country, “hanging it out,” as it is called in England, “ca canae,” as it is called in Scotland, is almost 
universal in industrial establishments, and prevails also to a large extent in building trades; and the writer 
asserts without fear of contradiction that this constitutes the greatest evil with which the working people of 
both England and America are now afflicted” (3). 
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home for the proprietor of his favorite drinkery. Laughing at the novelty of this practice, 
Ichi-san said he had never done anything like it before, and that it was “fun” (omoshiroi). 
Ichi-san would even have his laundry done by the proprietor of this drinkery located by 
Minami-Senjū station, who would fold his clothes and presumably also charge him for 
the services. Of course, the dynamic of this relationship shifted whenever Ichi-san would 
fall into debt at the drinkery – as it was his privilege and habit to drink on credit – and his 
mama-san would start charging interest on this debt, calling his phone every day to come 
and pay up. Then, Ichi-san would no longer come by with cakes after work, but begrudg-
ingly, with increments of cash. But a month later, the debt was forgotten about, and Ichi-
san would be back drinking and trying to fondle the mama-san every evening. Until Ichi-
san fired Mito-chan and took over the tehai – after which point he would be on the phone 
starting 16:30, mixing post-work alcohol with the exigency of filling the quota … – there 
existed a clear break between work at the construction site, and the world of Sanya. 
It was a distinctive feature of the day laborer’s working day that the minute it was 
over at 17:00, it was well and truly over. Work could not be taken home. Nor, among the 
guys in the Okinawa-gumi, were the hierarchical relations of the workplace reproduced in 
their social relations in Sanya, albeit, elevated status clearly did attach to the tehaishi. For 
it was the unfailingly graceful and humble Izukenji-san – paragon of a vanishing world of 
mobster values – who emerged as the mythic source of authority in Yama; a figure who 
looked out for everybody and treated everybody as equals. The return to this world of 
Sanya was marked with a drink after work. After leaving the site and changing at 16:45, 
all the guys invariably stopped by a convenience store before getting on the train. No 
matter the time of year, Riku-san would buy a 1.0 or 1.5 One Cup Ozeki sake, and some-
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times something sweet, sharing at first. A lean figure in his late-fifties with unshaven chin 
or a rough beard, Riku-san cut the figure of a lone wolf at the train stations, sitting a little 
removed from the rest of the group, leaning against a pillar on his heels, and sipping from 
his sake cup as he looked out in front of himself. On days when Riku-san did not have 
work, the number of One Cups he drank grew to ten, or sometimes fifteen. He laughed as 
he described his like for “liquor” (sake), and confessed he would start drinking at 5:00 
AM, black out towards noon, and fall asleep either in his room or somewhere under the 
overhang of Iroha arcade, where he could often be seen sleeping on the side of the street, 
a thin blanket spread over him, his geta sticking out from the bottom.22 Days off were, 
unequivocally, days off, and this separation of work from the world of Yama began with 
the consumption of a drink on the train-ride home. By the time the troupe got off the train 
in Minami-Senjū, they would all have a buzz. Thus, Izukenji-san always bought a 500 ml 
Nodokoshi Kirin Happōshū, and with it his trademark snack, kaki no tane (soy-flavored 
rice crisps and peanuts). Unless it was summer, when he would get a beer, as well, Ichi-
san always bought a cup of straight shōchū that he would tuck into the inside of his jacket, 
or in his back pocket. 
The consumption of alcohol on the train home and cigarettes on the train platform 
also separated the guys from the regular commuters. While smoking on the platform was 
not permitted, drinking in the train was not prohibited, but was certainly frowned upon. It 
created an atmosphere of unease around the troupe, particularly on less crowded trains – 
where they were in plain sight – when they openly flaunted the “rules” (rūru). Of course, 
as Akia put it, some of the guys acted more like “gentleman” (shinshi) on their way back 
than others. Izukenji-san, for instance, never smoked in public. Ichi-san and the others 
                                                
22 Geta are traditional Japanese footwear, wooden and heavy like clogs, but held fast like flip-flops. 
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would stand off to the side somewhere, behind a pillar, and smoke a cigarette on the plat-
form before the train arrived. To Akia’s horror, Misaaru simply smoked in the open. One 
time, when another commuter reminded Misaaru that smoking was not allowed, Misaaru 
proceeded to cuss the person out: “what’s it got to do with you?!” (kimi to nanno kankei 
ga aru no?!). But everyone drank in the train, cutting a sharp contrast to other commuters. 
In addition, many of the guys were still dressed in work clothes: Izukenji-san put on a cap 
and Nike sneakers after work, but kept on his baggy workpants, sporting a cellphone with 
One-Piece anime stickers (since he was an avid fan) round which his missing fingers 
showed on closer inspection. The others similarly carried bulky bags, and wore clothes 
stained with paint or cement, often ripped at the bottom. There was, indeed, a sense in 
which the guys consciously flaunted “manners” (manā) in the public space of the train 
compartment, but this was a far reach from the deliberate and threatening display of mob-
ster affiliation that Yamagishi-san took such pleasure in enacting on each occasion he 
came face to face with general society. Nor did Yamagishi-san ever go to work. It was 
only that, being tired after a day at work, having a drink took precedence over etiquette, 
and so the guys would help themselves – without exception – to a beer, sake or shōchū. 
Every once in a while, a prim, elder housewife might glare at us, at which Izukenji-san 
would react abashed, but such incidents were brushed off with a laugh as the troupe set-
tled into the effect of the alcohol. It was just as likely that the guys would give their seats 
away to a couple with a baby, and play with the child for the remainder of the ride back. 
At Minami-Senjū station, everyone went each his way – some to meet Mito-chan, 
Ichi-san to deliver his fresh confectionary, and Izukenji-san to the sento (bathhouse) – 
although there was a strong likelihood that many of them would end up drinking together 
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later that evening, be it at Mutō-san’s hole-in-the-wall, at Oiwake, Chūfukuro, Iseya, or at 
Gen, on whose proprietor Ichi-san had a crush. 
 
 The separation of the actual work-site from the world of Sanya entailed an aware-
ness of the social position the troupe occupied, and, of course, of themselves as objects of 
labor. If anything, the respect accorded the tehaishi as provider – or to the frail Iwa-chan, 
who everyone respected for having “worked his butt off” (bachi bachi hataraita) when 
he was young – implied a dichotomy between the “skilled artisan” (ude ga yoi shokunin), 
and the “disposable” (tsukaisute) object of labor. The only thing that compelled work was 
money. Whether, as Georg Lukács suggests, this awareness differentiated the day laborer 
engaged in manual labor – whose obligation to work lasted from 8:00 to 17:00 – from the 
intellectual labor of the salaryman must be asked elsewhere.23 But this antinomy between 
subject and object did give rise to a certain “self-consciousness of the commodity,” as Lu-
kács writes, as well as to a recognition and “relation between men,” enabled by the figure 
of Izukenji-san.24  
However, regardless of what the working man was aware of and knew, economic, 
objective necessity compelled the exchange of labor for cash. In this respect, the counter-
discourse of being an otoko (man) facilitated work itself by staving off the contingency of 
                                                
23 As “it stamps its imprint upon the whole consciousness of man,” Lukács writes in “Reification and the 
Consciousness of the Proletariat,” the commodity form alienates the subject from the equivalent object of 
labour, while the rationalization of work requires specialization that fragments the subject in turn (100, 88 – 
89). Reification finally penetrates consciousness with intellectual labour that objectifies the subject itself. 
According to Lukács, the journalist and lawyer sell their minds and souls but mistakenly believe their 
products of labour proceed from themselves (100, 172). 
24 In “Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat,” Lukács proposes that the “self-consciousness of 
the commodity” hinges on that contingent moment when the dialectical antinomy between subject and ob-
ject reaches its limit in the proletariat (168). For Lukács, that moment marks the arrival of contingency into 
history when the fetishism of the commodity gives way to “relation between men” and, thus, to nothing less 
than lateral recognition (169). 
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the wage – in return for death – with a narrative detour which called for repetition in the 
restitution of shame, “dignity” (iji) and sociality. On the margins of Japan Inc, where the 
truth of labor was disclosed to consist in expendability and death, the order of a singular 
“master signifier” was repeated over and over again. Precisely there where Jacques Lacan 
noted on TV in 1973 – “you will be pinned by signifiers that are only countable signifiers 
and which will efface … singularity” – where the commodity-form of labor was material-
ized in its most spectral guise, a (lost) signifier of sociality and honor was reiterated. 25 
The word of Izukenji-san carried the force of allaying personal differences. If only in 
outer appearance, his word was everyone’s desire. So too, coming back from work ex-
hausted was what an otoko did. 
Bodily exhaustion – and finally, death – constituted the after-effect of work. Thus, 
work rationalized the body in order to maximize productivity, and hence, the name of the 
game was to minimize costs. In short, the fewer the workers needed to complete a job the 
better. Substituting for an endless working day, minimizing workers predicated premature 
exhaustion for the worker.26 Together with alcohol, the repetition of this work was deadly. 
Akia would use both hands to count the number of friends who had passed away in their 
forties. Ichi-san would similarly remark of Iwa-chan that he used to drink “without caring” 
(nani mo kamawanaide). The guys had witnessed the signs of imminent death before, and 
they recognized them. When Mito-chan collapsed, Akia said “this is how Okinawans die” 
                                                
25 Quoted in Jacques-Alain Miller, “On Shame,” pg. 23. Lacan’s words recall Adorno and Horkheimer in 
The Dialectic of Enlightenment: “The technical process, to which the subject has been reified after the erad-
ication of that process from consciousness, is as free from the ambiguous meanings of mythical thought as 
from meaning altogether, since reason itself has become merely an aid to the all-encompassing economic 
apparatus” (23). 
26 Although certainly a form of “death from overwork” (karōshi), the premature death of (former) workers 
in Sanya must be distinguished from the “death from overwork” (karōshi) of the “salary-man” (sararīman) 
with family. In the name of “Scientific Management,” Taylor asserts the “self-evident fact that maximum 
prosperity can exist only as a result of the determined effort of each workman to turn out each day his larg-
est possible day’s work” (The Principles of Scientific Management, 4). 
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(kō yatte Okinawa no hito wa shinu no). And when Akia was carted out of his doya on a 
stretcher, Yama-chan from Sanyūkai approached to watch in the crowd, remarking: “he’s 
gonna die, isn’t he” (shinun jya nai no). 
It was common practice for Hasekō to assign the younger, workaholic member of 
its permanently employed dokata to construction sites that were still doing negiri. Kami-
kun explained the reasoning for this succinctly when he said that Itō-san does the equiva-
lent of three workers, simply by being on site. At the age of 49, Itō-san took the opposite 
approach from Ichi-san, who, as leader of the troupe, was at work more than anyone else; 
and so explicitly avoided physical exertion because he anticipated the long-term effects it 
would have on his body. Rather than merely instruct, Itō-san took it upon himself to do a 
vast part of the work himself. And he was, in fact, quicker at work than anybody else, and 
preferred to work by himself as he gradually moved ahead. As “head worker” (shokuchō) 
of the dokata, marked by the red (rather than white) helmet he wore, Itō-san was directly 
employed by the subcontractor, Chishima. It was his responsibility that work progressed 
on schedule. Itō-san would thus pick up slack by investing his own extra labor. Often, he 
would work in the breaks, after hours and even on Sundays. Because he was an employee 
of the subcontractor on a monthly salary, he was reputedly not paid over-time, but had to 
work every day. It was also said that his salary was lower than that of the day laborers, if 
the monthly sum was divided by the number of days he worked. Riku-san said that, while 
Itō-san might not be have been intending to guilt-trip the rest of the crew – which took its 
duly awarded breaks and went home at 17:00 – the effect was the same. There was some-
thing distinctly wrong with watching Itō-san’s slender body slave away, back bent over a 
shovel in a water-filled ditch, while everyone took their break. As well as they got along, 
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Ichi-san remarked flat-out of Itō-san’s exertions that “the man is stupid” (aitsu baka). At 
some point, Itō-san’s body was going to shut down, beyond the point of repair. He ought 
to have known how to conserve his energies. 
Yet, much as the guys had made an artform of preserving their energies – slacking, 
when possible – there was an adulation among them of raw, physical “power” (pawā). Of 
course, these tendencies formed two sides of the same coin insofar as they both expressed 
the desire for and ideal of inexhaustibility at work. Back in Sanya, this praise of strength 
took the form of banter, as many of the guys had long-standing reputations for their 
strength at the workplace, which, in Sanya, translated into a prowess for fighting. Perhaps 
Moto-san was most well-known for his power, and unsurprisingly so, when one came 
face-to-face with him. The guys had nicknamed him the “gorilla” (gorira) on account of 
his tremendous upper body, swelling forearms, and hands with stubbly fingers the size of 
salt shakers. Ichi-san, who similarly possessed a hefty upper body, and hands worn, swol-
len, and heavy from decades of work, would hold up Moto-san’s hands to display them, 
saying in front of everyone: “Have you seen these hands?! Are these the hands of a hu-
man being?!” (Kono te mita?! Kore ningen no te?!). True to his nickname, Moto-san 
could often be found passed out on the benches lining the wall of Oiwake. Upon waking, 
he would growl like an animal on the prowl and most often attack Shokawa-san (one of 
his favorite prey) who, giggling away with an ice drink swaying in his hands, would beg 
him to stop as Moto hugged him close, growling intimately, rubbing the stubble of his 
unshaven cheeks against his, and biting his scalp in loving imitation of a gorilla. And 
when he was particularly drunk, Moto-san would begin kissing and crying. The latter was, 
 300 
in fact, a penchant which many of the guys, including Ichi-san – the white-haired “silver-
back” (sirubā-bakku) – shared when they had drunk a drop too much.27 
At the construction site, the praise of strength occurred in more concrete scenarios, 
such as when someone dug a hole indefatigably, lifted an especially heavy rock or carried 
lots of steel pipes at once, as if it required no effort. Then someone might comment: “nice 
power” (naisu pawā). Back in Sanya, this machinic, superhuman strength would become 
the subject of conversation over drinks, as one guy lauded an other (who might be absent) 
for his feats at work. Mito-chan, in particular, liked to boast of his own physical prowess, 
telling the “youngsters” (wakashū) in the group that he would one day show them how to 
lift 30 kilo bags of rice. Likewise, it was not uncommon upon meeting workers in Sanya 
for them to remark that they “have strength” (chikara aru). Specific body “types” (taipu) 
were also lauded as being particularly “able to work” (shigoto ga dekiru); contrary to ex-
pectation, these were not the hefty-bodied type, but the lean and agile. However, Ichi-san 
repeatedly warned against over-exertion at the construction site, insisting that work take 
place at the worker’s “own pace” (mai pēsu). Mito-chan naturally hoped for the opposite, 
since hard workers reflected well on himself. But it was a generally accepted dictum that 
“hurrying” or “pushing oneself” (aseru) led to “accidents” (jiko). In morning assemblies, 
the foremen pointed out that accidents occurred most frequently in the first hour or two of 
work. It was, above all, important that workers pace themselves; a practice which entailed 
ceaseless attention to the possibility of accidents – for the construction site was a “horrif-
                                                
27 Of course, Moto-san was a tobi (scaffolder) by profession. On this note, Miyazaki Manabu describes the 
underworld intersection of construction workers and mob in the late 1970s: “The world of the tobi (scaf-
folder) is certainly a rowdy one, and scrapping was a daily occurrence. Among such men was a special 
breed known as the heavy-duty scaffolder. Incredibly strong, they balanced steel girders on their shoulders 
as they flew along scaffolding high above the ground. They were reckless, devil-may-care types that you 
would think had been born to fight” (207). 
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ic place” (osoroshī tokoro) – and a blocking out of this ever-present threat. Posters hang-
ing here and there at construction sites detailed endless iterations of accidents: from trip-
ping to getting caught under a machine. In effect, pacing entailed the sacrifice of immedi-
acy – of direct exposure to contingency – in an emptying out of time. When the end of 
the work day finally arrived, the worker wondered where the time had gone. 
The adulation of physical “power” (pawā) and the very notion of its regimentation 
discloses a specifically modern conception of ‘labor power.’ For the laborer and employ-
er alike, this ‘labor power’ constituted the source of value. Like the limits of the working 
day, it was the interest of the laborer to sell his labor power – and prolong his life-span –  
while the employer sought to maximize output through the complete expenditure of such 
labor power. It was the quantification of ‘labor power’ in units of time which enabled the  
extraction of surplus value – from Mito-chan and Matsuda-san’s pinhane, all the way up 
the pyramid of subcontractors – on the non-equivalent basis of commodity exchange. In 
The Human Motor, Anson Rabinbach thus writes of “labor power” that it is “both social 
and physiological, historically specific and at the same time a form of universal energy, 
or Kraft. Labor power represents the quantitative aspect of labor under capitalism.”28 The 
commodification of labor, of the dokata – as opposed to the tobi, tekkinya, or daiku, with 
whom the dokata enjoy “a relation between things” – is as arbitrary as it is social, as work 
on the “foundations” (kiso) actually paid less than other work on the construction site. Of 
course, the act of exchange itself produces the quantification of this “value-relation” – in 
                                                
28 Anson Rabinbach, The Human Motor: Energy, Fatigue, and the Origins of Modernity (Berkeley: Univer-
sity of California Press, 1992), pg. 74. Rabinbach quotes Engels: Labor power “is, in our present-day capi-
talist society, a commodity like every other commodity, but a very peculiar commodity. It has, namely, the 
peculiarity of being a value-creating force (my italics), the source of value, and moreover, when properly 
treated, the source of more value than it possesses itself” (74). 
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linear units of time – of ‘labor power,’ as if it always-already existed.29 The abstraction of 
‘labor power’ as “universal energy, or Kraft,” is immanent to the form of exchange itself 
in which the quantification of labor entails the conversion of ‘labor power’ into a socially 
useful object – the apartment block – to be sold.30 Yet, ‘labor power’ only becomes ‘labor 
power’ proper in its complete exhaustion. As Rabinbach cites Marx, the quantification of 
labor means its expenditure: “In the course of this activity, i.e., labor, a definite quantity 
of human muscle, nerve, brain, etc., is expended, and these things have to be replaced. 
Since more is expended, more must be received.”31 ‘Labor power’ thus emerges as a pure 
means. Rather than labor as a social metabolism, Rabinbach observes that the conception 
of labor for Marx is replaced by “sheer conversion of force.”32 It is this rationalization of 
labor as a pure means to the point of fatigue, and eventually, death, that is encountered in 
the hierarchical relation between overseers and workers at the construction site. For this 
reason, with no choice but to endure the limits of death-inducing fatigue – forced on them 
from above within the all-encompassing economy – it was said that the true hiyatoi (day 
laborer) prefers “money” (kane) over “health” (kenkō). 
Like the schedule of the construction site – of dates and deadlines of completion – 
for the laborer, the working day itself was subdivided into dockets of time (8:30 – 10:00, 
10:30 – 12:00, 13:00 – 15:00, 15:30 – 17:00) that fused the expenditure of bodily energy 
with the duration of time. Rabinbach writes of modern labor that there was an imperative 
in the late nineteenth century to understand motion “not only in terms of energy used, but 
                                                
29 Marx, Capital, pg. 163 – 165. 
30 Rabinbach writes in The Human Motor: “As Kraft is also the sum of energy of the universe, Arbeitskraft 
is objectified in the mass of commodities present in society” (75). 
31 Quoted in Anson Rabinbach, The Human Motor, pg. 75. 
32 Anson Rabinbach, The Human Motor, pg. 77. 
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also in terms of how it is deployed in space and in time.”33 At construction sites, the work 
day observed this imperative in that it was subdivided into compartments, whose passage 
was experienced as an anticipation of (a safe) ending, and across which energy was spent 
in motion. Like chronophotographic images of the late nineteenth century, time was thus 
spatialized, and the body occupied the center-piece of this spatialization, since the laborer 
had to know that, by the time it was 15:00 – or by the time he was 50, or 60 years old – 
he still had enough energy left to make it till the end of the day. It was precisely through 
such self-management, which necessitated working at “my pace” (mai pēsu) and slacking,  
that the top-down management of overseers was subverted. Of course, the best kind of 
working day was the “easy” (raku) one, which was physically undemanding and ended 
early. Yet the only work that ended early was konkuri, and this was not by prior decision, 
but in accordance with when the job was done. If the mixers came on time, the day could 
end as early as 15:00; if they did not, the day could last until 17:00. For this reason, when 
konkuri was taking place – with no breaks – the space of the apartment floor came to rep-
resent the passage of time. Since Hasekō constructed apartment blocks, every floor came 
pre-divided into equal-sized apartment blocks. These blocks were called “slabs” (surabu). 
Every uncemented slab came to signify a block of time: given that the mixers arrived on 
time, the guys could calculate the time necessary to conclude the floor. If more than half 
the slabs were finished before noon, things were looking positive, but it was never certain 
that the mixers would continue to arrive on time. 
No doubt, compartmentalizing the work day to manage its duration is not specific 
to the construction worker. The salaryman waits for lunch break and the end of the day as 
much as anybody. However, the day laborer and construction worker renders explicit the 
                                                
33 Ibid, pg. 93. 
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centrality and limits of the body, fatigue, and the blocking out of possible contingencies – 
of accidents – that is necessary to the smooth performance of capital accumulation. Risk 
of accidents is inescapable, and someone shoulders both its prevention and the cost of its 
outbreak. Moreover, the hiyatoi (day laborer) is disposed of by construction companies at 
17:00 every day. There is no binding contract between subcontractors and day laborers. 
The figure of the hiyatoi restores a certain non-contemporaneity to the emergence 
of a (supposedly) new class of “working poor” (wākingu pua) in contemporary Japan. It 
does so with a fading hope for recognition, and – as the troupe’s gambling habit attests –
an unashamed wish for luck to turn. Hence, when the mood was right in the drinkery and 
gambling center of Oiwake, Izukenji-san and Akia would occasionally sing the ‘80s hit 
song, “Sanya Blues,” on karaoke: 
Work today was tough    now there is only sipping shōchū 
Living in a doya there is anyways anyways, 
Nothing else    to do 
 
Drinking alone at the drinkery    the past that won’t return is nostalgic 
Crying and crying is to no purpose 
Sanya is my hometown now 
 
When construction is done, that’s it    we are the discarded  
It’s okay it’s okay the street-stander of Sanya 
Resenting society is to no purpose 
 
People talk badly of Sanya     but if we disappeared 
Buildings buildings and roads can’t be made 
Does nobody understand 
 
But we won’t cry    the world of working people like us 
Will certainly certainly come in time 
Let’s cry on that day, happy crying34 
                                                






Confined to sipping shōchū, and cut off from their families and pasts, the “street-stander” 
(tachinbō) of Sanya is made to repeat and re-experience severance from “society” (seken). 
Once construction is done, they are “discarded” (oharaibako). Precisely at the point when 
they had been restored to masculine sociality – and to lack in the equivalent form of the 
wage – this support is torn away. But Sanya has become the “hometown” (furusato) and 
the worker will not cry. They have their own pride, since they built Tokyo. Yet, recogni-
tion of this is deferred, and so the worker wishes that some day, his due will come. 
























What is gambling … but the art of producing in a second the changes that Destiny ordi-
narily effects only in the course of many hours or even many years, the art of collecting 
into a single instant the emotions dispersed throughout the slow-moving existence of or-
dinary men, the secret of living a whole lifetime in a few minutes. 






 Every Sunday morning, a steady flow of men can be seen heading in the direction 
of Asakusa from Sanya. As if they had taken on the musty complexion of the newspapers 
they carry tucked away under their arms, or in their backpockets, they can be recognized 
by their monotone, frayed clothing and their ghostly outer appearance. Be it on foot or by 
bus (the Tōei bus is free for welfare-recipients), everyone has one destination: WINS, the 
keiba (horse-gambling) hall in the Rokku area of Asakusa. Aficionados arrive early, even 
before the shutters are raised, standing impatiently in a crowd – as pachinko gamblers can 
be seen doing every morning, queuing to secure their lucky seat – waiting for the shutters 
to open and for the gambling to commence. By noon, and especially so on Sundays, when 
the high-profile races are screened, the six-story building of WINS is buzzing with 
crowds clumped around TV screens hanging from the ceiling. Most of the crowd is com-
posed of men in their middle-ages, yet young gamblers and women, are mixed in the 
crowd as well.  
Some sit on the staircases and in the few open spaces, by the walls and the corners 
of the hall, peering at the small print of the newspaper statistics spread on the floor before 
them. With pen in one hand and a stack of blank paper tokens by their side, they write on 
top of the statistics. Once they reach a decision, they fill in the numbers of their bet in the 
small circles on their paper token, using the signature plastic green pencil provided by 
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WINS. The circles have to be filled in completely; otherwise the machine will not read 
them. It is as if the gamblers are filling in the responses to a standardized exam with pre-
determined answers, except for the liquor, chaos and generalized hubbub of the gambling 
floors. Thus, some gamblers fill in their tokens by standing-room tables at the back of the 
hall. Others come armed with picnic chairs and reading glasses. Yet others are lined up to 
buy their bakken (actual gambling-tokens) at the machines against the front wall – before 
time expires! – and still others are queued to collect their returns. All the while, multiple 
screens on every floor rotate to show horse races from one corner of Japan to the other, as 
a ceaseless PA system announces the closure of betting periods, the start of new races and 
the final winnings. 
 The veritable fanaticism and effervescence inside WINS spills out of its gambling 
halls and into the surrounding areas of Asakusa, where, in the midst of the merriment of 
eateries, drinkeries, and kitsch street performances, blank gambling tokens are laid within 
hand’s reach as indoor TV screens show the races. In the back alleys of WINS can be 
found drinkeries that specialize in the clientele of WINS, offering cheap snacks – be it the 
regular fare that accompanies drinking such as gyōza, hiyayakko, yakizakana, tori no 
agemono, etc., or drinkeries that grill yakitori alongside the street. Smoke rises from their 
stalls as their intoxicated customers, bunched up, and boisterous, standing inside by high-
rise tables in front of a giant TV screen, smoke, talk, scream and laugh, creating a general 
atmosphere of exuberance. In each drinkery in these backstreets, blank paper tokens are 
placed on, if not spread across the tables, so that the clientele can fill these blank tokens 
in as the day progresses, walk over to WINS to buy their bakken, and settle back in front 
of the TV with a drink and food. Thus, on many Sundays, the guys in the Okinawa-gumi 
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would start their day early at a drinkery in Asakusa, or maybe even at the Okinawan res-
taurant, Gajū-Maru, before alcohol had gotten the better of them. Only towards two or 
three, would they head back to Oiwake with their bakken, and watch the main races there. 
Of course, by this point they would either be trashed and ready to crash, or be at the peak 
of conviviality: singing karaoke, watching the races, drinking mizuwari, beer, and eating, 
with a pile of shared cash lumped in the center of the table. 
 But keiba begins at WINS and it is there that all the tools the gambler requires can 
be acquired. These include a ¥100 ($1 USD) sports newspaper – everyone has a favorite; 
as Akia noted, the “newspaper has something to do with it” (shinbun mo kankei aru), that 
is, with winning, his preference being the Nikkan Sports – because the regular newspaper 
does not list gambling statistics. Also on sale are pamphlets that specialize on statistics of 
that day’s races, offering gamblers the added advantage of information tracking back the 
performance of each horse by ten or more races than the normal sports paper. Sold for an 
extra ¥400 – ¥500 ($4 – $5 USD), these pamphlets provide statistics on keiba, to the ex-
clusion of other news. The stalls on the ground floor of WINS also sell thick color pens in 
red, blue and black, for ¥100 – the minimum bet is ¥100 – designed for the gambler to 
over-write the statistics in the papers with their own divination. And free of charge, 
WINS provides the gambler with the flimsy, plastic green pencils with their pointed leads, 
and the blank paper tokens, both of which can be found in small receptacles hanging off 
the walls on each floor. It only remains for the gambler to bring money, fill in the circles, 
and purchase the bakken. As if to make the point clear, the machines upstairs do not even 
accept prospective tokens before cash has been put in. 
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Figure 3: Image of newspaper statistics from one keiba race, overwritten by the gambler’s hand. 
 
 While gamblers prepare, races are in constant progression such that only a fifteen 
minute interval separates race from race. Different screens, divided across the hall, screen 
different races. While a race is in live progress on one screen, another screen shows odds 
of an upcoming race, and another announces the returns of a past race. Depending on the 
season, horse races take place simultaneously in different parts of Japan: Tokyo, Sapporo, 
Kawasaki, Okayama, Fukushima, Yokohama, etc. Hence, if three locations are active on 
a certain Saturday or Sunday, races are announced by location and number, so that Tokyo 
race #2 is followed by Fukushima race #2, then Sapporo race #2, after which Tokyo race 
#3 takes place. It is toward the end of the day that the main races take place, and similarly, 
it is on Sundays that the especially high-profile races are held. In this way, the tension in 
the gambling hall rises as the day progresses, and from Saturday to Sunday. So too, high-
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profile races, like the “Emperor’s Cup” (Tennōshō) or “Japanese Derby” (Tokyo Yūshun),  
involving both well-known horses and jockeys, and a large stake, punctuate the calendri-
cal year, so that there is always something to anticipate. Of course, the hardened gambler 
can go to Kōrakuen to gamble on keiba every day of the week – in most locations, WINS 
only opens for the weekends – but Saturdays and Sundays constitute the main attractions, 
and, for the most part, were the only two days the Okinawa-gumi did keiba. 
The rotation of races ensured that, if a race the gambler had bet on was not in live 
progression, it was anticipated later in the day, much like particularly high-profile races – 
like the “Emperor’s Cup” – were anticipated through the year. Keiba gamblers were thus 
kept in constant expectation – not, however for the races to be over, like the working day, 
but rather – for the event of the race to occur. It was in the immediacy of the race, and the 
contingency of the winning horses-numbers that keiba held gamblers in its grip. In keiba 
– unlike kyōtei (boat-racing), in which the order of winning numbers was often decided in 
the first turn, and the inside boat had the advantage – this moment of intoxication arrived 
in the final 5 – 10 seconds of the race, when the horses would break into a sprint, and the 
configuration of numbers was thrown helter-skelter. Keiba focused on that experience of 
skirting the possibility of winning, and the repetition thereof, as much as on winning. 
But the trick was, of course, to turn a surplus from one’s bet. The guys would say 
“it’s okay as long as you win” (kate ba ī). However, winning ¥100 for ¥100 was a joke – 
less even than the “hourly wage” (jikyū)! – and for this reason, the guys would gamble on 
unlikely number configurations. At WINS, all the stages involved in turning a profit thus 
were condensed at once, as people could be seen “studying” (benkyō) the statistics, filling 
in their blank paper tokens, purchasing their bakken, standing glued to the TV screen, and 
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ripping up their bakken, or collecting their returns from the machine. When an especially 
unlikely configuration of numbers came in and the screen announced a preposterous sum 
of returns, somebody in the crowd might remark: “making a fool of us?” (baka ni shiteru 
ka?). For it was the common experience of gamblers that they lost more than they gained, 
or that they lost regularly. There were “waves” (nami) to winning and losing in gambling, 
so that gamblers in a slump – which each of the guys were most of the time – would wait 
for their time to come, and it would “certainly certainly come in time” (kitto kitto kuru sa 
sono uchi ni). Hence, Izukenji-san would say that “recently keiba isn’t coming” (keiba 
konai nā), and forthwith reassure himself that “it will come” (kuru sa kuru sa). However, 
at WINS, obsolete tokens littered the entirety of the floor, alongside a newspaper here 
and there, and partially filled tokens. It was a common habit for gamblers to tear or toss 
their losing tokens immediately after the race, such that a cleaner made the rounds every 
once in a while, sweeping between the feet of the standing crowds. 
Scavengers collected these tokens, in the hope of picking up a winning token that 
had been discarded. When the gambling hall was busy, such scavengers caused the ire of 
other gamblers by lining up at the machines with a stack of tokens picked from the floor. 
Inserting tokens one by one, they stalled the queue of gamblers anxious to place bets, and 
it was clear the tokens were not their own, because no money emerged from the machines. 
Only scavengers would insert valueless tokens into the machine, hoping that at least one 
winning token had been mistakenly discarded by its owner. The gambling halls of WINS 
were hunting ground for surplus value in whatever form it could be found. But ultimately, 
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the profits of the endlessly squandered lost tokens went to the Japanese state. For the state 
was owner of JRA (Japan Racing Association), which managed WINS.1  
 On the streets flanking WINS could also be found the old-fashioned soothsayers – 
“predictors” (yosōya) – selling their forecasts spread out, face-down on waist-high tables. 
Though their numbers had dwindled over the years, undoubtedly since their business had 
moved online and into newspapers, the yosōya could be found on Saturdays and Sundays 
surrounded by a small crowd of onlookers that was either listening intently to the yosōya 
or craning over upturned past prophecies, demonstrating the yosōya’s skill for getting the 
numbers right. Sometimes the yosōya sat silently behind his wares, and sometimes saying 
something, but generally allowing onlookers to take their look. At other times, he could 
be seen expostulating and putting on a real performance. By using his predictions of past 
races, the yosōya must convince the crowd before him that he possesses the knowledge to 
predict what the gambler should have known all along; or rather, what the gambler knew 
from looking at the statistics, but did not bet on. He is a magician of sorts, because where 
the newspaper provides a surfeit of information in numbers – starting with the number of 
the horse, its weight, its age, its final placement in past races, its shifting placement in the 
course of past races (did the horse begin in 15th place and move into 1st?), the distance of 
past races, the time it took, and the average ranking of the horse, the jockey, etc. – which 
the gambler has to decipher, the yosōya puts on a performance to convince the crowd that 
the face-down prediction is the unknown combination of winning numbers.2 With expert 
                                                
1 Japan Racing Association, 1/12/2014. 
2 In effect, the winning numbers are already written. The excess of abstract information regarding each race 
recalls Claude Lévi-Strauss’ observance (via Marcel Mauss) of a fundamental “contradiction” in language 
by which “there is always a non-equivalence or ‘inadequation’ between” the total system of signifiers and 
any given signified.” The magical effectivity of the copula – to be – achieves this adequation, necessary for 
symbolic thinking to function (Lévi-Strauss, Introduction to the Work of Marcel Mauss, 62 – 64). See also 
Ch. 2. 
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knowledge, the yosōya does for the keiba gambler what they would, in any case, have had 
to do on their own. However, only the decision to buy such knowledge from the yosōya – 
as yet another technique the gambler can employ, just as s/he chooses a particular paper – 
actualizes the performance of the yosōya. There must be something about the yosōya that 
compels this purchase, of which the size of the onlooking crowd constitutes the first indi-
cation. Under the assumption that a large crowd draws more people, the yosōya is said to 
work with a couple of buddies – called sakura (decoys) – standing about to give the im-
pression of a crowd. While the yosōya performed before a rapt crowd, someone might 
thus be seen nodding along, as yet another person pointed at the upturned cards, exclaim-
ing: “this is basic, this is basic!” (kore wa kihon da nā, kore wa kihon da nā!). Of course, 
it might also be wondered why the yosōya themselves did not gamble if they already 
knew the winning numbers. 
 The guys in the Okinawa-gumi literally gambled all the time. If not on keiba, then 
on kyōtei (boat-racing), keirin (bicycle-racing), hanafuda (flower-cards) or the lottery. If 
not on these, the guys were thinking of gambling. Ichi-san, the consummate construction 
worker whom Akia had also dubbed the “Paul Newman of Japan,” carried a NUMBERS 
lottery card in his wallet 24/7, and like a talisman this wallet never left his body. Whether 
it was a day off, or on the way to work, Ichi-san bought a new lottery card every morning, 
stuck it in his wallet, and kept it on him. 
It was as if the guys lived according to two distinct calendars. One was the regular, 
endless workday schedule – Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday … – and the other, 
that of gambling, doubling the first with the ever-present possibility of singular winnings. 
Sunday was the main gambling day of the week, and started the minute someone woke up. 
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Usually, Shokawa-san was the first to wake, as early as 7:00 or 8:00, when he would call 
Ichi-san or Akia – who never mastered the art of not picking up the phone, saying that he 
“valued his friends” (tomodachi o daiji ni suru) – to begin drinking. Nothing was open at 
this time, however, so the guys might kill a few hours sipping shōchū with a newspaper at 
the open-aired sushi bar by Mutō-san’s hole-in-the-wall, or perhaps even buy some Jinro 
or Kurokirishima at the convenience store, along with ice, plastic glasses, and water, and 
sit in an empty parking lot. By around 9:30, they could start heading towards Asakusa, or 
to Oiwake inside Iroha arcade, if Asakusa had become too far. In the latter case, someone 
in the group with a bicycle – usually, Nori-san – would be given cash, numbers and asked 
to buy bakken for everybody at WINS. Seven hours later, by 16:30, the main races would 
be over. Moto-san would have woken from the bench in Oiwake, making ready to escort 
Izukenji-san home. Shokawa-san would be staggering bow-legged out the sliding door, 
heading for the “next!” (tsugi!) place, and Akia – lamenting that he had been “called out” 
(yobidasareta) at 7:00 – would slip back to his doya unnoticed. Next day, on Monday, at 
work, some of the guys might confess they had no recollection of what had happened the 
day before. However, if somebody in the group or Sanya had won big the day before, the 
conversations in the train and changing rooms was infused with this news (or rumor). For 
news tended to spread quickly, so that the winnings of a remote acquaintance across town 
reached one within a day. Thus, the working week started on the back of a Sunday. 
Whether in a state of immediate readiness to gamble, or having lost so much cash 
that they had decided not to gamble, the troupe was in continuous contact with gambling 
in one form or another. On the train-rides to work or during breaks in the changing rooms, 
the statistics and yosō (predictions) for races – be it keiba, kyōtei, or keirin – were always 
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in somebody’s hands. This would spur occasional conversation, as one person might peer 
over the shoulders of the one holding the newspaper, and remark: “#7 is real likely to win, 
eh?” (Nanaban atama ga katai nā). Even if someone had (for the time being) decided to 
stop gambling, they always seemed able to recount the circumstances of upcoming races: 
the odds, the stakes, which horse (and jockey) was strong, and what combinations would 
give the highest yield. And if it was a less well-known race, a mere glance at the statistics 
seemed to give them instant insight into the intricacies of the race in question. Gambling, 
and especially keiba, formed a locus of social knowledge such that the guys could com-
municate in a string of ciphers – #7, #3, #13, #1; and in combination: #7 #3, #7 #1; and in 
triplets: #13 #7 #1, #3 #13 #7 – that were instantly recognizable to the other speaker since 
they, too, had looked at the race in question and knew what horses the numbers stood for. 
During breaks, lunch and sometimes even before work, Ichi-san would gamble with other 
workers in the changing rooms – albeit for smaller sums of ¥10, ¥100 or ¥1,000 (which it 
was rare to win) – with hanafuda (flower-cards), playing Koi Koi or Oichokabu. If it was 
Saturday and a main horse race was scheduled in break-time, from 15:00 – 15:30, one of 
the other workers might pull out their smart-phone (which functioned as a TV), and set it 
upright on the table for all to view. After Mito-chan had woken for tehai, Ichi-san might 
even call from work to tell Mito-chan to place kyōtei bets for himself and the others. If he 
won, Ichi-san returned to Mutō-san’s or Oiwake with his palm stretched out, demanding 
his money first thing.  
In fact, when Ichi-san had been staying in a doya, he kept track of the NUMBERS 
that won from day to day. A calendar hung in the room of his doya, on the back of which 
he would record the numbers that had won in columns. This enabled him to track patterns 
 316 
of numbers as they appeared, and to anticipate future numbers. If the number “3” had not 
appeared in a certain column for a long time, the likelihood of it soon appearing went up. 
By the same token, if the number “3” had appeared on consecutive days, the likelihood of 
this pattern continuing went down. Hence, the numbers were observed to follow the laws 
of probability; within limits, the gambler could predict the course of future numbers. But 
there was a variety of ways to play, or win, at NUMBERS. One way, quite simply, was to 
doggedly pursue or “chase” (oikakeru) the same number – like the lucky horse – over and 
over again. And there could be a variety of reasons why somebody had a preference for a 
certain number. It might be a number the person had won with numerous times before, or 
the number might have a special meaning for the person – a calendrical date, for instance 
– that prompted them to repeat it. In any case, such a number was individualized and had 
that special air of being lucky; although, there were specific numbers that were generally 
known to be unlucky, like shi (four), which also meant “death” (shi). Finally, the gambler 
of the lottery, NUMBERS, could, like seeking out the yosōya, have a computer assign a 
number on the basis of a calculation of probabilities. Each of these techniques constituted 
a legitimate means of gambling, of which the gambler could avail him or herself as it felt 
right. Regardless of the technique, a win was credited not to chance, but to the acumen of 
the gambler who placed the bet. And as a daily investment, the monotony of the working 
day was doubled by a no less repetitious, long-term gambling habit, in which the numbers 
and abstraction of the daily wage assumed a life of their own. Ichi-san had yet to win big 
at NUMBERS. Yet when he had insufficient funds, he would say: “it’s okay, NUMBERS 
will come” (daijōbu, NUMBERS ga kuru). 
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What every one of the guys hoped for – and no doubt also, every gambler – was a 
big win. Everyone, moreover, had a story of how they had won a considerable amount of 
money at some point in the past. Akia would recount how he had won ¥150,000 ($1,500 
USD) on an off-chance bet he had hardly thought about. Ichi-san would recall the time he 
had won ¥500,000 ($5,000 USD), and how incredibly good the noise of the machine had 
sounded as it counted his money – pure sound of excess – before he flicked the cash into 
his pocket. And Misaaru and Nori-san won big sums in the two years I was there, the lat-
ter, repeatedly. Such experiences were said to be formative of the inveterate gambler, for 
that was how one became “hooked” (hamaru). Then there were stories of people who had 
bought cars, or houses, with profits from gambling, yet everyone knew that it was simply 
impossible to make a “living” (seikatsu) from gambling. Overall, they lost more than they 
won. Yet every time the screens at WINS or Oiwake announced the returns on main races, 
it confirmed that somebody out there had taken the jackpot. Ichi-san had actually worked 
with someone who had won so much at NUMBERS that he did not have to work any-
more. And the mass media, too, was complicit in the production of the myth that it was 
possible to make a living from keiba. In fact, while I was in Japan, everyone spoke excit-
edly of an incident in which the state had charged someone with tax evasion for not de-
claring the ¥3 billion ($30 million USD) they had earned from horse-racing.3 Everyone in 
the Okinawa-gumi had their theory of how this had been possible – the person had started 
betting low, then spread their bets … – but it all began with ¥100 ($1 USD). 
                                                
3 See Naver Matome, “Kyōtei de 30 Oku En Haitō ni Kyogaku no Ken Tsuichōkazei o Kaisetsu Shite Mita,” 
6/8/2014. 
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Sums like ¥3 billion signified an impossible, incommensurable amount of money 
that the guys could only dream of winning.4 The magnitude of the sum recalls Immanuel 
Kant’s writing on the “mathematical sublime,” as “that which is great beyond all compar-
ison.”5 Indeed, if Frances Ferguson is correct in noting that the longing for the sublime – 
and the “irreplaceable subjectivity” it would confirm – emerges most powerfully with the 
advent of capitalism and its subject of equivalent value, it can be observed that capitalism 
functions precisely to maintain (if not amplify desire for) the sublime aspect of gambling, 
and that it was no coincidence that laborers, already so alienated in the commodity form, 
were held in thrall by the mythic magnitude of money.6 Gambling, moreover, appeared to 
reverse the position of the worker vis-à-vis the commodity: no longer selling, but buying 
– even squandering – with the aim of turning an excess from their tokens. Of course, their 
losses went to the state, like their wages spent – to the last drop – on alcohol in Sanya fed 
the economy. But the thrill and intoxication of gambling – the high of skirting so close to 
the real of coincidence – rejuvenated the body and implied an aptitude for seeking out the 
contingent precisely there where the shock factor would be greatest. Contrary to the work 
of the construction worker, the gambler in the crowd sought the encounter with the shock 
of the accidental. 
Hence, it was common to compliment gamblers who won, because gambling was 
not regarded as a mere game of chance, but rather, as one that required a certain skill and 
knowledge. But this aptitude was differentiated from the skill of work, for gambling was 
not labor. This was the case regardless of the specific types of gambling. Whether it was 
keiba, keirin, kyōtei, Koi Koi, Oichokabu, Don Don, or the lottery, the winner was always 
                                                
4 Adorno & Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, pg. 8 – 9. 
5 Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgement, pg. 132. 
6 Frances Ferguson, “The Nuclear Sublime,” in Diacritics (14.2 (1984)), pg. 6. 
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congratulated and applauded. When Nori-san won ¥100,000 ($1,000 USD) several times 
in a row at keiba, Akia would look at his numbers and remark: “and to think that he wins 
with this” (kore de katsun damon nā). Someone else might say to a winner: “all the credit 
to you” (sasuga da nā). On the floors of WINS, gamblers would compliment one another, 
and the winner would stand tall. Yet the skill and knowledge of the gambler was of a very 
specific type, and seemed to involve “instinct” (kan) far more than rational forethought or 
calculation. This “instinct” (kan) could lead the gambler to seek the yosōya, as much as it 
could lead the lottery-gambler to buy a computer-generated token, or to fill out their own 
numbers. Walter Benjamin thus writes that the trick for the gambler was for the “contact 
between his motor stimuli and “fate”” to remain intact.7 Simply predicting an outcome, as 
every gambler knew, did not have the slightest significance if a bet was not placed. It was 
one thing to predict, quite another to gamble. The artistry of gambling was only disclosed 
through the practice of risk: of staking one’s money. This also gave the lie to the yosōya, 
for the failure of the yosōya to bet only indicated that contact between the body and “fate,” 
or coincidence, had been severed.8 Thus, the key to gambling, Akia would say, was “not 
to think about it too much” (amari kangaenaide). The guys would laugh at the bets that I 
placed, perhaps even passing my numbers around, slanting their heads with a wry grin, as 
if there was little chance the horses would come in as I had bet on them; and if they did, it 
would not make any money anyways! For I had simply mixed up the order of the highest-
ranked horses, and thrown in a wild card here and there. Yet every gambler knew that the 
                                                
7 Walter Benjamin, “Notes on a Theory of Gambling,” in Selected Writings: Volume 2, Part 1, 1927 – 1930, 
trans. Rodney Livingston et al., ed. Jennings, Michael W., Howard Eiland, and Gary Smith (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1999), pg. 298. 
8 Benjamin writes: “When a winning number is clearly predicted but not bet on, the man who is not in the 
know will conclude that he is in excellent form and that next time he just needs to act more promptly, more 
boldly. Whereas anyone familiar with the game will know that a single incident of this kind is sufficient to 
tell him that he must break off instantly. For it is a sign that the contact between his motor stimuli and “fate” 
has been interrupted” (“Notes on a Theory of Gambling,” 298). 
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horses rarely came in as the yosō (predictions) in the paper had forecast. Only an amateur 
would have bet as I did. Admittedly, when I won three consecutive races, each garnering 
me ¥100 for the ¥100 I had staked, it elicited the laughter of the guys once again. And yet, 
when I placed bets on horses that appeared highly unlikely – if not guaranteed not to win 
– the guys would laugh, but then retract and state: “I don’t know, it might come with that 
…” (shiranai yo, sore de kurun jya nai …). For they were all believers in “beginner’s 
luck” (begināzu rakku), as if gambling necessitated a faculty the seasoned gambler was in 
short supply of. In thinking too much, indeed, knowing too much, the connectivity of “in-
stinct” (kan) to the futurity of numbers was sacrificed. 
There did, however, exist a corpus of knowledge requisite to success at gambling, 
without which the gambler would have been ill-equipped to embark on “battle” (shōbu). 
In brief, the gambler had to know how to read the statistics in the newspaper – for keirin, 
keiba, kyōtei – and the rules, as well as the various cards in games of hanafuda. This was 
enough: the gambler needed to know no more. Of course, long experience brought with it 
knowledge of a profusion of further facts, and honed techniques in their application. The 
guys, for instance, were able to read the statistics of the newspaper with but a glance, as if 
the surfeit of miniscule numbers registered with them in a photographic instant. They also 
knew the names and career profiles of famous horses and jockeys – although, horses were, 
without exception, referred to by number – and even their breed and offspring. In keiba, it 
was said “the horse is 70%, the jockey is 30%” (uma wa 70%, kishu wa 30%). Naturally, 
such knowledge shifted with kyōtei (boat-racing) and keirin (bicycle-racing), although the 
guys were as acquainted with the names of strong racers in both. In kyōtei, the boat on the 
inside lane – #1 – had a decided advantage; so much so, that it was not unusual for #1 to 
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place first for an entire day. Moreover, in kyōtei, the woman-racers were said to be 
“strong” (tsuyoi) in comparison to their counterparts. Keirin constituted a whole other 
ballgame, in which racers (who competed in teams) would pair up and strategize to take 
the final lead. Keirin gamblers were said to be particularly fanatic, as the race did not in-
volve horses, or machines – but “humans” (ningen) – who did not hesitate to knock 
shoulders against one another or even to bump another racer down. There was one such 
person living in Akia’s doya, who would go to keirin every day, and even travel about 
Japan, chasing his favorite racer. And then, there was hanafuda (flower-cards), which 
functioned as numbered cards for the game, Oichokabu, which Pin-san sponsored – ille-
gally – by the entryway to Iroha, and as sets in Koi Koi, which workers played most fre-
quently in the changing rooms. The latter especially required knowledge of the deck, and 
lucid memory, because the gambler had to keep track of the other player’s cards. There 
was also Don Don – a “bluffing” (hattari) game – that the guys would play in Izukenji-
san’s apartment after hours and hours of eating, since Nē-san particularly liked it. And at 
Hagiwara-san’s apartment, located on the second floor above Mutō-san’s hole-in-the-wall, 
the guys would get together once per week to play mahjong, of which Riku-san would 
explain that it was about “sticking it out” (tsupparu); adding that “people are the same 
way” (hito mo onaji), and that it was “over” (owari) otherwise. Finally, there were dice 
games, like Chinchirorin, which a Kanamachi man would sponsor every morning one 
alley down from Sanyūkai (until he was jailed for murder), and which especially had to 
do with speed, instantaneity, and lack of hesitation.  
In addition to knowing this multifarious array of games (and more), there was also 
a less rational factor to knowledge of gambling. Ichi-san, for instance, would observe that 
 322 
after decades of playing Koi Koi, “for some unknown reason” (naze ka shiranai kedo) the 
matsu (pine) cards tended to appear towards the bottom of the deck. However, there were 
as many matsu cards in the deck as there were cards in the other suits, and no reason why 
cards of the matsu suit should stick to the bottom of the shuffled deck. Similarly, Ichi-san 
would say that there were times in gambling when, for some inexplicable reason the same 
numbers kept repeating. For keiba, in which the starting lanes of horses had nothing to do 
with their likelihood of winning, such repetition occurred when the same number kept 
winning, regardless of the horse and race.9 When this actually happened, someone might 
note: “oh, it’s #7 again” (a, mata nanaban da). Or, fed up with missing the mark, they 
might shout: “what, it’s #7 again?!” (eh, mata nanaban kayō?!). Such patterns were 
“strange” (okashī), because they defied rational expectation, and made it seem as if the 
numbers led a life of their own; the numbers no longer signified horses or boats, but by 
coincidence, seemed to signify on their own.10 It gave the guys the intimation that other 
forces were at work than the rationally probabilistic. There was a distinct sense in which 
                                                
9 Himself an incorrigible gambler, Fyodor Dostoyevsky writes of roulette in his autobiographically based 
“The Gambler,” in Great Short Works of Fyodor Dostoyevsky, trans. Constance Garnett (Princeton: Peren-
nial Classics, 1968): “It seemed as though fate were urging me on. This time, as luck would have it, a cir-
cumstance occurred which, however, is fairly frequent in the game. Chance favours red, for instance, ten or 
even fifteen times in succession. I had heard two days before that in the previous week red had turned up 
twenty-two times in succession; it was something which had never been remembered in roulette, and it was 
talked about with amazement. Every one, of course, abandoned red at once, and after the tenth time, for 
instance, scarcely any one dared to stake on it. But none of the experienced players staked black either. The 
experienced gambler knows what is meant by this “freak of chance.” It would mean that after red had won 
sixteen times, at the seventeenth time the luck would infallibly fall on black. Novices at play rush to this 
conclusion in crowds, double and treble their stakes, and lose terribly” (489). 
10 Freud writes of the repetition and coincidence of numbers in his essay on “The ‘Uncanny’”: “If we take 
another class of things, it is easy to see that there, too, it is only this factor of involuntary repetition which 
surrounds what would otherwise be innocent enough with an uncanny atmosphere, and forces upon us the 
idea of something fateful and inescapable when otherwise we should have spoken only of ‘chance’. For 
instance, we naturally attach no importance to the event when we hand in an overcoat and get a cloak-room 
ticket with the number, let us say, 62; or when we find that our cabin on a ship bears that number. But the 
impression is altered if two such events, each in itself different, happen close together – if we come across 
the number 62 several times in a single day, or if we begin to notice that everything which has a number – 
addresses, hotel rooms, compartments in railway trains – invariably has the same one, or at all events one 
which contains the same figures. We do feel this to be uncanny” (“The ‘Uncanny,’” 213 – 214). 
 323 
the “thinking” (kangaeru), “studying” (benkyō), and predicting of number configurations 
yielded nothing, yet had to be done precisely to be set aside and forgotten. 
Once someone started winning, it happened that they went on a veritable winning-
streak. Hence, there were “waves” (nami) to gambling, and Sanya – a combination of the 
sign for yama (mountain) and tani (valley) – had its lows and its highs. Benjamin writes 
of the “fact that no one has so many chances of betting on a winning number as someone 
who has just made a significant win. This means that the correct sequence is based not on 
any previous knowledge of the future but on a correct physical disposition, which is in-
creased in immediacy, certainty, and uninhibitedness by every confirmation, such as is 
provided by a win.”11 When saying that it was best in gambling “not to think about it too 
much” (amari kangaenaide), Akia would thus mimic the gesture of quickly sketching in a 
gambling token, as if responding to a spur-of-the-moment “instinct” (kan) or “feeling” 
(fīringu). The gesture of the sketch follows Benjamin’s observation that the gambler must 
use “their hands sparingly, in order to respond to the slightest innervations.”12 Writing in 
the numbers with a heavy hand would have involved too much consciousness. Keeping in 
touch with the numbers necessitated a blind gesture of the body – thus, “beginner’s luck” 
(begināzu rakku) – which responded to the “slightest innervations.”13 Rather than “opti-
cal" consciousness, as Benjamin writes, the gambler had to respond to the “motor inner-
vations (inspiration).”14 The first bout of any winning streak thus came unexpectedly, that 
is, before the certainty and confidence of repetition hit in. Akia would recall how, as he 
                                                
11 Walter Benjamin, “Notes on a Theory of Gambling,” pg. 298. 
12 Ibid, pg. 298. For a further consideration of gambling and “innervation,” see Miriam Bratu Hansen’s 
“Room-for-play: Benjamin’s Gamble with Cinema,” in October 109 (2004). 
13 Walter Benjamin writes: “The gambler’s basic approach must, so to speak, adumbrate the subtlest net-
work of inhibitions, which lets only the most minute and unassuming innervations pass through its meshes” 
(“Notes on a Theory of Gambling,” 298). 
14 Ibid, pg. 297 – 298. 
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was just about to leave WINS, he decided to place one last bet for the hell of it. Hardly 
looking at the newspaper – skimming across and sketching in what felt right – he placed a 
¥100 bet on “three-in-a-row” (sanrentan); the hardest configuration to win, meaning that 
all three horses had to cross the line in correct order, placing first second and third. Then, 
when Akia was getting ready to leave and the order of winning horses was announced, he 
moved his eyes back and forth in disbelief from his bakken to the screen, squinting to see 
if the last number on the screen matched his own. And out of the machine came ¥100,000 
($1,000 USD)! This very same Akia would go through slumps at keiba, so much so that 
he would quit altogether – cursing: “no matter how much, there is never enough money” 
(ikura kane ga attemo tarinai) – however, when he won, as he did one day at Mutō-san’s, 
he would win repeatedly. First at kyōtei at Mutō-san’s, then keirin at the open-aired sushi 
stall, Akia would go back and forth, collecting money, scanning the statistics as if seeing 
through them, and comment on screening races as if he had seen them before. The crowd 
of marveling regulars would turn to him, baking in the summer sun, and call him 
“sensei.”15  
In fact, everyone knew of an incident in which somebody had won several million 
yen at Mutō-san’s hole-in-the-wall. Not knowing quite what to do, Mutō-san had gone to 
Kanamachi-ikka – his guarantor – to collect the funds. Otherwise, the guys said, “no one 
would gamble there” (dare mo yaranai). Next day, the same person gambled at the open-
                                                
15 Of the winning streak in roulette, Dostoyevsky writes in “The Gambler”: “Black won. I don’t remember 
my winnings after, nor what I staked on. I only remember as though in a dream that I won, I believe, six-
teen thousand florins; suddenly three unlucky turns took twelve thousand from it; then I staked the last four 
thousand on passe (but I scarcely felt anything as I did so: I simply waited in a mechanical senseless way) – 
and again I won; then I won four times running. I only remember that I gathered up money in thousands; I 
remember, too, that the middle twelve won most often and I kept to it. It turned up with a sort of regularity, 
certainly three or four times in succession, then it did not turn up twice running and then it followed three 
or four times in succession. Such astonishing regularity is sometimes met with in streaks, and that is what 
throws inveterate gamblers who calculate with a pencil in their hands out of their reckoning. And what hor-
rible ironies of fate happen sometimes in such cases!” (488). 
 325 
aired sushi stall next to Mutō-san’s – also backed by the Kanamachi-ikka – and won the 
same amount again. This time, the Kanamachi-ikka backed the loss, but the man was told 
never to return. 
The consummate gambler wins by betting on an unexpected number combination. 
To a certain extent, of course, the decision to bet on unlikely combinations formed part of 
the repertoire of skills the gambler employed to make more money, in the event that s/he 
should win. The gambler had to know both which races had a large stake (the main ones), 
and which races the horses, boats or bicyclists were most likely to come in contrary to the 
official predictions. The keiba races held during the week at Kōrakuen, for instance, were 
unlikely to yield large returns, both because the stake was small, and the horses tended to 
arrive according to expectation. These races were unexciting. The trick was to bet against 
the odds, and to win big. In short, the gambler of keiba was on the lookout for a breakout 
which went against the odds, without being altogether unthinkable. In kyōtei, in which the 
inside boat had the decided advantage, it was thus common to include #1 in bets, but then 
to pair it – since betting on #1 #2 would yield no returns – with a less likely number, like 
#6. Nothing felt as good as winning in kyōtei on #6, the boat in the outer lane. It was also 
common for Ichi-san to place kyōtei bets together with others. Since only six boats raced 
in kyōtei, there were fewer possible boat combinations than horses in keiba – 30 for “two-
in-a-row” (nirentan), 120 for “three-in-a-row” (sanrentan) – and he would try to cover all 
the likely bases. Pulling ¥500 from people left and right (the minimum bet at Oiwake and 
Mutō-san’s was ¥500), with the promise of sharing the winnings, Ichi-san placed bets on 
a variety of combinations, but this, too, was usually to no avail. At the instant of the first 
turn, something unaccounted for invariably happened, only to be confirmed at the second 
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turn, by which point the result of the race were as good as done. Ichi-san would then sigh, 
shake his head, leave the immediacy of the TV screen, and sit back down with mizuwari. 
In such instances, there was a distinct sense in which the gambler felt duped by the game. 
At WINS, this might elicit comments like not “to push it” or “make a fool of” (nameru-
na) the gambler. 
Knowing from past experience that winning occurred when it was least expected, 
the guys would try to replicate the circumstances preceding the original bet that was won. 
Everybody could recount the story of having once won big, and more significantly, could 
clearly remember the details leading up to the event. Like Akia’s experience of winning 
¥150,000, the circumstances preceding the event were inscribed on consciousness like the 
lucid after-image of shock. It might be that the the person had stood in a particular spot at 
WINS, had eaten rāmen noodles beforehand, had bet on a particular horse or jockey, or 
on a specific lucky number. In pachinko, there were likewise lucky machines and espe-
cially prosperous times of the month; and not so prosperous ones, when Ai-chan (the in-
veterate pachinko gambler at Sanyūkai) would mutter that the machines were “bullying” 
(ijiwaru) him. Pachinko gamblers would queue in the early morning to secure their lucky 
seat, before someone else took it and thus, would try to keep their winning-streak by 
maintaining the patterns that had surrounded it from the beginning. The singular, giving 
quality of the machines pachinko gamblers chose was, in effect, besmirched when some-
body else sat at them. Not only this, but the money the machine “put out” (dasu) was no 
longer theirs. By the same token, the guys never shared their keiba numbers with one an-
other – unless they were placing bets to cover bases – until the moment of purchasing 
their bakken. Leading up to this, comments exchanged remained within the sphere of not-
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ing that such and such horse was “likely to win” (atama ga katai). Gambling and winning 
with “someone else’s numbers” (hoka no hito no bangō) was not considered an altogether 
legitimate means of winning, for the labor invested in the numbers had to be one’s own, 
and the quality of the bakken was compromised by being the equivalent of another. Sin-
gular winnings required singular, personalized combinations. Clearly this was not suffi-
cient to securing a win. Yet, these practices disclosed a recognition of the less rational, 
embodied facet of gambling. 
Alas, as the coincidence of numbers, connectivity to winning occurred at the final 
possible instant, and materialized in the condensation of time. Benjamin says that it is “at 
the critical moment of danger (of missing his chance), that a gambler discovers the trick 
of finding his way around the table, of reading the table.”16 Akia placed that winning bet 
of ¥150,000 the minute before closing time for that race. Likewise with quick dice games 
like Chinchirorin, it is the very moment and gesture of throwing the dice that decides the 
outcome. So too, when teaching me Don Don – in which the aim was to pull an identical 
pair of hanafuda cards – Moto-san would half-jokingly, half-seriously, insist that I had to 
hold the pair of cards together “real tight, real tight!” (gyutto, gyutto!) before slowly slid-
ing the one card down to reveal the other; as if holding them tight and leaning one’s body 
into them could make the card numbers bleed into each other. In Koi Koi, too, in which it 
helped to pull identical cards from the deck, it was common practice to throw those cards 
down fervently with “spirit” (kiai). In fact, a soft mat had been placed on the table for this 
purpose. Ichi-san would comment at how “unskilled” (heta) I was at pulling lottery cards, 
and, half-seriously, half-jokingly, would show me how to pull a winning card out the box. 
Of course, in dice games, as in most hanafuda games, the moment of motor-connectivity 
                                                
16 Walter Benjamin, “Notes on a Theory of Gambling,” pg. 297. 
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to the winning numbers almost coincided with their materialization. Different games had 
different rhythms, and various displacements of the intoxicating instant of truth. Dice was 
instantaneous. With Oichokabu, Don Don, or Koi Koi, the moment arrived when all cards 
were finally revealed. In keiba, kyōtei, and keirin, the last possible moment to place one’s 
bet was separated from the race by a period of five minutes. Yet as gambling races proper, 
they demonstrated precisely the qualities of “acceleration and danger” – of “not winning” 
– that Benjamin observes in gambling.17 With kyōtei, this moment came at the beginning 
of the race, because the order of winning boats was usually established on the first turn (if 
not, on the second), when the leading boat put distance between itself and others. In keiba 
and keirin, however, this moment did not arrive until the end of the race, when the horses 
and bicycles accelerated into a sprint. At WINS, the last five to ten seconds of races were 
thus accompanied by shouting and exultation. Sometimes, a computer image was needed 
to determine the order of horses, so narrow was the margin. Time, in those moments, was 
condensed into an immediate experience of contingency, mediated by the instantaneity of 
the TV screen. 
As much as the pleasure of betting on the right numbers, however, it was missing 
the mark – the very danger of gambling – as much as winning, that propelled the gambler 
to repeat the act. Every single one of the guys, as well as the gamblers at Sanyūkai, would 
talk of coming close to winning. The same two horses they had bet on would win, but in 
the opposite order from which they had bet! Just watching the last fifteen seconds of any 
keiba race on which one had bet, there was the thrill of horses reaching for the finish line, 
and of the possibility that anything could happen. There was also another way to achieve 
                                                
17 Ibid, pg. 298. Benjamin writes: “Furthermore, one should note the factor of danger, which is the most 
important factor in gambling, alongside pleasure (the pleasure of betting on the right number)” (“Notes on a 
Theory of Gambling,” 298). 
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the singularity of an incommensurable win, and this was in the sheer negativity of loss; a 
propensity towards self-destruction that was most compatible with the liquor intake of the 
guys. However, it was first and foremost the form of the transformation of time that was 
addictive to the gambler. Regardless of whether s/he won or lost, every race, but especial-
ly high-profile ones – in which vast sums could be won – exposed gamblers to the possi-
bility of overturning the objective conditions of their lives. This possibility was proferred 
to them in the form of compressed time, for, as Anatole France writes, gambling was “the 
art of producing in a second the changes that Destiny ordinarily effects only in the course 
of many hours or even many years.”18 Contrary to the endless time of the working day, in 
which time was emptied out in anticipation for it to have been done, and the nerves of the 
body exhausted in an unrelenting necessity of registering, blocking and protecting against 
contingency, the time of gambling deceived the gambler into believing in the possibility 
of making infinite gains in an instant. In appearance, too, gambling – of which keiba was 
iconic, iterated across an array of variations – seemed to reverse the conditions of surplus 
production, insofar as, in the moment of gambling that preceded either victory or loss, the 
gambler was now owner of the bakken, the horse, the stocks, or the commodity (of time) 
from which surplus was extracted, in no time at all! In reality, of course, s/he had become 
the avid consumer of a commodity with no use-value, except for the intrinsic thrill of the 
experience, and whose obsolescence was as instantaneous and as cruel as that of the day 
laborer drained of labor power. 
Yet after (a week of) work, alcohol loosened the nerves, and the form of gambling 
seemed to redeem time. The experience of having once won haunted the gambler, so that 
                                                
18 Quoted in Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project, trans. Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin (Cam-
bridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999), pg. 498 – 499. 
 330 
s/he sought to repeat it, and the gambler was, in effect, “hooked” (hamatteru) by the lucid 
first experience of winning, as if the contingency of the event had pierced consciousness. 
Contrary to the construction site, where consciousness had to register and buffer all sorts 
of dangers, gambling involved a compulsion driven to repeat the original coincidence of 
winning. However, like losing, winning too, was never sufficient. In their conversion into 
money-form, winning combinations invariably produced a remainder of the real – just as 
losers witnessed how close they had come! – for it was always possible to have bet more. 
Thus, winners would take their winnings and, either augment their next bet, or strategize 
by spreading out their next bets. It was one thing to win, say, ¥10,000 from a bet of ¥100. 
But the art of gambling resided in taking that ¥10,000, and – like the mythic person who 
had won ¥3 billion – transforming it to a hundred times or a thousand times that figure; 
that is, until the winning-streak waned, and the unpleasurable side of jouissance emerged 
to the fore. 
Thus, the compulsive gambler desired the experience of shock and of coincidence 
that replicated the first encounter. It was the penetration of that “protective shield against 
stimuli,” of which Freud writes in Beyond the Pleasure Principle precisely with regard to 
war, mechanization, and machinery – erected so relentlessly at the construction site – that 
the worker sought to break down.19 In this respect, the statistics in the newspaper took the 
place of consciousness at the workplace. Where consciousness otherwise would have ex-
hausted itself in outlining and weighing an endless list of details, the newspaper provided 
this information ready-made. By doing the work of intellect for the gambler, the statistics 
could, in effect, “isolate what happens from the realm in which it could affect the experi-
                                                
19 Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, pg. 43. 
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ence” of the gambler.20 The newspapers thereby functioned as a mere means of holding a 
surfeit of information in check, without acting upon it – hence, enabling the gambler to 
“adumbrate the slightest network of inhibitions” – and allowing “instinct” (kan) to do the 
work of scanning, sketching, and, by reacting to “the most minute and unassuming inner-
vations,” to divine a winning code.21 It was self-evident from the sheer excess of figures, 
already abstracted into readily-digestible form, that the gambler could not aggregate their 
entirety. The gambler rather wrote on top of the statistics with a marker, circling here and 
there, and in their own shoddy handwriting, numbered the horses. Likewise, the specialty 
pamphlets for ¥500 aided gamblers, not by enabling them to “study” (benkyō), but on the 
contrary: by allowing them to shut out yet a larger portion of unnecessary information. 
Fingers crossed, the bakken bought on the back of this surfeit of abstract signifiers 
is the winning combination. For the sheer surfeit of statistics foregrounded the absence of 
the only significant numbers – of the first three horses – which the gambler, like a sooth-
sayer, had to provide. Of course, gamblers knew all too well that their chances of winning 
were slim, and that, any winning-streak would end. Nevertheless, they persisted in betting, 
and at times, to the point of ruin. Purchased at the last moment in an impatient queue, the 
bakken took on the value of the material fetish, which had to be renewed – like Ichi-san’s 
daily NUMBERS lottery card – with the wish for success. The express purpose of the 
bakken was not to protect against, but of standing in, to be exchanged for a singular sum 
of money. 
                                                
20 Walter Benjamin, “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire,” in Illuminations, trans. Harry Zohn, ed. Hannah Ar-
endt (Schocken Books: New York, 1968), pg. 158 
21 Walter Benjamin, “Notes on a Theory of Gambling,” pg. 297. 
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Notably, the sheer abstraction of statistics in the papers, not to mention, that of the 
bakken, recalls Marx’s elaboration of the dual character of the commodity-form.22 When 
gamblers spoke of horses, moreover, it was purely in numbers, as if the material qualities 
of the horse and jockey simply did not exist. Naturally, there existed famous jockeys and 
horses, like Yutaka Take who rode Deep Impact, or Secretariat in the USA, whose tokens 
at the famous Belmont race gamblers were said to have retained, rather than exchange for 
money.23 Yet, when it came to filling in the token, horses were indicated in numbers, and 
odds determined the final returns. Like financial stocks, the numbers of keiba took on a 
life of their own to be finally exchanged into a monetary figure. With the exception of the 
names of the horse and jockey, and a particular characteristic of the horse – maybe it was 
strong towards the end of the race, or good at “breaking out” (nukedasu) – every piece of 
other information was written in numbers. Yet, while the language of gambling was thor-
oughly abstracted into figures, in its secrecy, the bakken bore the signature of the gambler 
from the moment of its inscription and purchase. Hence, it was established that there was 
a connection between Akia and myself from the very first day we went to WINS, before I 
had even learned to read the statistics, because I won on numbers precisely the reverse of 
what he had bet on. Strictly speaking, they were his numbers, but I actualized their value. 
The bakken had to be kept secret, so it could not be considered apart from the person who 
had written it. Albeit of baseball, on which the guys also gambled, Riku-san would speak 
of the Hiroshima Toyo Carp as a team primarily owned by Mazda – a car company which 
was not in the same league as major manufacturers like Nissan or Toyota – and its play-
ers, who were also underdogs to the major teams. Yet, they all played with their “might 
                                                
22 Marx, Capital, pg. 126. 
23 Lawrence Scanlan, The Horse God Built: The Untold Story of Secretariat, the World’s Greatest Race 
Horse (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2007), pg. 190 – 191. 
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and main!” (isshōkenmei!). Nor did they use many “foreigners” (gaijin). In fact, the one 
foreigner on their team was underpaid and would “do his best!” (gambatteru!). In short, 
the Hiroshima Toyo Carp relied on their strength without purchasing outside help. They 
might be ranked third, but “everyone knows of them” (minna shitteiru). Coupled with his 
observation that mahjong, like “people” (ningen), is about “sticking it out” (tsupparu), 
Riku-san disclosed his life-philosophy in gambling. So too, Akia would speak of being a 
“man” (otoko) and of the importance of “seeing things through” (suji o tōsu). No doubt, 
the numbers on their bakken reflected their personal favorites, as well, and it was this 
quality that personalized the token, set it on its way to a singular value, and rendered its 
final monetary value their very own. 
The necessity of making a claim to one’s winnings – in the name, no less, than of 
being an otoko (man) – sprung from the equivalent form of money itself.24 Hence, the act 
of gambling must be considered over against the “daily wage” (nittō) of the working day. 
For the wage determined the form of time in which value was conferred upon the worker, 
and in which he gave himself – in exchange – to be recognized. 
 
 Walter Benjamin observes a formal congruence between the automatic motions of 
the gambler and factory worker. Working out of Freud’s writing on repetition and trauma, 
Benjamin notes the similarity of form in the repetitious bodily motions of the two. In “On 
Some Motifs in Baudelaire,” he writes that since “each operation at the machine is just as 
                                                
24 Jacques Derrida writes: “Effects of signatures are the most common thing in the world. But the condition 
of possibility of those effects is simultaneously, once again, the condition of their impossibility, of the im-
possibility of their rigorous purity. In order to function, that is, to be readable, a signature must have a re-
peatable, iterable, imitable form; it must be able to be detached from the present and singular intention of 
its production. It is its sameness which, by corrupting its identity and singularity, divides its seal [sceau] 
(“Signature Event Context,” 20).  
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screened off from the preceding operation as a coup in a game of chance is from the one 
that preceded it, the drudgery of the laborer is, in it own way, a counterpart to the drudg-
ery of the gambler. The work of both is equally devoid of substance.”25 At the end of my 
first day of working in the ditches with the excavators, Ichi-san thus remarked: “you see, 
there’s nothing much to it, work is merely the repetition of this” (taishate koto nai desho, 
shigoto wa tada kore no kurikaeshi). In repeatedly anticipating the contingency of shock, 
and screening out its possibility (at work), the “drudgery” of the construction worker and 
gambler both seem to foreclose experience per se. Benjamin observes that consciousness 
– as a “screen against stimuli” – consigns “experience (Erfahrung)” to a “certain hour in 
one’s life (Erlebnis).”26 He continues: 
Perhaps the special achievement of shock defense may be seen in its function of 
assigning to an incident a precise point in time in consciousness at the cost of the 
integrity of its contents. This would be the peak achievement of the intellect; it 
would turn the incident into a moment that has been lived (Erlebnis).27 
 
As a “shock defense,” the intellect or consciousnesss sacrifices the content of impressions 
– otherwise inscribed on the body – by intercepting and registering physical stimuli as “a 
precise point in time.” Hence, the intellect consigns experience (Erfahrung) to “a moment 
that has been lived (Erlebnis)”; bracketed off and contained within the past of linear time, 
as yet another “moment” within an homogeneous succession of occurences. Yet, there is 
obviously a clear difference between the necessary repetition of work – which the worker 
would not do without remuneration – and gambling, which the worker engages in even if 
s/he incurs debt. 
                                                
25 Walter Benjamin, “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire,” pg. 177. 
26 Ibid, pg. 163. 
27 Ibid, pg. 163. 
 335 
The lost time of factory work remains to be actualized as a “durée,” for only this, 
Benjamin writes: “rids man’s soul of obsession with time.”28 Moreover, in gambling, the 
gambler seeks a repetition that coincides with a previous experience of winning, thereby 
invoking a split, spectral temporality. On the other hand, construction work consigns time 
to seriality without hope. 
Of course, the “obsession with time” recalls the spatialization of time, and the day 
laborer’s veritable obsession with the working day to have been done. While the material 
content of the work day was emptied out in attention to the contingency of accident – the 
dust, soil, mud, heat, humidity, cold, rain, snow, chemical fumes, and danger of that steel 
bar bouncing back, with machinic force, in the face of the worker doing negiri – the time 
of the working day had been abstracted upon the assignation of an arbitrary (contingent), 
social value to the labor of the construction worker. In commodification, the equivalent, 
commensurable form of the “daily wage” (nittō) was constitutive of work as a passage of 
empty time, and of the worker as subject of capital. It was the distinction of construction 
work – contrary to the “salary-man” (sararīman) – that the content of work resided in the 
fending off of material stimuli, resulting in physical fatigue. And the predisposition of the 
construction worker to gamble consisted in the combination of these two characteristics: 
namely, the crystallization of the laborer in empty time, and the emasculation of material 
stimuli. At the end of a working day at the construction site, the worker stood emptied out 
on the train platform, wondering at once where the day had gone, and altogether numbed 
in the body. For while fatigue of the body, robbed of experience, was reinvigorated in the 
act of gambling, the constitutive contingency of the equivalent form was proferred to the 
laborer with the possibility of winning an incommensurable value. In repetition, the very 
                                                
28 Ibid, pg. 180. 
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form that robbed work of content was transformed into the promise, or wish, of attaining 
singular value. Thus, with half his mind, construction workers were thinking of gambling 
throughout work. 
The seduction of gambling resides elsewhere, then, than in the prospect of victory. 
Indeed, the gambler seeks the catastrophic – hence, the risk of gambling and the excess of 
expenditure it requires – in an impossible loss, or gain. The race promises the incommen-
surable in the form of time, compressed into a “narcotic.”29 In victory, coincidence would 
actualize the value of this time, and thereby, raise the impossible consciousness. It would 
transform the contingent into experience, and inscribe the circumstances of the victory on 
memory. The day laborer turned gambler thus emerges as a poet of modernity and shock. 
As Benjamin writes of Baudelaire: 
Baudelaire battled the crowd – with the impotent rage of someone fighting the 
rain or the wind. This is the nature of something lived through (Erlebnis) to which 
Baudelaire has given the weight of an experience (Erhfarung). He indicated the 
price for which the sensation of the modern age may be had: the disintegration of 
the aura in the experience of shock.30 
 
With the “impotent rage” of having been robbed of experience, Baudelaire sought to raise 
the shock sensation of modernity to the level of “experience (Erhfarung).”31 The intellect 
of the crowd – by which the gambler in Asakusa, too, was encompassed – had effectively 
deadened it to experience. Yet, precisely when “the sensation of the modern” would have 
been attained, the “price” of the experience of shock is disclosed in the “disintegration of 
the aura.” That which had been the aim of the gambler – the singular – is sacrificed in the 
                                                
29 Walter Benjamin, “Notes on a Theory of Gambling,” pg. 177 – 8. 
30 Walter Benjamin, “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire,” pg. 193 – 194. Benjamin writes: “If it were incorpo-
rated directly in the registry of conscious memory, it would sterilize this incident for poetic experience … 
The question suggests itself how lyric poetry can have as its basis an experience for which the shock expe-
rience has become the norm” (“On Some Motifs in Baudelaire,” 162). 
31 Walter Benjamin writes: “The shock experience which the passer-by has in the crowd corresponds to 
what the worker “experiences” at his machine” (“On Some Motifs in Baudelaire,” 176). 
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victory, and thus, the ground is produced for repetition. For lost or gained, the money can 
never be enough. Indeed, from the very first, the statistics in the newspaper, the odds, and 
the numbers on the bakken are devoid of quality. On the screen and in the newspaper, the 
individual horse has been stripped of the “unique manifestation of distance,” such that the 
gambler must hide his or her “own” – as opposed to “someone else’s” (hoka no hito no) – 
numbers to confer a guise of singularity upon them. 
 Moreover, the experience of the keiba, keirin, and kyōtei race was mediated by the 
TV screen. While it happened on rare occasions that someone might venture to the actual 
race grounds, this was something everyone had done at some point in the past (and could 
tell of), but did not do anymore. Instead, they fixated on the TV screen, standing up to see 
the main races. The up-close experience of shock closed the distance between viewer and 
medium of transmission, foreclosing critical distance, aura, and spectrality in the absolute 
immersion of the subject in medium. Under the sign of surface, pastiche, or of écriture as 
“radical difference,” the effect and affect of watching was euphoric.32 But it was the final 
conversion of the bakken into monetary form that effaced the dream of singular winnings, 
and laid the ground for repetition. Conversely, losing repeatedly produced an intransigent 
negativity that could easily be exacerbated. And most of the guys squandered their “daily 
wage” (nittō) on liquor and gambling. 
 It was not merely money, but their social reputations and accountability as “men” 
(otoko) the guys risked in gambling. The earning “self” (jibun) – the split “I,” alienated in 
equivalence – was at stake. In incurring debts, the question was raised whether the person 
was good for their word, or rather, their money. Like Shokawa-san, Ichi-san, and lots of 
others, Akia was always in debt to Oiwake, and on occasion, other drinkeries, on account 
                                                
32 Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, pg. 29 – 31. 
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of gambling. Just inside Iroha arcade, Oiwake hosted illegal kyōtei betting, like Mutō-san, 
and would lend people money on request. The small-statured, aging mama-san of Oiwake 
would sometimes sit tired out at the counter, and recount with her deep Kansai accent that, 
over the years (Oiwake had been in business for decades), she could not count the num-
ber of men who had run off without paying their debts. Yet, if they knew you, Oiwake 
would “dish out ¥200,000 ($2,000 USD) without hesitation” (nijū man en pon to dasu yo). 
Akia was in debt for this amount, and so too were Ichi-san and Shokawa-san. The guys 
would jokingly refer to Oiwake as the “Oiwake bank” (Oiwake ginkō), since everybody, 
at some point or other, availed themselves of its services. If not, the thought that they 
could do so afforded security. Of course, not everyone ran off with Oiwake’s money. 
Akia seemed to bear the burden of his debt gracefully; complaining when he was down 
that he was “deep in debt” (shakkin darake), yet, typically transmuting a negative into a 
positive, by noting that not everyone can borrow money: a reputation was required. At 
the beginning of each month, he and others would make trips to Oiwake – and Ichi-san to 
Gen, where he was so in debt, he said, that his “neck will not turn” (kubi ga magaranai) – 
to pay up the monthly installment that never seemed to disappear. Indeed, it took more 
than two years for Akia to reduce the original debt of ¥200,000 – borrowed in one fell 
swoop when he got into an altercation with Jean-san at Sanyūkai, and took refuge every 
day at Kōrakuen – to a more manageable figure of ¥60,000 ($600 USD). Yet, Akia would 
not pull money from others, and only borrowed from Oiwake. Moreover, he was fastidi-
ous in his monthly installments, transforming the negative displeasure of his seemingly 
endless debt into a positive sign of his accountability, word, and reputation as a “man” 
(otoko). Of course, for Akia it helped that he was not simply on welfare, but that he re-
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ceived more than other welfare-recipients on account of his medical status.33 Everyone 
seemed to know about this, and of his generosity, which often left him with only a few 
hundred yen in his bank account, and more than a few days left in the month. The guys in 
the Okinawa-gumi all knew where to go towards the end of the month, be it Akia or a 
drinkery where they could put it on a tab, when the money ran out. Yet, in one respect, 
borrowing from Oiwake involved a risk that was greater than borrowing from the other 
members, because by borrowing from Oiwake, the borrower put the reputation of the 
group at stake, and with it, the future possibility of taking out money from the “Oiwake 
bank.” When Te-chan, another “member” (membā) of the Okinawa-gumi, accrued a debt 
of several hundred thousand yen to Oiwake, and not only failed to make consistent pay-
ments but ceased to show up at the drinkery, the burden of his debt redounded on the oth-
er members of the group. This was not simply a matter of the mama-san at Oiwake put-
ting pressure on the other guys to make Te-chan pay, asking them where he was or 
whether they had seen him. More importantly, Te-chan emerged as a source of consterna-
tion because he threatened the financial viability of everyone. In fact, Te-chan had a prior 
history of “running away” (nigeteiru) from debts – of disappearing – that earned him the 
reputation of somebody not to be trusted. Ichi-san had told Mito-chan “not to use” (tsu-
kauna) him for work, and when Te-chan had an accident at work (which, in this case, al-
lowed him to make “injury” (shōgai) claims on the company), he was suspected of hav-
ing simulated the fall. It was finally decided that Mito-chan would “talk to” (hanashi o 
suru) Te-chan, yet this was always a risky strategy. When, more than one year later, Mi-
                                                
33 Depending on the heath status of the individual, welfare recipients were given “ranks” (kyū). Those in the 
“A rank” (A kyū), of which Akia was one, received more than others. Akia typically transformed this rank 
into the positive sign – although, to be kept hush hush – of his secure place within the welfare system. See 
Tōkyō-to Fukushi Hokenkyoku, 1/12/2014.  
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to-chan informed Oiwake of Shokawa-san and Akia’s phone numbers – as they were both, 
still, in debt – Mito-chan received such a verbal thrashing from Akia that they had a pro-
longed falling-out. Pulling Mito-chan aside in front of Mutō-san’s – “Mito-chan, come 
here a sec!” (Mito-chan, ciotto kochi koi!) – Akia confronted Mito-chan, who said “okay, 
sorry, I understand” (wakatta yo, gomen), but it was “too late to apologize, what’s done is 
done!” (ayamattemo osoi, sunda hanashi dakara!). 
 By incurring debts through gambling (and otherwise), the guys staked their social 
reputation and existence, yet, staking themselves was also precisely what an otoko (man) 
did. In gambling, as in fights, an otoko was good for his word. Riku-san said of mahjong: 
“once you give in, it’s finished” (magetara owari). Credit being a testimony to the man’s 
accountability, the question was how much negative value, or debt, an otoko could accrue 
without giving way. While such debts were incurred in specific relations with others, they 
were made known to everyone through passing remarks, so that indebtedness constituted 
a general condition of the otoko which, like the “illegality” (ihō) of gambling, countered a 
normative discourse of productivity. Life was at stake in this gamble. More than anyone, 
the case of Matsuda-san constituted the instance of someone who was “over” (owari), as 
both Akia and Riku-san would phrase it, or “out” (autto) as Ichi-san would put it. While 
Matsuda-san might not have gambled away the ¥30,000,000 (approximately $300,000 
USD) borrowed from the mob, he had invested it in unsuccessful business ventures. And, 
like the proper capitalist, he had shamelessly mixed business with pleasure as he traveled 
around Japan. Slowly, the photos of Matsuda-san disappeared from around Sanya. It was 
said the Kanamachi-ikka, a branch of the Yamaguchi-gumi, would kill him if they found 
him; that Matsuda would be “buried somewhere” (dokka umerarechau), if he did not end 
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in jail first. But no one embodied the vulgar form of the precept that a “man” (otoko) was 
“over” (owari) when he “broke” (oretara) – gambling – as much as Yamagishi-san, who 
gambled daily on Oichokabu with Pin-san, in plain view of passing police cars, under the 
entryway to Iroha. Yamagishi-san was loath to let winners leave the gambling table and – 
when his social position permitted him – would pull them back by the sleeve, for them to 
stay at the table. Then, he would up the stakes and keep going until the tide turned. When 
he had had a drop too much to drink, moreover, he was as fervent for a bout of hanafuda 
as an addict for his fix. Thus, Ichi-san would remark that, if there were one or two people 
like Yamagishi-san gambling, things could easily get out of hand. And it was one thing to 
gamble on keiba, kyōtei, and keirin; quite another to gamble among “buddies” (nakama). 
Indeed, when the guys in the Okinawa-gumi gambled on hanafuda, it was usually for low 
stakes. When they did so at Izukenji-san’s apartment after eating (because Nē-san liked 
it), Izukenji-san himself never participated – sitting off to the side, by the TV, drinking 
Nodokoshi Kirin Happōshū and chatting (or sleeping) – and the winnings themselves had 
a roundabout way of making their way into the hands of Nē-san, as the guys left, one by 
one giving their profits to her at the doorway. Ichi-san would, in fact, remark of gambling 
among acquaintances that one “should really not do it” (hontō wa yaccha dame) because 
it sowed resentment between friends. Gambling among friends threatened the sociality of 
the group, and its discourse of otoko. On the occasion that the Okinawa-gumi itself broke 
this precept, Akia would say that it was really common practice – when gambling among 
“buddies” (nakama) – to return some 80% of the winnings once the session was over. He 
was against “taking money amongst buddies” (nakama aida no kane tori). Yet, there was 
always a small amount of money involved when the guys played mahjong, Chinchirorin, 
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or Don Don, the excess of which never remained long with the winner, since word spread 
rapidly of who had won, and (at least) a modicum of generosity was expected from them. 
When someone had won big at keiba, announcing their victory to the world and taking an 
advance from Oiwake (before returning to WINS for their winnings), even Yamagishi-
san could be seen slinking along the Oiwake counter to collect his share. 
 There was a shamelessness to such actions, albeit, one that was constrained by the 
trope of being an otoko (man), and the importance of the “group” or “buddies” (nakama). 
Lacan writes thus of the disappearance of the “master signifier,” announcing (on TV) that 
“you will be be pinned by signifiers that are only countable signifiers and which will ef-
face … singularity.”34 Yet, the act of gambling itself illustrated the desire for the singular 
from the medium which rendered everything commensurable. Even a man’s dignity had a 
price, as Akia was witness to when his assailants demanded money in return for backing 
down from the fight. But it was exactly this commensurability of all things – epitomized 
by the individualizing labor market – which precipitated the repetition of the trope, otoko, 
that, in its negativity, required reference to a social entity (third) in order for its discourse 
to maintain integrity. In front of the TV screen, gamblers experienced no shaming gaze of 
propriety and, in a specific sense, this shamelessness was brazenly carried into the streets 
of Sanya. Every day, Pin-san, Yamagishi-san and others gambled out in the open, and on 
occasion, were joined by members of the Okinawa-gumi, like Moto-san or Akia. Each of 
them knew from experience that the regular police would not arrest people on account of 
gambling – hence, their brazen conduct – and that only a special department of the police 
dealt with such cases. Yet, everyone anticipated the arrest of Pin-san, who conducted his 
hanafuda operation in the open, but was circumspect about selling amphetamines. Insofar 
                                                
34 Quoted in Jacques-Alain Miller, “On Shame,” pg. 23. 
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as danger was suspected, Pin-san and the others restrained their exhibition of the “illegal” 
(ihō) aspect of their conduct, which otherwise functioned as a marker of their territory – 
Sanya was “our town” (orera no machi), in which one gambled on the sidewalks – and as 
a sign of irreverence for the legal, proper conformity of general society. Pin-san contemp-
tuously reminded me of this constitutive difference between himself and me, when he had 
learnt I was teaching Akia “the computer” (pasakon). Left to ourselves in Oiwake for an 
awkward moment, while Akia went to the restroom, Pin-san hardly looked at at me when 
he said: “Well, good luck with the computer. But just remember our world is illegal” (Mā, 
pasakon gambattene. Kedo, orera no sekai ihō dakarana). The necessity was for this sign 
of difference and counter-discourse – of Yama as a “lawless zone” (muhō chitai) – to stay 
in force without being arrested. Everyone thus knew what Pin-san did, that is, aside from 
running an illegal hanafuda business, but those other transactions were conducted behind 
closed doors. It was general social knowledge. Moreover, illegal bakuchi (gambling) had 
long been the domain of the yakuza of old in Japan. Its practice signified “an other world” 
(betsu sekai) which, as Izukenji-san put it, even “normal Japanese would not set foot in” 
(futsū no nihonjin datte hairanai).35 
Akia, who had risen to the rank of kashira, or “head,” while working ten years for 
the Nibikikai, would say that he “still thinks like an outlaw” (mada autorō no kangaekata 
                                                
35 For English sources on the yakuza and gambling, see Miyazaki Manabu’s Toppamono, Junichi Saga’s 
Confessions of a Yakuza, trans. John Bester (New York: Kodansha International Ltd., 1989), and David E. 
Kaplan and Alex Dubro’s rather stereotypical Yakuza: Japan’s Criminal Underworld (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 2003). There also exists an abundance of untranslated Japanese texts concerning the 
yakuza. The classical autobiographic texts by the third “foreman” (kumichō) of the Yamaguchi-gumi, 
Taoka Kazuo, Yamaguchi-gumi Sandaime: Taoka Kazuo Jiden (Tokyo: Tokuma Bunko, 2009) and the 
mobster who became a famous actor, Andō Noboru, Yakuza to Kōsō (Tokyo: Tokuma Bunko, 1993) are but 
two examples. Like the place of Izukenji-san, Taoka Kazuo had assumed a mythic place in the imaginary of 
former mobsters like Akia. Indeed, Akia recounted how there had been a queue of men lining up to give 
blood for Taoka Kazuo when he was lying on his deathbed. When I asked Akia whether he had read 
Taoka’s autobiography, his response was a dismissive no. Why should he have to, when he knew what the 
man stood for in real life. 
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o shiteru). Sometimes, he would tack back to his days in the mob, when he had worked in 
what was called kiritori – extortion – and say as if he was quoting a phrase, that “nothing 
is as dirty as general society” (ippan shakai hodo kitanai mono wa nai). Almost all his 
customers in Shinjuku had been members of general society, who had lent money to an 
other member of general society, who refused to return the funds. Consequently, the for-
mer sought help from the yakuza, where it had been Akia’s job to discover the latter’s 
weakness, and to “threaten” (kyōkatsu) them into returning the funds; Nibikikai pocketed 
a percentage of the returned funds. Noting similarly how “general society” (ippan shakai) 
was structured so that it was those at the bottom who did all the work, while those on top 
took the profits, Akia would observe: “The more respectable you become, the more dirty 
you become. That is why the yakuza is better” (Eraku nareba eraku naru hodo, kitanaku 
naru. Dakara yakuza no hō ga ī). Notably, such commonsensical views were difficult to 
reconcile with the avowed right-wingism of most of the Okinawa-gumi – except Misaaru, 
who voted for the Japanese Communist Party (Nihon Kyōsantō) – yet, they functioned as 
markers of difference that empowered the guys vis-à-vis society. Boasting was not neces-
sary to prove that the guys did not care a wink about the police, for their conduct already 
demonstrated this. Ichi-san’s occasional comment that so-and-so was “stupid” (baka) for 
ending up back in jail meant nothing more: the notion they had done something ethically 
reprehensible was absent from such statements. On the contrary, the bravado of being an 
otoko (man) more often entailed transgression, in spite of (or because of) police presence. 
However, no one wanted to be arrested or jailed. After a ten day stint in detention 
for aiding Shokawa-san in a fight, Akia grumbled he was too old for that sort of thing. It 
had been okay while he had been in the mob. But at the age of 56, with physical illnesses, 
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being jailed in a cell which hardly fit his body was not worth it. As for Shokawa-san, he 
bawled his eyes out when Nē-san came to see him in detention. 
Everybody knew that Sanya itself, and many of their usual haunts were under sur-
veillance by the police. It was said the local police at the “mammoth police-box” (mam-
mosu kōban) had a good “grasp” (haaku) of who hung out in front of Mutō-san’s hole-in-
the-wall. In fact, one day when Riku-san instigated a fight – for which Shokawa-san and 
Akia took the fall – the police from the mammoth appeared in Oiwake with a photo of his 
face, asking if anyone had seen “this man” (kono otoko). Ichi-san presumed a camera had 
been positioned high up on the tall apartment building facing down onto Mutō-san’s, 
where no one could see it. Henceforth, they would have to be careful, he said, and do it in 
the back alleyway if they were going to fight. Members of the Matsuda-group, too, were 
thought to be followed around by undercover police, as they had been arrested previously 
for possession of amphetamines. Kon-chan had, in fact, been arrested thus a second time, 
and was awaiting a two-year jail sentence. Yamagishi-san, too, would disappear from the 
entryway to Iroha for extended periods, ostensibly because he knew it was best to lie low  
some time: “because he knows it’s risky” (yabaitte wakatteru kara). And while the gam-
bling at Mutō-san’s, and inside Oiwake, continued in brazen fashion, there were moments 
of paranoia when members of the Okinawa-gumi would talk suspiciously of new faces at 
Mutō-san’s, wondering if they might be undercover police. Of course, when one evening 
Mito-chan’s girlfriend (at the time) received an anonymous phone call from a man asking 
if “the tehaishi, Mito-chan” (tehaishi no Mito-chan) was there, he became convinced that 
the “cops” (satsu) – indicated by the silent gesture of raising a fist to the forehead – were 
tracking his movements. How else would they know Yui’s phone number? 
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As it turned out, at least some of these fears were well-grounded, because one day 
undercover police descended on Mutō-san’s hole-in-the-wall en masse. Mito-chan made 
his getaway in the nick of time, as he witnessed the police descend just as he was walking 
toward Mutō-san’s from the end of the alley. From the second floor window, Hagiwara-
san looked down, horror-stricken, as events unfolded: at the arrests, the no-entry yellow 
tape, and the TV crews gathering with cameras. News of the event spread like rapid-fire 
in the Okinawa-gumi, for it had been poor Shokawa-san – whom, everybody knew, had 
started betting seriously on kyōtei only a few weeks earlier, when his mother passed away 
– who was caught red-handed in the act of placing a bet. An undercover cop was standing 
by his side. Just when Shokawa-san had told Mutō-san (writing in his ledger) his num-
bers, and was handing over the ¥500, the undercover police shouted: “HOLD IT!!” (MA-
TÉ!!). And with this, the remainder of the police charged in from the wings, detaining 
Shokawa-san, Mutō-san, and two of the other regular drunkards lounging about on the 
rickety stools, no doubt too drunk to stand. 
To Akia’s embarrassment, news of the arrest actually made it onto the NHK news 
the following day at noon, when everybody at Sanyūkai happened to be eating lunch with 
the TV on. Since the media had, no doubt, been invited along for the scoop by the cops, 
the incident was also reported in newspapers. As was the wont of mass media at the time, 
the reportage focused less on the illegality of unlicensed gambling itself, and more on the 
self-evident scandal of welfare-recipients seeping their state-acquired funds away into the 
Yamaguchi-gumi. The Sankei News reported as follows: 
Gambling with Welfare? Yamaguchi-gumi Members Arrested Under Suspi-
cion of Illegal Bookmaking, Tokyo, Sanya 
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On account of illegal bookmaking on motorboat races with welfare recipients in 
the Sanya district of Tokyo, the Metropolitan Police Department Office of Securi-
ty has arrested Uga Kaho (42), a leader in the designated crime organization Ya-
maguchi-gumi in Tokyo, Arakawa-ku, Minami-Senjū, and Mutō Isami (73), man-
ager of an eatery in Sumida-ku, Zutsumi-dōri, as well as three bookkeepers and 
three customers, on suspicion of breaking the motorboat racing law (illegal 
bookmaking). According to the police, the suspect, Uga Kaho, is keeping silent. 
 
The arrest took place on the 20th around 3 PM, at the yakitori eatery managed by 
the suspect, Mutō, with a TV streaming motorboat races, where he paid back win-
ners made to bet on an estimate of ¥10,500 per ¥100. 
 
According to the police, Ugo Kaho and suspects profited upwards of ¥100 million 
since Heisei 20, half of which is thought to have become funds for the organized 
crime syndicate. Half the customers were welfare recipients, and the upper limit 
of bets was set at ¥10,000 per person.36 
 
The written NHK reportage did not even bother to mention Sanya, merely stating that the 
arrests had taken place in the Taitō ward of Tokyo.37 As opposed to this, the Sankei News 
above pays some degree of homage to Sanya, localizing the events to Tokyo, Sanya. But 
it is the missing term in both articles that gives them the normative force of self-evidence, 
namely, the state. For it is only in relation to the state that the key terms in the articles fall 
into place: “welfare-recipients” (seikatsu hogo jukyūsha), “illegal bookmaking” (nomi 
                                                
36 See “Kyōtei de Nomi Kōi Kyaku no Taihan ga Seikatsu Hogo,” Sankei News, 22/10/2012. Heisei 20 re-
fers to the year 2008. The article reads as follows in the original Japanese: 
 














37 See “Seikatsu Hogo de Kyōtei? Nomi Kōi Yōgi de Yamaguchi-gumi Kumi-in ra Taiho, Tokyo, Sanya,” 
NHK News, 22/10/2012. 
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kōi), and the “designated organized crime-syndicate Yamaguchi-gumi” (shitei bōryoku-
dan yamaguchi-gumi).38 Not only was Mutō-san running an unlicensed kyōtei operation 
at his “drinkery” (inshokuten), but the odds of the bets themselves were being calibrated 
illegally, such that gamblers did not win as much as the official odds would have given 
them. Of course, the guys were well aware of this, expressing surprise, if anything, at 
how much the police actually knew about the intricacies of Mutō-san’s operation. For, in 
addition to Mutō-san, the police had also arrested Uga Kaho – the man behind the scenes 
who never appeared at Mutō-san’s, and whom nobody knew – and a lower-level member 
of the Kanamachi-ikka, who used to bicycle past Mutō-san’s hole-in-the-wall, pick up the 
profits, and hand them on to the Kanamachi-ikka. Moreover, the police also appeared to 
know everything about the profits that this Uga figure had reaped over the years. The 
guys surmised that the cops had been staking the place out for a long period of time. In-
deed, when Shokawa-san was held in detention, he seemed to notice somewhat familiar 
faces among the cops whom, he thought, had been hanging out at Mutō-san’s. After his 
release a few days later, Shokawa-san recounted what the police had asked him, and how 
he concocted some cock-and-bull story about never having gambled there before. For 
some time, it even appeared that the Kanamachi-ikka wanted to speak with Shokawa-san 
in person, to debrief him. Likewise, the police did not indict Mutō-san, although he re-
mained in detention for close to a month, and when he restarted business, the little TV 
screen had disappeared from its place on the wall across from the bamboo kumade (rake) 
                                                
38 As a “point de capiton,” the term of the state stitches together and gives sense to the normative force of 
the reportage (Lacan, “The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian Uncon-
scious,” 681). It is the very propriety of propriety that is reinforced in the news, which bashes welfare-
recipients and criminals, and that calls for a corollary readers’ response that can only proclaim the self-
evident impropriety of illegal gambling on welfare, not to mention, illegal gambling. The social bond is at 
stake. 
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from Ōtori Jinja, hung to bring good fortune in business. For good reason, the staff at 
Oiwake grew wary after this incident. The guys, too, began to circulate rumors that un-
known individuals had been seen outside of Oiwake, taking photos of the entrance. A po-
lice siege was imminent, Misaaru said, but still, Akia and the others kept going unde-
terred. Naturally, all this changed when Oiwake decided to acquire a license for kyōtei, 
thereby legalizing the gambling; although, the mama-san still grumbled when guys would 
pull out a bowl with dice, start up on Chinchirorin, and hand over a couple thousand yen 
to the mama-san, as a token of gratitude for letting them play.  
Wariness and avoidance of arrest differed from “ratting on” (chinkoro) “buddies” 
(nakama). An otoko would have dishonored himself by informing on friends or enemies, 
and therein resided his code of conduct and reputation. In effect, the occasion of arrest for 
what the mass media depicted as the most shameless of acts – flushing away welfare into 
the black market of a mob organization – emerged as the very pretext to affirm a sense of 
dignity as an otoko. There where the state would have affixed insufficiency and shame in 
the punishment of confinement – like Sanya itself – reference to a counter-discourse, and 
more specifically, to tropes of otoko (man) and nakama (buddies) operated to counter-act 
and nullify this shame. It was in solidarity – by protecting the social entity of the group – 
that dignity was upheld. Anticipating Shokawa-san’s release, the guys would discuss and 
predict – sharing knowledge of police procedures – when he was likely to be released and 
how exactly the arrest itself had taken place. Nori-san expressed concern that Shokawa-
san (formerly in the Japan Self-Defense Forces) had an airgun stowed away in his room, 
and for what would happen if the police were to search his doya. When his phone finally 
connected at 5 PM, someone called Shokawa-san, told him to forget the train and to take 
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a taxi (which everybody would chip in for). Akia noted it was “obvious” (atarimae) to do 
as much, and thirty minutes later, Shokawa-san pulled in at the Iroha entryway in a cab, 
where some 15 people were waiting for him on a blue-sheet spread on the ground, partly 
because they had been called, and partly by chance, as Matsuda-san was doing his tehai, 
ambling about with the wad of ¥10,000 bills in his hand. No doubt high on amphetamines, 
Yamagishi-san declared that he had been the one to think of paying for the taxi, and kept 
insisting that an itchō (single) block of tofu be passed around the group, starting and end-
ing with Shokawa-san, who had to finish the tofu (but he did not); a ceremony that most 
of the guys clearly found tiresome, but went through with. Ichi-san laughed at the sober-
faced Shokawa-san, who, once the alcohol started coursing through him, recounted tales 
from detention. Less than a year later, Shokawa-san was, of course, back in detention for 
fighting with a crazed opponent who refused to drop charges. 
Referring to the 1986 novel by former mobster, Abe Jōji, Ichi-san described such 
repetition characteristic of Sanya as: “The unlearned lessons from within the fences” (hei 
no naka no korinai menmen).39 The metaphor of the “fences” (hei), or jail, establishes an 
immediate corollary to the confinement that is Sanya. From within this confinement, it is 
through repeated transgression that the trope of otoko (man) is materialized in its mode of 
conduct, and distinct jouissance. Indeed, to be an otoko emerges as a veritable “Thing” in 
Sanya, whose confirmation can only be established, and reestablished, through repetition. 
And notably, there existed other modes of jouissance than those of transgression in gam-
bling or fighting. As a “Thing,” the instantiation of the trope of otoko was nowhere more 
evident than when everyone sang karaoke. Shokawa-san’s favorite song, which he sang 
                                                
39 See Abe Jōji, Hei no Naka no Korinai Menmen (Tokyo: Shimpūsha, 2004). 
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every Sunday, was called “The Treasure of Islanders” (Shimanju-nu Takara), by the Oki-
nawan band, BEGIN:  
How well do I know 
These island skies that I was born under 
The shining stars, the passing clouds 
Even if you ask me, I don’t know their names 
 
But more than anyone, more than anyone I know them 
In joy and in sorrow 
I’ve gazed up at this sky countless times 
 
You can’t understand it just by what’s written in a textbook 
Surely, there is something precious here 
That is the treasure of the islanders 
 
How well do I know 
The seas of the island where I was born 
The wounded reefs and dwindling fish 
I don’t know what to do about them either 
 
But more than anyone, more than anyone I know 
Caressed by the sand, tossed by the waves 
This ocean that keeps changing little by little 
 
You won’t see it broadcast on TV or playing on the radio 
But surely, there is something precious here 
It’s the treasure of the islanders 
 
How well do I know 
The songs of this island where I was born 
The Tubaraama, and the Densaa Bushi, 
I don’t even know the meaning of the words 
 
But, more than anyone, more than anyone I know 
On celebration nights and festival mornings 
The songs that drift over me from somewhere far 
 
Until that someday when I part from this island 
I want to understand the precious things here more deeply 
That’s the treasure of the islanders40 
                                                






Redolent with nostalgia for Okinawa, the lyrics, “Surely, there is something precious here” 
(taisetsu na mono ga kitto koko ni aru sa), emerged as a reference to the people present at 
the table on each occasion Shokawa-san sang the song. This was indicated by Shokawa-
san himself, who pointed down at the shared table in rhythm to the lyrics while everyone 
else joined in for the refrain, depending on each their state of inebriation. Displaced into 
the lyrics of the song, the masculine sociality of the guys did not consist in the stars, skies, 
ocean, textbooks, radio, TV, festivals or vanishing dialects of Okinawa, but was disclosed 
through them and was, indeed, effected through the singing of the song. Needless to say, 


































karaoke occurred alongside gambling and the spirit of collective effervescence could eas-
ily spill into violence. As a “Thing,” this masculine sociality gave itself to be recognized 
as excessive to general society – and required the gaze of general society – but threatened 
propriety precisely in its excesses. The alternative would have been to be fixed in shame 
without end or reprieve, aspiring to normativity and productivity.41 However, the Sanya 
man had his “pride” (iji). Izukenji-san and others would remark of dyed-in-the-wool con-
struction workers from Sanya, especially when they worked with laborers from elsewhere, 
that they knew their trade, were “skilled” (ude ga yoi), and were “exceptional” (sasuga). 
Laughing, Shokawa-san would add: “For the rest, they’re just drinking” (hoka wa nonde-
ru dake). Defiant, the thoroughbred worker of Sanya knew their work better than anyone, 
but threw propriety to the winds as it suited them. If, like Ichi-san, they did not feel like 
going to work – because it was too hot in the summer or because they were hung over – 
they “opened a hole, on purpose” (waza to ana o aketa). 
The ultimate price of decades of excessive working and drinking could be seen in 
the feeble, 50-year-old Iwa-chan, “become increasingly incoherent” (dandan to okashiku 
natteiru) who, it was rumored, only had a few years left. Akia was not much different, in 
and out of hospitals, and Ichi-san himself would react indifferently whenever somebody 
told him to drink less, or to use a condom in Yoshiwara. It was best to gamble now, in the 
imminent specter of the end, than to wait until it was too late. Disregard for health, for the 
productive life, the biopolitical, and for death itself emerged as the ultimate negativity of 
                                                
41 Slavoj Žižek, “Eastern Europe’s Republics of Gilead,” pg. 52. Žižek writes: “Although the first, so to 
speak, automatic, association that arises here is of course that of the reactionary, sentimental Blut und Bo-
den, we should not forget that such a reference to a ‘way of life’ can also have a distinctive ‘leftist’ conno-
tation. Note George Orwell’s essays from the war years, in which he attempted to define the contours of an 
English patriotism opposed to the official, puffy-imperialist version of it: his points of reference were pre-
cisely those details that characterize the ‘way of life’ of the working class (the evening gathering in the 
local pub and so forth) (Ibid, 52)”. 
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life as a “man” (otoko): a trope that opposed the generalized, social propriety propagated 
by the state, that recovered a modicum of dignity for the otoko. Notably, the guys were 
much less sanguine about death when it actually faced them. Nevertheless, they persisted 
in their life-styles undeterred; back to sipping mizuwari at Mutō-san’s merely hours after 
they had been let out of hospital, having just been ordered by doctors to lay off the liquor. 
Ichi-san worried about his blood pressure because it was above 170 whenever he checked 
it – and Akia’s upper reading could rise above 200 – but still he could be found drinking 
Kurokirishima mizuwari at all times of the day; nor did he ever consult a doctor, knowing 
full well that he should, but preferred to say: “There’s nothing wrong with me” (ore, doko 
mo warukunai mon). Taking all sorts of medication – to begin with: painkillers and sleep-
ing pills – that did not mix well with alcohol, Akia would claim doctors had not told him 
not to combine – although they clearly had! – and, though he occasionally went sober for 
a few days, he would drink days on end, vomiting up all the food he had eaten during the 
day. Shokawa-san, too, would spend days drinking non-stop, starting when he woke up. 
Ichi-san observed that everyone’s liver hurt, but that they continued drinking, hoping that 
“somehow it would turn out alright” (nantoka naru). So too, the guys might, for whatever 
reason, go on a fighting-spree, repeatedly getting themselves into confrontations and end-
ing up in the local “mammoth” (mammosu) police box. Be it with the cops or the doctors, 
the activities of the guys earned them a reputation, so that Moto-san was known with the 
police, and – from his liver readings – doctors knew that Akia was not, in any case, intent 
on getting any better. Of course, the welfare status of most of the guys already discredited 
them from receiving proper health care, but recognition by the police was something that 
some of them fantasized and bragged about. Thus, when it came time for the yearly Obon 
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matsuri (festival) held in Tamahime park, Mako-chan and Akia would both comment on 
how the “public order police” (kōan keisatsu) eyed them as they entered the park; looking 
at their callused hands. Akia would say that, given his record, the police “kept an eye on” 
(me ga tsukerareteru) him.  
 The day laborer, welfare-recipient and sometimes convicted criminal, if not active 
member of the yakuza, only validated himself as an otoko by doing what he did in spite of 
the disciplinary, punitive gaze of the state. It would have been “shameful” (hazukashī) if 
the gaze of authorities kept somebody from acting as he desired. Hence, Akia would state 
that he had “nothing to be ashamed about” (haji wa nai). He was not simply reacting, but 
was quite conscious of the obvious: that the conduct of an otoko required that “weakness 
not be shown” (yowami o misenai). Likewise, Ichi-san would assert that “there is no way” 
(sore wa arienai) he would spend the money of others which he had been put in charge of 
keeping. There thus existed an explicit code of conduct, which, in Shokawa-san’s case of 
being arrested for illegal gambling, involved not informing on one’s nakama (buddies). It 
was reference to nakama that enabled the shaming gaze of the state to be repulsed and for 
the dignity of otoko to be affirmed (through another articulation of shame). 
Gambling constituted a repetition of that everyday moment of severance from the 
equivalent wage of work. As a repetition, this moment of severance was overdetermined, 
because it not only iterated the daily moment of disposal, but the constitutive failure – or 
amputation – whereby the Sanya man had wound up in Sanya. Silenced as these wounds 
had become by the insistent reiteration of masculine sociality, it was ultimately their fail-
ure as economic caretakers and father figures – or, quite simply as laborers who had been 
fired or deemed unfit to work for health reasons, an event which had once prompted Akia 
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to attempt suicide, and other men to come to Sanya  – that haunted the guys, over against 
which they were prompted to insist upon the trope of otoko.42 In this sense, it was not the 
traumatic moment of subject formation that was repeated, but rather, failure as exclusion 
from a symbolic order of equivalence. If anything, the act of gambling sought to denegate 
the exchange of labor power (life) for money – death – by transforming the form of time 
into immediacy and mastering the abjection of Sanya (lack of lack) to which the men had 
been consigned. Gambling reversed the place of the worker vis-à-vis the equivalent form 
by simulating the play between presence and absence of money, to which the hiyatoi was 
perpetually subject. The throw of the dice, or wager of the bakken, repeated the traumatic 
moment of severance, only in the hands of the gambler, and with the promise of singular 
winnings. Yet, on the few occasions when the guys won, it was not sufficient. In fact, the 
win merely precipitated repetition. Even when the returns were considerable, the form of 
money qua money never attained a fullness of presence. As the stand-in for an impossible 
presence, money assumed the force of a fetish which was repeatedly gambled – at the last 
moment – or expended, but never saved, or used toward everyday expenses or payment 
of debts. Returns from gambling were inevitably spent on activities that were excessive to 
the everyday, such as going to a soapland in Yoshiwara, restaurants or drink. Both the act 
of gambling and the multifarious activities that followed a victory would achieve mastery, 
but the repetition leaves something to be desired because the final goal of the gamble is 
impossible: namely, to restore the subject to plenitude.43 Hence, gambling compelled rep-
                                                
42 See Ch. 7. 
43 Of course, repetition is required of the gambler – or drug addict – just as much as of the proper individual 
of general society who disavows gambling. It is in this respect that Derrida says in “The Rhetoric of Drugs,” 
that: “Depending on the circumstances (tirelessly analyzed, whether macroscopically or microscopically) a 
discourse of “prohibition” can be justified just as well or just as badly as a discourse of liberalization” (10). 
Instantiated in performatives, the nostalgic discourse of drug (or gambling) emancipation – which threatens 
the social bond – dreams as much of a “fantasy of reappropriation,” that is, of the impossible “restoration of 
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etition. The object cause of desire appeared retroactively, when it occurred to the gambler 
just how close s/he had come to victory. How close the horses had come to arriving in the 
correct order! A hair’s breadth seemed to separate losers from coincidence. Indeed, losers 
repeatedly complained how many times their horses had arrived in inverted order! If 
gamblers won, how much more they would have won if they had placed a bet of ¥100 or 
¥200 more! Inevitable failure inevitably spurred the gambler on to repeat the act of gam-
bling, unto exhaustion. Most guys let up on gambling only when they had gotten so sick 
of losing that gambling, albeit temporarily, did not prick them. 
 For others, gambling assumed a self-destructive character that threatened to teeter 
into a negativity without limit. This was especially the case when gambling was triggered 
and exacerbated by more immediate failures, external to the act of gambling. Thus, Akia 
explained that he turned to gambling after getting into a verbal fight at Sanyūkai. Feeling 
slighted, he decided to blow a couple hundred thousand yen at Kōrakuen. By deciding to 
lose, gambling transformed equivalence into a negativity that Akia would have difficulty 
returning. Years earlier, he had tried suicide when he could no longer work. On this note, 
Hegel sees the possibility of history or of difference in the “self-overcoming” of the Slave 
who achieves “Being-for-itself” by the “negating-negativity” of “absolute liquefaction of 
every stable-support.”44 Significantly, Akia did stop gambling at a certain loss of several 
hundred thousand yen. Indeed, as Derrida points out, a “respect for death” must be main-
tained in the moment when the Slave represses the moment of “absolute liquefaction” in 
                                                                                                                                            
an “I,” of a self or of the self’s body” as the prohibitive discourse (Ibid, 12). In fact, the two sides are mutu-
ally constitutive, so that each threatens the other as “the trace of the third”: “the third as destructuring struc-
turation of the social bond” (Ibid, 20). It was from in-between these two discourses that Ichi-san would say 
to me that one should not gamble between “buddies” (nakama). See Avital Ronell’s Crack Wars: Litera-
ture Addiction Mania (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2004) for more on general society in its consti-
tutive relation to “drugs.” 
44 Alexandre Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit, pg. 
20 – 21. 
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overcoming Slavery. If the “truth of the master is in the slave,” then the threat of death as 
“negativity without reserve” must be contained.45 In containment resides the condition of 
possibility of recognition, history, and “autonomous Consciousness.”46 Setting a certain – 
although, thoroughly excessive – limit to their gambling debts (and drinking and fighting), 
the troupe harnessed negativity in their favor; threatening a discourse of productivity. Yet, 
slowly but surely, drinking, gambling and fighting were not only accelerating the demise 
of the guys, but were unraveling the social fabric that bound them together. The excess of 
drinking, fighting and gambling threatened to undermine the signification of sociality that 
shielded them against the normative gaze of “general society” (ippan shakai). The limit 
of discourse itself was at stake. This constituted the very ground on which the person of 
Izukenji-san was mandated in the world of Sanya; for, in his absence, there could be no 
discourse of otoko. Only reference to the group, embodied by Izukenji-san, constrained 
expenditure. Hegel acknowledges this possibility of failing to “respect” death, of rushing 
“headlong into death pure and simple,” and thus, of “losing the effect of profit and mean-
ing which were the very stakes one hoped to win.”47 Amongst the day laborers, it was the 
disappearance of the amphetamine-driven Matsuda-san that exemplified the sheer plunge 
into negativity, not to mention, the obliteration of accountability as an otoko (man) and of 
social existence itself. 
Bataille writes thus of expenditure with reference to certain “unproductive forms” 
of activity in which “the accent is placed on a loss that must be as great as possible in or-
                                                
45 Jacques Derrida, “From Restricted to General Economy: A Hegelianism Without Reserve,” pg. 255. 
46 Alexandre Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit, pg. 
21. 
47 Ibid, pg. 255. 
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der for that activity to take on its true meaning.”48 Bataille even goes so far as to suggest 
that, rather than in utility, the origin of exchange itself might have resided in the “need to 
destroy and lose.”49 Hence of gambling, Bataille observes that it “can be considered to be 
a real charge of the passions unleashed by competition and that, among a large number of 
bettors, it leads to losses disproportionate to their means; these even attain such a level of 
madness that often the only way out for gamblers is prison or death.”50 At the far limit of 
expenditure and loss, gambling undoes the Hegelian dialectic of recognition in “an irrup-
tion suddenly uncovering the limit of discourse and the beyond of absolute knowledge.”51 
By a strange inversion, incommensurable debts through gambling coincide with singular 
winnings in the calculus of gambling, for the gambler cannot make good on his promise. 
Gamblers sacrifice (and pay for their failure with) their social reputation as otoko (men), 
if not with their lives. Gambling thus emerges as a metaphor for life itself. Only few, like 
Ichi-san or Moto-san, had the physique to survive the excessive life-style predicated in 
Yama. But even these two were ticking time-bombs, practically waiting to collapse. Akia 
would say of Ichi-san’s “type” (ā iu taipu) that their bodies crashed suddenly and all at 
once. Of himself, Akia would say that his failing health was a direct consequence of the 
excessive life-style he had led. “The bill catches up to you” (tsuke ga mawattekuru). 
 
                                                
48 Georges Bataille, “The Notion of Expenditure,” in Visions of Excess: Selected Writings, 1927 – 1939, 
trans. Allan Stoekl (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985), pg. 120. 
49 Ibid, pg. 121. Bataille observes that there may be an “interest in considerable losses, in catastrophes that, 
while conforming to well-defined needs, provoke tumultuous depressions, crises of dread, and, in the final 
analysis, a certain orgiastic state” (Ibid, 117). 
50 Ibid, pg. 119. 
51 Ibid, pg. 261. 
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At Sanyūkai, talk of gambling was taboo: an activity that was obviously regarded 
as an “addiction” (izonshō).52 Such talk undermined Sanyūkai as a space constituted on 
the denegation of unproductive forms of life. At Sanyūkai, even the long-lost alcoholic 
father with a gambling addiction and criminal record could be redeemed to take part in 
forms of sociality that did not revolve around excess. He could be trained both into do-
cility, and to shamelessly accept charity which sought to rescue him from himself and his 
environment. For he was, in their eyes, “pitiable” (kawaisō). People who came from out-
side Sanya, and volunteered at Sanyūkai, spoke thus of the homeless who lived in tents 
along the river, to whom the institution handed out food parcels once per week. Yet, the 
rest of Sanya itself – such as the entryway to Iroha arcade, where the drunks gathered, or 
even Mutō-san’s – remained strangely beside the grid of Sanyūkai’s activities; at once 
immediately adjacent to Sanyūkai, yet non-existent. Nor did staff or volunteers from out-
side Sanya ever make a stop at Sanya drinkeries – and there were a plethora: Oiwake, 
Iseya, Izumi, Takadera … – on their way home from work, preferring, instead, to make a 
beeline for Minami-Senjū station. Likewise, Sanyūkai never reserved venues within 
Sanya for events like the “end of the year party” (bōnenkai), opting instead for Asakusa. 
In a disqueting display of obsequiousness, one charity organization in Sanya even 
required that recipients of food sing Christian hymns before receiving their weekly ration. 
Thus, on every Sunday, a strangely pliable, straggly crowd of people could be seen lining 
up in a long row alongside Tamahime park, holding white sheets of music paper, and fac-
ing the opposite side of the street where loudspeakers had been positioned, and members 
of the staff faced them, in turn. Like the divisioning line between the interior and exterior 
                                                
52 See my discussion of Jacques Derrida’s essay, “The Rhetoric of Drugs,” in the Introduction and above. 
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of the Sanyūkai entry, an imaginary line had been drawn which established charity-givers 
vis-à-vis the other, on whose recognition the institution was dependent.53 
Institutions like Sanyūkai could not enforce sociality among its members without 
expelling the negative, excessive elements that threatened the institution at its core. It was 
founded on negating the negativity of these excesses. By ousting unabiding persons from 
its territory, Sanyūkai repeated the originary gesture that had landed individuals in Sanya 
in the first place, confined and cut off from family and society. Sanyūkai was an island in 
Sanya, as Sanya was an island in Japanese society. However, it was not only institutions, 
families, and general society that could not survive the excessive, repetitious life-style of 
the guys. Money, and liquor, spelled the eventual dissolution of the Okinawa-gumi itself. 
Often the self-destruction of social reputation began from borrowing meagre sums 
of money. Especially at the end of a month with no work, the guys would have spent their 
abure or welfare allowance, and turned to one another to for small sums of cash, lest they 
retreat to their rooms. It was equally common, however, for the guys to lose track of how 
much they had borrowed, lent, and from or to whom. This was no surprise, given that the 
guys were most often drunk when they pulled money from one another, that is, when they 
                                                
53 Of a social worker in West Virginia, Kathleen Stewart writes in A Space on the Side of the Road: Cultur-
al Politics in an “Other” America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996): “I entered the dense and 
haunting landscape of the camps on the words of a social worker in town who told me flat out to just stay 
out of them. She had moved to the area twenty-five years earlier when her husband came to practice medi-
cine in one of the five miners’ hospitals in Beckley – a town of 20,000 that is the service center for 150,000 
people from the hollers and camps within a radius of thirty or forty miles. Although she had worked daily 
with clients from the camps, she had never herself ventured out to this place that began five miles from her 
doorstep in a protected middle-class enclave. For her it was an imagined landscape beyond the pale – a 
place given over to dirt and violence, lack and excess. In the landscape of lack there was not enough money, 
not enough schooling, no lawns, no police, no fire stations, no paint on the houses, no city water, no cable 
TV, bad plumbing. It was unsanitary. There would be no one for me to talk to. There was nothing out there. 
In the landscape of excess there was the insanity of ecstatic fundamentalism, the danger of wild bars where 
drunken men cut each other with knives, the filth of pigs and chickens, the smell of wildness and dirty bod-
ies and unwashed hair, the piles of junk on the porches and in the yards, the spreading junkyards of rusting 
trucks and washing machines, the excesses of talk and story, the obvious eccentricities of people, the bald 
stares of people who notice a stranger passing” (67). 
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asked for the bill. Akia would grumble at the end of every month that Shokawa-san had 
demanded he return ¥10,000 ($100 USD) when he had not borrowed any money to begin 
with. To avoid confrontation – for Shokawa-san was Akia’s senior by four years; a code 
of seniority that Akia upheld – Akia would dish the cash out and disappear into his room 
for the final week of the month, living off instant noodles and water because he only had 
a couple hundred yen (a couple dollars USD) left in his account. Others, however, would 
get themselves into fights on account of paltry sums, having raised the anger of the lender 
either by failing, repeatedly, to return the debt, or by feigning forgetfulness. What pricked 
lenders most was when they found borrowers spending money – on liquor or maybe even 
gambling – at Oiwake, Muto-san’s, or other drinkeries, that clearly indicated they were in 
possession of cash they chose not to return. Ironically, lenders thereby replicated the very 
infuriation expressed by upstanding members of general society who paid their taxes and 
did not forgive waste by welfare-recipients. After Mito-chan’s fall from grace as tehaishi, 
Akia would therefore caution him “not to borrow from anyone!” (kariruna!). For, instead 
of returning money or, even worse, failing to give individuals their wages – yet promising 
to do so the following day – Mito-chan would set the money aside to drink, raising the ire 
of Matsuda-san, whose underlings he had decided not to pay, muttering under his breath: 
“how come only I can’t drink” (nande ore dake ga nonjya ikenaino). Matsuda-san would 
then make a fuss with the rest of the Okinawa-gumi, insisting that Ichi-san do something 
about his younger brother, or that Akia talk to him. However, it was to no avail, as even 
Ichi-san acted as if Mito-chan’s doings had nothing to do with himself, thereby appearing 
to give others the freedom to act as they wished with Mito-chan. Yet, everyone presumed 
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that even Ichi-san would retaliate if Mito-chan – family – was harmed. Thus, it was said, 
Mito-chan was safe and protected by the presence of his “older brother” (aniki). 
Holding his forefinger and thumb milimeters apart, Akia explained that over only 
¥100, the personal slight experienced by a lender could prompt them to kill. It was not the 
money itself, but the affront to the person and reputation of the individual – as an otoko – 
which triggered them to assert themselves as men. Thus the trope of otoko could spill into 
irrecoverable excess, for which the individual had to take responsibility – sacrificing their 
social existence – or it could shore up this negativity by placing limits on the activity of 
the guys.54 In the latter sense, Akia, who received more welfare than others – on account 
of his health – and was also more generous with his money, had made a rule of not asking 
people to return money when the amount involved was less than ¥3,000 ($30 USD). Any 
other conduct would have been unbecoming. But when it came to confrontations, Akia 
asserted that nothing could hold him back – neither the police, nor the danger of physical 
injury – and that he had no problem wielding a broken bottle on his opponent. Regardless, 
when it came down to it, he said, the other party backed down. 
In Sanya, “no one but me” (ore shika inai), Akia would boast, can take things “to 
the limit” (soko made) thus. Yet, it was normally somebody else, like the slightly crazed, 
very short-tempered Izami who was jailed a second time – previously for murder, but this 
                                                
54 Miyazaki Manabu writes in Toppamono: 
 “I didn’t only gamble in Kyoto, but in Osaka, too. It was there that I was once admonished by a 
veteran gambler belonging to a long-established gambling syndicate, the Sakaume-gumi. He was about 
seventy and had known my grandfather. 
 That day, I kept losing and was starting to behave rashly. Young guy that I was, I just kept on bet-
ting, determined not to quit until I won. Then someone patted me on the shoulder. 
 “Why not just die? Come on, walk away!” 
 I turned around to see the old gambler from the Sakaume-gumi. 
 Strangely enough, his words were all it took to calm me. The harder you gamble, the harder it is to 
get out of trouble if it’s not your lucky day. What’s important in gambling is to “die” – admit that you have 
lost. This is what the old man taught me. Afterward, he took me to a separate room. 
 “I’ll tell you something,” he said. “It’s only when you lose that you prove yourself as a man. It’s 
easy to be a winner. How you behave as a loser says everything” (221). 
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time for stabbing an “old man” (ojisan) in his seventies – who committed the deed. News 
of such murders spread like quickfire, as if everyone knew that, at some point or other, it 






When I was a child, my mother used to tell me. 
“You, what will you be when you grow big, 
I don’t mind what you become but, 
Please find a good path to walk, that 
Won’t be laughed at by the public.” 
This pricks me in my chest. 
 
One seeks one’s path on one’s own 
Staggering stumbling   at that moment 
The accumulated water   of the found path 
On fluttering eyelids   write the letter of forebearance 
And hold back the tears 
 
A flower that has blossomed is beautiful. 
However, a flower that will bear fruit, 
Is even more beautiful. 
A flower that will bear fruit, 
I believe that this is a man’s dream. 
 
To make a flower that bears fruit bloom 
From birth to the day of dying 
One way of truth   from the heart 
For us   who continue to hope 
This year’s wind, too, is too severe  
 
After all, what a human can rely on, 
Is only oneself. 
Until the day he goes to the grave 
To be a man is to see through 
The path one has chosen 
 
Only one destination   forever onwards 
The day a man   closes life is 
The moment a man   drops his dream 
In a hardly credible world 
I will trust myself and live1 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  








 Akia’s life changed when he was 25. At the time, he was working in Tokyo, lead-
ing his own group of laborers in the “demolition” (kaitai) business. Up until then, he had 
been fortunate. Akia’s bosses had favored him, and thus he was on the cusp of establish-
ing his own name and company in the business at a very early age. Having dropped out of 
high school, Akia – like so many of the guys – had come from Okinawa as a teen to work 
as a manual laborer. He had almost made it in the construction business at the age of 25. 



































As the leader of his crew, Akia’s daily routine consisted in picking everybody up 
in the morning, driving them to the site in a minivan, and leading the work itself. Decades 
later, he would reflect on the health consequences of having done his share of demolition 
work at an early age and time when hardly any health measures were observed. Workers 
merely wrapped a towel around their mouths to keep out toxic fumes and dust. Hence, at 
the age of 56, when Akia was ailing from multiple illnesses, including a brain tumor that 
could not be excised, and the “itai-itai disease” (itai-itai byō) – “it hurts-it hurts disease”; 
so named on account of constant pain – he wondered whether demolition work had partly 
caused his condition. 
But when he was 25, it was a fight that spelled the turning point in his life. When 
he and his crew arrived on the site, it turned out an other group of workers had been hired 
to do the same work. This double-booking transformed into a confrontation between the 
leaders of the two groups, as both refused to give the day’s work to the other. Hung-over 
and bellicose from the previous night of drinking, Akia reacted instantly when the leader 
of the other group put a hand on him. Before anybody could separate them, Akia flipped 
the man on the ground and kicked him in the chest when he tried to get back up. The kick 
had just been a light nudge, Akia would say. 
Life continued regularly for a couple weeks after the incident, until one day, Akia 
arrived home to a line of police cars parked out front. Charged with manslaughter, he was 
incarcerated and in his first trial, was found guilty of involuntarily killing his adversary. 
However, on looking back at the trial years later, Akia would bitterly recount that it was 
not until his lawyers contested this verdict – and succeeded in receiving a retrial on the 
grounds that medical malpractice had led to the man’s death – that the case was to per-
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manently alter his life. The moment medical malpractice was claimed, the case caught the 
attention of the mass media, and Akia’s name was made known to the general public. 
Akia was finally given a three-year sentence. However, it was not the prison term, but the 
publicization of the court case that redirected the course of his life. For Akia, who would 
go to jail several times again – twice for over a year, one of which as a “substitute” (mi-
gawari) for someone higher in the mob echelons – jail could be endured, but the stain to 
his personal reputation could not be repaired.2 
When he was released, Akia was, in fact, offered his old job back, but he declined. 
Shortly thereafter, he was approached by the yakuza through an acquaintance, and offered 
a place in the organization if he should desire it. Akia was to spend 10 years of his life in 
the Kantō-based Nibikikai. Before the Nibikikai dissolved, Akia would rise from driver 
to bodyguard, to kashira (head) of his own troupe, until in-fighting put him on discipli-
nary probation, having to eke out a living in Sanya. When this finally happened, Akia 
paid the ward office a visit and – in the exhibitionist mobster style of Yamagishi-san – 
threatened the state into giving him welfare. Working the system constituted a righteous 
technique of survival, the successful outcome of which redounded to his credit.3 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See Miyazaki Manabu’s Toppamono, pg. 210 – 212, for a depiction of the incendiary conflicts that arose 
between subcontractors (for work) in the late 1970s. 
3 Joining the mob certainly did not secure Akia employment free from discrimination. As Miyazaki Mana-
bu writes of one mob member in the 1980s: “Most hit men involved in yakuza battles in Kansai were from 
Okinawa, making their way by offering their bodies as shooting targets. Kuniba was one of them. It was the 
only way for outsiders like him to get ahead, given the way the Kansai yakuza world is dominated by locals. 
Kuniba had just been released from jail two months earlier, after serving a five-year sentence” (Toppamono, 
365). In fact, Akia’s moment of glory in the mob came when he was released from his stint in jail as a 
“substitute” (migawari) and 800 members from various syndicates gathered to pay their respect. It was an 
achievement of which he would say, “it’s not like everyone can do it” (dare demo dekiru wake jya nai). 
However, these words were undercut by the regret Akia expressed – “why’d he have to die from being hit” 
(nande nagutte shinun dayo) – over the incident in which he was found guilty of killing a man, and that led 
to his life in the mob. 
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A week rarely passed without one of the guys getting into a confrontation, or fight. 
Even Misaaru, who might have appeared the least hot-headed of the bunch, had a history 
of winding up in detention centers. The graduate of an elite Okinawan high school, and of 
Meiji University, Misaaru had been president of his own small company that specialized 
in the installation of LAN lines, yet, would also recall breaking bottles and “half-killing” 
(hangoroshi ni suru) his opponents in bar brawls. What was the point of breaking bottles, 
he asked, if not to half-kill your adversary? 
But the most well-known fighter was Moto-san, “bodyguard” (bodigādo), “junior” 
(kōhai), confidant and friend to the lean and elegant Izukenji-san. Indeed, once he was set 
off in a fight, Ichi-san remarked, “there is no stopping” (tomerarenai) Moto. By this same 
token, however, Moto could be counted on – unlike anybody else, Akia would say – to 
come to one’s aid. He would “come running” (tonde kuru) without giving the matter a 
second thought. 
Although alcohol blurred judgement, the expression of an idealized code of honor 
could be observed in fighting. As Shokawa-san emphatically explained on meeting me – 
an outsider – the fundamental principle of fighting consisted in protecting one’s “buddies” 
(nakama).4 He asked me if it was not “obvious” (futsū) that one “look out for” (mamoru) 
the members of one’s group, and that, if any one member was threatened or beaten up, to 
strike back. As such, the compulsion to fight invoked the necessity of protecting sociality 
itself – thus, reference was made beyond the dyadic relation: to “buddies” (nakama) – but 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 In Confessions of a Yakuza, Saga writes:  
“So you see, if you aren’t powerful, somebody’s going to come bargaining into your turf. And if 
you can’t shove him out again, you’ve had it. So you mustn’t ever show weakness. 
Suppose you get into a fight with a guy from some other gang: whatever happens, you must 
squash him. If you let yourself get hurt without hurting him back, then it doesn’t matter what happens to 
you, we’re the ones who’re going to suffer.” (Saga, 81) 
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it also sought to maintain order, and more specifically, hierarchy and formality within the 
group. Shokawa-san continued to explicate this code of conduct. As Okinawans, he said, 
it was not done to “lay a hand on” (te o tsukeru) anybody senior in age to oneself. Juniors 
could talk back at seniors, but to physically strike them was not accepted. On the contrary, 
violence might be employed by seniors to reinstate this proper order of things. Of course, 
in place of fighting, an apology could be accepted from the offending party. Thereby, the 
reciprocity of fighting might even give rise to alliance, as it had in the case of Shokawa-
san and Akia’s friendship. For Akia – Shokawa-san’s junior by four years – had started 
off their relation with a faux-pas, offending when he should have been deferential, but he 
had set himself aside, and apologized. Camaraderie had been established by acceding to a 
social system of seniority that both individuals recognized. By the time Akia ended up in 
detention at Asakusa police headquarters – for aiding Shokawa-san in a fight – the latter 
was introducing Akia to others as his “younger brother” (otōto).5 
But most often, failure to observe deference towards seniors landed one in a fight. 
Fighting even took place among the guys themselves, albeit not among its core members. 
One man who was younger than the others – in his mid-thirties – had a habit of becoming 
offensive when drinking, and so, one day after work, Mito-chan, Ichi-san, and Moto-san 
had had enough. Since it would have been awkward for Mito-chan – the tehaishi – to put 
the man in place, Moto-san did it. A week later, the man’s face was still swollen and one 
eye was blood-red. It had been “much worse” (motto hidokatta), Ichi-san said, right after 
the battering. But everybody continued work as before, save for a brief urging from Ichi-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 In the “Writing Lesson,” Claude Lévi-Strauss writes of the transformation of strife into gifting: “Actually, 
it was hard to believe that an exchange of gifts was in progress … it is hardly surprising that, when the ex-
changes are over, one group should go off dissatisfied with its share, and (taking stock of its acquisitions 
and remembering its own gifts) should build up feelings of resentment which become increasingly aggres-
sive” (Tristes Tropiques, 303). 
 371 
san to fix the habit. Still, Ichi-san acknowledged, it was difficult to alter habits. Similarly, 
one day outside Mutō-san’s hole-in-the-wall, Ichi-san witnessed a man, slightly younger 
than himself, lambasting the senior Hagiwara-san for his condescending attitude. Notably, 
Ichi-san and others in the Okinawa-gumi had not been particularly fond of Hagiwara-san, 
likely for the very same reason the man was shouting at him. Ichi-san himself had moved 
out of Hagiwara-san’s apartment because the latter charged him a monthly shower fee of 
up to ¥5,000 ($50 USD). Nonetheless, in this instance, the flagrant disregard of deference 
prompted Ichi-san to take the younger man to task. Demanding what kind of behavior it 
was to speak like that to a “superior” (meue) – “he’s your senior, right?!” (meue desho?!) 
– Ichi-san challenged the man to a fight when the latter persisted in justifying his conduct. 
As he broke into a shadow-boxing stance, flinging his fists about, Ichi-san beckoned the 
other man to join him around the corner. Sure enough, the younger man apologized short-
ly after, first to Ichi-san, and then to Hagiwara-san. And as the man lowered his head and 
shook hands, Ichi-san went about introducing him to everyone as if he were a new recruit.  
Where talk was endlessly unproductive, the threat of violence ensured immediate 
resolution. Of course, it was not just the prospect of fighting, but of losing to an opponent 
like Ichi-san – who professed to “beating the hell out of” (boko boko ni suru) adversaries 
– that enforced submission to a certain social order. One day, Ichi-san himself might lose 
or retreat. Yet, for the time being, he still had a knack for ending fights before they could 
even start. In one instance, Ichi-san entered a snack bar, happening to sit next to a young 
“hoodlum” (chimpira) look-alike, dressed up in baggy sports clothes. At the slightest hint 
of attitude from the neighboring man – who was sizing Ichi-san up – the latter ended the 
situation by stating: “I don’t know if you’re part of some organization, but it’s irrelevant” 
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(dokka no soshiki ni haitteru ka dō ka shiranai kedo, sore wa sore de ii). And in an in-
stant, the tension was diffused, because Ichi-san had made it clear that it did not matter 
whether the other man was yakuza-affiliated or not. His words sent a quick ripple through 
the man and cut to the chase: if they were going to fight, they might as well skip the pos-
turing and have it out right away. Or, they could get along drinking. It was one or the 
other. Ichi-san thereby called the man’s bluff, and sure enough, the next day Ichi-san was 
laughing over the hoodlum cheerily toasting with us by the end of the night. 
 Yet, in most cases, fighting caused a tiresome inconvenience to other members of 
the group. Unlike Ichi-san’s no-nonsense confrontations, other individuals repeatedly got 
themselves into situations in which the responsibility befell to others to prevent the fight, 
or to provide aid if things got out of hand. In fact, the 60-year-old Shokawa-san was re-
garded as the most troublesome drunk of the lot, because he would embroil others in con-
frontations and had done so countless times. But it was not just Shokawa-san. One even-
ing, the guys had to chase Ha-chan because he insisted on antagonizing his opponent, 
driving him down the street until they ended up in front of the mammoth. So too, Akia 
repeatedly had to step in to prevent fights involving Riku-san, Misaaru, and countless 
other acquaintances. It was a weekly, if not daily occurrence that somebody got them-
selves into a confrontation, such that the rest of the crew would sigh, lower their heads 
and moan: “not again” (mata kayō). And, in addition to the trouble of preventing or aid-
ing, there were other inconveniences to fighting. Sometimes the furniture in drinkeries 
was broken, so that everyone involved had to pay for repairs; alternatively, someone 
would have to go with a drill and hammer to fix things. Likewise, on the rare occasion 
that in-fighting took place, amends had to be made. Naturally, the individual who insti-
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gated the fight always justified their conduct, throwing blame on the other party. They 
said that there had been no choice but to act as they had, and in this way, everyone had to 
live with the self-righteous machismo of the others. 
Looking after and indulging one another created social bonds of indebtedness that 
strengthened the group, but that – like gambling – could accrue to that point of negativity 
at which the individual destroyed his or her reputation. It became especially burdensome 
when someone ended up in detention, or jail, because the others – most often the person’s 
closest “buddy” (nakama) – had to pay visits. Personages like Izukenji-san and Nē-san 
would also visit, providing magazines and clothing, while Matsuda-san would deploy his 
police connections, at least to give the appearance of securing an early release. Of course, 
the tightest bond should have arisen on the occasion that someone went to detention on 
account of someone else. However, such an outcome was contingent on the remembrance 
of debt. 
 On the other hand, coming to somebody’s rescue often enhanced the reputation of 
the rescuing individual. The one time Matsuda-san was attacked from behind and beaten 
down in front of Mutō-san’s place, Akia stepped in since, he said, it looked like Matsuda 
“would take a beating” (yararechau). After all three had been hauled into the mammoth 
police box, Akia kicked the other man in the stomach when he pointed at Akia, accusing 
him of having instigated the affair. This incident earned Akia the reputation of somebody 
who would not side with the police to play to his own advantage, and with it, a nickname 
coined by Matsuda-san – “the devil’s man” (debiru no otoko) – for having unhesitatingly 
kicked the other person inside the police box, in front of the cops. As Akia would say, he 
looked to the “actions” (kōdō) of others to evaluate them, and in this case, his actions had 
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spoken for themselves.6 And matters unfolded similarly when Akia ended up in detention 
on account of Shokawa-san. In fact, it was from a third person, Riku-san, that Shokawa-
san inherited the fight, for Riku-san had abruptly abandoned a confrontation in the hands 
of Shokawa-san, who called Akia.7 Faced with a crazy opponent who, at the very instant 
Akia came running, had picked up a bicycle to throw, Shokawa-san and Akia retaliated 
by battering him with an aluminum trash can. After the police detained them all, the other 
man refused to drop charges, causing Shokawa-san and Akia to stay in detention for two 
weeks. In effect, the only person whose reputation remained unscathed after this incident 
was Akia, because he had played no part in starting the fight. He had only gone running 
when Shokawa-san called, as his code of ethics dictated, and despite others advising him 
it was “better not to go” (ikanai hō ga ī); and – as luck would have it – he had been put in 
a two by one meter cell, whereas Shokawa-san had lounged in an empty six-person cell. 
In this way, sociality had been maintained, and their release gave occasion for “everyone” 
(minna) to get together, including a remorseful Riku-san, and Matsuda-san, the facilitator 
of their early release. Yet, Akia’s self-sacrifice called for return. In so doing, it also set a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 In Toppamono, Miyazaki Manabu instantiates similar values: 
“As he spoke, Mr. Uchida kept nodding to himself. To him, even a bad reputation was good pub-
licity. It never occurred to him that press coverage like this would dirty my name. To him, the opposite was 
true: “You stood up for yourself all the way in your fight with the police, and you won through in the end. 
That earns you respect.” 
Mr. Uchida only cares about the principles at stake. He rejects anything that doesn’t add up to him, 
whether he hears it from a general contractor or a yakuza. 
Many times I’ve heard him tell a yakuza, “You’re full of shit. Get lost!” 
This didn’t have the kind of consequences you might expect, however. Yakuza knew he wouldn’t 
hesitate to kill someone if he felt it was justified, and I think they respected him for that. Indeed, he had 
been sent to prison thirteen times for standing his ground. No one could deny the formidable spirit of a man 
who matched words with deeds” (277). 
7 As Marcel Mauss quotes Tamati Ranaipiri: “Now, I give this article to a third person who, after a certain 
lapse of time, decides to give something as a payment in return (utu) … the taonga that I received from for 
these taonga (which came from you) must be returned to you.” (Mauss, The Gift: The Form and Reason for 
Exchange in Archaic Socities, 11). See Ch. 3 for a discussion of this excerpt in relation to Marshall Sahlins’ 
writing. In this case, the circulation of violence among the men in Sanya necessitated incremental value. 
Individuals struck back with a violence and with numbers of buddies that exceeded the originary injury. 
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normative standard which fraught relations through Shokawa-san’s failure to reciprocate. 
Only by protecting Akia or someone else, as Akia had done for him, could Shokawa-san 
return or pass the gift – or fight – onwards. Violence was thus made to circulate in Sanya, 
and to take on an incremental character.8 
 But even when they fought alone, there was excess to the violence with which the 
guys fought their adversaries, as if the amount of damage inflicted was never enough. An 
indelible mark had to be left behind, either on the adversary, or on themselves. Moto-san, 
for instance, took on the man reputed to “have been the strongest” (ichiban tsuyokatta) in 
Sanya, giving him injuries that required several months of hospitalization. Fortunately for 
Moto-san, the opponent did not press charges, but did give Moto an elbow injury which 
might remain with him “for life” (isshō). As a repetition, fighting was to have established 
the masculinity of the individual – as an otoko (man), recognized by “everyone” (minna) 
– but most often, the self-assertion failed. By fighting, the individual might have caused a 
“burden” (meiwaku) to everyone, or might have taken a beating. Then again, some of the 
guys went on fighting sprees, as if one fight was insufficient. In fact, when Moto-san got 
injured, he had been fighting solo – as he always did, without involving anyone else – for 
months. Notably, this fighting spree coincided with a period in his life, having just turned 
fifty, in which he was suffering from something akin to a mid-life anxiety crisis. Finding 
himself unable to make a fist, Moto grasped a plastic bottle at all times, and exhibited all 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 The violence directed at adversaries was most often triggered by a personal slur and as Misaaru explained, 
"everyone has short tempers” (minna ki ga mijikai). Hence, reciprocity was overdetermined by past injuries. 
It consisted in a misrecognition of the constitutive injury to the otoko of Sanya: disposal. See René Girard’s 
Violence and the Sacred, trans. Patrick Gregory (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1977), for the 
theorization of a comparable logic whereby mimetic desire for an originary object is replaced by a mimetic 
violence that – particularly in a “lawless zone” (muhō chitai) like Sanya – threatens to spiral out of control. 
In this respect, the direction of violence towards a “surrogate victim” is arbitrary (Ibid, 257). It must be said, 
however, that Girard’s theorization of violence runs counter to the argument I make for techniques of state 
recognition that drive differences into social expulsion, thereby leading to the circulation of excess violence 
within the confines of Sanya. 
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sorts of strange behavior, like bolting in and out of Oiwake, and calling Akia in the early 
morning to go for calming “walks” (sampo). And when he drank, he drank continuously, 
to the point of becoming so “utterly drunk” (beron beron) that, one evening, he could be 
found swaying and bracing himself against the electric pole right in front of the mammoth, 
barely able to hold his eyes open. Thus, he would drink, sleep in Oiwake, wake and drink. 
Having turned fifty, Moto-san would later explain that, up until this point, he had “risen 
and risen” (agatte agatte) at work, imagining all the while that he would eventually reach 
the top. But the moment seemed to have passed without his being aware of it, and now he 
was on the way down. He could keep up with younger tobi for a day or so, but otherwise, 
he fell behind. Fighting transposed this insufficiency – the inevitable result of age, and of 
decades of work in construction – into a reaffirmation of masculinity. Akia, for example, 
had so idealized fighting that he was constantly attuned to actualizing its principle, which 
he would quote – “proverbs” (kotowaza) and karaoke being his forte – with the proverb: 
“side with the weak and crush the strong” (yowaki o tasukete tsuyoki o kujiku). Alongside 
the more obvious reference to yakuza ideals, the proverb reversed the assignation of guilt 
that was constitutive of Akia’s life as an “outlaw” (autorō), and gave that life an aura of 
virtue.9 
By refiguring the act that landed him in jail, the constitutive act of fighting would 
reverse the order of justice, guilt, and punishment. It would constitute Akia as an otoko in 
his own right, and he staked himself to this end. When Akia’s ane (older sister) died, and 
– confined to Sanya – he was unable to attend the funeral in Okinawa for lack of cash, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Miyaki Manabu writes in his autobiography, Toppamono: “Basically my father was utterly indifferent to 
my schooling and never said a word on anything educational. But there was one precept he used to drum 
into me like crazy: act like a man. His definition of manliness was to protect the weak, one’s juniors, and 
friends in trouble, even if it meant putting your body between them and danger. Also, stand up to the strong 
when they try and push you about, never back down, and never make excuses” (38). 
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impotence led him to “go wild” (abareru) in Iroha arcade. Taking on three opponents, he 
woke in the hospital with broken ribs. The excessive violence of fighting could, in effect, 
be directed towards the self, as much as the other. In fact, fighting blurred the distinction 
between self and other in the formation of an “I,” or otoko, from which violence had to be 
ousted. Yet, in its transposition, the source of this violence was inexhaustible – as Akia’s 
“anger” (ikari) at Sanyūkai was “eternal” (eien) – and the remainder of violence triggered 
repetition, while also giving rise to pleasure in pain. As if his ribs would never heal, Akia 
repeatedly refractured them, and never seemed to get rid of his bandages. The mark of the 
fight functioned as a proof and sign of masculinity that compelled repetition by virtue of 
insufficiency. Failing to help a “buddy” (nakama) in a fight would have compromised the 
reputation of the otoko, and the inconveniences (police detention, scars) of having helped 
someone – in spite of oneself – were made known through passing remarks. However, the 
drive to violence likewise functioned to circulate an excess, the originary wound of which 
could not be contained. Shokawa-san laughed at the “footprint” (ashiato) left by Akia’s 
slipper on somebody’s face, when he had kicked them outside Oiwake. Only a week later, 
Shokawa-san recounted how he had his “pride” (iji), and had therefore held tightly to the 
aluminum can as he beat his opponent, even as it sliced through his finger. 
Failing to account for the repercussions of one’s actions on others could cause the 
repetition of masculinity to backfire. Like Mito-chan, Shokawa-san’s bragging had long 
since gone hollow and tiresome for lack of group recognition. However it was the laconic 
Riku-san who was made to bear the brunt of responsibility for the two-week incarceration 
of Akia and Shokawa-san. Ichi-san, who rarely went out of his way to lecture anybody, 
had to sit down with Riku-san to talk over what had happened. The problem, or violence, 
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had to be addressed and quelled at its very third, social source. Behind his back, Riku-san 
was now called a “troublemaker” (toraburumēkā). Even Shokawa-san would mutter that 
Riku-san was now “over” (owari). So too, after doing time in detention, Akia – who had 
already intervened for Riku-san several times – said that he would no longer get involved. 
From then on he would take a “no touch” (nō tacchi) policy, claiming: “the real winner is 
the one who walks away” (nigeta hō ga kachi). Assuming responsibility for one’s actions 
was of basic importance in maintaining a reputation as an otoko, since it was recognition 
by one’s “buddies” (nakama) that upheld this reputation. 
Yet, with the exception of Izukenji-san, it seemed that anyone could occupy the 
place of the individual causing a burden to everyone. In fact, only months before the fight, 
Ichi-san and Akia were lauding Riku-san precisely for being the kind of person who did 
not entangle others in his affairs. Riku-san was known for refusing to seek, or accept any 
financial support from the state. To the exasperation of Ichi-san – who was all too aware 
of the difficulties of making a living as an elder construction worker, and was adamantly 
of the stance that “you take what you can get” (moraeru mono wa morau) – Riku-san had 
severed the little support he had received while being treated for an illness, thought to be 
cancer. Years back, Ichi-san had similarly found Riku-san injured in Asakusa after a fight, 
refusing help and insisting on going home by himself in spite of several broken ribs. 
Riku-san would come to be known for his warped sense of honor and for his drunken fits, 
when it was not unusual for him to pull a knife. But in this instance, Riku-san had broken 
his own mahjong dictum – people are “finished, if they compromise” (magetara owari) – 
and so he fell in the category of being “out” (autto), as Ichi-san called individuals who 
could not uphold their own standards. The fall and rise of individuals came swiftly, such 
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that at one point in the year, someone like Ha-chan might have fallen out of favor; while, 
half a year later, Ha-chan himself joined the others in complaining of somebody else. In 
this manner, the guys consistently fell short of their own standards, precisely in instantiat-
ing them, and this failure prompted repetition. It was never enough. 
 
 In its transgressive mode, the repetition of fighting – of the trope of otoko, and the 
solidarity of the group – made reference to an ideal that was embodied by Izukenji-san as 
the emblem of “buddies” (nakama), hierarchy, and hospitality. In a poignant rendition of 
the importance of the group, Izukenji-san recalled how he had first arrived in Sanya dec-
ades earlier, looked about him, and wondered whether he would “be able to make it in 
this town” (kono machi de yatteikeru ka). At the time, he knew no one. Hence, years later, 
Izukenji-san would say without a hint of immodesty that one’s “buddies” (nakama) are 
“everything” (subete). If he were to go to a new town, he would have to start from scratch, 
with nothing. Yet, in “this town” (kono machi) – Yama – Izukenji-san had his “buddies” 
(nakama) and his partner, Nē-san. For lack of any other markers of social status – college 
degree, résumé … – recognition by others in one’s immediate vicinity took on paramount 
significance. Such social recognition was “everything” (subete): it marked the difference 
between the violence of disposability – death – that the labor market confined individuals 
to, and the dignity conferred by recognition as an otoko.10 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 See the Introduction in which I argue that, notwithstanding their dependence on welfare, the day laborers 
of Sanya constitute a “reserve army of labor” (Marx, Capital, 781). Supplemented by welfare or the abure 
system – techniques of state recognition – the intermittent availability of construction work constituted the 
structure from within which the desire emerged for extra work, no matter the risks to health. Oftentimes, it 
was the fired salaryman who could be found in Sanya, where his meagre welfare earnings virtually ensured 
that he submitted himself to one last round of surplus extraction – under the precarious conditions of which 
he could have his welfare cut because he did not declare his earnings, which almost nobody did, or simply 
for gambling or drinking – until his body failed, and he had, indeed, been disposed of. Of such disposability 
as it occurred in the 1990s, Ōyama Shirō writes in A Man With No Talents: 
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 Contrary to expulsion and confinement to Sanya, Izukenji-san and Nē-san made a 
practice of inviting everyone home for meals and alcohol. Once or twice per month, but 
particularly on holidays, long weekends, and breaks like the shōgatsu (new year) or obon, 
Izukenji-san and Nē-san hosted gatherings for the Okinawa-gumi, and an endless range 
of friends, acquaintances, and acquaintances of acquaintances. During these get-togethers, 
their tiny living room – which was no more than five by two meters; opening up through 
sliding doors onto an even smaller bedroom, narrow kitchen with barely enough space for 
one person, and genkan (entryway) feeding directly into it; beside which was also located 
a basic toilet, as the apartment had no shower or bath – would get so crowded that people 
had to squeeze between each other at the table or sit behind one another to fit. Izukenji-
san would sit at the far end of the table, beside the small TV, chatting with someone, and 
occasionally directing Nē-san to get this or that for the guys. As for Nē-san, she would sit 
in seiza position (knees bent underneath her) in the bedroom adjacent to the living room, 
occasionally making food, adding it to a table already decked out with all kinds of dishes, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 “The crucial class distinction in San’ya, then, has nothing to do with having a place to live. Rather, 
it is based on whether or not you scavenge your food. 
 Having no permanent abode versus having to forage for a meal – the difference in the degree of 
misery between the two is great indeed. Tokunaga (like myself) is not willing to take just any job, and he 
feels little resistance to living on the streets if it comes to that, but if circumstances made him stoop to the 
level of scrounging garbage, he would resist mightily, I believe. Are not the people in San’ya who are truly 
homeless those you would call scavengers? 
 That San’ya’s true homeless are the older men who have been wholly excluded from the labor 
market is apparent from the resistance that they, as former laborers, put up when confronting this ultimate 
degradation. Those who can somehow remain in the labor pool will spare no effort to do so when facing 
such a crisis. It is only these older men, therefore – men whose final resistance has met with defeat – who 
are to be counted among the truly homeless” (74). 
 On a similar note, Edward Fowler writes of Sanya in the 1990s in San’ya Blues: “… an increasing 
number of doya are affordable only to the young and able-bodied day laborers physically capable of work-
ing at least every other day. Their number is dwindling, however. As noted above, San’ya’s population is 
aging rapidly along with the nation’s as a whole, with one important difference. The day laborer’s life aver-
age age, in the early fifties as of 1990, is approaching his average life expectancy, which is in the mid-
fifties and which compares unfavorably to the national male average of over seventy-five. Men who 
worked regularly when they were younger and healthier now take sick more easily, and for them there is 
virtually no safety net. The final resting place for many of these men, who are too old to do hard labor but 
too young for welfare, is typically the street” (47). 
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drinks and ashtrays. But she would overturn this image of docility with a sarcastic, quick-
witted humor that knew nothing of decency in parrying comments from the guys. Nē-san 
also would not drink, as she could not take alcohol. And it was only far later in the night, 
usually after midnight, when the food had been consumed and the guys had settled into a 
drinking-only mode, that she relaxed, and took part in gambling with hanafuda. As I was 
told by Ichi-san, at Izukenji-san’s apartment, one had to eat “without hesitation” (enryō 
naku) to make the hosts “happy” (ureshī). This hospitality was extended to all and sundry, 
some of whom came empty-handed – which was accepted – but most often laden with 
large bags of ice, bottles of shōchū, if not a box of Izukenji-san’s Nodokoshi Kirin 
Happōshū. And when the new year arrived, the guys would decide what to get for Izu-
kenji-san and Nē-san in advance, knowing they would spend several evenings, if not days 
at their place. 
 Of new year’s eve, 2012, I wrote as follows: 
Nē-san was sitting a little off to the side all the while. Not joining us at the actual 
table. Earlier in the evening, she’d been dealing with the food, moving back and 
forth. Later, she took a seat beside us in the adjacent room. When I’d offered to 
help in the kitchen, Moto-san had come forth with a Japanese saying to the effect 
that the kitchen is the domain of women, not to be stepped into by a man. At my 
side, Ichi-san noted that it was an old saying … but that young people today don’t 
care either way. Anyways, when Nē-san took a seat next to us later in the evening, 
she was looking on all the while to make sure we had everything needed. On oc-
casion, Izukenji-san would ask her to do this or that. The man of the house. And 
how cutely Nē-san was dressed, in baggy brown cotton pants and large-buttoned 
sweater with designs seamed into the pockets. Like a figure out of a Miyazaki 
anime. But always looking at you intently, like Izukenji-san, straight in the eye. I 
can’t even begin to list the food that was put on the table … from the regular 
osechi ryōri in stacked boxes, to sashimi, tuna, brain, maguro, fish eggs, grilled 
shrimp, crab legs, home-made potato salad, fried spam, pork/meat stew, rice … 
and toshikoshi soba – which, Izukenji-san noted, had to be eaten before midnight, 
like they did as children, before being put to sleep. The whole table was stacked 
with food. Akia dealing out the ice and Jinro, and a box of beer outside the win-
dow. I think Hajime-san brough the crab, and Noribō later came along with 
around 15 cans of the Nodokishi Kirin Happōshū which Izukenji-san drinks. It 
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was an incredible meal … and the food just kept coming. They must have spent 
quite a lot of money on it all, but this wasn’t mentioned … 11 
 
However, the ultimate, irrevocable mark of the importance Izukenji-san placed on 
“buddies” (nakama) consisted in his three missing fingers. They signified the length to 
which Izukenji-san had sacrificed himself in taking the fall for mistakes of those under 
him. Of course, to the uninitiated of normative society, the missing fingers unmistakably 
signified that Izukenji-san was a past or present member of the mob. Like fighting, and 
the trope of otoko, the transgressive character of the severed fingers might elicit wariness, 
revulsion, or fear to the outside world, while it compelled respect and deference in Sanya. 
Moreover, common lore on yakuza had it that a missing finger meant that the person had 
“messed up” (shikujitta). But the fact of Izukenji-san’s sacrifice was established among 
the guys and had assumed mythical proportions. Ichi-san, who rarely ever praised anyone, 
and certainly never adulated anyone, would emphatically state of Izukenji-san’s fingers 
that this was “extremely rare” (metta ni nai). In like fashion, Akia would say Izukenji-san 
was a “man’s man” (otoko no otoko), or even a “man of legend” (densetsu no otoko). In 
the self-sacrifice, the three missing fingers indicated the amount of “suffering” (kurō) 
Izukenji-san had undergone for those under him. In this sense, Ichi-san said, there was “a 
stupid aspect to” (baka na tokoro ga aru) Izukenji-san, insofar as he might not have had 
to sever his fingers, but had himself insisted on doing it. Severing one’s fingers could, as 
Akia explained, become a “habit” (kusé). Nevertheless, Ichi-san noted that Izukenji-san 
was “an incredible person” (sugoi hito) on account of his past in the Fukuoka yakuza. 
Izukenji-san had been part of the “top of the yakuza” (yakuza no toppu) before coming to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 January 3rd, 2013, edited journal entry. Like toshikoshi soba (year-crossing soba), osechi ryōri are tradi-
tional foods that are eaten only on the new year. It consists of a variety of osechi or dishes served in bentō-
like boxes that are stacked one on top of the other. 
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Sanya, and was said to be “famous in Fukuoka” (fukuoka de yūmei). Looking to Akia for 
confirmation – who nodded affirmatively, as somebody who knew the mob – Ichi-san 
granted that he “only knew half” (hanbun shika shiranai) the story, but that – speaking to 
me – “it is clear from Nē-san’s manner, right?” (nē-san no taiō kara wakaru desho?), that 
Izukenji-san was a person of considerable influence. For this reason – “because such a 
person is being used” (sō yū hito o tsukatteiru kara) – Ichi-san would not call Izukenji-
san directly if work was available, but rather, “put in a call to Nē-san” (nē-san ni denwa o 
ireru). Izukenji-san might then “be sitting next to” (tonari ni suwatte) Nē-san, and nod – 
“yes, I’ll go” (hai, iku) – which Nē-san would then convey to Ichi-san. 
In this manner, Ichi-san made sure “to be attentive and cautious” (ki o tsukatte) in 
his dealings with Izukenji-san, since, he said, “things slip out of place if Izukenji-san gets 
angry” (Izukenji-san ga kiretara mono ga zurechau). Akia would also attribute an almost 
supernatural power to Izukenji-san, in claiming that if Izukenji-san ordered it, or, for that 
matter, if Izukenji-san was in trouble, everyone would go running. As Ichi-san put it, one 
“could not live up to” (kao ga agaranai) Izukenji-san. Or as Akia would note, it was “not 
possible to imitate” (mane suru koto wa dekinai) Izukenji-san. So, too, Misaaru would 
say that “everyone is indebted to” (minna sewa ni natteru) Izukenji-san and Nē-san. The 
two were located at the very source of hospitality in Sanya, of all places, where most men 
had all but been ousted from general society, and as such – at the source of the gift – they 
acted as guarantors of a sociality and counter-discourse, grounded in the trope of being an 
otoko.12 Hence, all talk of being a stand-up otoko started and ended with Izukenji-san.13 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 It was nothing less than my own presence in Izukenji-san and Nē-san’s home – outsider and professed 
researcher – that testified to their hospitality. In this way, Blanchot writes of hospitality “of myself to the 
Other” within Sanya (The Writing of the Disaster, 19). On another occasion, Izukenji-san vouched (bowing 
his head) for Korean and Chinese workers in Sanya. 
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But in spite of his elegance, often sporting a long scarf and knit sweater in the winter, or a 
patterned collared shirt and baseball cap in the summer, there was not a hint of self-
importance or egotism in Izukenji-san’s demeanor, which, if anything, was self-
deprecating to an excessive degree. He was at once the regular guy – who liked the chil-
dren’s anime series, One Piece, stayed at home to watch it, and had his phone covered in 
One Piece stickers – and the former mafia don. Izukenji-san could have been arrogant 
and conceited on account of his mythic past, and yet, Ichi-san said, Izukenji-san would sit 
down at a table next to someone like me, smile and have a drink. For this, Ichi-san gave 
Izukenji-san a thumbs up. At once at the pinnacle of hierarchy among the guys, and in 
Sanya itself, Izukenji-san did not distinguish between people on the basis of reputation, 
but took a liking based on his experience with them. Hence, Izukenji-san’s reputation ap-
peared to precede and follow him about like some kind of aura, only to be confirmed 
when interacting with him. The disarming quality of his person and manner was evident 
everywhere. Izukenji-san would leave a drinkery, returning the already profuse bows of 
the owner by bowing even lower, and Ichi-san might note, as if to himself in passing, that 
Izukenji-san was, “after all, incredible” (yappari sugoi). It was “normal” (futsū) for the 
Kanamachi-ikka to put out a bottle for Izukenji-san when they happened to be in the 
same drinkery. But, likewise, Akia would remark that a man must have gone through an 
incredible amount of suffering to treat anyone, be it the drunk, homeless man lying at the 
entrance to Iroha arcade or the Kanamachi-ikka, with the same humility.14 Izukenji-san 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Of the “quilting” function of Lacan’s “point de capiton,” Žižek writes: “The quilting performs the totali-
zation by means of which this free floating of ideological elements is halted, fixed – that is to say, by 
means of which they become parts of the structured network of meaning” (The Sublime Object of Ideology, 
87). 
14 Mary Douglas writes in Purity and Danger (New York: Routledge, 1966): “Ritual recognises the potency 
of disorder. In the disoder of the mind, in dreams, faints and frenzies, ritual expects to find powers and 
truths which cannot be reached by conscious effort. Energy to command and special powers of healing 
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was as familiar as anybody with the drunks hanging about the entrance to Iroha, in front 
of Sōgidan, and would lower his head as he passed by. As such, he embodied a vanishing 
set of yakuza values in which the “top” (toppu) looked out for the weak. Like Mito 
Kōmon’s coat of arms, Izukenji-san’s severed fingers constituted an emblem of generosi-
ty, as rumor of his conduct preceded its repetition.15 
Izukenji-san was as polite and deferential at work as anybody could be. Indeed, if 
anything, he was more assiduous than the others, as he was well aware that his physical 
strength was not on par with the other workers. When I first worked with Izukenji-san, 
we attended the induction meeting for new workers together. At the meeting, the 28-year-
old foreman snickered since Izukenji-san had written part of his paperwork in syllabic 
alphabet – katakana – however, he did not ask Izukenji-san rewrite it.16 Unphased by this 
condescension, Izukenji-san went right to work. Only once, after years of working with 
Ichi-san, did Izukenji-san in any way object to work conditions. He had met with Ichi-san 
for drinks, and – while looking at his fingers and noting that he had, in fact, gone to such 
lengths for others – he said he would “never again do” (mō zettai yaranai) cement work. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
come to those who can abandon rational control for a time … In these beliefs there is a double play on inar-
ticulateness. First there is a venture into the disordered regions of the mind. Second there is the venture 
beyond the confines of society. The man who comes back from these inaccessible regions brings with him 
a power not available to those who have stayed in control of themselves and of society” (117 – 118). 
15 Drawn from Japanese “historical drama” (jidai-geki), Mito Kōmon refers to the TV character of a retired 
feudal lord of Mito who travels Japan, vanquishing corrupt officials in the name of the weak. The climax of 
this hugely popular TV series consists in the moment, repeated in every episode, when Mito Kōmon reveals 
his true identity by drawing his coat of arms before the corrupt, who bow before him. Writing of a compa-
rable “philosophy” in their orientalizing Yakuza: Japan’s Criminal Underworld, David E. Kaplan and Alec 
Dubro observe of the outlaw character in Japanese literature: “Like Goro Fujita’s novels of seventy years 
later, Hasegawa’s stories portrayed men of questionable backgrounds who fought as hard as they gambled, 
yet maintained a philosophy of supporting the underdog and never troubling the common folk. Above all, 
they remained loyal to those who helped them. A virtuous traveler would be willing to sacrifice his life for 
the oyabun who for one day had opened the gang’s home to him … The aggressive yet compassionate out-
law, useless to mainstream society but willing to stand up for the common man – these are the essential 
components of the yakuza legend. It is a tradition inherited not only from the machi-yakko but from the 
samurai as well, and it spread through the feudal underworld” (16 – 17). 
16 Izukenji-san was by no means illiterate. He simply could not be bothered to write out the ideograms. 
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Apparently, Izukenji-san had ended up with the job of shoveling concrete on the upper 
story; a task that entailed others – from different companies – telling him over and over 
what to do and not in the nicest manner. “You get told things” (mono yuwareru) was how 
Ichi-san put it; meaning that somebody brusquely told you to shovel here, then there, and 
to take a little off the top. In fact, Ichi-san never did this task, as he always operated the 
vibrator. But thereafter, Ichi-san refrained from sending Izukenji-san to do concrete work. 
And in a sense, Ichi-san was giving Izukenji-san preferential treatment, since he was un-
forgiving of complaints from others. However, unlike many others, Izukenji-san had done 
his time, and chosen the moment to address the issue. Ichi-san’s protectiveness of Izuken-
ji-san thus emerged in barely noticeable forms, as when, one day, Mito-chan failed to tell 
Ichi-san that a new worker in the group had been bad-mouthing Izukenji-san on the train 
home. Ichi-san flipped at Mito-chan in front of everybody, shouting how “fucked up” 
(okashī) it was that everyone knew but himself. The worker in question quit of his own 
accord, and it was not necessary for Mito-chan to take action. But the incident led Akia to 
instruct Mito-chan that the “harmony” (wa) of the group was more important than any-
thing else. The slur to Izukenji-san had threatened the integrity and balance of the entire 
Okinawa-gumi. 
However rarely it was deployed, Izukenji-san’s word imposed a law of order on 
the group. This was evident when there was strife between individuals, or among mutual 
acquaintances of Izukenji-san, whom Izukenji-san wished would get along amicably. 
Unity was restored under the figure of Izukenji-san when he asked Ichi-san to make up 
with Hajime-san, although Ichi-san and others in the Okinawa-gumi had never cared for 
Hajime-san. Ichi-san went drinking with Hajime-san and, afterwards, told Izukenji-san 
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that there was “no more” (mō nai) awkwardness between them. Of course, the peace was 
an uneasy one, not least because it was Hajime-san and two accomplices who put Akia in 
hospital with broken ribs a year earlier, when Akia had apologized, and then “gone amok” 
(abareta) in Iroha arcade. Yet, even Akia held his peace – and tongue – after Izukenji-san 
requested that Ichi-san make up with Hajime-san. At gatherings at which both Akia and 
Hajime-san were present – be it at Izukenji-san’s apartment, Oiwake, or Fukuhachi, 
Hajime-san’s drinkery, where the guys started drinking – Akia held his peace, even when 
Hajime-san commented with a snide: “What’s with your face color? It’s kind of blue. Are 
you gonna die soon?” (kao iro daijōbu? nanka aoi yo. mō sugu shinun jyanai). No doubt, 
Hajime-san knew that Akia had been diagnosed with a tumor. But even in the absence of 
Hajime-san, Akia did not utter a single word bad-mouthing the latter, save in company of 
those closest to him. 
Of course, there were limits to Akia’s patience. As if the ideogram had nothing to 
do with one of his favorite karaoke songs, he explained how he had made a philosophy of 
the ideogram for “forbearance” (shinobi) – “忍” – which consisted in the combination of 
a protective “heart” (kokoro), or “shield” (taté) – “心” – and a “sword” (katana) – “刀” – 
to be wielded at the very limit of endurance. If it got to that point, Akia would strike and 
betake himself to a new town. But for all the simmering tension, Izukenji-san’s request 
had imposed a functional peace and the appearance of amity. Indeed, rumor was that back 
in the day, Izukenji-san received a fee from the Kanamachi-ikka to arbitrate and settle 
disputes between rival factions in Sanya. Now that Sanya had quieted down, Izukenji-san 
said, he did this for free. 
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It was not as if Izukenji-san and Nē-san themselves had not led, and partaken in 
their fair share of violence. The social fact that Izukenji-san “knows everything about” 
(sō iu no zenbu shitteiru) the intricate hierarchies of the yakuza world not only authorized 
him to impose order in what he described as the “lawless zone” (muhō chitai) of Sanya. It 
attributed a knowledge to him – of violence, as the very form of enforcement of order, for 
in Sanya, it was the strongest who survived – that was inaccessible to others.17 It was as if 
Izukenji-san’s past, shrouded in the stuff of myth, empowered him to speak of things that 
the others passed over in silence. Thus, Izukenji-san would lower his head and say of the 
past to Nē-san that “we did some terrible things, yeah” (warui koto yatta na). It had not 
just been a matter of striking back, Nē-san said, but of preempting: of striking before the 
other party did. Only in recent years – five, ten years back – had things calmed down in 
Sanya. But on one chance occasion, Izukenji-san and Nē-san had encountered an old 
nemesis on the streets. Izukenji-san had ended in a scuffle with the man, rolling around 
the sidewalk, while Nē-san threw rocks from the side. There had been friends in the past, 
too, who had been “killed” (korosareta). Ichi-san recounted how people disappeared, and 
no one would know what had happened until someone asked: “did you know” (shitteta)? 
Back then, “gangs” (gyangu), too, had been active in Sanya. These gangs were known to 
keep track of the work schedules of individuals who had gone away to work for days in a 
row. Gang members would lie in wait for such individuals outside Minami-Senjū station, 
assault them on arriving back, and strip them of their money. It had likewise been unsafe 
to sleep outside – in Iroha arcade, for instance – because it was not uncommon for groups 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 However, this does not invoke the constitutive order of the market. As Marx says in “The Working Day”: 
“The peculiar nature of the commodity sold implies a limit to its consumption by the purchaser, and the 
worker maintains his right as seller when he wishes to reduce the working day to a particular normal length. 
There is therefore an antinomy, of right against right, both equally bearing the seal of the law of exchange. 
Between equal rights, force decides” (Capital, 344). 
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of individuals to come by, beat up a sleeping individual, and take their cash. Hajime-san 
had been the leader of such a gang, Akia said, which preyed on the “weak” (yowai mono). 
“Everyone” (minna) ostensibly knew of this. Yet, Izukenji-san would describe Hajime-
san as a natural leader with a knack for attracting followers: a figure one could rely on to 
come to one’s aid, in force.18 
Izukenji-san, moreover, was acutely attuned to the marginal status of Sanya in a 
way that – unlike the others – allowed him to comment on this fact. Of course, everybody 
was well aware of the outcaste status Sanya was accorded in the imaginary of proper Jap-
anese society. Yet, except for the rare occasions when Akia would outright say to me – in 
private – that Sanya’s workers were “human garbage” (ningen no gomi), the theme of its 
marginalization was either passed over in silence, or only referred to obliquely in passing. 
Akia, for instance, would say – without explaining – that there were two reasons why he 
could not be with a woman. The first was his conviction at the age of 25. The second was 
the fact that he lived in Sanya. Living in Sanya presumably stigmatized and disqualified 
men from enjoying stable relations with the other gender. But Mito-chan was constantly 
flirting with someone. And Kikuchi-san had stopped doing shabu (amphetamines), pulled 
his act together, and made a girlfriend within a year of release from prison; all this, too, in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Ōyama Shirō writes of such “gangs” (gyangu) in A Man With No Talents: 
 “I refer to the frequent outbreaks of crime involving thieves (some working by stealth, some vio-
lently) called mogaki, who went after laborers returning to San’ya fresh from their jobs at a hanba. By the 
time these laborers, who had worked for a ten- or fifteen-day stretch, arrived back in San’ya, they were 
already well in their cups; once here they’d lose all inhibition and drink away until finally they sank, plas-
tered, to the street, with their work bags as pillows. In their pockets were the earnings – ten or fifteen days’ 
worth – that they’d received from their hanba jobs. Men sleeping on the streets in those days were not al-
ways dirt poor, as they are today. 
 Such men would become the targets of mogaki, who stole about at night in packs of twos and 
threes. Mogaki would lift valuables from the pockets of men who had passed out drunk; any victim who 
was awakened by the commotion would first be beaten to a pulp and then robbed. Members of a San’ya 
labor union formed by radicals used to band up and go on patrol late at night in order to lend a hand to po-
tential victims” (84 – 85). 
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spite of having cancer. Finally, Izukenji-san was with Nē-san, and he was most faithful to 
her, noting how much they had been through in the years and that it would be unthinkable 
to betray her. It was even said that Izukenji-san was doing “alright” (daijōbu), reining in 
his drinking – though Izukenji-san certainly drank to excess – because of Nē-san, who 
monitored his consumption. More importantly, however, Nē-san validated Izukenji-san as 
a person and “man” (otoko). Without Nē-san, it never would have been possible for the 
troupe to come over. Nē-san enabled the feasts and homeliness of Izukenji-san’s place, 
and in so doing, she gave everybody the closest experience they would have to eating in a 
family setting.19 
Izukenji-san and Nē-san were not actually married. Nē-san, who was older than 
Izukenji-san by a couple years, had been married with children earlier, and she had at 
least half a dozen grandchildren. As for Izukenji-san, he, too, had been with someone else 
earlier in his life. However, this earlier relationship – which, no doubt, involved wife and 
children – was passed over with a pause, and the comment that there was “no point” (mu-
da) dwelling on the “past” (kako). Nonetheless, and aside from references to past women, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Izukenji-san’s mythic status as an otoko was, in effect, dependent on Nē-san, who established his place 
by sitting in seiza position (knees bent underneath her) in the adjacent room opening onto the dining room, 
and attended to every need of the men. Indeed, in order to make evident Izukenji-san’s elevated status to 
me, Ichi-san did not refer to his status among men, but to the manner in which Nē-san addressed him. In 
Toppamono, Miyazaki Manabu writes of the figure of the “elder sister” (nē-san) in the yakuza world of old. 
Miyazaki says that, “looking after her own was what the “elder sister” of a yakuza family did,” and he con-
tinues: 
 “While yakuza like to talk of otoko no hanamichi (“man’s glorious path”), “manliness,” “honor,” 
and the like, the fact is that beneath its macho exterior there is a matriarchal aspect to the yakuza world and 
maternal principles exert a powerful influence. Men adhered to a code of “take my good name and you take 
my life,” and were extremely conscious of face and obligation. Moreover, many would die young, either 
killed in gangland strife or burned out by debauchery and dissipation. To help them cope, they needed the 
emotional anchor provided by something maternal. 
 The yakuza world wouldn’t be complete without its “mother” figures. These women would heal 
the pain caused by the deaths of menfolk by recounting the exploits of the fallen and transforming their 
lives into the stuff of legend. Actually, the women often grew quite fed up with how stupid men could be, 
but would sing their praises anyway – and it was this kind of support that would encourage the men to take 
leaps into the unknown. So while on the surface it was a typically male-dominated world, the existence of 
women in the underworld counted for a great deal, in both spiritual and material ways. I am under the im-
pression that there were many times when my father was dancing unknowingly to my mother’s tune” (22). 
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particularly in the presence of Nē-san, Izukenji-san commented on the marginal status of 
Sanya as if he had mastered the trauma and shame that marked the guys and separated 
them from general society. Where Akia and the others desired to be in a relationship with 
a “woman” (onna) – a prospect Ichi-san deemed “impossible” (muri) – Izukenji-san and 
Nē-san had each other. And where everybody stayed silent regarding the constitutive 
failure that framed and confined Sanya to Sanya, Izukenji-san discoursed freely; noting, 
for instance, that I was venturing into a place – Sanya – that even Japanese people would 
not come to: a “lawless zone” (muhō chitai). Whether on account of his past, the amount 
of suffering he had endured, or the presence of Nē-san, something authorized Izukenji-
san to speak fearlessly of what had otherwise been rendered taboo: the failure – or lack of 
lack – that constituted Sanya.20 
With the exception of Izukenji-san, almost everyone had run out of luck in both 
their family lives and romantic pursuits. Akia and Moto-san had never had a relationship, 
and their only sexual experiences had been with prostitutes. Almost everyone else had 
been married with kids. Misaaru had been married three times and had one daughter from 
each marriage. He spoke to two of them once every year, and the third, whom he had 
never met – and whom he wished most to meet – lived somewhere in Kagoshima. Ichi-
san, who had been married to a nurse, had two sons in Okinawa, about the age of 30. Ha-
chan had children here and there in the world, as he was an incorrigible womanizer (like 
Mito-chan), but he also had a daughter with a Japanese woman. The fact of her being 
Japanese distinguished her from the other kids. Indeed, this was also the only child with 
whom Ha-chan was in touch, and she had forgiven him when he had apologized for the 
father he had been, telling him that “things happen” (iroiro aru). There was a distinct 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 See the Introduction for an explication of lack of lack. 
 392 
sense in which the discarded women and children, primarily in the Phillipines, confirmed 
Ha-chan’s identity as a Japanese man. Notwithstanding that his Japanese daughter was in 
Japan, Ha-chan spoke often of his plan to return to the Phillipines. Hagiwara-san likewise 
had kids in Thailand; a country he had been banned from for engaging in illegal activities. 
Mito-chan had raised his two daughters with his wife until they were self-sufficient and 
had only left his wife in recent years. His daughters now had children. But he also had 
another child on the side, who he had never met – but that everyone, including his wife 
and kids, knew all about – and he was incorrigible in his efforts to “sow his wild oats” 
(tane o maku), as the others described it. Even as he planned to get back together with his 
wife, Mito-chan was flirting with other women, and while he had been dating Yui (in the 
Sanya neighborhood), he had actively been trying to get her pregnant. He had told her he 
would pay for the birth, and the prospect seemed to make him happy, but that was it. 
Sometimes, Yui would have to call Ichi-san, because Mito-chan had become drunk and 
violent, and shortly after their plans to have a child, the couple broke up. But Shokawa-
san was the most vociferous in lamenting the loss of his two children, one boy and one 
girl, in Okinawa. His wife, whom he still lauded as being “beautiful” (kirei), had snuck 
into his house during their break-up, and taken his son. As if it indicated his masculinity, 
Shokawa-san recalled how the fight to keep his children had been an “incredible” (sugoi) 
affair. Yet, he would lower his head when expressing how much he regretted finally giv-
ing them up. 
At some point or other, everyone expressed nostalgia for their past life and regret, 
if not desire to see their children and family. However, these admissions rarely took place 
and when they did, it was late in the evening, under the considerable influence of alcohol. 
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They likewise ended quickly, observing the pattern of one man mentioning his children in 
passing, another suggesting it might be possible to contact them and the first man shaking 
his lowered head. Naturally, Akia’s reaction to my suggestion that Ichi-san wanted to see 
his children was to deny this fact, since, Akia claimed, Ichi-san “is not that type of man” 
(sō iu otoko jya nai). Perhaps Ichi-san would not have been considered a “man” (otoko) at 
all, had he wanted to see his kids. But he had, in fact, wished for this, and Akia had been 
present. Akia nevertheless insisted Ichi-san had neither regrets nor weaknesses: a trait he 
projected on Ichi-san, as if regret reflected badly on the latter. Talking of social failure – 
of lack of lack – was rendered taboo. But it was precisely this failure that constituted the 
ground of possibility for the counter-discourse of the otoko to be actualized and that gave 
it its force. The reminder of social failure could not be effaced and triggered the assertion 
of masculinity. 
The guys invested considerable energy and money in compensating for the lack of 
a spousal relation. It was common knowledge that Ichi-san had a favorite soapland in Yo-
shiwara, at which he knew all the women, mostly Chinese, and where – for ¥10,000 
($100 USD) – it was possible to have intercourse without protection. Rumor had it that 
Ichi-san went at least twice per month, and, no doubt, more than this, after he assumed 
the role of tehaishi. When people started saying Ichi-san had become “stingy” (kechi) 
with cash, and that Ichi-san was not the Ichi-san of old, it was likewise rumored that the 
cash was going to “soaplands” (sōpu). So too, Matsuda-san was rumored to look after a 
woman in Yoshiwara. And Akia could regale any listener with tales from back in the day 
when he had been in the Nibikikai: of the girls he had saved from prostitution and debt, 
and of how he gave money left and right to hostesses, without, he said, asking or taking 
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in return. It was, in fact, out of character for Akia to mix such gifts with an expectation of 
return, as he took pride in the selflessness of his actions. Instead, he went to Yoshiwara 
when he had to “take care of things” (yō o sumasu). Indeed, except Mito-chan – who was 
always flirting – the only intimate experiences anyone had with the opposite gender was 
in Yoshiwara. Medication even circulated to ensure the guys could perform when the 
moment arrived. On one such night, during his days as tehaishi, Mito-chan was said to 
have blown upwards of ¥50,000 ($500 USD) in Yoshiwara. 
Apart from Yoshiwara, the only contact anyone had with the opposite gender was 
either with Nē-san, the older mama-sans of Oiwake or Chūfukuro, or the younger mama-
sans from Gen, or other drinkeries and hostess clubs. Ichi-san, who took daily pleasure in 
drinking and eating in the presence of younger, and often Chinese mama-sans, exchanged 
phone numbers with the women. Thus his phone would begin ringing in the middle of the 
afternoon, when the drinkeries were empty; alternatively, the phone would ring to remind 
him of his debt. These affairs never went beyond the confines of the drinkery, even when 
the mama-san of Gen started doing the laundry for Ichi-san, presumably for a fee. So too, 
Misaaru’s affair with a woman in Chōfu fizzled out. Mito-chan expectedly broke up with 
Yui, whom he had threatened with violence one too many times, and dumped the next 
woman, a graduate of Tōdai (Tokyo University), as he started planning a reunion with his 
wife in Okinawa; a prospect everyone knew was doomed to failure, because there was no 
way Mito-chan could bring her to Sanya, as they planned. In fact, the only person who 
maintained a relation with his child was the “mild-mannered” (otonashī) and “earnest” 
(majime) Nori-san. Yet Nori-san, too, had fallen out of wedlock. 
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The most poignant story of severed family relations, however, was Matsuda-san’s. 
Born into a burakumin family and village in Northern Japan, Matsuda-san recounted how 
the fact of being an outcaste was only made real to him when his first child was born.21 
Of course, he was aware of his social status growing up in a secluded hamlet, exclusively 
for burakumin. As a child, it was difficult entering the neighboring hamlet because men 
were on guard outside the train station, specifically to prohibit the entry of undesirable 
persons from his burakumin town. Such was the policed boundary dividing and separat-
ing regular folk from the outcaste. And when he got married, Matsuda-san’s mother-in-
law objected to the marriage on account of his being burakumin. While recounting the 
story, Matsuda-san held up his right hand with the palm forwards and two middle fingers 
bent in towards the palm, so that only the forefinger and pinkie were protruding. He 
asked rhetorically if Akia “knew” (shitteru) what this meant – Akia nodding – and ex-
plained that this was the sign designating the outcastes. The missing fingers were meant 
to signify that burakumin passed on physical deformities through the genes. Hence, when 
Matsuda-san’s first child was born, his mother-in-law immediately inspected the fingers, 
giving out a sigh of relief to find them all present. Only then, Matsuda said, did he under-
stand what it entailed to be a burakumin. When I asked Matsuda-san whether he was in 
touch with his kids and wife, he shook his head resentfully, and said he had long lost 
touch with them. 
The silence to which the troupe consigned the most painful, constitutive aspect of 
their lives in Sanya could carry over into a refusal to accept “welfare” (fukushi). Riku-san 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 With historical roots in the pre-Meiji (1868) era, the burakumin (outcaste) or “non-human” (hinin) class 
have traditionally engaged in professions that deal with death, carcasses, animals and leather. Hence, there 
were a profusion of small-scale shoe factories in Imado, the burakumin area just South of Sanya. See Ch. 4 
for more on the burakumin. 
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refused any kind of state support simply because he did not want to be dependent. Others, 
however, decided not to seek welfare because they did not wish for their families to know 
their situation or whereabouts. If someone applied for welfare, the ward office contacted 
their spouse or next of kin to investigate if the family could not take financial responsibil-
ity for the individual, thereby disclosing their whereabouts, and maybe worse, the fact of 
their seeking welfare. By seeking welfare, the men inadvertently placed a burden on their 
families, many of whom had not seen them for years; rather than risk the welfare office 
reaching them, many men went without welfare, and thus, medical care. Of course, some 
of the guys merely wished to remain under the radar of the state. However, it was the unit 
and institution of the family that caused shame to arise. Because by contacting the family, 
the state made the individual man beholden to others with whom he had either cut contact, 
or from whom he had been cut off. In this way, the state threatened to revive wounds that 
would undercut the idealized “freedom” (jiyū) of the individual man and laborer. In effect, 
the family exerted a normative force sufficient to deter individuals from seeking aid that 
they clearly needed. If the state could not do it, the family retrojected responsibility for 
failure – as sons, husbands, fathers and economic providers – back on the individual man. 
As a result, both the disinclination to seek welfare and the fact of dependence on the state 
– to which the individual, and their family, were thus indebted – pointed to a constitutive 
stain that the individual could not do enough to overcome. At one extreme, this could re-
sult in somebody choosing to live in a tent along Sumida river. Or, like Riku-san, who 
had no, or seemed not to have a family, it could result in someone destroying their body, 
working to survive. One man, who Sanyūkai saw on a weekly basis, waited to seek medi-
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cal attention – in spite of insistence from Sanyūkai staff – until he was on his last legs, 
dying a few weeks later from terminal cancer. 
Failure as economic providers, or family and father figures left men in Sanya with 
no choice but to reference the trope of otoko. Where normative society predicated failure 
as upstanding, productive and reproductive fathers – lacking even the insufficiency of the 
normative – Sanya offered reference to a counter-discourse that functioned as an ideology 
of work (beause an otoko worked), but which also conferred a modicum of dignity on the 
troupe for the lack of lack: the absence of work and family. However, this assertion of 
masculinity could only occur in a mode of repetition, because however much the trope of 
otoko, and Sanya itself, shielded the guys against the shaming normative gaze of the state, 
something inevitably – yet unexpectedly – deprived them of the insufficiency which was, 
in turn, constitutive of the counter-discourse of being an otoko. One day, a sibling or par-
ent – or someone else’s family – might pass away, or they might be reminded of the past. 
Akia said he thought every day of the “guilt” (zaiakukan) of having killed someone. The 
instant of delivering that fatal kick to the chest was frozen in time. So too, Akia said he 
thought every night of all the “buddies” (nakama) who had passed away over the years. 
More than anything, powerlessness in the face of death triggered repetition, because con-
finement to Sanya was tantamount to an early, solitary death. Only the group provided 
respite from the individualizing violence of labor, and thus, reference to the figure of Izu-
kenji-san was necessitated: someone for whom “everyone” (minna) would go running, 
should the sociality he embodied be threatened. 
 By this reasoning, the honor of fighting consisted in actualizing the trope of otoko 
as someone who set themselves aside – as laboring individuals – and protected everybody 
 398 
else. Specific targets emerged, alongside idealized forms of fighting. On this note, it was 
only some individuals – Shokawa-san or Riku-san, for instance – who involved others in 
their confrontations. Although everyone justified fighting with reference to the same code 
of being an otoko, others, like Moto-san, Ichi-san and Akia only fought in circumstances 
in which others could not come to their aid. In this way, they took responsibility for their 
actions without “burdening” (meiwaku kakeru) anyone, and the response to their fighting 
was consistent with this conduct. Rather than grumble or complain, it was more common 
for others to express concern, even if this concern meant calling someone “stupid” (baka) 
for fighting. For instance, no one complained when Moto-san went on his fighting spree, 
but Izukenji-san and others worried that someone might take “revenge” (fukushū). One 
evening, when a crowd had gathered in front of Mutō-san’s, a man with a grudge against 
Ichi-san exploded at him and swore to summon the police. Ichi-san slapped the man over 
the scalp, told him to “get out of here!” (kaere!), and everybody laughed as the infuriated 
figure darted down the street to tell on Ichi-san at the mammoth. But the imminent arrival 
of policemen would disrupt proceedings at Mutō-san’s, and thus, after a brief pause, Ichi-
san went running after the man to confront him by the mammoth itself. Everyone laughed 
again, and Akia noted that “it’s like a manga” (manga da yo): Ichi-san did not even care 
about the police. Riku-san, too, went running after Ichi-san to put a halt on the police. By 
shifting the nuisance to the mammoth, Ichi-san preempted the police arrival, and diffused 
the spat. He made sure that nobody was affected by his actions. 
 If there was one thing that triggered the anger of Moto-san or Ichi-san, however, it 
was a past or present yakuza exhibiting his tattoos to intimidate. This trigger was not by 
chance. There was a “reason” (riyū), Akia said, that they got into these fights. Moto-san, 
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in particular, was known to take on yakuza from outside Sanya, swaggering through town 
in sharp-cuffed suits, shiny black shoes, crew cuts, with gold jewelry and traditional tat-
toos visible through the openings in their shirts. Such men were asking for it. Ichi-san, 
too, was known to lose it if it turned out an opponent had traditional tattoos. The person’s 
attitude might have been bad to begin with, but if they also had tattoos – as Ichi-san 
might notice on grabbing them – it triggered rage. Just as Moto-san was “unstoppable” 
(tomerarenai) in these instances, Ichi-san would “mess up” (boko boko ni suru) his ad-
versaries; leaving them, at least, with a bruised and bloody face. Not enough could be 
done to eliminate the abuse of yakuza iconography. If Sanya constituted a stain in relation 
to general society, the abuse of vanishing mob ideals – the trope of the upstanding otoko, 
who, like the influential, yet ever self-effacing Izukenji-san, protected the weak against 
the strong – disclosed a constitutive stain in the discourse of the honorable otoko. Indeed, 
it was by referencing idealized yakuza conduct – embodied in the mythic otoko – that the 
guys protected against the intrusion of shame. The adversary who abused this ideal there-
fore had to be battered, but the battering triggered repetition, as if the disgrace could not 
be contained. Within the interiority of Sanya itself, it was individuals like Yamagishi-san, 
of Matsuda-san’s group, who personified the abuse of yakuza iconography.22 
 Accordingly, there existed two polarized modes of being an otoko. Izukenji-san 
represented the first mode of conduct, in which the individual assumed responsibility for 
his own actions and observed deference, yet, dissimulated authority in hospitality that 
extended horizontally to include everybody. In this idealized mode of the Okinawa-gumi, 
the leader of the group sacrificed himself to take care of “everyone” (minna) or “buddies” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 The figure of Yamagishi-san was inextricably twinned with the figure of Izukenji-san. Thus, there was no 
overcoming the constitutive stain of “outlaw” (auttorō) ethics, which, rather than assert a code of honor of 
its own, gave credence to the shamefulness with which Sanya was regarded. 
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(nakama). The Matsuda-group represented the second mode of conduct, which consisted 
in dissimulating egotism – or money-grubbing – in the selflessness of authority and made 
use of yakuza iconography (against commoners) for personal gain. Ultimately driven only 
by pecuniary benefit, the latter was a sham of the former, and replicated the market logic 
that the former denigrated. 
 This difference between the Okinawa-gumi and the Matsuda-group was apparent 
in their wage systems. In their heyday, the Okinawa-gumi and Matsuda-group composed 
the largest work groups in Sanya. Of course, until Matsuda-san founded Sanja Kensetsu, 
neither was a company per se, though both were affiliated with the subcontractors to who 
they provided labor. But the groups could be differentiated on the basis of their informal 
membership. In spite of the fact that Izukenji-san came from Fukuoka, the members of 
the Okinawa-gumi were mainly from Okinawa, whereas members of the Matsuda-group 
came from a variety of places. Matsuda-san was from Northern Japan. Ha-chan was from 
Yokohama. And Matsuda-san used anybody in his labor who could be “used” (tsukaeru). 
His seemingly limitless pool of laborers included the homeless, which made it even more 
difficult to make out who made up the Matsuda-group. Matsuda-san’s system of paying 
workers reflected this complexity, instantiating a hierarchy of unequal, vertical relations, 
insofar as individuals fell differently on the pay-grade. Mito-chan and Ichi-san, on the 
other hand, were known to pay everyone a flat amount (¥12,500) from which they de-
ducted ¥500 ($5 USD) per head. In the Okinawa-gumi, the tehaishi took only what was 
considered their fair due for providing work, and received their monthly income from the 
subcontractors. The ¥500 of pinhane could earn Mito-chan a maximum of ¥10,000 ($100 
USD) in one day. However, this was the exception, since Mito-chan rarely sent out more 
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than ten workers. But in the Matsuda-group, it was normal for Matsuda-san to pull more 
than ¥20,000 ($200 USD) from pinhane every day. At the top of his group, Matsuda-san 
made himself rich, whereas the ultimate authority of the Okinawa-gumi – Izukenji-san – 
worked in the trenches alongside everyone else. 
 There was one final, definitive difference between members of the Okinawa-gumi 
and the Matsuda-group, namely, that everybody in the Okinawa-gumi frowned on the use 
of recreational drugs. Ichi-san instantly described anyone who shot amphetamines as “out” 
(autto). Of course, this was not said explicitly of Matsuda-san on whom Ichi-san depend-
ed on for workers, nor of Yamagishi-san. On the contrary, Ichi-san castigated Kami-kun 
for joking about Matsuda-san’s habit. But when it came to young members of the Matsu-
da-group, like Kon-chan, Shokawa-san and the others did not hesitate in pointing out that 
he did “amphetamines” (shabu). With this, any talk of the likeability of the person was 
“over with a single stroke” (ippatsu de owari). He was immediately disqualified. Thus, 
no one said anything when Matsuda-san would disappear for several days, although eve-
rybody attributed it to amphetamines. In fact, the final downfall of Matsuda-san was at-
tributed to his use of shabu (amphetamines), since he had lost touch with reality, and 
over-extended his resources. Unlike alcohol, it was said, shabu rendered a person unac-
countable for his or her own actions.23 It ruined their accountability as men. In Matsuda-
san’s case, shabu had even bankrupted him. Thus, Akia would recall an incident from his 
young days when he had been made to do shabu. Not knowing what it was, he had de-
molished a tekiya (outdoor stall) and was consequently beaten by a gang of yakuza. Izu-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Of course, for Matsuda-san, it was precisely “alcohol” (saké) that ruined the accountability of men. The 
two discourses were mutually constitutive. How many times he castigated Akia for drinking to the point of 
self-destruction! Indeed, Matsuda-san might have disappeared for days on end, but he could never be found 
drunk. 
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kenji-san, too, said that, even among his “underlings” (shatei), there had been those he 
had warned of going down the road of amphetamines. No matter how much one said, it 
was to no avail. 
But despite their differences, everybody gathered under the roof of Izukenji-san 
and Nē-san, as if Izukenji-san – who was at once of the Okinawa-gumi, and beyond it – 
functioned as a point of unity between the two groups. In his home, Izukenji-san might 
take the liberty to warn Mito-chan – after his fall from tehaishi – not to do shabu and that 
he would have nothing to do with Mito-chan if this occurred. In this instance, Yamagishi-
san was sitting next to Mito-chan, running a finger up and down the veins of his arms, as 
he pored over the sores. Of course, Yamagishi-san would never have injected in front of 
Izukenji-san, or the Okinawa-gumi. There was no disputing who the senior figure was, 
and Matsuda-san, too, deferred to Izukenji-san upon the slightest prompt. 
 Both the Okinawa-gumi and Matsuda-group followed the rule of thumb of an eye 
for an eye, condensed in the the adage that everyone in Sanya quoted: “do it in return, if it 
is done to you” (yararetara yarikaese).24 It was not simply that the category of otoko was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 This phrase originates from the early 1980s confrontation between the laborers of Sanya, represented by 
the then powerful Sōgidan labor union, and the state, yakuza and subcontractors. With the transformation of 
Sanya into a “welfare town” (fukushi no machi), the phrase has notably come to signify reciprocity among 
laborers themselves. See “Yama” Seisaku Jōei Iinkai, Yama: Yararetara Yarikaese. See also Kamakyōtō, 
Sanyagentōi, Henshū Iinkaihen, Yararetara Yarikaese: Jitsuroku, Kamagasaki, Sanya Kaihō Tōsō (Tokyo: 
Tabata Shoten, 1974), as well as Yamaoka Kyōichi, Yama: Yararetara Yarikaese (Tokyo: Gendaikikashitsu, 
1996). In Zengakuren: Japan’s Student Revolutionaries, Stuart Dowsey notably traces the emergence of the 
phrase – translated as “An eye for an eye” – to an earlier moment in the Chūkakuha movement of the late 
1960s: “The government has resorted to increasing the strength of the riot police in order to suppress the 
university struggle and the anti-Ampo struggle, so in order to cope with this the Chukaku have elected to 
follow the old Biblical adage ‘An eye for an eye, a tooth for the tooth!” (233). And finally, in A Man With 
No Talents, Ōyama recalls “denunciation sessions” conducted by the militant leftist union in Sanya in the 
1980s. As if the order of shame was at stake, he describes: 
 “Formerly, hanba bosses accused of wrongdoing by the laborers during these consultations would 
be asked to attend denunciation sessions held right there on the street. This was a frequent occurrence. The 
union was backed by a radical umbrella organization and supported by a group of intellectuals on the out-
side; together they formed a very powerful political network. No mere hanba boss was a match for the likes 
of them. 
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established in reciprocity. Survival necessitated violence, and otoko designated somebody 
who could hold their own in Sanya. Short of striking back, and the person could expect to 
be taken advantage of. It was only respectability or seniority – a reputation, that implied a 
prior deployment of violence – that earned someone the luxury of refraining from retribu-
tion. It had to be known that the other person was let off the hook. Only in this way could 
indulgence be transformed into benevolence, and emerge as a sign of magnanimity. Thus, 
the insufficiency and shame of the otoko, for one had to “know” (shiru) “shame” (haji) to 
be an otoko, consisted in shame before death.25 Sanya constituted a space of accelerated 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 Before calling in the bosses, the union leadership would have already negotiated with the general 
contractors in charge of the construction sites where the bosses worked; the orders to appear before the 
denunciation sessions came from the contractors. If that weren’t the case, the bosses would never have 
shown up. As it was, they were resigned to their fate, and the sessions had the feel of a “people’s court.” 
 Typically the impetus for these denunciations was the nonpayment of wages and other breaches of 
contract. Day laborers would rush to the union and complain whenever they felt that they had been 
shortchanged. (That there are indeed hanba bosses wholly deserving of such denunciations is something I 
can attest to from my own experience.) The bosses thus had their backs to the wall, having essentially been 
told by the contractors to bow to the inevitable. Standing before a crowd of union activists and day laborers, 
they would lower their eyes and mumble repeated apologies amid a torrent of abuse. I’ve been told that 
some bosses actually prostrated themselves before a group, although I have never witnessed such a specta-
cle myself. 
 “So you really think what you’ve done was wrong? How was it wrong, exactly? Tell us again, 
from the beginning!” 
 These brazen-faced bosses, who had no breeding or formal education but were brought up rather 
on audacity and derring-do, would repeat their words of apology, in fits and starts, as if trying to trace over 
letters on a page. 
 “We can’t hear you! Once more, from the beginning!” 
 With this command, they would be forced to repeat their apologies yet another time. 
 Any real (which is to say, monetary) settlement doubtless took place before a denunciation session 
even began; the session itself, then, served as a kind of ritual through which the union boasted of its author-
ity to the San’ya day laborer masses. The whole purpose of the ritual being to rip the transgressors’ egos to 
shreds, the hanba bosses, be they defiant or humble, would not be released until their egos were, in the ac-
tivists’ eyes, sufficiently rent” (98 – 99). 
25 The trope of the otoko was alienating in itself, for an otoko worked for self-sufficiency and, with the few 
exceptions which made all the difference, bore his suffering in silence. An outdated traditionalist term that 
the guys themselves used – like giri (duty) or on (obligation) – an upstanding otoko had to have a sense of 
haji or “shame,” and sought recognition as an otoko from his “buddies” (nakama). Notably, Ruth Benedict 
employs the term haji to translate shame. Yet this discourse of the otoko was not exclusive in Sanya. As the 
writings of Ōyama Shirō demonstrate, the affect of insufficiency could precipitate precisely the opposite 
impulse of that of the self-assertive otoko. Reminiscent of Abe Kobo’s The Box Man: A Novel, trans. by 
Dale E. Saunders (New York: Vintage, 2001), Ōyama writes: 
“At this stage in life I no longer feel the need to accomplish anything in order to justify my exist-
ence; at the same time I appreciate the human need to avoid certain things at all costs in order to survive. I 
have gone to very great lengths up to now to avoid the frustration and disillusionment that is brought about 
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obsolescence in which the violence of the individualizing labor market was introjected on 
the relations between neighbors, or neighbors as strangers. Despite this misrecognition of 
the source of violence, the repetition of masculinity established a boundary – from within 
the confinement of Sanya – that staved off the stigma of social failure. It necessitated that 
reference be made to a third, social entity that transcended individual life, so that workers 
sacrificed themselves for the longevity of the group, or “everyone” (minna).26 
The imperative of giving an eye for an eye confined the circulation of violence to 
Sanya. More alarmingly, it also necessitated a principle of retribution that made the guys 
wary of others seeking revenge. Matsuda-san, for one, explained that one had to develop 
eyes in one’s back to survive in Sanya. In fact, much as Matsuda-san would disappear for 
days doing shabu, he never became excessively drunk, for fear of sleeping outside where 
he might be found by someone with a grudge: “Wait, isn’t that Matsuda lying there … ?” 
(e, Matsuda jya nai no ka …?). Indeed, one day Matsuda-san was beaten down in front of 
Mutō-san’s, when Akia stepped in; a favor that Matsuda-san returned a year later, when 
he negotiated with both the police and the adversary who refused to drop charges against 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
– invariably, as far as I am concerned – by the kind of human interaction that accompanies nearly any job. I 
am convinced, moreover, that I would go to the same lengths all over again if need be. 
Now if I were somehow able to avoid having to work altogether, I was confident of being able to 
tolerate an existence that consisted solely of eating and sleeping – an existence devoid even of conversation 
with another human being – for weeks on end. (The cleanup work sponsored by the Tokyo metropolitan 
government is the exception here and needn’t be avoided; I think of it as an amusement and not at all as 
something stressful or burdensome.) 
When the time comes to take stock of things, it hardly matters to me if my existence has not been 
blessed by events that can be put in the “plus” column. I will consider my life a success if I have reduced to 
the bare minimum – as close to zero as possible – those events that must be relegated to the “minus” col-
umn” (124). 
26 In A Man With No Talents, Ōyama Shirō writes of the homeless men along Sumida river: “To my way of 
thinking, the possibility that some form of hierarchical relationship would fail to emerge among the men 
along the terrace who camp out in front of their blue-tarp shanties and drink it up is very slim indeed. It 
seems far more natural that a class structure (even if not a very strict one) exists among this population of 
men in their sixties, each group consisting of a kingpin, his inner circle, and his underlings. To prevent in-
fighting among the membership from causing the group to disband altogether – or to stop any infighting to 
begin with – some form of (semi-)permanent social order becomes necessary. I can think of nothing other  
than violence, however, that would be capable of producing such a social order among San’ya men” (81). 
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Shokawa-san and Akia, so that both of them were released from detention early. Yet just 
as Matsuda-san’s actions had returned in the form of someone taking revenge, Akia and 
Shokawa-san would have to look out for another person holding a grudge. Shokawa-san 
warned that it was summer and that people “get strange” (kurucchau). Sure enough, a few 
weeks later, the man dropped by Sanyūkai with two buddies in tow; an appearance which 
Akia interpreted as an intimidation, and threat. Like gambling debts, the guys would thus 
accrue vengeance. If they fought too much, or got themselves into one too many fruitless 
confrontations, the inevitable was bound to occur. It was said especially of Shokawa-san 
that he had it coming. But this was no laughing matter, as it was not merely violence, but 
death that circulated in Sanya. 
Everybody could remember an incident in which the death of a “buddy” (nakama) 
had occurred on account of someone else. Though they might not be 100% certain, it was 
most likely their friend had been killed, or that suicide had been caused by another person. 
One oldtimer and colleague of Izukenji-san observed that it was “particularly the case” 
(tokubetsu ni sō) in Sanya that “the debt of past actions returns” (tsuke ga mawatte kuru). 
This stocky man with traditional tattoos, a missing pinky, and a bad knee that caused him 
to limp, still carried his knife about, noting that there was no changing the way of “an old 
yakuza” (mukashi no yakuza). He recounted the story of one “champion” (champion), the 
only other individual of equal rank to himself and Izukenji-san; everyone else had been 
“subordinate” (shatei), he said, drawing a line in the air between himself and those under 
him. Originally a boxer from the Kansai region, “champion” had been so strong he could 
grab someone by the throat and kill them by squeezing. Hence Izukenji-san’s colleague 
had intervened in countless fights to restrain “champion.” Nowadays, “champion” had, of 
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course, become so weak in the knees he had to wear braces. But this was beside the point, 
for Izukenji-san’s colleague said of “champion” that he “cannot return” (modorenai) to 
Sanya on account of his enemies. In fact Akia had encountered “champion” in a previous 
lifetime, more than a decade earlier, when Akia had just come to Sanya. He attributed the 
death of his friend to this “champion,” who had driven his friend into debt, and finally, to 
suicide. Akia’s body would perk up at the slightest mention that “champion” had made a 
rare appearance in Sanya. Yet, at Izukenji-san’s place, when Moto-san had hushed the 
room for an important phone call between Izukenji-san and “champion,” Akia sat with 
his head lowered. He never mentioned “champion” after Izukenji-san’s friendship with 
the man had become clear. In this way, the observance of deference quelled the outbreak 
of violence within the group, while anyone outside was fair game. 
The principle of reciprocity missed the structuring, social violence that consigned 
Sanya to oblivion and death. In effect, it was only the concrete manifestation of authority 
– uniformed policemen – that angered the guys, whereas the abstract, economic principle 
that confined a conglomerate of useless men to Sanya was passed over. This was the case 
despite common knowledge that the local cops preferred to “turn a blind eye” (mite minu 
furi) to the fighting in Sanya. They had had enough of the endless petty fights. Ending up 
in the local mammoth was therefore not as bad as ending up in the Asakusa police station, 
where police actively punished fighting. At the mammoth, the guys could be quite certain 
of release within a few hours, but if they were taken on to another police station, it meant 
serious trouble. The mammoth functioned merely to contain violence. Of course, none of 
the guys had the slightest respect for the local police, who were often treated as objects of 
ridicule. Like Ichi-san, Akia seemed to enjoy taunting the police in front of the mammoth, 
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greeting them causally as he passed, or walking straight up to them to start a conversation. 
Ichi-san said it was okay to “poke fun at” (karakau) the police once in a while. 
When it came to national politics, however, Akia was as right-wing as possible. If 
he had a “nuclear bomb” (kaku), he said, he would bomb North Korea and China off the 
map. After all, it used to be that warring clans in Japan exterminated every member of the 
enemy. And if he had been in good health, Akia said, he would be driving around a black 
and white right-wing truck with loudspeakers up top. Had I heard of the Nikkyōsō (Japan 
Teachers’ Union)? He would “threaten” (kyōkatsu) them, and stick the cash in his pocket. 
To Akia, Japan was a nation of “etiquette” (reigi sahō), and a “nation of the gods” (kami 
no kuni) symbolized by the Japanese “emperor” (tennō). The “Rape of Nanjing” (nanking 
dai gaykusatsu) had been exaggerated, and Japan had been “deceived” (damasareta) into 
World War II by the USA. Notably, Akia never mentioned women or “comfort women” 
(jūgun ianfu) explicitly. However, his stance on these issues was implicit in his support of 
right-wing politicians like Ishihara Shintarō and his repetition of the discourse that denied 
“The Rape of Nanjing.” When Akia recounted past encounters with Philippine hostesses 
and prostitutes in Japan – as when his underworld bosses had presented him with his pick 
from three Philippine prostitutes on his release from jail; an offer that he did not take up, 
preferring to chat with the woman he picked because she was a “Philippine” (firipin), and 
because one “should not do women that easily” (onna wa sō kantan ni yarun jya nai) – it 
was with a mixture of (self-aggrandizing) benevolence, and racism.27 While everybody in 
the Okinawa-gumi frequented drinkeries where Chinese, Philippine, or Thai hostesses or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 The discourse of otoko thus intersected with the rhetoric justifying war in the name of liberating women, 
or “comfort women” (jūgun ianfu) who wanted to prostitute themselves to the Imperial Japanese Army. See 
the Introduction for my discussion of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s observation that: “White men are sav-
ing brown women from brown men” (Spivak, A Critique of Postcolonial Reason, 284). 
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women proprietors worked, the conviviality of these everyday meetings – which involved 
fondling, laughter, and at one drinkery, even a fining system for every occasion the guys 
inappropriately touched the bodies of younger women (one of whom had been deported) 
– were seemingly contradicted by racist comments to the effect that “the way of thinking 
is different” (kangaekata ga chigau) in Chinese women. Such comments escalated when 
these women would call Ichi-san, for example, to insist that he pay back his debts. These 
were attentions, however, that Ichi-san at once disparaged and thrived on. Because it was 
in the presence of primarily foreign waitresses, women proprietors, and hostesses that his 
identity as a Japanese man was affirmed. On occasion, the guys did frequent hostess bars 
run by Japanese hostesses, but such hostess bars were relatively expensive. They not only 
burdened the members of the Okinawa-gumi with heavy expenditures that had to be paid 
on leaving, but confronted them either with salary-men or yakuza affiliates whose income 
clearly surpassed their own. It was in the cheap local eateries and drinkeries that the guys 
felt at home drinking, singing, fighting, fondling foreign women and expatiating on right-
wing politics on the news. In accordance with such views, Akia voted for the LDP – the 
only party that pitched “strong” (tsuyoi) leaders – and political conversations started and 
ended on the note that Japan needed more leaders like Ishihara Shintarō. Only once did 
Akia express concern that conservative politicians – Ishihara’s partner, Hashimoto Tōru – 
would end welfare if they had their way. Yet, when welfare was cut in early 2014, Akia 
did not complain. Like a good subject, he acceded to the policies of the political elite and 
added that someone like himself had no place contesting such decisions. Abenomics was 
“fantastic” (subarashī).28 On the other hand, Akia claimed that the terms in which the far 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 So named after the economic policies implemented under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, “Abenomics” fo-
cuses on fiscal stimulus, monetary easing, and structural reforms. 
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left waged their politics – “proletariat” (puroretariāto), “capitalists” (shihonka), the “state” 
(kokka) – were arcane and incomprehensible to him. Where it might have been supposed 
that Akia – the member of a minority from Okinawa – would espouse leftist politics, the 
contrary was the case. Albeit eliding the fact that right-wing interests conflicted with his 
own, Akia transposed his vision of the ideal world – in which leaders (the political elite) 
worked for the good of the group (or nation), and “subordinates” (shatei) sacrificed them-
selves for this good – onto national politics. In this way, Akia’s espousal of yakuza ethics 
dovetailed into out-and-out fascism.29 
Nor did the political positions of other members of the Okinawa-gumi differ much 
from Akia’s, although Akia was by far the most vociferous advocate of emperor worship. 
Shokawa-san had voluntarily served in the Jieitai (The Japan Self-Defense Forces), kept 
an airgun in his apartment as a memento, and would expatiate on the power of Japan and 
how it was no match for other nations. Only Ichi-san expressed something like hatred for 
the U.S. military bases that had all but overrun Okinawa, noting, however, that there was 
“nothing to do about it” (shōganai). History had run its course. Okinawans had put up the 
strongest front and sacrificed more than other Japanese. And if there was to be war, Ichi-
san said, he would volunteer and take down at least one enemy. What manifested itself as 
bravado in daily life – accounting for oneself, protecting one’s “buddies” (nakama), and 
staking oneself in the process – translated into a naïve misrecognition of interest when it 
came to national politics. With the exception of Misaaru, every one of the guys espoused 
a rhetoric of right-wing nationalism which resonated with their everyday ideals and that 
gave itself to represent their interest, but whose conservative bent was violently opposed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 See Kaplan and Dubro’s Yakuza: Japan’s Criminal Underworld for a factual account of the connection 
between right-wingism and the yakuza in post-war Japan. 
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to sustaining individuals through welfare payments. Needless to say, the concrete actions 
that actualized Izukenji-san’s authority could have been differentiated from the hypocrisy 
of politicians like Ishihara Shintarō – who most certainly did not sacrifice themselves – 
but the discourse of the nation (and emperor) resonated with the discourse of the otoko. 
Above and beyond the discrimination the guys experienced in their daily encounters with 
the state or police, the nation restored them to a constitutive insufficiency that they were 
otherwise deprived of in their concrete encounters. It was not in spite of, but precisely on 
account of its contradiction with their treatment by the powers-that-be, that the discourse 
of nation successfully interpellated the guys. The violence of their disposal and contain-
ment in Sanya was thereby deflected away from the nation-state and inward on the serial-
ized, individual unit of the other workers in Sanya.30 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 It could even be ventured that the “symbolic” (shōchō) form of the postwar emperor could be discerned 
in the social relations that persisted in Sanya, albeit it was precisely in Sanya that the figure of Izukenji-san 
enabled lateral recognition. At the opposite end of the social hierarchy, the emperor effectively constituted 
Sanya in its marginality, and a certain identity-in-difference could be observed between the imperial system 
and the hierarchy among workers in Sanya. There, at the very bottom of the social and labor subcontracting 
hierarchy, where subcontractors sought men for so-called “3K” work – kitsui or “severe,” kitanai or “dirty,” 
and kiken or “dangerous” – the tehaishi system borrowed from the conventions of the yakuza, so that it was 
the role of the caretaker oyabun or “boss” to look out for his workers over and beyond providing them with 
work. An old-fashioned system of hierarchical obligations and relations persisted thus in Sanya. Notably, in 
general society, this system had been superseded by “recruitment agencies” (haken gaisha) which operated 
exclusively through the phone, such that workers rarely if ever met face-to-face with their office managers, 
and were arguably alienated all the more (see Ch. 10). While the upper echelons of Sanya’s subcontracting 
system operated within the same “pyramid” (piramiddo) as that of “recruitment agencies,” in Sanya there 
was almost no accountability to the state insofar as financial transactions were concerned. On the one hand, 
this enabled workers on welfare to hide their income, however it also allowed for a black market of labor to 
dovetail with the mob. It was naturally in the interest of the state, not to mention companies like TEPCO, to 
subcontract to the mob, not least because the seemingly endless intricacies of the pyramid structure dissim-
ulated knowledge or “responsibility” (sekinin), and therefore guilt, on behalf of the top. There was an order 
of state recognition in effect which violently forced the margins into silence and death. Even the homeless 
living along Sumida river had to contend with regular visits by city officials who urged them to vacate and, 
by recording the location of every tent, made sure that no further blight was caused to the city image: now 
fully visible from the height of the newly constructed tourist attraction and tower, the Skytree. Even at the 
most abject, then, techniques of state recognition were in place to ensure that, at the very least, the stain and 
danger of the taboo was contained. As Mary Douglas writes in Purity and Danger, the margins possessed a 
threatening power of its own: “To have been on the margins is to have been in contact with danger, to have 
been at the source of power” (120 – 121). For, unlike the imperial figure who blocked lateral recognition, it 
was precisely in Izukenji-san’s home that the workers I knew were recognized in their differences. Thus, it 
was not uncommon for the guys to break into tears in front of their friends, be it because they had drunk too 
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Just south of Sanya in the old burakumin neighborhood of Imado, a representative 
of the Buraku Kaihō Dōmei (Burakumin Liberation League) elaborated on the persis-
tence of “discrimination” (sabetsu) in the present. The issue, Uramoto said, has “clearly 
gotten worse” (akiraka ni hidoku natteru). Modernity constituted the origin of a specific 
form of discrimination by which the caste system, in which burakumin and the “common 
people” (shomin) each exercised specific “roles” (yakuwari), was crushed and subjugated 
into the service of the “economy” (keizai) and “production” (sangyō). The “low-grade 
existence” (katō na sonzai) of the burakumin was carried over into this modernity, yet, 
was stripped of the functional value recognized in its role. What was “left behind” (noko-
shiteshimatta) was the “feeling of repugnance towards death” (shi ni tai suru 
kegarekan).31 In Japan, the form of this discrimination, Uramoto continued, consisted in 
“avoiding” (sakeru). Saying the English word repeatedly, to “neglect” (negurekuto), 
Uramoto insisted that to “avoid” (sakeru) is to “discriminate” (sakeru). Contrary to the 
West, in which discrimination took overt forms, discrimination in Japan, he said, resides 
in acting as if the problem does not exist. “It's almost as if such an attitude has become 
the right thing” (maru de tadashī koto ni natteru). Avoidance allows the “majority” 
(tasūha) to say they are being “fair” (kōhei): “We haven’t done anything wrong” (jibun 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
much or because they were genuinely in mourning – and for somebody to say with a reassuring pad to the 
shoulder: “you’re an otoko too, eh” (omae mo otoko da na) – because these moments were indulged. If 
only fleetingly, the counter-discourse of otoko enabled workers in Sanya to repulse the judgmental gaze of 
society, and to converse of being fired, of attempting suicide, of divorce, of their long-lost children, or of 
their multifarious illnesses, some of which were terminal. 
31 Interview (October 28, ’13). By “gotten worse” (hidoku natteru), Uramoto refers to recent years. In light, 
for instance, of the “hate speech” (hēto supiichi) deployed by the Zaittokai, Uramoto’s observation does not 
operate across the board. However, he suggests a mode of fetishistic disavowal – “I know, but nevertheless 
…” – in which the fetish does not achieve its violence by calling its object into visibility in a naming which 
denies subjectivity, but that achieves the same effect by turning a blind eye: pretending ignorance. See 
Uramoto Yoshifumi’s Edo, Tokyō no Hisabetsu Buraku no Rekishi (Tokyo: Meiseki Shoten, 2003), and his 
Renzoku Tairyō Sabetsu Hagaki Jiken: Higaishi to Shite no Hokori o Kaketa Tatakai (Tokyo: Kaihō Shup-
pansha, 2011). 
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tachi wa warui koto shiteinai). The issue “does not exist, even though it exists” (sonzai 
shiterunoni, sonzai shinai).32 
 
For those receiving welfare, their state case worker was somebody to be wary and 
careful of. Appointments with him or her had to be kept punctiliously, not to mention in a 
sober state: a rule the guys were surprisingly observant of, always returning sober from 
meetings at the ward office. Welfare recipients were even prohibited from drinking liquor 
on welfare, and the guys were constantly conscious of the state’s gaze. If the ward officer 
called while one was away from the phone, or worse, paid an unannounced visit to one’s 
doya while one was out, it gave rise to endless speculation as to why the officer had come. 
More than anything, the guys became nervous they were in trouble, which, at the extreme, 
might cause them to lose their welfare. But most often, it was something trivial, or maybe 
the officer had even called with good news. A new insurance card might have arrived, or 
the ward might have granted permission to move into an apartment. Thus, when the guys 
spoke on the phone with their officer, they adopted a tone and formality of address which 
was most polite and obsequious. There could be dire consequences to failing to live up to 
the expectations of the ward officer, and thus, anything to do with the ward office became 
the subject of anxiety. Especially worrisome were instances in which the guys were put in 
police detention, and therefore, could not keep their appointments with the ward. In such 
instances, they could only hope and speculate that their absence had gone unnoticed, and 
that the cops had not contacted the ward. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 “Discrimination” (sabetsu), as such, observes a structure of denegation by which the margin sustains the 
center. See “Yama” Seisaku Jōei Iinkai, Yama: Yararetara Yarikaese, pg. 69. 
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The state exercised the power to put the men in Sanya on the street, or force them 
to do physical labor for a living. Given the transgressive life-style of the guys – drinking, 
fighting and working without “declaring” (shinkoku) their income – the prospect of being 
“cut off” (kirareru) welfare constantly threatened them. Mito-chan was of particular con-
cern after alcohol caused his hospitalization in a mental hospital. The hospitalization had 
facilitated his welfare application. However if it happened again, Mito-chan would be cut 
off. The state was unforgiving in this sense. One and a half years after his hospitalization, 
Mito-chan was drinking as before, and was seeing and hearing things. To keep the ghosts 
away, his floor was “covered in salt” (shio darake). He had to be weaned off alcohol, but 
if he was hospitalized (as he had been, before), Mito-chan would lose his income. Unable 
to work, he would wind up in the streets. 
Sanya had become a “welfare town” (fukushi no machi). The days when receiving 
welfare was frowned on had passed, and it was now “normal” (futsū) to be on welfare.33 
The objective conditions of the labor market had dealt their blow. If the law of reciprocity 
bypassed the state – on which everyone was dependent – it was not least because Sanya’s 
aging population lived and passed away behind closed doors, which nonetheless kept old-
style doya at full occupancy. Any confrontation with the state was consequently invested 
with a futility underscoring everybody’s dependence. Left-wing institutions like Sōgidan 
had lost any appeal that they once held for people like Akia (opposed to the left), namely, 
their power. In the past, Akia would say, Sōgidan “was incredible” (sugokatta). Anyone 
with but a rudimentary knowledge of Sanya could recall the riots that rocked Sanya in the 
early 80s, not to mention, the title of the documentary sponsored by Sōgidan and directed 
by Saitō Mitsuo who was killed by the Kanamachi-ikka while shooting the documentary: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 See ““Yama” Seisaku Jōei Iinkai,” Yama: Yararetara Yarikaese, pg. 25 – 26. 
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Yama: Yararetara Yarikaese (Yama: Do It In Return, If it Is Done To You).34 Back in the 
day, workers of Sanya rioted against subcontractors, yakuza, and the state. The contain-
ment of violence required the “riot police” (kidōtai) to be present. In one well-known 
murder, a policeman was even stabbed to death by a laborer who had had enough.35 
However, while the legacies of these events persisted in Sanya, they had largely been rel-
egated to the past. On June 9th, the day on which the Sanya policeman was killed, an an-
nual symposium was held apropos the event and culprit, who was serving a life sentence. 
Likewise, portraits of Saitō Mitsuo could be found in the Sōgidan office. And when it 
came time for Sōgidan to host its biannual gatherings in Tamahime park – during Obon 
in summer and for the New Year’s wake in winter – the labor union erected a shrine in 
the park with portraits of Saitō Mitsuo, and others murdered by the mob. As a carry-over 
from the past, the blue vans of riot police then lined Namidabashi and the “public order 
police” (kōan keisatsu) gathered in throngs outside the park, distinctly recognizable in 
civilian clothes: dorky waist-packs (or shoulder bags), plain pants, plain shirts, vests, caps, 
sharp-looking glasses and peering black eyes. Only on these few occasions did residents 
of Sanya gather for Sōgidan events, which otherwise consisted of a paltry gathering of 
five to six Sōgidan members marching through the empty streets on Friday mornings. 
With a red and white union flag billowing above them, these Sōgidan members would 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Ibid, pg. 15 – 17. Saitō Mitsuo himself wrote that the camera functioned as a “weapon” (buki) for the day 
laborers by exposing the conditions of their exploitation by the state, subcontractors and mob. Mitsuo was, 
in fact, shot with the live camera raised to his eye. See ““Yama” Seisaku Jōei Iinkai,” Yama: Yararetara 
Yarikaese. In a slightly different vein, Saitō’s film recalls Kazuo Hara’s 1987 documentary, The Emperor’s 
Naked Army Marches On (Yukite Yukite Shingun), in which the protagonist, Okuzaki Kenzō, confronts his 
former World War II officers with the guilt of ordering the execution of two other men in his unit, so their 
flesh could be eaten. See Hara Kazuo, Camera Obtrusa: The Action Documentaries of Hara Kazuo, trans. 
Pat Noonan and Takuo Yasuda (New York: Kaya Press, 2009). 
35 See “6.9 Kekki 30 Nen, Towaretsuzukeru Yoseba, Kangoku, Hinkon … Shūkai Hōkokushū” (Saitama: 
Shūkai Jikkō Iinkai, 2010). 
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expostulate over loud-speakers against the state, and stand about with political flyers in 
their hands, ready to hand out to an absent crowd. 
 
 Alongside its transformation into a “welfare town” (fukushi no machi), Sanya had 
witnessed a mushrooming of nonprofits that aid the needy. The oldest of these nonprofits, 
with three decades of experience operating in Sanya, was Sanyūkai.36 
Sanyūkai opens its doors at ten every morning Monday through Friday, and every 
third and fourth Saturday of the month. Aside from the generic crew that begins gathering 
around ten and leave the alley all but empty by one, the staff and a few regular volunteers 
(of Sanya) help set up chairs and ashtrays outside. Without exception, the few hangers-on 
after lunch are either intimate with the staff or are waiting for an appointment in the clinic. 
Everybody else – and so the regular volunteers say, often with disdain – leaves after their 
free meal, without putting any work in. 
 Every day, the process of calling the men outside up to eat occurs in the same way. 
Jean-san stands outside from the moment Sanyūkai opens its shutters, and appears to 
keep track of the order in which everyone arrives, so that those who arrived first get to eat 
first. Most often, however, the process is off-hand and casual. Particularly when there is a 
crowd of 30 or 40 (towards the end of the month), Jean-san loses track of who has been 
called up to eat and who has not. Nonetheless Jean-san knows almost everyone outside 
by name, and demonstrates this knowledge when he indicates that so and so-san can go 
up to eat by addressing them with their name, and flicking his forefinger upward; a ges-
ture that is often accompanied by a more or less humble bowing, or bobbing up and down 
of the head and shoulders. The scene makes a spectacle of intimacy between the head of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 See Ch. 4 for more on Sanyūkai. 
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the NPO and the men lined up outside, waiting, who often display an unconcealed pleas-
ure in being called by nickname by Jean-san, be it Fukada-san the “fake” (nisemono), 
Akia or the “guy from Okinawa” (Okinawa-yarō), Aizawa-san or “Ai-chan,” and Toba-
san or “Toba-chan.” But the display of familiarity belies both an hierarchy inscribed in 
the relations between those who come to Sanyūkai for services, and the shame that struc-
tures the act of waiting (up to two hours) to secure a free meal. 
This enactment of intimacy between Sanyūkai staff and those outside dissimulates 
the gaze of social authority, and replaces it with what Akia liked to call, after the famous 
book, “the structure of amae” (amae no kōzō).37 Notably, the power to shame – to discard 
its beneficent posturing, and remind the men outside that they are, in fact, beneficiaries of 
services freely bestowed on them – remains with Sanyūkai. There is an inherent hierarchy 
to Sanyūkai’s charity that cannot be divested from its relation with the men outside. Thus, 
Fukada-san, a former post-office worker made to retire during prime minister Koizumi’s 
privatization of the postal system, observes there is “something distinctly wrong” (nanika 
okashī) with the everyday scenario of grown “men” (otoko) sitting two hours with bowed 
heads to receive a meal, to have a finger flicked at them to go upstairs to eat; “something 
distinctly wrong” (nanika okashī), as if Fukada-san cannot identify what that “something” 
(nanika) is after volunteering at Sanyūkai for two decades. For the exhibition of intimacy 
conceals the shame of waiting for and receiving a free meal. 
Of course, the intimacy and personalization of relations at Sanyūkai also ensured 
that connection to its staff, and significantly, to the head of Sanyūkai, meant everything: 
the difference, even, between receiving and not receiving medical care. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 See Doi Takeo, “Amae” no Kōzō. 
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But it was difficult for an uninitiated passer-by to decipher what was happening in 
the alley by Sanyūkai without prior knowledge thereof. Except when Jean-san or Moriya-
san did their round to enliven the atmosphere, most often by poking fun – laughter flaring 
up for a moment among a handful people – the alley was crowded and silent. One time, a 
stranger asked Ai-chan why there were so many people gathered in the alley, and Ai-chan 
– embarrassed – had to lie; explaining to me afterwards that he “could not possibly say” 
(iu wake ni wa ikanai) that free meals are given on the second floor. Ai-chan’s reluctance 
to confess bespoke both a consideration for Sanyūkai, insofar as it would burden the in-
stitution if random people started lining up – brought about, no less, than through Ai-
chan’s indiscretion! – and a bashfulness regarding the fact that he himself was waiting for 
such a meal. What occurred at Sanyūkai was not to be pandered about, to strangers least 
of all. 
Many of the men who came to Sanyūkai, especially those close to the staff, would 
complain that most others came, ate, and left without lifting a finger. Indeed, there were a 
few freeloaders even among the men close to the staff, including someone who had lived 
with Jean-san for two years. But most had risen through the ranks by volunteering, that is, 
by providing services that were indispensable to Sanyūkai, but that anyone else could al-
so proffer. In this way, even volunteering was treated as an opportunity offered by Sa-
nyūkai: the mimesis of a job position for which there was plenty of reserves, the remu-
neration for which came solely in the form of recognition. Thus, Akia, who had risen to 
the top of the volunteers, would say of freeloaders that “they know no shame” (haji shi-
razu), and at his most derisive, refer to Sanyūkai as a mere “dining hall” (shokudō), and 
to those outside as “pigs” (buta). But this description of Sanyūkai was repeated by Fuka-
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da-san, albeit in less harsh terms, when he said that none of the fundamental Sanyūkai 
activities – handing out bread packages on Wednesdays, rice-balls or bentō boxes on 
Thursdays by Sumida river, and providing free daily meals – “connect” (tsunagaru) to 
the recovery of an independent livelihood in the long run. Sanyūkai gave momentary res-
pite for the stomach and wallet, and thereby, it kept people coming back for more. It was, 
in fact, entirely possible to feed oneself every day of the week, the entire year, by shifting 
from one takidashi (free food-stall) to the next. For those lacking in knowledge, Sōgidan 
had published and circulated a calendar listing where and when and by what organization 
free food was on offer on each day of the week. 
Most people who came to Sanyūkai for meals and medical care (80% minimum) 
were already receiving welfare. In fact, Sanyūkai had no qualms about drawing a line and 
exhibiting that this was the particular type of individual (already on welfare; not really in 
need) to whom they catered. For when a truly dirty homeless person came along, they 
were handed a lunchbox on the pretext that it was not sanitary to let them inside. There 
was, of course, some truth to this hygiene claim. Yet, Akia would note, there was also 
something clearly wrong with a set-up which turned away individuals with access to nei-
ther welfare nor medical care, and embraced welfare recipients who could use a little 
more aid: to ease the burden of their gambling habit, to balance their drinking budget, or 
just to find a place away from the solitude of their rooms. Every once in a while, Jean-san 
could thus be seen turning the corner of the alley with somebody in tow. Beyond the cor-
ner, he would hand them the ¥1,000 or so they had requested. As these transactions oc-
curred more or less out of sight, it was never clear how much who was able to extract 
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from Jean-san. But it went without saying that the latter felt obliged to give, and that pro-
spective recipients calculated when Jean-san was most likely to grant their request. 
The most notorious and helpless borrower at Sanyūkai was Ai-chan. More than a 
decade earlier, Ai-chan had accrued an astronomical gambling debt that forced him to run 
away from loan-sharks. Alas, even after a decade of living homeless in a tent by Sumida 
river, an exceptionally dogged loan shark tracked Ai-chan down when he went on welfare, 
and his name (and address) entered the public records. A lawyer volunteering at Sanyūkai 
finally resolved the matter by having the claim declared illegal, and by having Ai-chan’s 
name eliminated from the records. Upon meeting him, however, it was difficult to believe 
that the soft-spoken and diminutive Ai-chan had accumulated a debt that sent loan-sharks 
chasing him for a decade, forcing him to disappear. At Sanyūkai, Ai-chan was known for 
his colored pencil drawings of children’s anime figures – Kurayon Shinchan, Doraemon, 
Sasaezan, Chibi Maruko – that decorated the fridge upstairs, as for his ability to sew and 
fix the hems of his clothes. He worked six days a week cleaning pachinko parlors in 
Shinjuku. The job started every morning at five and lasted a couple hours, after which Ai-
chan would cycle to Sanyūkai on a pink fold-up bicycle (a gift from Akia, who had found 
it too feminine), arriving in time for lunch. On Thursdays, when Ai-chan was supposed to 
make riceballs, he would peep around the door to the second floor – obviously hoping to 
find the room full, so he could head back in the alley and stand around and chat – only to 
be hailed by everyone inside as late, and to come in and help! But Ai-chan, who dutifully 
reported his earnings to the ward office (which recalibrated his welfare accordingly), had 
money trouble. Fukada-san described Ai-chan as “ill” (byōki). After all: “what fifty-year-
old asks to borrow ¥100?” (gojū sai no dansei ga hyaku en kashite to iu ka?). Hooked on 
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pachinko, Ai-chan would be asking at the end of the month (one day one person, the next 
another) whether so-and-so did not have ¥100 or ¥200. The end of this money was the ¥1 
pachinko. Ai-chan himself complained helplessly of the headache it caused – and the lack 
of consideration it entailed – that ATM machines only dispensed bills. This prevented Ai-
chan from withdrawing the few coins that would take him through the month. Indeed, the 
only way to circumvent this problem was by commuting to the central branch, where the 
money could be dispensed over the counter. 
Everyone at Sanyūkai knew of Ai-chan’s habits – as they did of everyone else’s – 
and, of course, of Jean-san’s lending. Yet, like the structuring events that had precipitated 
the arrival of Sanyūkai regulars in Sanya, such subjects were not mentioned. Lending and 
borrowing thus formed an informal economy which constituted the silent substructure of 
Sanyūkai. Unless one was standing at the margins of the Sanyūkai alley – where requests 
and lending took place – no one spoke of drinking, gambling, going to Yoshiwara, not to 
mention, of borrowing from Jean-san. The staff, too, was complicit in this silencing of the 
subjects that touched on the core existence of the men who came to Sanyūkai; proactively 
trying to transform the atmosphere upstairs and outside into a cheerful one in which jokes 
were bantered and topics limited to recent weather and news. Certain conversations were 
even shut down by staff maneuvering away from topics like soaplands, upcoming or past 
races, and pachinko. Otherwise, staff members would sit with their heads lowered, unable 
to either stop or participate as conversation progressed. However, talking about soaplands 
or gambling required an unique strain of shamelessness in front of the staff. Indeed, such 
topics went against the mission of Sanyūkai – aiding those in need, and if possible, reha-
bilitating them for work – an institution that ostensibly did not wish to facilitate gambling 
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or drinking by supplementing income or lowering the over-all cost of life. But it was only 
through such indulgence, or amae, that Sanyūkai sustained the spectacle of need – indeed, 
that the NPO and its staff were needed – that justified its existence and the acceptance of 
donations which supplied staff salaries. Hence, the habitual handouts that kept everybody 
coming back for more were swept under the rug. 
 For the men outside, the cost of institutional indulgence required that they accede 
to shame by silencing activities that involved excessive expenditure. Precisely that which 
was taboo constituted the foundation of Sanyūkai. But that is not to say that anyone really 
felt shame over anything. It was, rather, the shameless assumption of a shameful position, 
graciously dissimulated in the beneficence of charity, that enabled for Sanyūkai to persist. 
And it was not merely drinking, gambling, or frequenting red light districts that had to be 
silenced; the stories of those who had been laid off on account of company “restructuring” 
(risutora) – in the ‘90s, or before, in the ‘60s and ‘70s era of high economic development 
– or on account of illness were likewise consigned to silence. It was best not to speak of 
such things. It was only on the margins of the institution, at the far end of the alley, or out 
of reach of the staff that individuals like Ai-chan, Wada-san, Fukada-san and Akia might 
recount their life-story. There, before his troubles at Sanyūkai began, Akia would recount 
how (after his years with the Nibikikai) he had been laid off construction work because of 
illness. His health had caused him to miss too many days. Observing that Sanya presented 
a “problem of disposability” (tsukaisute no mondai), he (uncharacteristically) lowered his 
head, as if making an admission, when stating that he had been laid off – judged unusable 
– on account of his health. There was nothing more “shameful” (hazukashī), Akia would 
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say, than living off “other people’s money” (hoka no hito no okane). On this account, he 
was trying to do his “very best” (isshōkenmei) by volunteering at Sanyūkai. 
 Nothing testified more to the normative power – at least, to mimic propriety – that 
the taboo of certain topics exercised over the men outside than what these men would say 
in the absence of the staff. Yama-chan, for instance, worked almost full-time at Sanyūkai 
– doing all the menial tasks to supplement his limited pension – but his work was strictly 
divided from the supervisory role that other staff assumed. Though Yama-chan had lived 
in Sanya for over a decade, and knew more about the place – like the majority of the men 
outside – he was either setting up the entrance, serving tea at the top of the stairs, or help-
ing with the preparation of rice-balls or bread for distribution, while the remainder of the 
full-time staff, that included four administrators, two nurses, one rotating kitchen member 
and Jean-san, held their private, morning meetings. It was rumored that, at these morning 
meetings, the “case” (kēsu) of each individual frequenting Sanyūkai was discussed. When 
a decades-old veteran, volunteer, and worker at Sanyukai – Nomura-san – ceased to come 
to work, only to be found dead in his bed surrounded by liquor, Yama-chan was likewise 
excluded from the discussion of who would take Nomura-san’s place, notwithstanding 
that it was Yama-chan who would have to work with this person. It was not Yama-chan’s 
place to provide an opinion on who might be best for the job. The power to decide who 
among volunteers was qualified to rise to a paid, part-time job, was exclusively relegated 
to staff who commuted to Sanyūkai, worked 9 to 5, and had little if any experience of 
how Sanya operated outside the confines of Sanyūkai. Yet, as Fukada-san observed, so-
and-so might be “docile and gentle” (otonashī) at Sanyūkai, while “fighting” (abareru) 
and getting into confrontations outside Sanyūkai. Any drunks, it might be added, were 
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asked to leave, and promptly led out of the alleyway upon failure to do so. Usually, 
Moriya or Sonobe would grab them by the arm and forcibly see them off; a send-off 
which frequently transformed into a rather comical affair when the uncomprehending 
drunk returned to the reception on their heels. Drinking in the alley was thus frowned up-
on, except on Fridays and Saturdays after work, when select members of the men outside 
were invited upstairs for snacks and drinks. Sure enough, there was justification for im-
posing a “no alcohol” (sake kinshi) rule in Sanya, of all places. One head nurse, for in-
stance, had worked at Sanyūkai for decades, and could vividly recall one man beating 
another man’s head against the wall of Sanyūkai, while she sat inside. In another instance, 
someone had grabbed the metal pole used to roll up the shutters, getting ready to stab 
somebody with it. This nurse insisted safety was her first concern, and that a male staff 
member be on duty all the time. In this fashion, certain acts that were constitutive of 
Sanya outside Sanyūkai – drinking, fighting – and indeed, of being an otoko, were disal-
lowed in the confined space of Sanyūkai. In yakuza style, Akia had, of course, set himself 
up as a protector of Sanyūkai; holding hostile influences at bay from his strategic position 
by the end of the alley, and monopolizing the right to violence for himself. In this same 
spirit, feeling fully justified by his investment of work, he would make Sanyūkai work in 
his interest – providing favors for others; getting an appointment with the doctor, or re-
ceiving a meal, clothes, shoes, etc – as was his due. However, it was not only drinking or 
fighting that was tabood. Yama-chan consciously adopted a stance of “not saying any-
thing” (kuchi o dasanai) when it came time to decide who would replace Nomura-san, as 
if he was scared of opening his mouth. In fact, when the seventy-year-old Shirai-san – 
known for his grumbling and occasional bad-mouthing of others – expressed an opinion 
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(not the first time, apparently) to the effect that Sanyūkai might compensate its volunteers 
financially, Moriya-san broke into a rage. From up in the entryway, behind the pedestal 
on which the tea was placed, Moriya dealt a tirade to Shirai-san, shouting that he “will 
not accept it a second time” (nido to shōchi shinai zo) if Shirai-san – head lowered by this 
point, raising his hand apologetically to convey that he understood – were to say it again. 
Strangely enough, no one afterwards – save for Akia, who noted that the beast had finally 
reared its head – reproached Moriya for his actions. Responsibility lay with Shirai-san, 
for having said something inopportune. He should have known better. In this manner, 
there existed a latent fear among volunteers at Sanyūkai of speaking against the staff or 
of too openly announcing their activities outside of Sanyūkai, lest they fall out of favor, 
and lose their privileges. 
The conduct necessitated by such fear was directly opposed to conduct becoming 
of an otoko. Where an otoko was self-reliant, Sanyūkai required that the men outside wait 
for their food, and that they wait to be called upstairs for the end-of-the-week party, when 
alcohol was served. And it did sometimes happen that Jean-san neglected to call someone 
upstairs, whom he hitherto always invited up. Whether Jean-san had forgotten, or forgot-
ten on purpose, such action resulted in leaving someone out in the cold; on account of 
which that person became reluctant to return. Where an otoko had his “pride” (iji) to 
maintain, it had to be set aside at Sanyūkai. To maintain one’s privileges at Sanyūkai, an 
otoko had to be docile. He had to forget about refusing to “bend” (mageru), walking 
one’s “own way” (jibun no michi), and of “protecting” (mamoru) and “taking care” (daiji 
ni suru) of one’s “buddies” (nakama), or for protecting “the weak” (yowai mono). And it 
was for precisely this reason that some regular members of Sanyūkai, and one day, Akia 
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found it necessary to “go amok” (abareru) away from Sanyūkai. As an island within 
Sanya, Sanyūkai could only establish itself by contradistinction to the mores that it op-
posed, and thus it required and fed itself off the world of Sanya about it, and of Akia 
within it. 
Family relations at Sanyūkai were no different from that of the workers, as almost 
everyone had lost touch with their families. One staff member thus observed that the men 
had no “connections” (en) with kin. Even after the March 11th, 2011, earthquake and nu-
clear disaster, there had been no effort to contact and establish the safety of their families. 
Like the guys in the Okinawa-gumi, the men at Sanyūkai would go to soaplands to satisfy 
their desires. When the staff was gone, or at the margin of the alley, where Akia stood all 
day at the corner, the 70-year-old Wada-san would grin, baring his toothless mouth, when 
asked how he had spent his latest winnings, and if it had been on “this” (kore): the pinkie 
stuck out to indicate a woman. In the absence of the staff, people like Imai-san would talk 
unabashedly of how the best job in a “pink salon” (pinsaro) was that of the manager, who 
got to teach girls how to give blowjobs. Yet, alongside this covert practice of paying for 
sexual services with welfare, the men at Sanyūkai also engaged in more overt competi-
tion for the attention of the kitchen staff, all of whom were women. Notably, there was 
little possibility of succeeding with any of these women, because they were almost all 
nuns, and if not, they were either married with kids, or at least twenty years younger than 
the men. Nonetheless, the men would flirt when given the chance: exchanging comments, 
thank yous, and smiles when they returned their dirty plates (in person) after lunch. Some 
would take flirtation to the next step, like Izumi, who gave girly gifts and wrote letters on 
pink, barbie-doll paper. He had made a practice, too, of giving back “massages” (massāji) 
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to the staff downstairs, and sometimes, too – it was rumored – to the staff upstairs, while 
everyone else was away doing takidashi (food handouts) by Sumida river. It was said that 
he snuck up when everyone was out. To the consternation of others, Imai would similarly 
situate himself strategically close to the kitchen when the Friday and Saturday afternoon 
“drinking parties” (nomikai) were held on the second floor, enabling him to chat with the 
women while everyone else remained seated in the adjacent room. Kuma-san likewise 
had a relationship going with one of the kitchen staff, whom he also knew from another 
NPO in Sanya, and seemed to flaunt this connection with conversations that were irrele-
vant to everybody else. Acquiring the private phone numbers of the women was consid-
ered quite a feat – though the men never shared these numbers, nor even let on that they 
had acquired them – which gave rise to endless speculation as to whether so-and-so had 
gotten so-and-so’s number. Lastly, going shopping for, or far better, with the kitchen staff 
was regarded as an enviable privilege; a duty that was assigned to a single individual un-
til, by whim of the staff, another person was picked. Staff favoritism even determined the 
proximity with, and the duration of time for which the men at Sanyūkai could keep com-
pany with staff in the kitchen. Not surprisingly, therefore, the volunteers at Sanyūkai vied 
with each other to be favorites with the male staff, who occupied the decision-making, 
administrative places in the organization. 
Though far from explicit, a hierarchy among the men frequenting Sanyūkai could 
be discerned from their proximity to the entryway, and the ease with which they spoke to 
each other and the staff. The fifty-year-old Izumi, who had suffered a stroke a year earlier, 
sat either on the steps leading up to the entryway, or on a chair immediately adjacent to it. 
Adorned with giant plastic, flourescent Buddhist prayer beads around his neck, a black T-
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shirt with a white dragon designed across it, baggy black pants, sandals, bald round head 
with the stubble of a beard, round eyeglasses, and a couple front teeth that showed every 
time he talked or laughed, Izumi’s lower jaw hung open every time someone slapped him 
jokingly on the scalp from behind. Too weak to partake in food-handouts, when everyone 
came back from Sumida river, Izumi could be found giving massages either at the bottom 
of the steps, or sometimes inside the entryway to staff and volunteers alike. 
One of the oldest and longest volunteers at Sanyūkai, Toba-san would likewise sit 
right by the entryway, often on a low, fold-up camping chair that fit his short, lean stature. 
Originally a fisherman by trade, scarcity of work had led Toba-san to unemployment, and 
to live in a blue-tent by Sumida river. Back in the day, Toba-san had been known for his 
traditional performances of dance and song, when he would dress up for festivals, but the 
years had gradually taken the energy from him, and a stroke had led him – with the aid of 
Sanyūkai – to take a room in the doya just in front of Sanyūkai. Nowadays, he could most 
often be found sitting quietly by the entryway, occasionally cracking a dry, sharp joke in 
response to some comment by the staff, or heading up the rice-ball making on Thursday 
mornings. Toba-san never ate lunch upstairs, but instead, had a lunch-box (with his name 
written on it) prepared for him everyday by the kitchen staff, to be eaten, as he would say, 
as otsumami (snack) with his “rice alcohol” (kome no sake), or sake, later in the evening.  
 Imai-san, a relative newcomer to Sanyūkai who had risen suddenly in favorability 
with the staff, would conveniently step out of his doya opposite Sanyūkai at around 11:00 
every day, barely bothering to put on his shoes, as he dragged them across the ground and 
arrived just in time for lunch. Imai-san would sit or stand just about anywhere, seemingly 
oblivious to the monumental silence which had been erected around specific topics, as he 
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conversed freely on everything from soaplands to gambling. Fukada-san likewise seemed 
to have mastered the act of arriving just in time for lunch; after helping to make rice-balls 
in the mornings, he would return to his room, catch an episode of jidai-geki (historical 
drama), and go back to Sanyūkai for lunch. So too, Wada-san, yet another incorrigible 
gambler in his seventies, would arrive – especially toward the end of the month – half an 
hour before noon. Former salary-man, laid off in the seventies era of high-economic de-
velopment, and then guardman, Wada-san would sometimes show photos of himself from 
his earlier days, when he had been to Hiroshima and Korea on business trips; of himself 
in Hiroshima Peace Park, ringing the bell in Miyajima shrine, of a young Korean hostess 
in a snack bar, and later of himself as a guardman. One photo showed him dressed up in a 
loincloth, and shouldering an omikoshi (portable shrine) for the Kanda matsuri (Kanda 
festival). He had lost touch with everyone in the photos. But he still looked the likeness 
of his younger self in the frayed, glossy images from another era, though his back was 
now slightly hunched, and he had lost most of his hair under the cap he sported. A news-
paper, folded to the horse-gambling page, was invariably tucked in his back pants pocket, 
besides a pack of cigarettes. Like the generic gambler, Wada-san wore thick cotton pants, 
a button-up shirt, black plastic shoes and to add a bit of drama, a black cap with a white 
dragon on it. He had the most lovable smile, and was an incessant talker; hardly listening 
as he moved relentlessly from topic to topic, shuffling around on his feet. On the few oc-
casions that he won at his favorite pasttime of keiba, Wada-san would, albeit embar-
rassedly, admit that he had spent the money on food and soaplands. 
And there was a plethora of other characters at Sanyūkai. There was Nomura-san, 
who bicycled to Sanyūkai from afar, and like Yama-chan, received a salary for helping a 
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few days per week at Sanyūkai’s partner doya, Sanyūsō. Still in his early fifties, Nomura-
san had a penchant for dressing flashy. He would sometimes appear in yellow-black tiger 
design leggings strapped above his shoes, but he was most well-known for his trademark 
pink, G-string underwear that showed from behind whenever he sat. Years ago, Nomura-
san – who went by an alias – had gotten into a bicycle accident, and having been laid off 
in the aftermath, sought help from Sanyūkai. He spoke fondly of his daughters, and might 
even tell of the life and wife he had “run away” (nigeta) from, but it was unclear whether 
he was in touch with them, and along with the lack of a phone number, his use of an alias 
attracted suspicion. Nomura-san would tell tales of Pantagruelian proportions, of drinking 
and dining, and of staying awake for days on end, but one week he failed to show at work 
and was found dead, surrounded by bottles, in his room. Another Yama-chan, too, passed 
away from terminal cancer during the course of two years; a lean, silent, and elder figure 
who passed his time sitting on a fold-up stool outside his doya, Sanyūsō, observing life as 
it moved by. The quiet and ever-polite Oshiba-san, who always underdressed in winter, in 
but a plain collared shirt and green workers’ pants, helped every morning with set-up and 
could be found sitting on the benches, muttering inaudibly to himself while everyone else 
chatted. At six in the mornings, he could also be found standing by Namidabashi, hoping 
for one of the few vans that still picked up laborers for miscellaneous jobs to come by. 
And at the extreme margin of Sanyūkai’s social sphere, there was Mori-san, a man in his 
40s who had become so withdrawn that it was difficult to sustain a conversation with him, 
or rather, to do so without being distracted by surroundings and forgetting about him. For 
Mori-san shied away from personal topics as if it were the plague, endlessly commenting, 
instead, on the weather for which he, too, was remarkably underdressed in winter. In spite 
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of the repeated comments by staff members to dress warm, Mori-san would sit shivering 
on the benches with neither jacket nor scarf. Over time, his few clothes had become worn 
and grubby, and as it became increasingly apparent that Mori-san was losing control over 
the most basic of aspects of self-care, the staff repeatedly asked him where he lived, only 
to be told evasively that it was somewhere beyond Minami-Senjū station. Likewise, Gon-
kun lived in his own world, always wearing the same blue shorts, the same faded, yellow 
button-up shirt, and the same flat shoes with socks stretched up his legs. Gon-kun was the 
spitting image of an elementary school boy trapped in the body of an adult; about 180 cm 
tall, with a round stomach, and equally pudgy face. He never went anywhere without his 
backpack (stuffed to the brim), and his portable radio. And when he came to Sanyūkai, he 
would invariably be sitting with a Japan road map unfolded no more than 10 cm from his 
face. Thus, peering endlessly into the map, he would wait for lunch, eat, leave, and spend 
the remainder of his day walking about Sanya, or in Sanya’s parks, in which he also slept.  
 Then there was Akia, who was often misrecognized as a Sanyūkai employee from 
the manner in which he worked side by side with Yama-chan, running menial tasks, right 
from opening to closing hours. Unless he was upstairs helping in the kitchen, or preparing 
for takidashi on Wednesday and Thursday mornings, he would stand at the far corner and 
end of the alley flanking Sanyūkai, from whence he could survey both the alley itself, and 
all the men sitting on the benches, as well as greet and speak to the steady stream of men 
coming down the street forming a “T” with the Sanyūkai alley. Akia thus functioned as a 
counterweight to the Sanyūkai entry, as he greeted and chatted with an endless number of 
passersby, including – to the discomfort of Sanyūkai staff – members of the Kanamachi-
ikka. From his position, greeting everyone even before they reached the entryway, it was 
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as if Akia were the informal front-man of the organization. If it were not for Sanyūkai’s 
limited finances, it might have been assumed Akia was making a profit of racketeering. 
Akia had, in fact, worked his way up through the ranks of volunteers to help with 
the distribution of second-hand clothes from a storage house by Tamahime park. It was in 
this capacity that he could provide goods upon demand. On account of his unofficial rank, 
working alongside the staff, men who came to Sanyūkai would bypass the staff, and the 
queues, by asking Akia directly whether he could not get this or that: a pair of shorts, a 
vest, underwear, a toothbrush, soap, etc. Asking Akia did not entail the trouble of having 
to face the staff. It could be done informally, without fear of rebuff, or of being indirectly 
told that they had asked for one too many favors. Akia would pull his weight with staff in 
place of others, making sure they got their proper due. When he was not actually working, 
Akia would therefore situate himself at the far margins of Sanyūkai, where he could take 
requests and chat freely. At his corner, it was as if he had set up an underground, subsidi-
ary booth to Sanyūkai, at which his leverage with the staff ensured the provision of goods. 
And Akia was not afraid to ask the staff for this and that for so and so, since, in his mind, 
he had worked his way into a position from which he was entitled to make requests. 
Akia even pushed the balance of indebtedness in his own interest. Not only did he 
take care of all the menial tasks – cleaning, taking out the garbage, loading and unloading 
packages – that none of the administrative staff did. He treated volunteers to alcohol once 
the day was over, and for the weekly Saturday mahjong sessions at Jean-san’s apartment, 
he would come laden with food and liquor, and pay for everybody’s taxi ride there. It was 
therefore difficult for the staff to refuse Akia; a fact that he was, no doubt, well aware of, 
and took advantage of. In fact, Akia would ask for favors even if he there was likelihood 
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of refusal. “I don’t care if they say no” (kotowarete mo kamawanai), he said. This pushed 
the onus of refusal on the other party. Rather than occupy the position of the party which 
hesitated to ask for fear of rejection, Akia outdid himself as a volunteer, and thereby, he 
placed the staff in an (indebted) position from which it was difficult to refuse his requests. 
But naturally, Akia used his discretion in granting favors, giving preference to some indi-
viduals over others. For Akia had foes and friends at Sanyūkai, both among the other 
volunteers, and the staff. 
However there was growing concern among the staff, as Jean-san put it, that Akia 
was “standing out” (medatsu). Another volunteer should be given the opportunity to take 
the place that Akia had carved out for himself. Tension between Akia and the staff arose 
not least because he was increasingly acting as a broker between Sanyūkai and the people 
outside, and from this position, stirred the envy and discomfort of others. Akia was often 
surrounded by his own group of acquaintances at the end of the alley, a congregation that 
doubled the circle formed around Jean-san and other staff in the immediate vicinity of the 
stairway leading up into the reception, and further into the inner sanctum of the clinic. In 
fact, while Akia’s health was still good enough, he would get up and stand outside on the 
corner starting at 8 AM, before the staff arrived. Unless one took a detour south about the 
block to enter from the other end of the alley, it was impossible to avoid Akia who greet-
ed everyone as they came or left Sanyūkai, be it other volunteers, staff, permanent nurses, 
voluntary doctors, or psychologist. And Akia’s circle of acquaintances in Yama was wide, 
indeed, such that – by standing on the corner – he pulled all sorts of other characters into 
the periphery of Sanyūkai. After a couple of decades’ experience in Sanya, Akia knew 
folks from past work experience, from living in various doya, and now, from Sanyūkai 
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where many drifters, newcomers to Sanya tended to gravitate (and as veterans of Sanya, 
at least half the Sanyūkai crew had experience with construction work). He had a knack 
and reputation for talking to anyone, be it the homeless along Sumida river or Tamahime 
park (all of whom he knew, by name), or the yakuza down the street. By standing thus on 
the corner, daily, Akia was effectively living his philosophy of looking out for “the weak” 
(yowai mono), while helplessly aggrandizing his own sphere of benevolent, just influence. 
Akia’s previous job in Kotobukichō had been comparable to his tasks at Sanyūkai. 
In Kotobukichō, Akia had made it apparent to the mob that he was “usable” (tsukaeru) as 
a lookout for the illegal gambling dens they operated. As part of his tasks, he would stand 
on the street and scout for trouble, be it uniformed or undercover police, or troublemakers 
in general. At Sanyūkai, then, Akia was merely deploying knowledge he had acquired in 
other places; be it working as a “bodyguard” (bodīgādo) who would, quite literally, insert 
his body between Sanyūkai and trouble. Indeed, after Akia left Sanyūkai, the staff had no 
choice but to make an (embarrassing) call to the police when there was trouble they could 
not contain. By whatever means necessary, Akia would either have escorted such trouble 
out of the alley, or spotted it before it arrived. “Nothing escapes my eye” (ore no me kara 
nogareru mono wa nai), he would say. Yet, as Akia’s position of influence expanded at 
Sanyūkai, he was slowly, but ineluctably headed on a collision course with the staff. The 
denouement was to occur over a member of the kitchen staff. For, in addition to being the 
most conspicuous and hardworking of volunteers outside – in whose presence the atmos-
phere could transform instantaneously from sombre to exuberant – Akia was also the fa-
vorite among the kitchen staff. Whenever there was a lack of kitchen workers, be it for 
cooking or dishwashing, Akia would enter the kitchen to help, and on Wednesdays, when 
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preparations had to be made for curry the following day, Akia would stay after everyone 
else had left, peeling and cutting potatoes, carrots, and onions, because on Thursdays, his 
crush, a Christian nun in her early 40s, was in charge of the kitchen. 
 A concatenation of events snowballed into Akia’s expulsion from Sanyūkai. First, 
there was the problem of Akia’s excessive visibility at Sanyūkai. He was doing too much, 
the staff said – “standing out” (medatsu) – and this was unfair to others. Others should be 
given an opportunity, as well, and the organization needed to make way for “new faces” 
(atarashī kao). Akia had, of course, responded that he understood. He said that he “knew” 
(wakatteiru) his presence at Sanyūkai had become too much. Moreover, as himself noted, 
Akia had gotten “too deeply involved” (fukairi) in Sanyūkai’s affairs, and was not able to 
assume “distance” (kyori) from them. With wariness, he watched the rise into favorability 
of new characters, like Imai-san, whom he warned Sanyūkai against, and personally 
vowed to keep in place. And one day, when Akia went upstairs to prepare for curry, who 
should be sitting there, ready to offer his services, but Izumi. It had been decided at a Sa-
nyūkai staff meeting that certain work was to be rotated among volunteers. And, sure 
enough, Izumi’s presence was enough to drive Akia away, who increasingly took to dis-
rupting his rhythm of volunteering every day. He might spend several days in a row 
drinking by Mutō-san’s, only to appear at Sanyūkai, where some staff members had start-
ed asking questions, even noting that there might be problems with Akia continuing to 
volunteer, if his appearances were to be so sporadic. He had ceased to be accountable, 
saying in private that it “did not matter” (kankei nai) whether he was at Sanyūkai or not. 
Thus, without putting in a phone call, he would spend a couple days working with the 
guys in the Okinawa-gumi, and then reappear at Sanyūkai to volunteer. In addition, Akia 
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took to noting the instances when he and others had been slighted by Sanyūkai staff or 
their affiliates. It was, in effect, the line separating people coming from outside Sanya – 
be it staff or volunteers – and those from Sanya itself (who sat on the benches outside Sa-
nyūkai), that Akia was tuning into. There had been the time when a volunteer from a 
partner organization to Sanyūkai had refused to give Akia her phone number, saying: 
“Why do I have to give you my phone number?” (nande denwa bangō agenakucha ikenai 
no?). Another time, Akia – who had embraced Christianity during his time at Sanyūkai – 
went to church in Asakusa, only to be given the cold shoulder by members of the Sa-
nyūkai staff, whose congregation it was. He had thus found himself sitting off to the side, 
by himself, during the Sunday sermon. Afterward, he would remark that “this is not 
Christianity” (kirisutokyō jya nai). So too, it had irked him when the Christian caretaker 
at Sanyūsō had commented on the death of an acquaintance: “It’s okay, since he lived as 
he wanted” (iinjyanai, suki ni ikitekitan dakara). Taken aback by this off-hand remark, 
Akia would retort in private that: “You don’t say that. No matter what, you don’t say that” 
(sore wa nai desho. ikura nandatte, sore wa nai desho). Where Akia had hoped to remi-
nisce, he had been rebuffed by “indifference” (mukanshin) to the death of a mutual ac-
quaintance, no less. One day, too, Akia had been drinking by Mutō-san’s, and a Sanyūkai 
staff member walked straight by him without saying a word. When asked the next day 
why he had not said anything, the staff member simply remarked that he did not frequent 
“such places” (sō iu toko). Sure enough, Mutō-san’s place appeared in the NHK news a 
few months later, during lunch, when everyone at Sanyūkai was upstairs eating with the 
TV on, an occasion on which even Akia became slightly embarrassed. Finally, there was 
that earlier occasion when Akia had flipped out at Jean-san, shouting angrily at him in 
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front everybody in the alley, and bursting away. In retrospect, Akia would recount that he 
had been justified in his anger, adding that no one – especially not the staff, which was 
composed of “yes-men” (iesu-man) – could call Jean-san into line like that. “Only I can 
do it” (dekiru no wa ore dake). Thus, Akia would explain that it had not, in fact, been a 
big issue that had triggered his anger. Jean-san had only passed a snide remark at Akia, 
but Akia would not let it go. It would have been okay if it had come from somebody else, 
but when it came from someone in a position of authority, Akia would not just let it pass. 
No doubt, Akia was well aware that the staff and others were regarding himself as having 
issues: the other day Akia had been shouting at Jean-san (innocent), and just now he had 
been spotted drinking at the open-aired corner nomiya (drinkery) on Namidabashi, hiding 
his drink behind his back. At least at Sanyūkai, it was said, Jean-san and others kept a tab 
on how much Akia drank, but now he was drinking by himself. 
On the first occasion of his outburst at Jean-san, Akia stopped going to Sanyūkai 
for a couple weeks, until the staff finally relented, and – albeit without Jean-san – asked 
Akia to come back. When things went awry the second time, however, the staff was not 
as indulgent. One day, Akia was drinking by Mutō-san’s, and lo and behold, Imai was on 
his way back from shopping for Sanyūkai together with Akia’s crush. Just as they turned 
the corner, Akia noticed that his crush had taken hold of Imai’s arm, so as to nudge him 
along. The sight – of the “smallest detail” (ichiban komakai toko), as Akia prided himself 
on noticing – triggered a fit of rage. Putting his drink aside and telling Mito-chan that he 
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would be right back, Akia bolted around the corner, up the Sanyūkai staircase, and, fling-
ing Imai to the floor, started beating him.38 
 Shortly thereafter, having worked at Sanyūkai for three years, Akia stopped going 
altogether. The break came less in the form of a confrontation, than a gradual fizzling out. 
For Sanyūkai never expressed their explicit disapproval of Akia’s conduct – rather, some 
staff members took to simply ignoring Akia when he visited the Sanyūkai alley, not even 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Having learnt the “computer” (pasakon) and “internet” (intānetto), Akia was to read what his love – who 
was witness to the fight – had to say of his conduct, not in person, but on Sanyūkai’s homepage:  
A Relationship of Growing Together (共に成長していく関わり ) 
 
A gentleman who is always smiling, a gentleman who cracks jokes and gives everyone a good time, a gen-
tleman who is there together, and kindly helps out with this and that. There are times when such a gentle-
man suddenly stops showing up, and gets angry at some instant with an incredibly threatening attitude. Or 
rather, a gentleman who has special difficulty communicating. At such times, I think of the life that person 






A heart’s wound that still has not healed, a shadow power that nothing can be done about, that cannot be 
controlled with one’s own power. There are such things for anyone. But I am sometimes startled by the fact 
that that of the gentleman far exceeds our imagination. Being thrown away by someone important, be-
trayed, being made unnecessary,  being insulted … if in the same position, anyone would surely become 






When the gentleman who disappeared comes back, or comes to his senses and takes on things with a seri-
ous mind, or when he opens his heart more than before, there is a big happiness that spreads out. Being glad 
and sad by turns, we are waiting for that day to come again, and believe in it before we know it. Every day, 
we do not know what will happen. Every individual has their unique rhythm and time. That is why every 
day is important. Because every individual gradually becomes an indispensable person, as we are changed 





、段々とかけがえのない人になっていくからです。) (Sanyūkai, “Hibi no Dekigoto,” 2/11/2014) 
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saying hello (which Akia did not do either), and others avoided him (or so Akia thought) 
when they spotted him down the street, only to veer into an alley – and the truth was that 
Akia did not have anything else to do. He could not work with the Okinawa-gumi, as his 
body would not keep up, and the only alternative was to drink. Thus, when Akia showed 
up weeks later on the second floor – albeit having received a green light from Jean-san – 
a staff member told him they had “heard of no such thing” (sō iu koto kītenai). There had 
been no discussion among the staff regarding whether Akia would be allowed to resume 
his volunteering services. With this, he was sent back downstairs.39 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 In A Space on the Side of the Road, Kathleen Stewart evokes a comparable moment between a former 
coal miner and social worker in Appalachia. She writes and cites: 
 
  “ELLIS BAILEY: Strip minin’ 
is the cheap way 
of the coal operator getting’ the coal, 
cuttin’ the whole top of the mountain off, 
pickin’ the coal up, 
and not having to go underground to git it. 
Pickin’ the coal up by a cheap hoe and git rich quick. 
Well what the hillside is left is left barren 
and no place for a prayer to go 
first rain come  
a slide will start 
It will start them rocks, mud, and ever’ tree will all pull ever’thang in front 
of ‘m 
there danger in whole towns to git hit 
whole towns get covered up 
whole roads disappear 
whole rivers dammed up 
there’s no way that I see to stop it. 
it’s a barren land left to work 
for a man to pay taxes. 
They’s all tied up with the coal comp’nies 
the coal comp’ny’s in with the insurance comp’ny 
what the hell you gonna do? 
There’s nothing we can do I don’t guess. 
 
The VISTA worker interrupts him at this point, presumably in an effort to disrupt the coalescence 
of what she must read as the famous “Appalachian fatalism.” Reducing the speech act to a referential and 
instrumental function, she asks him to pull himself out of his talk and come to his senses and act rationally. 
 
Well, the first thing we can do is to talk about it. 
We’re having a meeting down at the church Friday night, 
why don’t you come? 
 439 
 Contrary to the “anger” (ikari) against others in Sanya – which started and ended 
in a fight – the anger against Sanyūkai, Akia said, was “never-ending” (eien). The wound 
revived wounds that would not heal, and the silence to which Sanyūkai consigned Akia 
enclosed him in guilt, questioning – like others who had fallen afoul of Sanyūkai – what 
he had done wrong.40 But back in the Okinawa-gumi, Izukenji-san giggled at Akia’s “ex-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
You can talk to people who have some of the same things happen to their places that you have 
with yours. 
 
To her thinking, general laws of organizing can and should be posited, and it is this mental map, rather than 
the litany of narrated effects, that she would follow in the effort to lead words into action … But Ellis’s 
discourse carries its own epistemology of action embedded in discursive styles in use … in the local dis-
course, the claim that “thangs happen” elicits graphic stories of accidents, tragedies, and bodily illnesses 
that come unexpectedly, could happen to anyone, and are suffered. 
 
Well, I’ve had a broken back all my life 
I got my broke back in the mines down there at … 
 
Again she interrupts with an instrumental idea. 
 
All the more reason you should do somethin’ about it. 
 
Ellis is silenced. The VISTA worker’s speech, aimed as it is at direct referents in a fixed, objective “real 
work” of causes and effects, seeks out the certainty of the last word, while Ellis’s speech remains situated 
and dialogic … The VISTA worker ends the scene with a badgering mode of direct questioning that would 
be unthinkable in the hills except as an address to an outside enemy like the company or the state. 
 
So the coal companies did it to you in the mines and you’re gonna let ‘m do it 
to you in your own home too? 
   ELLIS: [silenced, looking down, embarrased.] 
 
I am reminded of what they call confusions in the hills – conflicts in which things reach an im-
passe and there is not only nothing left to say but the social order itself seems to fall apart; in a confusion 
people will disremember a family member or a church will split apart in schism. Confusions are an embar-
rassing topic: no one likes to talk about them; it is almost as if they are an embarrassment to society itself – 
an unthinkable faux pas. In this case, the VISTA worker’s speech itself might be taken as an embarrass-
ment – an instance of shameless, socially ignorant talk that is the object of political back talk (81 – 83). 
40 Of the loosening of chains and the consignment of relations in the asylum to “Silence,” Foucault writes: 
“Henceforth, more genuinely confined than he could have been in a dungeon and chains, a prisoner of noth-
ing but himself, the sufferer was caught in a relation to himself that was of the order of transgression, and 
in a non-relation to others that was of the order of shame. The others are made innocent, they are no longer 
persecutors; the guilt is shifted inside, showing the madman that he was fascinated by nothing but his own 
presumption; the enemy faces disappear; he no longer feels their presence as observation, but as a denial of 
attention, as observation deflected; the others are now nothing but a limit that ceaselessly recedes as he 
advances. Delivered from his chains, he is now chained, by silence, to transgression and to shame … the 
language of delirium can be answered only by the absence of language, for delirium is not a fragment of 
dialogue with reason, it is not language at all; it refers, in an ultimately silent awareness, only to transgres-
sion. And it is only at this point that a common language becomes possible again, insofar as it will be one 
of acknowledged guilt” (Madness and Civilization, 261 – 262). 
 440 
pulsion” (hamon). It was a giggle that disclosed fondness of Akia’s ways, and though it 
could not heal, it restored Akia to his errant self.41 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 The exhibition of masculinity (through fighting) in Sanya can be juxtaposed to another mode of existence 
described by Ōyama in A Man With No Talents: “During my long career in San’ya, I have tried to reduce to 
the bare minimum the need for resuscitating my wounded ego by making it a practice to shrink it to the 
smallest possible dimensions. This is a defense mechanism I acquired quite naturally out of the realization 
that nothing presents so great a danger to the San’ya day laborer as his attempt to sustain himself on inflat-
ed pride. Yet such a mechanism notwithstanding, I am even now beset by an occasional ego crisis, during 
which I feel the same urge to bolster the pride welling up in me that I suspect must have welled up in the 
breast of my former bunkmate who was forever talking to himself. Still, I could never have expressed that 
urge in the form of violence. Even when I was convinced that fighting was the only answer, the vitality that 
enables one to embark on a violent course never sprang forth in me” (119). 
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“I’m seventy-three, doctor. I’ve done pretty much as I pleased all my life, and I 
don’t expect to be cured at this stage.” 
 The inside of his mouth was black with nicotine, so that it was like peering into a 
small cave. His voice was low and hoarse. 
 “I was a bit wild when I was young, I’m afraid, and now my body refuses to do as 
I say any more.” 






The Okinawa-gumi had been in a steady state of disintegration in summer of 2014, 
two years after I first met them. Akia had found an apartment thirty minutes from Sanya 
by bus and only showed his face a couple times per week, as it suited him. Shokawa-san, 
too, had moved out of his doya and into an apartment even farther away than Akia’s. The 
core members of the Okinawa-gumi were going each their solitary way, retreating behind 
closed doors, and drinking on their own. 
But Ichi-san had rented a dilapidated two-story nomiya (drinkery) off of Iroha ar-
cade, complete with counter and tatami alcove. The money he made from tehai was now 
said to exceed ¥400,000 ($4,000 USD) per month, and with this, he said he was “alright” 
(daijōbu) paying the monthly rent of ¥90,000. Ichi-san’s place had, in effect, become the 
new hang-out spot for a motley crew of new individuals, which included members of the 
old Okinawa-gumi. Ha-chan rented a space on the floor upstairs for ¥10,000 every month, 
as did another man who worked regularly for Ichi-san. A sink outside, with hose attached 
to the faucet, functioned as a shower, and inside, on the ground floor behind the counter, 
were a stove and fridge. The necessities of daily life had been gathered there and so it had 
become common for gatherings to take place at Ichi-san’s place, rather than at Oiwake or 
other neighborhood drinkeries. It diminished costs considerably – especially for Ichi-san, 
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who did not seem to purchase anything – that people could bring their own liquor, stash it 
in the fridge and even cook. Sometimes strangers would stop outside, peek in through the 
sliding doors, and ask if it “was open?” (yattemasu?). Yet, as always, everyone seemed to 
suffer from insufficient funds. Akia, Ichi-san, and Shokawa-san – not to mention others, 
like Te-chan, who had since been diagnosed with cancer (along with Obara-san) and now 
slept in an internet café – still had debts at Oiwake. Nevertheless, Ichi-san gambled every 
night at Oiwake on kyōtei with his new income. But he was said to have changed from his 
old self: “He’s different from the old Ichi-san, no?” (mukashi no Ichi-san to kawattenai?). 
However, it was not only Ichi-san who had changed. Misaaru had stopped answering the 
phone since he had gone “crazy” (kichigai) with pachinko, Akia said; although, Misaaru 
charged that he was keeping his “distance” (kyori) from Akia and others, because all they 
did was drink. Mito-chan had taken to dragging about strangers as if they were his entou-
rage, borrowing money left and right. And Shokawa-san spent weeks away from Sanya at 
a time, prompting Akia to say that he was no longer a “buddy” (nakama).  
Of all these presences and absences, Ichi-san said that “this is really an interesting 
town” (hontō ni omoshiroi machi). The inveterate worker liked the independence of indi-
viduals coming and going, “as they liked” (jibun katte). Yet, despite Ichi-san’s lauding of 
everybody going their own way, the Okinawa-gumi was not what it had been. Something 
had fallen apart. Even people outside the Okinawa-gumi were starting to observe that the 
group had changed. The gaze of a third, social party, in which the group gave itself to be 
recognized – be it by the local police, or general acquaintances of Sanya – had ceased to 
confer self-evident recognition as it once had. The troupe no longer gathered on Sundays 
to drink and gamble. Gatherings at Izukenji-san’s place had become scarce. The group no 
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longer presented a united front of solidarity. “Everyone” (minna), as Akia put it, had 
“split up” (barabara). It was as if somebody was pulling the thread connecting everyone; 
undoing the social fabric. 
Implicit to the market logic of every-man-for-himself, the outcome of such social 
atomization was everywhere evident in Sanya. While its doya enjoyed full occupancy, its 
streets were empty, for the aging denizens of Sanya had retreated into their rooms.1 Thus, 
they constituted “an immense mass” of serialized, now-defunct productive units, between 
whom lateral recognition had been obstructed.2 Almost every day, an ambulance could be 
seen pulling up in front of a doya, carting someone away. One day a man was found dead 
on the street, just down the road from Sanyūkai. Atomization by the objective order of 
the economy heralded social death, and ultimately, solitary death behind closed doors. 
Social connectivity had become limited to dependence – as welfare-recipients – on the 
state; the agent in whose gaze the Sanya man gave himself to be recognized in need. Of 
course, the Okinawa-gumi sought recognition by their own group, replete with reference 
to vanishing virtues of the criminal underworld. Relations of seniority were frequently 
expressed with terms like “older brother” (aniki) or “underling” (shatei); transposing ya-
kuza terminology onto their own relations. The virtues of knowing “shame” (haji), “in-
debtedness” (on), and giri-ninjō – loosely translated as “duty,” “conscience,” “human 
sympathy,” and “justice” – were expounded. Akia carried about a traditional Japanese 
“fan” (sensu) in the summer, as Riku-san wore geta. And Izukenji-san was described as a 
                                                
1 Fowler writes in San’ya Blues: “Whether resolutely or resignedly, the men leave something behind by 
coming here: jobs, families, creditors, prison records, gangster connections, failed businesses – the list is 
perhaps nearly as long as the combined roster of the area’s two hundred lodging houses. They may indeed 
gain anonymity and freedom of movement, but the price they pay for these is very dear: a loss of contact 
with the outside world. It is a price that newcomers pay perhaps more willingly than veterans of the yoseba; 
the latter know the tally of loneliness adds up over the years with compound interest” (16). 
2 Marx, “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte,” pg. 117. 
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“man of legend” (densetsu no otoko), as if the term made no reference to the 1983 yakuza 
movie.3 
Late one night, Ichi-san told me – with a senior hostess nodding solemnly along –
it was “impossible” (muri) for me to “understand” (wakaru) the intricacies and pressures 
of being Japanese thus. Perhaps he was also nervous that I get everything wrong, because 
he told me to send my writing to him, and to “ask” (kiite) him any questions I had. Yet, in 
so doing, he acknowledged there was something at stake in my writing on Sanya and my 
time with the guys. His anxiety – no one, he said, had penetrated as far into their world as 
I had – bespoke the constitutive nature of a gaze in which traditional Japanese values was 
recognized, and the imperative of claiming exclusive knowledge thereof. It was in such a 
gaze, albeit from within the confines of Sanya – as it was Mito-chan’s wont, for instance, 
to brag that the cops kept track of the Okinawa-gumi – that the disintegration of the group 
had caused it to lose social currency.4 In turn, (former) members of the group were shorn 
of the power that had hitherto accompanied their affiliation. Under Ichi-san’s leadership, 
even work had ceased to operate as a unifying force.  
After laying Mito-chan off and taking over, Ichi-san, who had always disliked the 
inbred character of the Okinawa-gumi, had successfully dispersed its core work members. 
He had laid off a number of the regular workers – who Mito-chan had cherished – stating 
that he had “gotten tired of” (tsukareta) people who “cannot see things through” (kejime 
                                                
3 The 1983 gangster movie, Ryūji, refers to its main character as “a man of legend” (densetsu no otoko). As 
much as Japanese literature, films, TV shows, and karaoke, the myth of the yakuza, however, is constituted 
in the gaze of the West, and specifically, in that of the USA. See, for instance, Sydney Pollack’s cult classic 
1984 movie, The Yakuza, Kaplan and Dubro’s Yakuza: Japan’s Criminal Underworld, and more recently, 
Jake Adelstein’s Tokyo Vice: An American Reporter on the Police Beat in Japan (New York: Pantheon 
Books, 2009). 
4 See Hoon Song’s Pigeon Trouble: Bestiary Politics in a Deindustrialized America (Philadelphia: Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania Press, 2010), pg. 1 – 18, for a meditation on the relation of researcher to her or his so-
called object. 
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ga nai). For all their complaints, stipulations on where and when they would work, and – 
worst of all – failure to show for work when they had promised – Ichi-san would say flat-
out that he “doesn’t need them!” (iranai!). In this way, the 28-year-old Kami-kun had to 
find alternative sources of work, in spite of being the most versatile and energetic worker. 
After a verbal fight, Ichi-san had even vowed never to send Misaaru (his cousin) to work, 
prompting Izukenji-san to mediate and tell them all to “get along” (naka yoku shinasai). 
Izukenji-san had himself decided to seek work as a tobi through an other acquaintance, 
though Ichi-san still called Nē-san with work, and Izukenji-san sometimes went. Over 
time, the number of workers Ichi-san could count on had dwindled and, while work still 
trickled in, the quota of workers Chishima requested had also diminished. In mid-summer, 
Ichi-san had difficulty filling a quota of just five. He himself would fail to show for work, 
“purposely leaving a hole” (waza to ana o akete), as he said. But the next day – and this 
was supposedly his “strong point” (tokui ten) – he would “arrange things perfectly” (bac-
chiri kimeru), giving no one an excuse to complain. 
Yet another sign that all was not well in the Okinawa-gumi lay in the near-failure 
of the monthly mujin no kō (mutual financing organization) gatherings.5 The mujin con-
sisted of a once-per-month gathering – of ideally twelve members, so that the meetings 
could continue the duration of one year – in which members contributed ¥10,000 ($100 
USD) per month towards a lump sum that one designated individual took home each time. 
                                                
5 The practice of the mujin no kō or tanomoshikō (mutual financing organization) resembled gambling inso-
far as individuals appeared to make a surplus from their social bonds with others. It was a gamble in which 
individuals staked their money on the reliability of the others. Robert E. Cole writes of the mutual financing 
association in Japanese Blue Collar: The Changing Tradition (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1971), pg. 139. Prescott B. Wintersteen, Jr., writes of its premodern form in “The Early Muromachi Bakufu 
in Kyoto,” in Medieval Japan: Essays in Institutional History, ed. John W. Hall and Jeffrey P. Mass (Stan-
ford: Stanford University Press, 1974), pg. 202. Notably, this institution is not specific to Japan. Evelyn S. 
Rawski writes of the mutual financing association in China, in “Popular Culture in China,” in Tradition and 
Creativity: Essays on East Asian Civilization, ed. Ching-i Tu, (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1987), 
pg. 51 – 51. 
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Ideally, one person pocketed ¥120,000 every meeting. Everyone used their mujin income 
in expenditures that their regular income did not permit. Akia, Ichi-san, and Shokawa-san 
would use their money to once-and-for-all pay their debt to Oiwake. Misaaru and Mito-
chan would go to Okinawa. At the source of such largesse, the mujin posited the group. 
As Izukenji-san and Nē-san transformed the equivalent money-form into the hospitality 
of their home, the mujin produced the illusion of surplus production in the absence of la-
bor. It was the reliability and unity of the group – of one’s “buddies” (nakama) – that en-
sured excess. In this way, the mujin functioned as both an affirmation and test of group 
solidarity. On the one hand, the mujin took the form of a celebration. Everybody gathered 
to drink and eat at a certain venue – a reserved back room of a sushi restaurant, for in-
stance – and a speech and toasts were given in the course of the evening. On the other 
hand, the mujin never worked the way they had been planned. The first time the Okina-
wa-gumi undertook the mujin, the gatherings only lasted a month. After dining and win-
ing at Hikari-sushi, Misaaru used the money to fly to Okinawa. Yet, in the heyday of the 
Okinawa-gumi and Matsuda-group, this mujin had rapidly expanded to include characters 
like Yamagishi-san and Matsuda-san, with whom others – Misaaru, for one – did not 
wish to take part. It was said that Yamagishi-san and Matsuda-san were bound to mess 
things up. Frustrated as organizer of the mujin, Mito-chan called an end to it upon hearing 
the complaints, exclaiming that Misaaru and others “should have said so to begin with” 
(saisho kara ie). 
Similar conflicts arose two years later when members of the Okinawa-gumi began 
a mujin again. Misaaru insisted on doing it at a proper venue – i.e. at Hikari-sushi, where 
everyone could meet and drink – while others claimed this cost too much money (indeed, 
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dinner for one cost ¥3,000), and that it would be best just to meet informally and hand the 
money over. However, Misaaru objected to this set-up and refused to take part. Thus, the 
mujin was “messed up” (okashī) from the get-go. The solidarity of the members had been 
compromised to begin with, and to make matters worse, by someone who, it was rumored, 
had not returned the cash he had received two years earlier. Moreover, whereas two years 
earlier, it had been the sheer excess of participants that had caused failure, the 2014 mujin 
was plagued by a shortage of members. Having difficulty coming up with ¥10,000, some 
individuals dropped out along the way. As Shokawa-san put it, such individuals were not 
“buddies” (nakama), for it should have been altogether possible to come up with ¥10,000. 
Realizing the mujin was “in trouble” (yabai), Nē-san even asked to take her turn as soon 
as possible, before others jumped boat. The unreliability of other participants jeopardized 
investments that everyone had already made, because, as the year progressed, everyone’s 
returns were diminishing. 
The mujin constituted a test of group solidarity that, in its inevitable shortcomings, 
posited an ideal, and yet – in order to take on a modicum of success – it had to signify the 
group as the source of largesse. On a purely formal level, the ritual mujin formalized the 
tacit, contractual relationships that sustained the viability of the working group. Everyone 
had to be on board for it to succeed. As an extension of this logic, the ritual mujin pushed 
the necessity of solidarity one step further, by replacing labor with the mutual generosity 
of its members. But whereas Mito-chan had been forgiving, Ichi-san’s intransigence with 
work matters had caused working members to dwindle to five. Nor were core members of 
the Okinawa-gumi, like Moto-san or Nori-san, participating, and Misaaru had effectively 
cursed the mujin. To boot, two participants had already dropped out, reducing the number 
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of participants to eight. As if gambling, it was said that those who remained were “certain” 
(tashika) to stick it out. However, to avert any other contingencies, it was decided that the 
money be collected at the beginning of every month, when everyone had come into funds. 
Moreover, there was to be no celebration per se, as the cash was dropped off at Ichi-san’s 
to be handed on. In effect, the mujin had devolved into a pecuniary function from which 
its qualitative, social aspect had been stripped. Participants dropped off or picked up their 
cash, without meeting face to face. 
 In the spirit of this fractured mujin, petty disagreements divided former members 
of the Okinawa-gumi from each other. Akia held a grudge against Shokawa-san because, 
when Akia had been hospitalized and asked to write an emergency phone number, he had 
put down Shokawa-san’s. On learning of this, however, Shokawa-san had given Akia a 
verbal thrashing, saying that Akia should have discussed the matter with him beforehand. 
If they had been in the yakuza together, Akia recounted, Shokawa-san’s response would 
have been quite unforgivable, for the two of them had done time in the joint together, and 
Akia had come to Shokawa-san’s rescue. Yet – as if to throw water on the fire – the fact 
was that they were not in the yakuza. Referencing such tropes was moot. If Shokawa-san 
was afraid of shouldering a funeral bill, nothing could be done. In fact, money was get-
ting between everyone. Misaaru was repeatedly criticized for failing to return the money 
from the last mujin. Mito-chan had taken to borrowing left and right. And, be it on mah-
jong or hanafuda, gambling was now taking place in which individuals would “take 
money from each other” (kane no toriai): “among friends” (nakama no aida). If some-




It was only in Izukenji-san and Nē-san’s home that the equivalent money-form 
was distilled into hospitality for “everyone” (minna). At Ichi-san’s drinkery, on the other 
hand, everyone brought their own goods. Participation was conditional on the observance 
of a certain, unspoken contract. If this contract was broken, individuals were “out” (autto). 
But in Izukenji-san and Nē-san’s home, such ousted individuals were received, almost no 
matter what they had done. And there were many who fell out of favor with the group. As 
Akia put it, the excessive life-style of Sanya was such that, “once you tasted it” (ikkai 
ajimi shitara) – as if it were a drug – it was exceedingly difficult to give it up. So too, life 
in Sanya invariably caused individuals to stumble in their relations with others and to ruin 
their bodies. 
As Sanya itself had once been a booming laborer’s town, it was possible, in Sanya, 
to witness the rapid rise and fall of individuals. This bust, or falling into general disrepute 
of certain persons was not an inherent result of the excessive, Sanya life-style, but rather, 
of a propensity towards egotism – and excess – that caused the individual to renege on his 
relations and obligations to others. Misaaru, for instance, had fallen into disfavor because 
he was too fastidious in his demands and criticized excessively. In short, he was “a pain” 
(wagamama). The insistent ways of the former businessman and company boss did “not 
agree with” (awanai) Sanya, and much as Misaaru complained with good intentions, his 
voice assumed a righteous tone that did not sit well with Ichi-san, or the rest of the troupe. 
As for Akia, he seemed to be in and out of the hospital incessantly for this or that ailment 
– carried off in an ambulance twice or thrice per year, this time because he had fainted in 
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front of Mutō-san’s, another since he had fractured a spinal disc, and was immobile in his 
room – but his self-destructive life-style never seemed to cause disrepute. 
 Nevertheless, taken to excess, the combination of egotism with money and liquor 
constituted a deadly concoction. If only in failing to show for work because of a previous 
night of drinking, liquor threatened to undo reputations of reliability. Once or twice might 
be all right – everyone did it – but when missing work became consistent, the reputation 
of the person plummeted. At one point, Ha-chan had fallen into disfavor thus. Complain-
ing left and right about the quality of work Matsuda-san sent his way, he failed repeatedly 
to go to work. Rumor of Ha-chan’s inconstancy spread like a virus and he quickly be-
came a person to be shunned. When the Okinawa-gumi learned that, to top matters, Ha-
chan also did shabu (amphetamines), it was the nail in the coffin. Like Te-chan, who 
never returned money, it was best to “avoid” (sakeru) Ha-chan. Only to compound the 
problem, Ha-chan proceeded to faint in his room – ostensibly, because the heater had 
been left on – and was carried off in an ambulance. But Ha-chan eventually made up with 
Matsuda-san. After a final spat in a public drinkery, Ha-chan took off his glasses, raising 
his head as Matsuda-san stood up and slapped him smack across the face. With this, the 
two were said to have “made up” (nakanaori). And one year later, Ha-chan was living 
with Ichi-san – who had perhaps been his most severe critic – and it was now Misaaru’s 
turn to be on the outside. Of course, less than a year after Ha-chan’s recovery, Matsuda-
san himself was on the run from the mob. Similarly, Ichi-san was showing signs of wan-
ing in his job as tehaishi, one year after the takeover. In spite of the money, the role of 
organizing and holding workers accountable had grown tiresome for Ichi-san, the invet-
erate worker. He spoke of quitting. Truth was that – like Mito-chan before him – Ichi-san 
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had ceased going to work and was living (or drinking) solely off his income as tehaishi. 
Misaaru criticized Ichi-san for this, as he had Mito-chan, insisting that no one would “fol-
low” (tsuiteiku) Ichi-san the way he was carrying on. Drinking too much for work, Ichi-
san risked holding others accountable to standards that he himself would not observe. 
Meanwhile, Mito-chan was waiting in the wings, wondering when tehai for Chishima 
would return to him. If this happened – which was unlikely, because Mito-chan himself 
was in a bad state drinking more than ever – the subcontractors would again be united 
under a single tehaishi, for Mito-chan had kept the company connections, like Shinkō or 
Ōmaki, that he had made on his own. Indeed, it had been when Mito-chan – so given to 
expanding his domain, as that of the Okinawa-gumi – was deposed as tehaishi, that the 
powerful, unified image of the group had begun to crack. Without an excess of work, 
there could be no generosity among members. 
Things unravelled slowly, but definitively for Mito-chan while he was tehaishi. It 
started with him ceasing to go to work. At first, he had worked while doing the tehai, yet 
as demands intensified, this became impossible. He dedicated himself solely to doing the 
tehai – a daunting task, especially in the first year, when it was unclear to him whether he 
could do it – but made a rule of waking in the mornings to see everyone off at the station. 
After the first year, however, Mito-chan stopped getting up in the mornings, unless it was 
absolutely necessary. His day started at three or four in the afternoon, with a mizuwari at 
Mutō-san’s. And as time progressed, Mito-chan gradually acquired a negative reputation. 
Misaaru, as his cousin, cautioned Mito-chan that he was “drinking too much” (nomisugi). 
Mito-chan never once made an effort to go to work, even when his presence would have 
completed the quota. No doubt, Mito-chan was well aware that his deteriorating physical 
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condition would have made a fool of him at work. Yet, the effort would surely have been 
recognized, since it increasingly seemed like Mito-chan was making others work for him. 
By the time Mito-chan started his tehai, he was now already drunk, and undeniably so by 
the time workers trickled back to Oiwake or Mutō-san’s. Worst of all, workers peripheral 
to the Okinawa-gumi were complaining of Mito-chan’s conduct. They would explain that, 
having been sent consecutive days to construction sites more than an hour and half away, 
they had asked Mito-chan where work would be the following day, expressly stating that 
they did not wish to go far. Their “livelihood” (seikatsu) hinged on time to rest after work, 
and on the reduction of transportation costs. Yet, Mito-chan only responded that it would 
be “okay” (daijōbu), and to be at the station at 6:00 AM. When they arrived at the station 
next morning, their fears were confirmed, for Mito-chan had ignored their request. In this 
manner, Mito-chan’s attitude became impudent – “just go to work!” (shigoto ike!) – as he 
expected workers to work, no questions asked. Mito-chan had grown “arrogant” (hana ga 
takai), and worse. Witnessing the turn of events, the no-nonsense Riku-san had altogether 
stopped working for Mito-chan. Even Izukenji-san expressed consternation over Mito-
chan’s conduct unbecoming of a “boss” (oyabun) of 25 workers, showing up for the “new 
year party” (shinnenkai) with a hickie on his neck, and “graffiti” (rakugaki) – by Yui, his 
then girlfriend – on his forehead. “It doesn’t look good” (kakko ga tsukanai), Shokawa-
san said, turning to Ichi-san to ask why he did not act: “it’s your younger brother, right?” 
(otōto desho?). But matters were worse than outward appearances led one to suspect, for 
Mito-chan was failing to pay workers. It had happened repeatedly that, on exiting Oiwake 
with an envelope, workers had been cut short by a couple thousand yen. Every day, Mito-
chan was slipping himself some more drinking money from less influential workers. And 
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Mito-chan had become a terrible spendthrift, bandying about money left and right. Cash 
had become the sign of his power. 
Mito-chan’s denouement came one day when everybody, already back from work, 
had been calling him. Mito-chan was not picking up. Nor had he picked up when Obara-
san, Chishima’s middleman, had called him to convey the quota for the next day. Instead, 
Ichi-san had received a call from Obara-san, who could not get in touch with Mito-chan. 
It was swiftly decided that, though Mito-chan had the phone numbers, the tehai would be 
completed without him. Ichi-san took over and finished in a flurry, calling for Chishima, 
and for Shinkō and Ōmaki, the two other companies for who Mito-chan recruited. Half an 
hour after the tehai had been settled, Mito-chan burst through the doors of Oiwake, with a 
face as white as a sheet. Discomfited by comments – “your face is white, are you okay?” 
(kao iro shiroi zo, daijōbu?) – it took him a moment to realize the tehai had already been 
concluded. Within a week of this occurence, Ichi-san had spoken to Obara-san, and fired 
Mito-chan. 
Fallen from his high-horse and shunned by the majority of the group, this was not 
yet Mito-chan’s lowest point. He still did his tehai for Shinkō and Ōmaki, although this 
in itself was insufficient to cover his expenses, and hung out with – at the time, the equal-
ly unpopular – Ha-chan. Realizing he had an alcohol problem, Mito-chan had started go-
ing for walks in the early afternoons. Thus, he could be seen walking, solitary, along Su-
mida river and back by Tamahime park. 
One day, Mito-chan was discovered passed out on the street: 
The first thing Akia said was that Mito-chan had been taken to the hospital in an 
ambulance. Apparently, he had gone to Sanyūkai by himself in the morning, but 
had been turned back because there was no doctor there that morning. Abe-san 
and Hagiwara-san later found Mito-chan on the street by Mutō-san’s place, and 
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called an ambulance. Ichi-san had also called Akia to ask whether Sanyūkai 
could not do something. At the time, it still was not clear what had happened to 
Mito-chan at the hospital, but I do distinctly remember Akia saying: “this is how 
people from Okinawa die” (kōyatte okinawa no hito ga shindeikuno). 
 
After lunch, Akia and I headed out to Iroha because Ichi-san said he’d be there. 
Ichi-san himself was playing “oichokabu” on the cardboard by the entrance to 
Iroha arcade. Inside Oiwake, Shokawa-san was drunk and Hagiwara-san was 
talking about the morning. Ichi-san was outside … I had to head off to an inter-
view, but before I went off, I spoke to Ichi-san. At first, when I said I’d go to see 
Mito-chan, he said it’d be “better not to go” (ikanai hō ga ī), but when I insisted 
that this had to be the chance to have Mito-chan hospitalized and well, he put his 
hands together and said “onegaishimasu,” and if possible, to have Mito-chan 
hospitalized for a month or two. He did also say that, “when this kind of thing 
happens, I get worried too” (kō iu koto ga aru to, ore mo shimpai suru kara). 
 
When I got back from the interview, and in spite of the fact that Abe-san and Hag-
iwara-san had gone to the hospital – ostensibly to ensure Mito-chan was hospital-
ized; although, Mito-chan was turned away and had to walk home from the hospi-
tal by himself – … Mito-chan had gotten back and was upstairs on the second 
floor of Mutō-san’s. Everyone was downstairs drinking out front – quite a crowd, 
because it was one of the first sunny days of the year: Ichi-san, Shokawa-san, 
Noribō, Noribō’s friend/kōhai Nao-san, and the list just continues. The first thing 
Ichi-san said to me when I got there was to go upstairs and talk to Mito-chan. 
Well, as usual, when Ichi-san says “talk,” he says to go and “give him a real talk-
ing to” (gan gan itte). 
 
When I got upstairs, Mito-chan was lying there sweating and shaking all over. He 
even had trouble talking, with his lips shaking. He was half-awake, half-asleep … 
I tried to convince him that we should call an ambulance again, but Mito-chan 
just kept saying that he was tired and wanted to sleep. People were coming in and 
out of the room … Moto-san and others. Downstairs, outside, it was chaos with 
the guys drinking. Hagiwara-san, indecisive and full of himself as usual, saying 
that they were thinking of various schemes to take care of Mito-chan. 
 
I went to Sanyūkai – Jean-san giving me a weird look like: “What the hell are you 
doing here?” – to ask if they’d see Mito-chan the next morning. I explained the 
situation. Jean-san said that the only way Mito-chan could get hospitalized would 
be if he were “unconscious” (ishiki fumei). He also said that they could see Mito-
chan in the morning, but that they would not call an ambulance.6 
 
I went back to Mutō-san’s. Ichi-san was actually quite emotional, turning away 
from everyone and crying. He’d say “thank you, thank you” (arigatō), and shak-
ing our/my hands. Shifting in and out of crying, turning away, his face puffed up 
                                                
6 Perhaps on account of my friendship with Akia, of which Akia said that Jean-san was jealous, the head of 
NPO had taken to giving me the cold shoulder, and particularly so after I stopped volunteering. 
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and red. Then, he’d turn back and drink … at one point, this new nerdy looking 
guy with glasses started talking shit to Hagiwara, who was sitting right across 
from Ichi-san. (There must have been around fifteen people sitting outside at this 
point). The guy with glasses shouted: “You, you’ve been arrogant from way back” 
(omae, mukashi kara erasō ni). Then Ichi-san stepped in between saying not to 
address Hagiwara-san as “‘you’, don’t say ‘you’!” (omae, omae wa nai daro!).7 
Since the guy wouldn’t back down, Ichi-san said “fine, let’s take it around the 
corner.” Ichi-san then got up, took practicing swings at people and moved around 
like he was in a boxing ring. Laughing and saying: “yō-shi,” “it’s been a while 
since I really fought.” I remarked that Ichi-san always diffuses situations by chal-
lenging to a fight and Ichi-san responded, laughingly saying that “it’s because I 
beat the hell out of them” (boko boko ni suru kara). Sure enough, Ichi-san went 
around the corner to wait for the guy … and while he was there, the younger guy 
changed his mind and said he was just going to go over and “shake Ichi-san’s 
hand” (akushu). All of a sudden, he was docile; like clay in Ichi-san’s hands. And 
Ichi-san started to introduce him to everyone. The younger man bowed his head 
to us all and clicked glasses. 
 
While this whole show was going down, Misaaru arrived. We’d been trying to get 
in touch with Misaaru all day, but he’d forgotten his cell phone at Hagiwara-
san’s place the night before. I told him what had happened – with him saying “no 
way” (uso) – and we headed upstairs. Hajime-san was there with Abe-san in the 
room adjoining Mito-chan’s. It turned out that Shirahige hospital, where Mito-
chan was sent that morning, was the worst. (In fact, Akia had said it’s the hospital 
where you are a living “human experiment” (jintai jikken), and “I told you so” 
(ittta desho) when Mito-chan had been turned away in the morning). Hajime-san 
was actually quite knowledgeable about things, saying that from his experience 
it’d be best if Mito-chan drank weak mizuwari throughout the night, rather than 
stop/cut liquor completely. While he spoke, Misaaru and I decided that we should 
take Mito-chan to the hospital right away. We called an ambulance, and told Mi-
to-chan to keep his eyes closed as if he were unconscious. Mito-chan told us that 
he wouldn’t be able to “act” (engi). When the ambulance folks came upstairs, 
Shokawa-san was just getting in the way, drunk on the second floor, as if he’d just 
come upstairs to have a look. Misaaru got pissed at him. In fact, there were so 
many people, especially downstairs, hanging around and approaching me, 
Misaaru, and Mito-chan. As for us, we were trying to clear space for Mito-chan 
and to get rid of the “smell of alcohol” (sake no nioi). It was like everyone was 
approaching us. Or me. We’d decided in a matter-of-fact way that it would be 
Misaaru and me who would take Mito-chan to the hospital. So Akia was like 
“onegai” to me, and Noribō came up repeatedly, bowing, worried, and saying 
“Mito-chan yoroshiku onegaishimasu.” I felt pressure, with others, too, be-
queathing Mito-chan into my hands. Even Riku-san, sitting solitary at a short dis-
tance, waved me over to say it was okay that Misaaru – Misato-san – was going 
with me to the hospital, but that if Ichi-san came back in time, to go with Ichi-san 
instead. I.e. to go with the real brother instead; it somehow being implicit that I 
                                                
7 Translated as “you,” omae can be a particularly condescending form of address, as it was in this case. 
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go instead of Misaaru. Notably, Ichi-san disappeared somewhere the moment Mi-
to-chan was being carried downstairs. I only saw him when Misaaru and I – dis-
cussing how to keep it a secret that Mito-chan had been taken to hospital in the 
morning, and how to avoid Shirahige hospital – were waiting for the ambulance 
staff to get in touch with a hospital, while checking Mito-chan’s vital signs. Riku-
san almost forcibly dragged Ichi-san to the ambulance, where Ichi-san pulled 
away. Two policemen had come over at this time to check on what was going on, 
taking a peek in the ambulance to see who was there. When they’d crossed the 
street, on the way back to the mammoth, I saw Ichi-san running across the street 
and accosting the policemen from across the rails, as if shouting at them. 
 
Misaaru and I tried to convince the ambulance staff not to take us to Shirahige 
hospital, but because Mito-chan was unconscious – i.e. not opening his eyes – 
they were scared it could have been something with his brain, and Shirahige was 
the only place that could treat that. We decided that there was nothing to do about 
it, and headed back to the hospital where Mito-chan had been turned away in the 
morning. It was around 5 PM at this time. It would take us another 6 hours to get 
Mito-chan hospitalized. 
 
We arrived at Shirahige hospital and Mito-chan was taken through the regular 
tests. We were shut out of the room Mito-chan was in. (Later, when we went to see 
Mito-chan at the mental hospital, he told us he’d been lying there visibly with 
pain in his chest, breathing real hard, and the nurses had acted like they “hadn’t 
noticed” (miteminu furi); how it scared him). At one point, though, I saw him 
through the open door and I went inside. Mito-chan was there sweating – pretty 
much abandoned by the nurses and doctor, who were elsewhere – with pain in his 
chest. He smelled, because he hadn’t washed. Getting the chills. Breaking out in 
sweat. He was in a panic, though, saying to me: “Not here. Here is impossible” 
(koko wa muri, muri). Also putting his fingers together to say that he’d been told 
to pay ¥60,000, to get the money now. He wanted to go home and I got worried. I 
asked the nurse if someone had told him to pay, and she immediately said no. I 
didn’t realize at the time how scared Mito-chan had gotten by the way they ig-
nored him. I also did not know that Mito-chan was hallucinating at the time. He 
had, in fact, been hallucinating from the beginning of this year. On the way to the 
hospital, Misaaru had held Mito-chan’s hand, and Mito-chan had refused to let 
go. (In the hospital itself, the doctor recorded that Mito-chan had been seeing 
things and saying that “there’s a cockroach on the wall” when there was none). 
 
Misaaru came inside, too, and told Mito-chan not to worry about ridiculous 
things like money. The doctor came over. I flipped out and said it was ridiculous 
that someone in this state would be turned out. The doctor got angry at me, in 
turn, saying there was no right for me to speak to him like that (kō iwareru sujiai 
ga nai). He said he’d “stop” (chūdan) the examination of Mito-chan if I didn’t 
leave the room. (Of course, by this time, it had leaked that Mito-chan had been at 
the hospital in the morning. “Did you know he was here this morning?”, the 
nurse said, to which Misaaru and I said “no, we didn’t,” concocting a story, 
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pushing responsibility onto the establishment for having turned away Mito-chan 
in the first place). At least, this is what I presume Misaaru continued to do, be-
cause I got kicked out of the room. For a short while, I could hear Misaaru talk-
ing to the doctor inside. When Misaaru came back, he told me that it had been de-
cided that the doctor/ambulance staff contact a “mental hospital” (seishin byōin) 
because Shirahige hospital was not able to deal with the issues that Mito-chan 
was dealing with, i.e. the hallucinations and coming off alcohol. It took us, at 
least, an other two hours before the next hospital was decided: the crazy long 
wait, of which the ambulance staff had warned us, before we actually headed out 
with Mito-chan in the back. Crazy long wait. When they finally did find a hospital, 
the ambulance staff came back to us and suggested that, perhaps – with Mito-
chan himself hinting that he wanted to go home – it would be better to take Mito-
chan home, watch over him for the night, and go to a mental clinic. My interpre-
tation of the ambulance staff saying this was that the mental hospital itself had 
suggested this. Indeed, the ambulance staff themselves said that this was the case. 
But Misaaru started to flip out, saying: “it’s all about money!!” (yō suru ni, kore 
dake desho!!) – holding his thumb to forefinger to signify money. Before that, the 
ambulance staff had asked him repeatedly if Mito-chan had his insurance card. 
Misaaru had also been on the phone with the mental hospital and had been asked 
– as the cousin – to bring ¥100,000 that very evening. Another big issue was 
whether or not the older brother could come along. 
 
Finally, it was decided that we go. Much to Misaaru’s consternation, however, it 
was not a “precondition” (zentei) that Mito-chan be hospitalized at the other end. 
But they had agreed to at least see Mito-chan. So Misaaru headed back to Sanya, 
to get Mito-chan’s insurance card and to get Ichi-san who had agreed to come 
(but was passed out, sleeping in Oiwake when Misaaru got there). They drove 
from Sanya to the mental hospital in Nishi-Arai. I stayed with Mito-chan in the 
ambulance. 
 
After the ride to the mental hospital in Nishi-Arai, we finally arrived. We entered 
the hospital through the back entrance … everything was dark and it took a while 
before the staff on the inside opened the door. It was an intimidating building, 
from the inside too, with imposing walls and locks on every door. You definitely 
got the feel that you were locked in, and couldn’t get out unless someone brought 
a key along. We were introduced into a small room and I was told that I could sit 
next to Mito-chan. I went about assuring the nurse on duty that we were bringing 
along the insurance card, and that the older brother was also coming. 
 
The doctor finally came. Young man, in his mid-thirties. I immediately got a bad 
vibe/feeling from this person … . He wasn’t meeting eyes with either Mito-chan or 
myself. Looking down and to the side, as if to say we weren’t even worthy of his 
attention – that he was condescending to speak to us: a pain – he asked standard 
questions like when the last time Mito-chan had had any alcohol. I think he asked 
questions for about three minutes max. He was real hesitant about writing, as 
well – half-assed – scribbling and crossing his letters out, looking down at the 
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paper as if it was a distraction from us, something to keep from looking at us. He 
kept doing this even after I shouted/criticized him … because after 3 minutes of 
asking questions and muttering condescendingly to me – “what, you’re just a 
friend” (chie, yūjin ka) – he suggested that we go home with medication. I flipped 
out, saying that he’d only spoken to Mito-chan for three minutes when we’d spent 
twelve hours arriving – there was a wince in the room when I said this, from the 
nurse and the ambulance staff member – and to please wait until the older brother 
came. The doctor said he could wait ten minutes. It was ridiculous. I said it was 
“ridiculous” (rifujin) the doctor would make a decision based on three minutes. 
That he was “responsible” (sekininsha) for Mito-chan – who, one in a million, 
could die if he didn’t receive care from going off the liquor – and that it was “ri-
diculous” to say that they would send Mito-chan home with medication “so this 
would not happen” (sore ga okoranai yō ni). I.e. so he would not die from with-
drawal. There was an other wince from the people in the room. (In fact, Mito-
chan’s intravenous therapy was changed three times that night).8  
 
I have to say, though, that I’ve never seen Mito-chan as docile as he was that 
night. The doctor also had the audacity to say early on that even if Mito-chan was 
hospitalized, he didn’t know if Mito-chan would stop drinking anyway (so what 
was the point of hospitalization?). I asked the doctor whether it wasn’t proper to 
ask – normal, as a psychologist – about Mito-chan’s family situation, etc, and he 
returned arrogantly, addressing me with “anata,” and insisting that I was asking 
this and that to no purpose. I responded by saying that I was just asking and that, 
surely, they would inquire about such family matters henceforth, and: “yoroshiku 
onegaishimasu.” For an instant, the doctor seemed ashamed, to be conscious of 
himself … and while we waited, a ridiculous situation ensued in which there was 
just silence, the doctor scribbling and crossing out to avoid dialogue … when he 
could have used the fifteen minutes we waited for Ichi-san to arrive to talk to Mi-
to-chan. So I asked Mito-chan questions instead, and whether he himself wanted 
to say something. He said “not particularly” (betsu ni nai). As for the doctor, he 
said he already knew all that stuff, i.e. because he had read the report from the 
other hospital. He also asked Mito-chan “himself” (honnin) what he wanted and 
Mito-chan said he “wanted to be hospitalized” (nyūin shitai desu). 
 
                                                
8 In A Man With No Talents, Ōyama Shirō writes of a similar encounter with doctors: 
“He didn’t stop writing in his file even when I sat in the chair right in front of him. I waited for the 
exam to begin, but he didn’t stop writing even then, so finally, unable to bear the silence, I launched into a 
catalog of my symptoms. The doctor still didn’t lay eyes on me, however; he simply continued scribbling in 
his file. He seemed to realize that I’d been talking only when I had finished, at which point he whispered 
something to the nurse standing next to him. She escorted me out of the room to an area where I could take 
my blood pressure recorded and produce a urine sample … Later, when she finally called me back into the 
room, there he was, with his nose still in a file. At this point the form he was filling out seemed to be on my 
behalf; he handed the completed form to the nurse. “That’s all now; we’ll get you your medicine,” she said, 
and ushered me out of the room. During the entire exam, the doctor did not look at me or speak to me even 
once. 
I paid this doctor more than ten visits altogether, with virtually the same scenario playing itself out 
every time” (102). 
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Finally, the doctor seemed to break, noting that Mito-chan’s liver readings were 
quite high, and that it might be an idea to have him stay one night, have the family 
come in next morning, and have the doctor the next day make the decision. I felt 
relief at this, because it meant it’d be okay if Ichi-san didn’t show up in time. I 
kept calling Misaaru and Ichi-san, telling them to come right away, rather than 
buy stuff at the convenience store. They finally arrived, Ichi-san smelling of liquor 
heavily, going straight to the table beside Mito-chan – telling me to shut up be-
cause he wanted to hear what the doctor had to say! – and answering questions. 
The main question being whether there were other siblings, family members. And 
finally the verdict: given that Mito-chan’s been drinking a little – “for three 
years!,” I interjected, only to be shut up by Ichi-san! – the plan was to have Mito-
chan hospitalized a week (the amount of time it would take for the symptoms to go 
away). 
 
Hard as it was for him, Ichi-san massaged Mito-chan’s shoulders and sent him off. 
 
After they took Mito-chan away, Ichi-san started to flirt with the two nurses in the 
room. One was real big … but she smiled and said “ugh, it really stinks of liquor” 
(sake kusai) when Ichi-san asked “whoa, how do you get so big?!” and jokingly 
butted stomachs with her. And to the other petite nurse, Ichi-san said – while she 
smiled and laughed – “what are you doing here with the body of an elementary 
school kid” (shōgakusei no karada shite)? 
 
We drove back, stopping off at a convenience store to get beer – Ichi-san getting a 
Smirnoff Ice – and finished off the night drinking on the second floor of Hagiwa-
ra’s place, above Mutō-san’s. Ichi-san even tried to convince me to go to work the 
next day instead of him. I declined. 
 
Mito-chan was discharged from hospital ten days later. His hallucinations had ceased, as 
they turned out to have been alcohol-induced, and he had been altogether weaned off the 
alcohol. Misaaru and Ichi-san had assumed responsibility for collecting money to pay for 
the hospital bill, which exceeded ¥100,000 ($1,000 USD). Everyone Mito-chan had once 
sent to work was approached, and if they provided funds, their names were written down 
next to the amount they had given. The plan was to force Mito-chan to face up to the fact 
of having been a “burden” (meiwaku) to so many. As expected, Izukenji-san had Mito-
chan home after his discharge, simply to check in and see how he was doing, observing – 
albeit in Mito-chan’s absence – that it might take him one or two years to become his old 
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self. But others were, of course, more skeptical. Akia, for one, said that the “environment” 
(kankyō) in Sanya was “too bad” (warusugiru); there was no way for Mito-chan to break 
free from it. Sure enough, after a couple months of medication, sobriety, and having gone 
on welfare, Mito-chan was back to his old self, drinking from morning until evening. One 
day, when Mito-chan insisted his word carried weight in Sanya, Ichi-san flat-out retorted 
that someone on “welfare” (fukushi) had no “trust” (shinyō).9 
 
 A year after the fact, Akia would comment of Mito-chan’s “all too self-righteous” 
(jibun katte sugiru) behavior that he has no sense of “indebtedness” (on). Mito-chan had 
been saved by the group, and yet, unashamed, his actions demonstrated no consideration 
for the others. But what was Mito-chan to do? It was not just Mito-chan, but “everyone” 
(minna), according to Akia, who was being “all too self-righteous” (jibun katte sugiru). It 
was the modus vivendi to assert masculinity in face of weakness, shame and death. And 
this was also how everyone got along, complaining about each other in private: so-and-so 
had not returned cash, Shokawa-san was fighting, or Misaaru was complaining too much. 
Everyone, Ichi-san said: “gets along, while complaining” (butsu butsu iinagara, yatteru). 
 However, when the trope of otoko was reasserted in the absence of recognition by 
the group, it assumed an especially hollow air, devoid of self-assurance. In such moments, 
Mito-chan, Ha-chan, or Misaaru emerged in an individualized guise, having no recourse 
but to insist on their ways and masculinity. Shunned by everybody, Mito-chan’s boasting 
took on an abject, pitiful air, as did Akia, when he insisted that his suicide attempt would 
                                                
9 In summer of 2015, it was Ichi-san’s turn to be hospitalized. Earning his income solely from tehai, he had 
not gone to work the entire year, and his once-muscular arms had gone to mush. Everyone joked that, next, 
he would get the shakes like Mito-chan before him. To everyone’s surprise, he gave responsibility for tehai 
during his hospitalization to his cousin, Misaaru, with whom he had fought so viciously the previous year. 
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have succeeded – by slicing his stomach up in samurai style – if the knife had been sharp. 
In fact, Akia was living with serious health issues which not only alienated him from the 
others, who had not been diagnosed with life-threatening illnesses, but which gave him a 
dismal outlook on the future. Otherwise invisible on the exterior, incessant physical pain 
led him to drink, and to combine excessive amounts of alcohol with painkillers, sleeping 
pills, and other medication. 
Akia had been informed by the hospital that he could expect a brain hemorrhage. 
The eventuality of this hemorrhage, he was told, could not be prevented because his tu-
mor could not be excised. Akia could only await the inevitable “rupture” (haretsu) of a 
blood vessel, which, the doctor said, would be recognizable by “incredible pain” (sugoi 
itami), and take himself to hospital when it happened. Chances were that he would sur-
vive, but that the hemorrhage would paralyze him from the waist down. Having learnt of 
this, Akia puttered around Mutō-san’s drunk, occasionally saying “I don’t want to live” 
(ikitakunai). He threw up as he rounded the corner to go to his doya. Later in the evening, 
he borrowed a “kitchen knife” (hōchō) from his neighbor across the hall, and in his room, 
proceeded to stab himself in the stomach. But the knife was dull. It got caught in the fat. 
Changing his mind, Akia walked down the stairs, outside, and phoned an ambulance. 36 
hours later, he had already been discharged from hospital. Of course, Akia’s suicide was 
to have been a “manly,” “pure” (isagiyoku) gesture of slicing up his bowels in traditional 
style. After his failed attempt, however, Akia could only insist the knife had been dull. 
Similarly, he kept on drinking, as if the specter of disaster did not exist. “Rather than 
bend my convictions” (shinnen o mageru yori), Akia said, he preferred to “die early” 
(hayajini shite). 
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The truth was that, in their weakest moments, everyone was scared, and that their 
vulnerability intimated multifarious wounds. Mito-chan held on tightly to Misaaru’s arm 
in the ambulance. For all his talk that Mito-chan had nothing to do with himself, Ichi-san 
repeatedly broke into tears while Mito-chan was down with delirium tremens. And Akia 
always conveniently forgot about evenings when he had been carted off by an ambulance 
in the throes of death. There were “other things” (hoka no koto), Akia said, that bothered 
him when he was immobilized in hospital. Like the fleeting late-night moments when the 
guys expressed desire to see their children, such confessional moments – of impotence or 
vulnerability in hospital – were quickly consigned to silence after the fact. Mito-chan, for 
once, expressed regret at his treatment of his girlfriend, Yui, and Akia almost seemed to 
express remorse over his severed family relations, in addition, that is, to his deteriorating 
health and strained relations at Sanyūkai. 
If a strangely silent defeatism descended on the group while Mito-chan was lying 
supine on Hagiwara-san’s floor, it was not merely the specter of death, but powerlessness 
before the state that elicited this reaction. Indeed, as it turned out, Mito-chan would never 
have been hospitalized at the mental hospital without an “insurance card” (hokensho). For 
lack of hard cash – ¥100,000 up front, Misaaru was told – Mito-chan was as good as the 
recognition conferred upon him by the state. Before the medical establishment, masculine 
bravado gave way to a resignation before fate. It was better for a foreign graduate student 
to take Mito-chan to the hospital than it was for the guys. The objective was not even that 
Mito-chan receive good care. It was only that he be admitted to hospital, and any hospital 
at that. This was, of course, a problem of old in Sanya. It used to be that Sanyūkai would 
call ambulances, only to have the patient dropped off around the corner. Thus, one way of 
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ensuring hospitalization was to act unconscious at a train station in a wealthier ward, like 
Setagaya-ku, in which individuals requiring hospitalization were more likely to be treated. 
By the same token, it used to be that patients from Sanya were housed in the old, wooden 
extensions of hospitals, before these were demolished. It was from prior experience, then, 
that the guys were aware of the dangers of alcohol withdrawal – Mito-chan had suddenly 
stopped drinking, trying to get his act together – and knew that his earlier dismissal from 
Shirahige hospital could have resulted in death. Akia, in particular, could list an endless 
series of abuse by the medical establishment, starting with flagrantly wrong prescriptions 
and the seeming refusal of doctors to acknowledge bone fractures (which another hospital 
recognized right away). Without funds or state recognition – “insurance card” (hokensho) 
– the troupe was impotent before the medical establishment. 
 Read as weakness, such overdetermined moments of impotence and vulnerability 
were automatically deflected into violence. It was no coincidence that Ichi-san decided to 
assert the values of deference and hierarchy precisely as Mito-chan lay prostrate upstairs, 
nor that he was taunting the cops right when the ambulance arrived. Akia likewise picked 
a fight with Hajime-san when he could not mourn his older sister’s death, and Shokawa-
san turned to gambling after his mother’s death. In such instances, it was not only the loss 
that was introjected, but the guilt of and abstract violence of the labor market. Only in its 
most concrete manifestation – like that of the neighboring laborer – did the guys reproach 
the state: in the form of the local cops. The interests of the national state, especially in its 
rightist discourse, were misrecognized as their own, as it was in the attitude or slur of the 
neighboring worker that the originary violence of social expulsion was misrecognized. 
Sanya’s transformation into a “welfare town” (fukushi no machi) had all but rendered its 
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population dependent on the state, and recognition thus functioned to keep individuals in 
place. For this reason, obedient regulars at Sanyūkai might be found brawling in another 
joint. Two decades had passed since Sōgidan had mounted massive riots against the state. 
For lack of numbers – and “power” (pawā) – taking issue with the state was a moot point, 
and thus, the discourse of otoko had become complicit with the “production narrative” of 
capitalism: “so efficient,” Spivak says, “because it is constructed in terms of the most ef-
ficient and abstract coding of value, the economic.” In a tension internal to this narrative, 
insofar as it at once individualized productive units and produced desire for sociality, the 
discourse of otoko threatened to disperse and usurp the qualitative coding of the “group” 
or nakama, which would have denegated death by exchange-value.10 It was notably in 
this negativity that the counterdiscourse of otoko held its own against a production narra-
tive. However, cut off from family and general society, the constitutive wounds and im-
potence of the otoko were constantly in danger of being reopened. 
It happened on occasion that a family member passed away. For those of the guys 
who were remotely in touch with their kin, news of the impending death reached them by 
phone. Akia learned of his older sister passing away thus. For lack of money, he chose to 
remain in Sanya, rather than fly to the funeral. And when Shokawa-san’s mother passed 
away, Akia advised him, too, to stay in Sanya. The problem was two-fold. Flying back to 
Okinawa required money the guys would have to borrow from Oiwake, and which would 
take at least one year to pay back. More significantly, however, it was unclear, especially 
in Akia’s case, if his family would welcome him. On the other hand, Shokawa-san could 
muster enough money to pay the fare to Okinawa, but he would have to ask his family to 
help pay for the return. Rather than suffer the humiliation, not to mention, the possibility 
                                                
10 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, A Critique of Postcolonial Reason, pg. 244 – 245. 
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of being stranded in Okinawa, Akia told Shokawa-san not to go. Shokawa-san mourned 
the passing of his mother in a drinkery off Namidabashi: 
The guys, especially Ha-chan and Shokawa-san, were pretty drunk. Shokawa-san 
and I walking shoulder to shoulder down the street. At some point after we’d got-
ten to Izumi, and after we’d tried to convince Akia to come to the construction site 
Friday – he said he was “scared” (kowai) after so long, noting the ten-year “gap” 
(gyappu) while he had been an “outlaw” (auttorō) – Shokawa-san said “it’s okay 
to tell him” (ittemo ii yo). At which point, Akia turned to me to say that “Shoka-
wa-san’s mother has passed away” (Shokawa no ofukuro ga nakunatta). I’m not 
sure how long it took after that, but at some point briefly afterwards, I noticed 
Shokawa-san tearing. His eyes welling up. I can’t quite describe the sight … this 
man, now in his late fifties, strongly built with jeans, leather belt, and collared, 
red short-sleeve shirt … graying, flowing hair with worn face but straight eyes … 
completely break down in tears. Soon, Ha-chan had his arm around the back of 
Shokawa-san, looking away and crying too, his baseball cap backwards on his 
head along with his glasses strung smartly from the back, the black stud of a plas-
tic earring in his left ear. At some point, even Akia said “I’m gonna start crying, 
too” (ore mo …), and started tearing, albeit not like the other two. While Shoka-
wa-san was lamenting, mourning with Ha-chan’s arm around his back, Akia ex-
plained to me the trouble of collecting money for a ticket back to Okinawa. The 
costs. ¥100,000 or such one way. Apparently, they’d tried to collect … but even if 
Shokawa-san were to go one way, he would have to make his own money in Oki-
nawa to come back. Shokawa-san had come to Akia to seek advice, saying that 
he’d take the one-way ticket, but Akia had advised him against it. Now, it was too 
late. The funeral ceremony was over. At that very moment. Crying out loud, 
Shokawa-san kept saying things like: “I wanted to see her face and “hug” (idaku) 
her before!!”, “She is gone from this world!!” (mō kono yo ni inai!!), “There is 
nothing anymore!!” (nanmo nai!!), “even if I go to Okinawa … there is noth-
ing!!”, “Forgive me, mother, for being such a pathetic son” (yurushite o kure, 
nasakenai musuko san o), “Mama-, Mama-” (mama-, mama-). Crying all the 
while … he asked which direction Okinawa was in, and Akia pointed south, to-
wards the ventilator in the store. Then, Shokawa-san got down on his knees, cry-
ing, and bowed repeatedly towards that direction, talking to his mother, asking 
for forgiveness for being such a bad son, and saying he would live “her part” (no 
bun) from here on in. He said “regrettable” (kuyashī) – not to be able to see and 
part from his mother in person. Apparently, Shokawa-san had not slept for four 
nights before this … probably in anticipation of his mother’s death. He said the 
one thing he would not do is “fight” (kenka) because his mother wouldn’t want 
him to. It’d be a bad thing to do. “That I won’t do” (sore dake wa shinai). He kept 
saying “thank you” (arigatō) and “sorry” (gomenne) to us, saying that now he’d 
stop crying. In response to him, the others – both four years younger – said things 
like: “That’s a man’s tears” (otoko no namida) … “from the soul” (tamashī kara) 
– Akia said, of when a man really cries … Ha-chan described how he’d been able 
to meet his father on his deathbed before dying, and that he could “understand” 
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(wakaru) how “hard” (tsurai) it was for Shokawa-san not to be able to meet or 
see his mother before the actual putting away of her … Ha-chan started crying 
again at this point, too. Akia saying “that’s it, cry it out, let him cry it out.” Try-
ing, too, to put a bit of a break on it … after Shokawa-san had done bowing to his 
mother, “it’s over” (sore de ī, mō owari da yo). Akia noted how this would go on 
for a week, because the guys on the corner were being so “nice” (yasashī). Akia 
noted, too, how he’d “gone wild” (abareta) in Iroha arcade after his older sister 
had passed away this year. He told the story of how he hadn’t been able to pay for 
the ticket, how he’d called his brother … and been told to “take care of his own 
stuff, as in, they would take care of things in Okinawa.” There’s “nothing you can 
do” (nanmo dekinai). Shokawa-san said this today, too: “nothing I can do” 
(nanmo dekinai). 
 
Meanwhile, a phone call came from Mito-chan because Moto-chan was seemingly 
going at it … in a fighting, trouble-making mood again. Akia said “not to go” 
(ikanai hō ga ī) … Shokawa-san went and came back, saying Noribō is getting 
angry with Moto-chan now. 
 
Shokawa-san told me not to fight. Looking at Akia, he said they came out of that 
generation … Shokawa-san’s father (who had committed “harakiri” and died) 
had told him not to fight, even if you came back “crying” (naitemo). But if they hit 
you, then you can come back – it’s alright, ok – at them with all you’ve got. 
 
Akia said he “doesn’t like trouble, but that he will protect his friends” (nakama 
wa mamoru), regardless of his own cost. Regardless of what might happen to him. 
There was some disagreement here … because Shokawa-san said that some of the 
guys, even if they are “nakama,” are wrong and he will tell them so on such occa-
sions … to which Ha-chan said that the point of being “nakama” is that you will 
stand with your buddies even if they are wrong. 
 
Akia said “it’s important for a man to live everyday with a sense of his “guilt” 
(zaiakukan).” Ha-chan said, in response: “you say some good things” (ī koto iu 
nā).11 
 
Everyone knew that death was awaiting them in Sanya. When cautioned about his sexual, 
drinking, or gambling habits, even Ichi-san, who still appeared to be a functional worker, 
would say: “I do not have long to go anyways” (dōsei nagakunai kara). It was not simply 
that the troupe had reached an age in which their parents, if not older siblings, were likely 
to pass away. The guys lived with the prospect of their own death, as Te-chan, Obara-san, 
Kikuchi-san, and Ishikawa-san had been diagnosed with cancer and Akia was waiting for 
                                                
11 Edited notebook entry, September 26, ’13. 
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his blood vessel to “rupture” (haretsu). It was noted of Iwa-chan that he was “the most in 
trouble” (ichiban yabai). Izukenji-san was said to have “taken on in years” (toshi totte 
kita na), as he “gets drunk quickly” (yopparau no ga hayai). Even Ichi-san said he could 
not fight and win against a youngster. And everybody had witnessed friends pass away in 
the past. Whether they had died of natural causes, been murdered, committed suicide, or 
passed away as early as in their forties, Akia said, he would think of them every evening, 
and he could count them using all fingers. Ichi-san likewise remarked that it was a “good 
thing” (ii koto) to talk about the dead. Indeed, there was no small degree of guilt involved 
in remembrance of the deceased. Akia, for instance, would recall reading the suicide note 
of a friend and chasing after him, before he flung himself to his death off Sakura-bashi in 
Asakusa. This was, incidentally, the death that had been prompted through the actions of 
the legendary “champion.” When Akia had later been living in Kotobukichō, Yokohama, 
two other friends committed suicide one after the other. Discovering the body of the latter 
hanging from the ceiling, Akia decided to return to Sanya. There was, in effect, “nothing 
to do” (nanmo dekinai). Guilt over powerlessness triggered Akia to fight three opponents 
in Iroha arcade, as if the violence were directed at himself. By a concatenation of events, 
Shokawa-san turned to gambling, on which account he was duly detained, and was back 
to fighting after his release. Nevertheless, an early death constituted a social fact in Sanya, 
just as confinement – or impotence: shorn of the experience of mourning – was structured 
by general social forces. With no other means – or reference – at their disposal, the guys 
could only stake their bodies, albeit in a gamble against death which would inevitably be 
lost.12 
                                                
12 In San’ya Blues, Fowler quotes a conversation between labor union members. The occasion is the funeral 
of another union member:  
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Death in Sanya, or rather, Sanya as a place of death went unrecognized in general 
society. Even the 29-year-old Kami-kun noticed that the “crimes” (jiken) and “homicides” 
(satsujin) in Sanya went unreported in daily news, while issues that touched on politically 
relevant issues of the day – such as gambling on welfare money under crisis – made it on 
the nationally televised NHK. By this token, there was never any mention of the men who 
died from heat-stroke – several every day – on the streets of Sanya in the summer. As one 
Sanyūkai regular said, it was, in fact, ideal for the Japanese state that welfare-recipients 
in Sanya – unlike the burgeoning suicide rate of productive middle-aged men – were dead. 
Costs had to be cut. If this could be achieved in the process of putting Sanya men into the 
precarious situation of never having enough welfare – predisposing them to work jobs no 
one else would do – and ensuring that their expenditures either fed the national economy 
or the state directly through WINS, this was sufficient. Murder was achieved by means of 
an abstract economic imperative manifest in the objective economic order. The counter-
discourse of otoko fused with this order, insofar as it propagated the self-responsibility of 
the otoko, and the introjection of guilt. Thus, when someone was murdered in Sanya, the 
rumors spread like quickfire as if the event did not concern oneself. So-and-so had seen 
                                                                                                                                            
 “I’m … just … not … going … to …” Sakata can hardly sit up at the table. 
 “Die!” Another voice finishes the sentence for Sakata. 
 “He’s not going to die. Ugh – that’s the problem!” This from yet another heckler. 
 “… d-die!” Sakata belatedly finishes his own sentence. 
 “Oh, what the hell, you’re all crazy! The whole place is crazy! But it’s not going to do any good to 
sit and moan. If we want something to happen, we’ve got to make it happen. We can’t wait for someone to 
take our complaints to city hall. We’re the ones who’ve got to take the initiative, so long as there’s a single 
breath left in our lungs. If we don’t, you can bet your life no one else will, and the city would be very hap-
py to close the book on us. The city can afford to wait until we all die. Can we afford not to act now?” 
 “Hey, the big talk sounds good, Kobe, but what can we really do? The city holds all the cards, and 
we don’t have a single ace.” 
 “I never said it would be easy, Ibaraki. But look at the alternative. Go ahead and sleep on the street 
when the dough runs out. Sleep there until you pick up pneumonia. Then get tossed into a pauper’s ward 
and be given up for dead even before you’ve breathed your last. Don’t you see what I’m saying? Death is 
staring us in the face every day. Now doesn’t that motivate you?” 
 “It motivates me to take another swig from my bottle! Shooting for the stars just makes it hurt all 
the more when you come crashing to the ground” (163 – 165). 
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the legs of the body sticking out of a garbage can. Riku-san was said to know the suspects. 
Someone might even comment how surprising it was that the murder “had made it in the 
news” (yoku nyūsu ni notta ne). The event had already assumed the form of an everyday, 
naturalized occurrence, with no personal relevance. 
It was, of course, a different story when everyone had known the person who died, 
and this, regardless of how popular the individual had been. The flamboyant Nomura-san 
at Sanyūkai had been disliked by Akia, Fukada-san, and others for his bossy attitude. Yet, 
when his death was discovered, the news was received by both Akia and Fukada-san first 
as a shock. Akia broke into a sob and instantly cut the phone. Equally unnerved, Fukada-
san said that “liking and disliking did not matter” (suki kirai wa kankei nai). Nomura had 
been a “buddy” (nakama), regardless. For a couple of days, Nomura-san’s death had cre-
ated camaraderie among foes, for his death – in his early fifties – constituted a commen-
tary on the plight of every Sanya man: repeatedly repressed, yet, triggered by proximity 
to death. Everyone knew what Sanya had in store for them, but nevertheless, they insisted 
on repeating the fetishized trope of otoko. The aging population of Sanya had already de-
generated into ghosts to all but their own TV screens and WINS. As Akia put it, Sanya 
was “next to hell” (jigoku no tonari). The decades-old psychologist at Sanyūkai similarly 
mythologized and unwittingly romanticized suicide in Sanya, by observing that – unlike 
the salaryman – the suicide in Sanya had no social connections: no job, no family, no 
friends, no nothing. 
The one future link the guys could be assured of was to the state. 
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Those on welfare who could work were constantly reminded of their insufficiency 
by their case-workers at the ward office. They had to find proper work since, if they went 
to danbōru, it was not considered legitimate.13 In effect, every detail of life in Sanya was 
conditioned by the state. Welfare-recipients who worked without declaring income had to 
be constantly wary of the ward office finding out about work, or simply, of being caught 
gambling or drinking. Non-welfare-recipients had to live in the precarity of never having 
a secure income, not to mention, of being caught engaging in illegal gambling or fighting. 
In place far before the academic turn to neoliberal discourse, the precarity of existence in 
Sanya threatened its subject – the “person of Yama” (yama no ningen) – with abjection at 
every turn. Like the surveillance cameras that had been surreptitiously placed in Sanya, 
the gaze of the state split the subject from him or herself. It was the “pride” (puraido) or 
“dignity” (iji) of every Sanya man to survive within the strictures of the economy. Hence, 
when someone like Riku-san would lose it – shouting: “you fucking with a Yama person?” 
(yama no ningen nameteru no ka?) – there was implicit reference to survival necessitated 
by the Sanya man. In these instances, the “person of Yama” (yama no ningen) responded 
to a slur that had been misrecognized as a threat to restore the disposability of the subject. 
Naturally, Riku-san reciprocated with a violence commensurate to that of surviving in the 
economy. The originary source of violence, which rendered the Sanya man vulnerable, or 
rather, disposable, was misrecognized, displaced and deflected in a powerlessness before 
the economic order. 
Safe-guarded from such reciprocal violence, the Japanese state circumscribed and 
appropriated the value of the Sanya man. Save for activities like illegal gambling or drugs, 
                                                
13 See Ch. 5 regarding the danbōru system. 
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the state collected on the lives of Sanya men, be it through WINS, by ensuring they work 
the most menial of tasks, or by fetching their cash and valuables when they died. 
 
In its propriety, Sanyūkai operated as an extension of the state. Of course, it must 
be said that Sanyūkai received no state funding. However, on account of its amicable, and 
symbiotic relationship with the ward offices – each did favors for the other: the state paid 
back in kind when Sanyūkai took cases that it preferred to relinquish – enabling Sanyūkai 
to facilitate welfare applications. It thereby enlarged the circle of its dependents and more 
significantly, produced an indebtedness that dissimulated – and displaced the shame of – 
staff dependence on donations, not to mention, on the men relegated to the outside. Thus, 
in administering care to those who “needed” (hitsuyō) it, Sanyūkai replicated a discourse 
of state that threatened to sever privileges extended in the indulgent embrace of amae. At 
stake in the act of giving, then, was the source of beneficence that had to be monopolized. 
Not surprisingly, it was the head of the institution who filled this role, not only by giving 
cash hand-outs out of sight, but by taking executive decisions regarding on whose behalf 
Sanyūkai would impose on the state. Those who did not come to be recognized remained 
outside Sanyūkai’s purview. Homage had to be paid and the price of Sanyūkai’s attention 
was exactly the “dignity” (iji) of the “person of Yama” (yama no ningen). In this manner, 
Sanyūkai “turned a blind eye” (mite minu furi) to the excesses of Sanya, just as the police 
pretended not to see the circulation of violence. The death of Sanya was achieved through 
negations of that which did not exist to begin with. In 2014, the old doya standing along 
Namidabashi had been operating as tourist hotels for long over a decade. 
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When somebody in Sanya passed away, there was always the question of whether 
or not (or how) to contact their family. Even before this, however, there was the question 
of whether or not a funeral could be afforded. Certainly none of the guys had money for a 
funeral. They would have to scrape together, as they had to pay Mito-chan’s hospital bill. 
But who would take home the ashes of the departed? Akia, for one, was never in contact 
with his family, but was confident “somebody” (dareka) would retrieve his remains. The 
others were less confident. When Mito-chan had presented Ichi-san with the money for a 
flight to Okinawa, the latter had refused to attend the funeral of their father. Nor could the 
two of them locate their third brother, who had gone missing for years in Shiga prefecture. 
Contrary to custom, in which “the oldest son” (chōnan) – Ichi-san –  directed the funeral 
Mito-chan, the youngest son, flew back to Okinawa (with money borrowed from Oiwake) 
and pressed the incinerator button. Nor was Ichi-san the only person to have traumatized 
paternal relations: Shokawa-san’s father had committed suicide by disembowelment, and 
Akia had not met his father.14 His mom had carried him while she did construction work 
in Okinawa, raising four other kids. Fractured, inoperative family relationships were thus 
passed on, from generation to generation. Indeed, when Nomura-san was discovered dead 
in his room, Sanyūkai could not contact his family, wife, or daughters because no phone 
numbers were listed on his phone. Nomura-san had volunteered and worked at Sanyūkai 
for more than two decades; however, the only contact number that could be found was of 
                                                
14 Members of the Okinawa-gumi were more familiar with the violence of suicide by disembowelment than 
might have been presumed. Akia attempted suicide in this manner. Shokawa-san’s father had taken his life 
this way. And when I traveled with Akia to Miyakojima in 2015, his island of birth in Okinawa, he discov-
ered that one of his childhood friends had passed away by “cutting the stomach” (hara o kitta). On account 
of this act, the friend was remembered with a grin by an other acquaintance, accompanied with the words: 
“he had guts” (konjō atta). The act was an effect of the normative force of the trope, otoko. 
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a server from the local drinkery, also the only person, aside from Sanyūkai affiliates, who 
came to the funeral. 
However, as the day of the funeral approached, preparations started to go awry. It 
was not only Nomura-san’s family who could not be contacted. Sanyūkai itself neglected 
to send out notices that Nomura-san had passed away, even to volunteers who had 
worked with him for years. On the day of the cremation, a straggling crowd of Sanyūkai 
regulars could be seen walking towards Minami-Senjū station. Some of them barely able 
to stand, this was one of the few occasions in the year when they carried themselves all 
the way to the station and got on a train. Yet when they finally arrived at the funeral par-
lor there was no cremation scheduled. They had gotten the date wrong. The next day, 
when the funeral had really been scheduled, only half the previous crowd went along. 
When the Okinawa-gumi heard this story from Akia, Ichi-san remarked it was “unthinka-
ble!” (arienai!) to mistake the day of a funeral. Sanyūkai had slipped up, but the missed 
funeral was indicative of an ethos in which the death of Sanyūkai regulars was swept un-
der the carpet. Most offensive of all, Akia said, was the fact that staff members, who had 
worked decades with Nomura-san, did not go to the funeral. In not so subtle ways, the 
line separating staff from the men outside had been reiterated. It was best not to make too 
much of a thing every time someone at Sanyūkai died. 
 
Nomura-san’s death not only foreshadowed the deaths of the men who sat outside 
Sanyūkai every day, or of the guys, whose bodies were similarly failing them. His death 
signalled the death of Sanya, and the final passing of the life of the hiyatoi (day laborer). 
In 2015, Ichi-san was hospitalized for two months, and was told by doctors that he would 
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die if he continued to drink. He looked like a “mummy” (miira) when he was discharged 
from hospital, Akia said. As for Akia himself, Misaaru would recount in an almost panic-
stricken voice, across an international phone line, that Akia was drinking every day to the 
point at which the admixture of medication and alcohol caused him to lose mobility in his 
body. At this rate, Misaaru said, Akia “does not have long to go” (nagakunai). It is “scary” 
(kowai), Misaaru added. 
It was the virtual inexistence of young men in Sanya, however, that signalled the 
death of the life-styles embodied by its aging denizens. And yet, if the precarity that has 
constituted the condition of life in Sanya has been generalized among the “working poor” 
(wākingu pua) of Japan today, who may never meet outside work, I recall moments from 
the construction site when I seemed to glimpse similarities between our older troupe, and 
a younger generation of construction workers. During lunch, I could only peer across the 
tables of the changing room at a bunched up group of able-bodied tekkinya (steelworkers), 
many of who looked far younger than 20, but certainly no older than 25, who sat hunched 
over as they puffed away at cigarettes, and cut a distinct difference from our troupe, with 
their earrings and their golden-dyed hair. Whether these workers lived with their families, 
in apartments dispersed across the city, or in a company dorm, there was a clear hierarchy 
inscribed in their relations, as their mid-twenties leader shouted instructions from the end 
of the table while they smoked away the remainder of their time. 
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Vanishing and Emerging Socialities 
 
 The death of Sanya invokes the vanishing of other forms of sociality grounded in 
labor. It takes us from the importance placed on nakama (buddies) to the battlecry of the 
withering Zengakuren: “unite!” (danketsu!). However, it likewise returns to the subject of 
the entrance and graduation ceremonies, whose powerlessness before the objective order 
of the economy lends itself to an identification with power. In an age in which the retreat 
of the state from the economy has authorized a shamelessness of its very own, epitomized 
by “Fukushima,” the shameless hate speech of the emerging “internet right-wing” (netto 
uyoku) consolidates a sociality which echoes that of the “radical” (kageki) leftist, given to 



























“He doesn’t deserve the name of the ‘radical’” would be the comment upon you if you 
don't develop serious labor union practice. Any way, you are called “radical”. So you 
should do as a “radical” does. You must get the reputation: “That fellow is a ‘radical’. 
But that ‘radical’ is very serious!”.  




The “Radical” (Kageki) Leftist 
 
 Except for a banner that can sometimes be glimpsed from the windows of landing 
planes, there is no trace of the nearly half-century of resistance by farmers, students, and 
leftists to the construction of Narita International Airport. Hanging from a distant wall on 
the perimeter of the airstrip, the barely noticeable banner states in bold English, “DOWN 
WITH NARITA AIRPORT,” and underneath this in Japanese: “Positively Against Narita 
Airport” (Narita Kūkō Zettai Hantai). Indeed, at the Narita Airport and Community His-
torical Museum, visitors can look at the history of the “Sanrizuka Struggle” (Sanrizuka 
Tōsō) behind glass panes, as if the last of the resisting farmers had sold out long ago.1 But 
the farmhouses of Hagiwara Susumu, Shitō Takao, and Kitahara Kōji remain, albeit with-
in a couple dozen meters of passing jumbo jets, and under the constant gaze of a riot po-
liceman stationed in a watchtower overlooking their fields.2 
                                                
1 The “Sanrizuka Struggle” (Sanrizuka Tōsō) began in 1966 when the Japanese state announced its plans to 
construct Narita Airport. Aided by students and leftists groups, including the Zengakuren and Chūkakuha, 
the Sanrizuka-Shibayama Union to Oppose the Airport (Sanrizuka-Shibayama Rengō Kūkō Hantai-Dōmei) 
was formed by local farmers, delaying completion of the first runway until 1978, six years later than it had 
been scheduled to be completed. The Sanrizuka-Shibayama Union to Oppose the Airport fractured in 1983, 
but was carried on by factions. See David E. Apter and Nagayo Sawa, Against the State: Politics and Social 
Protest in Japan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984). See also the 1968 documentary film by 
Ogawa Shinsuke, Sanrizuka no Natsu, contained in Suzuki Hitoshi, Ogawa Purodakushon: ‘Sanrizuka no 
Natsu’ o Miru (Tokyo: Ōta Shuppan, 2012). 
2 In Against the State, Politics and Social Protest in Japan, David E. Apter and Nagayo Sawa write of the 
early 1980s: “Many people both inside and outside Japan are surprised to find that the Sanrizuka movement 
is still going on; if nothing else, the magnitude of Japan’s accomplishments has made many of the concerns 
of the sixties and seventies seem academic” (9). 
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As if this disappearance afflicted the left in general, members of the Zengakuren, 
a shortening of Zen Nihon Gakusei Jichikai Sō Rengō (All-Japan League of Student Self-
Government), have likewise dwindled from a mass student movement numbering in the 
thousands in the ‘60s and ‘70s, to less than 100.3 Nevertheless, as the state of affairs was 
conveyed to me during the two-year period in which I attended protests and symposiums 
with the Zengakuren, and met with its members individually, the fight to “protect Shitō-
san’s farmland” (shitō-san no nōchi o mamoru) and to maintain the Sanrizuka Struggle is 
happening in the “now” (ima), if not also approaching its most critical stage. Indeed, for 
the Zengakuren, what has otherwise been consigned to history – “blocked out” (fūsa) and 
“concealed” (inpei) – exercises a traumatizing effect in the now. Driven by the repetition 
of a primal state crime, the Zengakuren and their leftist affiliates demand an (impossible) 
redress, for: Sanrizuka, Okinawa, Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Bikini, 3-Mile Island, Chernobyl 
and, in addition to a seemingly endless list, now more than ever, Fukushima. 
 In fact, the remainder of farmhouses blocking the expansion of Narita airport, not 
to mention of the so-called “radical” (kageki) left, gives the lie to the state discourse that 
appears to have drowned out resistance. And the Zengakuren were aware of their place as 
one that undercut state rhetoric. For instance, of the much-praised Hiroshima Peace Me-
                                                
3 The Zengakuren was said to consist of 300,000 members in the immediate post-war period and during its 
heyday of activism in the ‘60s and ‘70s. See the essays collected in Stuart J. Dowsey, Zengakuren: Japan’s 
Revolutionary Students (Berkeley: Ishi Press, 1970). Matsunami Michihiro gives an historical account of 
the group’s emergence in “Origins of Zengakuren,” in Zengakuren: Japan’s Revolutionary Students. He 
writes: “on July 3, 1948, a preparatory meeting was held to form a united system for the student movement 
in Japan. On July 6th, the decision was taken by representatives of 138 universities to form an All-Japan 
Federation of Student Self-government Associations. Accordingly, on September 18th, 1948, the federation 
was formed at a meeting which lasted 3 days. The full name of the new federation was the Zen Nihon Ga-
kusei Jichikai Sorengo, which became abbreviated to the name it is popularly known by – Zengakuren. The 
founding was attended by 250 representatives from 145 universities and they adopted the following resolu-
tions: (1) Opposition to the fascist-colonialistic reorganization of education; (2) Protection of the freedom 
of study and student life; (3) Opposition to the low wages paid for student part-time work and paid by 
SCAP (the occupation forces); (4) Opposition to fascism and the protection of democracy; (5) Unity with 
the battle line of youth; (5) Complete freedom for the student political movement” (48). 
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morial Museum, which every tourist and school party visits, the Zengakuren state that, in 
addition to the questionable captions downplaying war crimes committed by the Imperial 
Japanese Army, not to mention the dubious practice of selling “Obamajority” T-shirts at 
the gift store when the Obama administration has endorsed U.S. nuclear armament, the 
museum sidelines the fact that Hiroshima was a military base prior to August 6th, 1945.4 
Contrary to the wishes of surviving victims of the nuclear bombing, hibakusha, and their 
families, the “peace” museum neglects to show that their experience not only led them to 
oppose nuclear arms, but war itself.5 Hiroshima was picked, the Zengakuren say, because 
it operated as a military base. In effect, the victimization discourse in Hiroshima and Na-
gasaki feeds directly into a state discourse that hierarchizes Japanese and foreign victims 
of World War II, as if to gear up for war, and the specter of the past which drives the 
Zengakuren is of the future, as the Japanese state prepares to “reactivate” (saikidō) nucle-
ar plants, and to revise Article 9.6 “No More Hiroshima! No More Nagasaki! No More 
Bikini! No More Chernobyl! No More Three-Mile Island!”. As Zengakuren members 
consistently and insistently repeated in demonstrations, symposiums, and across personal 
meetings, it is only at the last critical instant that the antagonism between state or “capital” 
(shihon), and “workers” (rōdōsha) – whose interests, the Zengakuren say, are as “oil and 
water” (abura to mizu) – will be resolved in the repetition of war, or of “revolution” (ka-
                                                
4 The atom bomb was dropped on Hiroshima on August 6th, 1945. 
5 The term, “hibakusha,” refers specifically to “people” (sha) who suffered “radiation exposure” (hibaku). 
6 On the Northeastern margin of Japan, a lab at the Rokkasho Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Plant was said to 
be ready to transform Japan’s nuclear waste into nuclear arms. In effect, “nuclear energy” (gempatsu) was 
equated with “nuclear arms” (kaku heiki) by the Zengakuren, and not only because of the danger nuclear 
power plants posed to their environs in an earthquake-prone nation. For Japanese literature on the victimi-
zation discourse of Hiroshima, see the first book of photographer Fukushima Kikujirō’s autobiography, 
Hiroshima no Uso: Utsuranakkatta Sengo (Tokyo: Gendaijin Bunsha, 2013). Translated into English, this 
title would read, “The Lie of Hiroshima: The Postwar that Did Not Develop,” in which “develop” (utsuru) 
refers to the process of developing photos. See also Fukushima Kikujirō’s collection of photos in Shōgen to 
Igen (Tokyo: DAYS JAPAN, 2013). See also Lisa Yoneyama, Hirohima Traces: Time, Space, and the Dia-
lectics of Memory (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999). 
 479 
kumei). For the Zengakuren, the definitive moment of “danger” (kiki), indeed, of the dis-
appearance of the trace of resistance, is logically one of “hope” (kibō). Charged with con-
tradiction, it harbors the possibility of “flipping” (hikkurigaesu) the masses into action. 
Demonstrations by the Zengakuren and affiliated leftist organizations reminded of 
and gave representation to a world traumatized by capitalism. As Jacques Rancière notes 
of Marx’s writing and the formation of the communist party, in the Zengakuren discourse 
there was, however, an exclusivist logic at work – “oil and water” – which established the 
Zengakuren in the place of workers, speaking on his or her behalf, precisely by relegating 
them to a negativity which could do “nothing but” fight for revolution.7 As that definitive 
final moment, revolution appeared as destiny to the Zengakuren. Yet, it was a destiny that 
was always imminent in the endless “now” (ima) or now-time of emergency. For, as the 
pure negativity of “oil” or “water” – one or the other, rather than the heterogenous hybrid 
– the worker, as Rancière observes, “is someone who has only one thing to do – to make 
the revolution – and who cannot not do that because of what he is.”8 In this negativity, by 
which the laborer was consigned to his or her place through a constitutive insufficiency, 
the impossible possibility of the revolution was always imminent, yet impossible. It was 
precisely in their debilitated condition that workers confirmed the necessity of leadership 
by the “radical” (kageki) left, and this gap was sustained by the Zengakuren discourse. In 
1982, thirty years before I attended rallies at Sanrizuka, the following statement was read: 
The whole world faces now a grave crisis of imminent war – nuclear war; the 
human being is thus threatened with holocaust and annihilation. An urgent de-
mand for peace expressed in anti-war, anti-nuclear protest is becoming more and 
more common not only among the Japanese people but also among people all 
over the world. 
 
                                                
7 Cited in Jacques Rancière, The Philosopher and His Poor, pg. 70. 
8 Ibid, pg. 80. 
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We, the members of the Opposition League and those who are rallying around it, 
have been fighting for 17 years against the construction of Sanrizuka military air-
port under the banner of “Stop war! Fight for peace!” in diametrical, violent con-
frontation with the state power. 
 
Now that anti-war, anti-nuclear struggle is gaining momentum anew, we feel it 
our duty, as ones fighting in Sanrizuka – a fortress of people’s struggle of the 
whole of Japan, to fill responsible positions in the struggle.9 
 
Notwithstanding the narration the Zengakuren would undertake of the neoliberal “attack” 
(kōgeki) on workers from the mid-1980s onwards, the content of this statement, read out 
loud fifteen years after the Zengakuren joined the “struggle” in Sanrizuka, did not differ 
much in 2011 – 2013. If anything, the onslaught of state power that had all but eliminated 
the Zengakuren from the 1980s onwards would testify to the last-ditch efforts of the state, 
and confirm that the impossible possibility of revolution was imminent.  
 Needless to say, the possibility of a “revolution” (kakumei) in contemporary Japan 
was hardly a point of consensus, even among people staunchly opposed to the state. As if 
the number of remaining farms in Sanrizuka constituted a case in point, one non-standing 
public teacher said that “things fall out of place” (mono ga zurechau) when youngsters in 
the Zengakuren claim “revolution is the hope” (kakumei ga kibō): an impossibility in this 
day and age, even if it were desirable. Thus, eschewed by the anti-nuclear movement, the 
“Anti-Poverty Network” (Hanhinkon Nettowāku), and other leftist groups that stop short 
of being labelled “radical” (kageki), the Zengakuren nevertheless insist on the necessity 
of “historical recognition” (jidai ninshiki), that is to say, on a misrecognition that took on 
the violence of fetishism. But it was precisely “those people” (ano hitotachi), the teacher 
said, who came to demonstrate when s/he was on the verge of being fired. 
 
                                                
9 Cited in David E. Apter and Nagayo Sawa, Against the State: Politics and Social Protest in Japan, pg. 1. 
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As one of its many excursions across the nation in protest, the Zengakuren travels 
to demonstrate at Sanrizuka several times per year. For the outsiders who come along for 
the gathering and demonstration in Chiba Prefecture, as I did, the trip begins early in the 
morning from Shin-Koiwa station on the Chuō-Sōbu line, where somebody comes to pick 
one up. 
On my first trip to Sanrizuka, my primary contact at the Zengakuren, Dafuka-san, 
phoned at our appointed meeting time to say he could not make it, but had sent somebody 
else. And so it was a stranger who picked me up at the station and, first thing, handed me 
a surgical face mask and baseball cap, instructing me to put them on when we got close to 
our destination, Zenshinsha, since the “public order police” (kōan) were “keeping watch” 
(mihatteru) outside.10 Fortunately it was a long walk to Zenshinsha, the headquarters and 
publishing house of the Chūkakuha, the Middle-Core-Faction or the Japan Revolutionary 
Communist League, which houses the main Zengakuren members, including Dafuka-san, 
organizer of “student activities” (gakusei undō) under the umbrella of the Chūkakuha. So 
Dahara-san responded at length to my query of how he had entered the Zengakuren.11 
                                                
10 As if it were not a matter of arrest, but simply of being caught associating with “radical” (kageki) leftists 
on a camera, wariness of the police camera is long-standing. In Toppamono, Miyazaki Manabu writes of 
the 1960s student movement: 
 “Riot police blanketed the area. Exiting Yotsuya, the nearest station, we were immediately sand-
wiched tightly between rows of uniformed cops who jostled us as we walked in silence toward our destina-
tion. There were also plainclothes personnel all over the place, photographing everyone taking part. 
 Students hated this because photos that identified them as activists could harm their employment 
prospects – or so we all believed. And it was certainly the case that anybody arrested during a demo would 
find it very hard to land a decent job. Except for the really determined activists, most demonstrators there-
fore lowered their heads when the police began snapping. In our hearts we felt ashamed, but as we would 
all one day have to make a living it served as a small defensive measure” (93). 
11 The Zengakuren were effectively subsumed under the Chūkakuha. The Chūkakuha not only gave hous-
ing to the core members of the Zengakuren. After years of activism, it provided a niche for students to con-
tinue their activism as they got older. It offered an alternative that supplemented the generally recognized 
path of completing studies and getting a job. In “The University Problem,” in Zengakuren: Japan’s Revolu-
tionary Students, Kokubun Yutaka writes of the birth of the Chūkakuha: “As was mentioned earlier, Maru-
gakudo joined forces in 1962 with the Sampa Rengo of Shagakudo, Shaseido and the structural reform 
groups of the Front in order to create effective opposition to the Ikeda government’s proposed University 
Control Bill. This new alliance didn’t last long. Moreover, within Marugakudo, a spirited controversy de-
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Before going to university, he had never thought that there existed organizations or labor 
activities aimed at changing the world. When he entered Kyoto University, it was the 
time of the Iraq War, and the Japanese state was using terrorism to deport people. Or ra-
ther, he said, it was being racist in considering such and such an individual a potential 
member of Al Queda, because they were Muslim. It happened that someone in the dorm 
was forcibly taken away by the police, ostensibly since he did not have proper visa papers 
– which, he did – and it became a big event in the university. In the end, the students won 
the battle as the foreign student was released from detainment, and that was how it started 
for Dahara-san, who, like many other Zengakuren, forfeited his studies and never gradu-
ated from university.  
The mask and hat went on just before we rounded the block to Zenshinsha, a five-
story building that had been steel-plated on the outside. Alongside cameras that hung off 
the building was a large sign stating Zenshinsha – 前進社 – and a steel door someone had 
to buzz you through. Once inside the first set of doors, there was an alcove – in between 
two steel doors – with cameras showing the outside of the building. There, another buzzer 
had to be pressed, finally letting one into the low-ceilinged, altogether cramped space of 
the interior. Perhaps because there were so many people waiting that morning, the entire 
first area felt claustrophobic. Piles and piles of leaflets and pamphlets filled the available 
table space, one small room leading into an other. Up a staircase, in the students’ section, 
                                                                                                                                            
veloped over the wisdom of making such a joint action with the Sampa Rengo. The debate grew into a 
basic split in which one faction, led by the Zengakuren chairman, Nemoto Hitoshi, favored independent 
actions, while the other faction, which gathered around the secretary Onoda Joji, advocated joint-actions. In 
the autumn of 1962, Marugakudo’s parent body, Kakukyodo, held its 3rd National Committee Meeting and 
the split within Marugakudo widened. The Nemoto faction now began to be called the Revolutionary 
Marxist Faction – Kakumaru (Kakumeiteki Marukusushugi-ha), and the Onoda Faction (also called the 
Yamamoto or ‘Y’ Faction) took over the National Central Committee of Marugakudo and became the 
Chukaku faction (literally: the Central Core Faction). These two new factions under Kakukyodo’s wing 
made their official debut in February, 1963” (112 – 113). 
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there were separate rooms for the men and women, each containing bunk beds for eight 
or ten. Adjoining the bedrooms was something like a dining room area with a central ta-
ble, and a computer room. Dafuka-san, who quickly showed me around, explained that 
Zenshinsha operated on “donations” (kanpa). In fact, rumor had it that the Chūkakuha ran 
a small hospital, as a social experiment, of course, for the Chūkakuha was clearly against 
capitalist profit-making. The steel exterior of the building, Dafuka-san said, was designed 
to protect against “state power” (kokka kenryoku). As he would later confess, living at 
Zenshinsha was a nerve-wracking life, as the authorities broke in every year to search the 
place. 
When the time came, all those going to Sanrizuka gathered outside of Zenshinsha. 
Forming a crowd of a couple hundred, everyone divided into designated groups to board 
minivans – one for the students – wherein, as if my seat had been designated, I sat next to 
Dafuka-san. During the two-hour commute, Dafuka-san asked about the Tea-Party in the 
U.S., tracking global fascism as he compared it to the emergence of Hashimoto Tōru’s 
Japan Restoration Party. He also spoke of the Zengakuren getting arrested on account of 
their activism. Jinokawa had been jailed seven months for organizing a protest within the 
grounds of Hōsei University, and Dafuka-san himself had been arrested twice, no doubt, 
in addition to other infractions, simply for handing out flyers in Hōsei University. When I 
observed the difficulty of finding employment in Japan with an arrest record, Dafuka-san 
nodded. However, he added that one has “to overcome that” (sore o norikoeru). Dafuka-
san himself was on a veritable “blacklist” (burakku risuto), as he and former Zengakuren 
leader, Oda Yōsuke, discovered when their computerized ESTA (Electronic System for 
Travel Authorization) visa applications to the U.S. were automatically rejected, presuma-
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bly because their names had been given to the CIA. Thus, when I naively suggested that 
the number of riot and public order police present at demonstrations was primarily to in-
timidate participants, Dafuka-san added that their main objective is to maintain “public 
order” (chian). For them, he said, anything that disturbs public order should be reduced to 
“zero” (zero). Indeed, when we arrived at our destination, there was a mass of “riot police” 
(kidōtai) and “public order police” (kōan keisatsu) swarming at the entry to the farmland. 
It was like a military grounds with the kidōtai, kōan looking through cameras and 
scribbling in their notebooks, and uniformed police, many of whom approached us asking 
if we had anything dangerous in our bags. A man behind me shouted back: “Obviously, I 
don’t!” (motteru wake nai jyanai!). And there were people of all ages in our crowd, albeit 
most wearing face masks, and when we arrived at the privately owned field on which the 
rally was scheduled, a stall had been set up selling locally grown pears and vegetables. Of 
course, it was the giant stage that had been set up in the front of the farmers’ field that 
caught one’s attention. A small staircase ran up the side with banners up top stating “10.9 
Total National Rally” (10.9 zenkoku sōkekki shūkai), and above it: “Anti-Nuclear Energy, 
Preventing the Confiscation of Farmland” (genpatsu hantai, nōchi toriage soshi). Along 
one side of the field, a metal wall several meters high had been constructed, above which 
the kōan could be seen peering through binoculars and cameras. Down below, protesters 
sat on collapsible stools, newspapers, or plastic sheets. Their own organizational or union 
banners were standing on poles stuck in the soil, forming a dense array of swaying colors. 
The demonstrators had divided into three rowed sections facing the front, which could be 
distinguished by the blue helmets of the “Liberation Faction” (Shaseido Kaihōha), the red 
helmets of the “Communist League” (Kyōsanshugisha Dōmei), and the white helmets of 
 485 
the “Japan Revolutionary Communist League” (Nihon Kakumeiteki Kyōsanshugisha 
Dōmei) known as the Chūkakuha. None of them, notably, seemed to get along with one 
another.12 When the Sanya Sōgidan leader (of the “Liberation Faction”) rose to speak, the 
Zengakuren leader could be seen snickering off to the side. In fact, Zengakuren members 
made no secret of the factionalism that divided the three main groups, stating without any 
scruple that the political agendas of the “red helmets” (aka heru) and “blue helmets” (ao 
heru) were “… not so good” (amari yokunai). Nonetheless, the factions were presumably 
gathered as one in the abstracted figure of the number of people present, ‘1,045,’. This 
was a figure that was invariably announced at the end of symposiums, and taken as a sign 
of support along with the amount of cash raised from that day’s donations. 
While the speeches progressed, the Chūkakuha representative living in Sanrizuka 
spoke to me of recent developments. It was common practice for the Chūkakuha to “send 
in” (okurikomu) members, ostensibly to help locals fight the state in conflict-ridden zones 
– be it Sanrizuka, Okinawa, or Fukushima – and thus, Jinokawa-san, a 180-centimer tall, 
silent intellectual type in his early thirties with a stutter and glasses, yet fearless in actual 
conflict with police, had been sent to aid Hagiwara-san, Shitō-san and Kitahara-san of the 
Hantai Dōmei.13 Like other Zengakuren members, Jinokawa-san had “graduated” (sotsu-
gyō) from his student activities. As he himself had said prior to his deployment, he would 
“go anywhere” (doko demo iku) asked, and hence, he had been sent to Sanrizuka, where 
                                                
12 For a brief history of the factionalism dividing the New-Left, see Nakano Hiroshi, We Live on the Rail-
way: Railway Struggle Against Privatization, trans. International Solidarity Committee of Doro Chiba 
(Chiba: Workers’ Learning Center, Doro-Chiba, 2003) and Dowsey, Zengakuren: Japan’s Revolutionary 
Students. In “The University Problem,” in Zengakuren: Japan’s Revolutionary Students, Kokubun Yutaka 
writes of helmets that “Apart from the original purpose of protecting the head of the wearer, these helmets 
also have the function of identification and help promote a feeling of solidarity amongst members of a 
group” (115). 
13 Hantai Dōmei refers to the remainder of the Sanrizuka-Shibayama Union to Oppose the Airport (Sanri-
zuka-Shibayama Rengō Kūkō Hantai-Dōmei), after its formation in 1966, and its split in 1983. 
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he was said to be “trusted” (shinyō sareteru) by the Hantai Dōmei, and where, aside from 
organizing demonstrations and symposiums, he helped with farming. Thus, he explained 
how 50 supporters of the Hantai Dōmei were arrested at the Tokyo High Court that May, 
for refusing to disperse after the judge dismissed their appeal.14 As a consequence of this 
dismissal, on August 6th, when “everyone” (minna) was in Hiroshima, the old “solidarity 
hut” (danketsu koya) – “Tenjinmine Location Headquarters” (Tenjinmine Genchi Honbu), 
constructed in 1966 – was demolished. Jinokawa-san, who worked on Shitō-san’s fields, 
went on to explain that Shitō-san’s house had been cut off from his fields, by a runway no 
less, forcing him to drive around to reach them. So too, the walls surrounding Shitō-san’s 
house had been built so low that the noise and exhaust fumes from passing airplanes went 
right in. Of course, Shitō-san himself had used these walls to set up the signboards visible 
from passing airplanes. A camera had been placed overlooking his fields to survey when 
the riot police were not at their posts. And some twenty kōan cars circled around the area, 
following the farmers and Jinokawa-san around, even in everyday tasks like driving to 
the supermarket. 
The speeches lasted a good two hours, with an opening and main address from the 
Hantai Dōmei. Representatives of each of the main groups composing the three factions 
spoke. Gathered from around the nation, some had even driven from Hiroshima to attend 
that day and the following day, at an anti-nuclear protest in Fukushima. Consequently, as 
was the case at these gatherings, the speeches functioned simultaneously as an expression 
of support for the cause at hand, and as an – invariably – traumatizing barometer of labor 
developments from around the nation. Ultimately united in their struggle against the state, 
                                                
14 Zenshinsha, “Sanrizuka Gentō Honbu Saiban de Karishikkō tsuki Hanketsu Kyōkō, 50 Nin Taiho! Zettai 
Yurusanai!”, 21/5/2011. 
 487 
and against “neoliberalism” (shinjiyūshugi) as the object of “historical recognition” (jidai 
ninshiki), speakers, as always, had the effect of riling the audience. For it was “anger” 
(ikari) that was said to motivate “laborers” (rōdōsha). In this way, statements by speakers 
frequently met with responses of affirmation – “that’s right!!” (sōda!!) – of outrage at the 
state – “nonsense!!” (nansensu!!) – and of clapping, especially when speakers announced 
a successful or planned “strike” (sutoraiki), or when well-known union leaders, such as 
Chairman Tanaka of Dōrō-Chiba, took to the stage.15 The Sanya Sōgidan representative 
met with little applause, yet spoke of how they had “lost buddies” (nakama ga nakunatta) 
to nuclear labor. Opposition to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) was expressed as one 
with the fight to preserve Sanrizuka.16 But it was the Dōrō-Mito union representative who 
stole the show, recounting how Japan Railways was requiring them to run the Jōban line 
trains within 20 km of the Fukushima nuclear plant, merely to demonstrate their presence. 
On the basis of the state declaring the area “safe” (anzen), workers had simply been told 
to carry out their duties. In addition, a train that had been lying idle for six months within 
                                                
15 Tanaka Yasuhiro succeeded to the leadership of Dōrō-Chiba after Nakano Hiroshi, the former Chairman, 
passed away in 2010. For a history of Dōrō-Chiba’s long-standing partnership with the Chūkakuha, and its 
collaboration in the “Sanrizuka Struggle,” see Hiroshi Nakano, We Live on the Railway. Nakano himself 
writes of anger at the workplace, or as it is translated, “workshop”: “The very core of workshop struggle is 
anger against capital, in case of national railway workers’ struggle, the JNR management. It is absolutely 
impossible for workers who have no indignation against capital to fight workshop struggle. Another basis 
of workshop struggle is resentment against the corrupt union bureaucrats that are responsible for the miser-
able situation of labor movement” (27 – 28). See Nakano Hiroshi, We Live on the Railway, pg. 30 – 48 for 
an account of how Dōrō-Chiba participated in the Sanrizuka struggle by refusing to transport jet fuel to the 
airport. Nakano writes of Tomura Issaku, legendary president of the Hantai Dōmei or “Opposition League” 
endorsing Dōrō-Chiba in the late 1970s: “He summarized the essence of the labor-farmer solidarity in a 
brief sentence: “The District Chiba fights with railroad as a weapon, while the Opposition League fights 
with land as its weapon. It makes labor-farmer solidarity”” (48). For further readings on Dōrō-Chiba, see 
Nakano Hiroshi, Oretachi wa Tetsuro ni Ikiru 2: Dōrō-Chiba no Rekishi to Kyōkun (Chiba: Rōdōsha Gaku-
shū Center, 2003), and Oretachi wa Tetsuro ni Ikiru 3: Dōrō-Chiba no Tatakai (Chiba: Rōdōsha Gakushū 
Center, 2007). 
16 Because it would remove tariffs on farm products, TPP negotiations met with vociferous opposition from 
the Japanese farm sector. 
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the irradiated zone was being reinstated without any radiation check-up, nor any effort to 
decontaminate. Hence, Dōrō-Mito had gone on “strike” (sutoraiki).17 
When the speeches concluded, preparations were made for the demonstration. The 
helmets went on and the microphones, speakers, banners, and drums came out. Someone 
announced from the makeshift podium: “This is a demonstration action that cuts through 
the construction area of taxiway #3!!” (daisan yūdōro kōji kuiki o jūdan suru demo kōshi 
de arimasu!!). The ultimate end of the protest, as one speaker had shouted, was “to stake 
the body, and to repel the riot police!” (karada o hatte, kid ōtai o gekitai suru koto desu!). 
Kitahara himself had asserted that, “until we grasp victory, we can absolutely not give in. 
Sanrizuka can definitely be won!” (shōri o nigiru made wa zettai ni kushicya iken. sanri-
zuka wa kanarazu kateru!). Thus, as somebody shouted out the “slogan-calls” (shupurehi 
kōru) for the day’s protest, the participants repeated by shouting in turn: 
Let’s unite and do our best!! Do our best!! Do our best!! (danketsu shite gam-
barō!! gambarō!! gambarō!!) 
We will obstruct the construction of taxiway #3!! (daisan yūdōro kensetsu o soshi 
suru zo!!) 
We will preserve Shitō-san’s farmland!! (shitō-san no nōchi o mamorinuku zo!!) 
We will obstruct the restart of nuclear power plants!! (saikido soshi suru zo!!) 
Crush the confiscation of Shitō-san’s farmland!! (shitō-san no nōchi toriage, fun-
sai!!) 
Oppose nuclear power plants for nuclear armamanent!! (kakubusō no tame no 
genpatsu, hantai!!) 
We will crush the neoliberal attack!! (shinjiyūshugi kōgeki o funsai suru zo!!) 
Farmers, fishers, laborers, let’s unite and fight!! (nōmin, gyomin, rōdōsha wa 
rentai shite tatakao!!) 
We will triumph!! We will triumph!! We will triumph!! (shōri suru zo! shōri suru 
zo! shōri suru zo!!) 
We will preserve Shitō-san’s farmland!! (shitō-san no nōchi o mamorinuku zo!!) 
Let’s unite and do our best!! Do our best!! Do our best!! (danketsu shite gam-
barō!! gambarō!! gambarō!!) 
 
                                                
17 Gōdō Ippan Rōdō Kumiai Zenkoku Kyōgikai, “JR Mito Shisha Kōgi! Dōrō Mito Gekirei no Torikumi 
Yōsei! Hōshanō ni Osen Sareta Sharyō o, 10 Gatsu 9 Ka ni Katsuta Sharyō Sentā Made Isō Suru Koto ni 
Danko Hantai Shimasu!”, 6/10/2011. 
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Led by members of the Hantai-Dōmei, participants thus took to the empty roads flanking 
the taxiways, leading from Shitō-san’s house to his farmlands. Yet, save for the hundreds 
and hundreds of kidōtai lining the streets and walking beside the demonstrators, keeping 
them in line, and the swarming kōan with their notepads and cameras, there was no one 
around to hear the cries of the demonstrators. Off to the sides, masses of kidōtai could be 
seen doing training exercises, as if training for war.  
As a matter of course, the Chūkakuha had brought along their own cameraman to 
document the day. Virtually indistinguishable from one of many kōan photographers who 
also positioned themselves alongside the oncoming demonstrators, the Chūkakuha photos 
would later accompany articles in the Chūkakuha newspaper Zenshin. Videos might even 
make it onto youtube. But it was to the state that the cries of victory – “We will triumph!! 
We will triumph!! We will triumph!!” – were addressed. Indeed, any youtube search for 
Zengakuren or Chūkakuha will reveal short disparate clips with viewers in the thousands; 
in fact, a Chūkakuha search is more likely to locate a clip of the Zaittokai confronting the 
Chūkakuha numbering viewers in the hundreds of thousands, posted by the Zaittokai. Nor, 
for that matter, was it uncommon for demonstrations to take place in completely deserted 
locations, like the empty backstreets of Fukushima City, on a holiday no less, where no 
one would hear anything. Naturally, this lack of attention was in the interest of the state, 
which circumscribed the activities of the far left and thereby prevented them from form-
ing anything nearly resembling an unruly crowd. When the Zengakuren joined the newly 
arisen anti-nuclear masses, it was common for the newspapers to downplay the number of 
participants, as they received their figures from the police.18 
                                                
18 Of course, the collusion between the mass media and state to downplay numbers of demonstrators is not 
specific to Japan. 
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Given the paltry number of Zengakuren members, it had, in fact, become policy to 
“protect” (mamoru) members and participants from arrest. This imperative had ostensibly 
arisen by way of losing two leaders to six months of incarceration, altogether weakening 
the group: an experience the Zengakuren were loath to repeat. No doubt, some assurance 
was also necessary for outsiders, for it was all too apparent that the overwhelming kidōtai 
could crush demonstrations in one fell swoop. One way of protecting participants, Dafuka 
claimed, was never to publish the names of demonstrators alongside photos that appeared 
of them in Zenshin. Naturally this referred mainly to participants coming from outside the 
Zengakuren, for many of the Zengakuren members published in Zenshin under their real 
names. In fact, wariness of the kōan seemed to attend all meetings with the Zengakuren. 
One was escorted out of general meetings by a Zengakuren member since the kōan were 
on surveillance outside, either in a car or standing on the sidewalk. When large gatherings 
were held, lookouts would therefore call to say which subway entrances to avoid. Indeed, 
on my first meeting with Dafuka-san, he told me to wait in seclusion because a kōan was 
following him. Hence, when the Chūkakuha held its biannual general meeting in a rented 
hall, I had to arrive with sunglasses, surgical mask, and a hat. And I had to travel to the 
hall itself in a group because it was hazardous to go alone, given the hundreds of kōan 
who were invariably gathered outside, ready to stick a camera in one’s face. Leaving the 
hall was even more of a hassle, as the couple hundred participants could not leave singly. 
They had to shuffle out in small groups forming a mass of individuals in surgical masks 
and sunglasses, many without an inch of their head showing. Matching the image of the 
fearsome “radical” (kageki) propagated by the state, they thus went to the train station in 
broad daylight. These masked processions had been organized from start to finish. Even 
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train tickets had been purchased in advance, handed out in the hall, and everyone boarded 
the same train. It was also discouraged for anyone to exit the train or train stations alone, 
and it was only inside the trains that the masks slowly came off to reveal faces behind the 
anonymous horde that had suddenly swarmed into and filled the compartments. 
It was only individuals with prior conviction records, like the former Zengakuren 
leader, Oda Yōsuke, who did not seem to care about being seen, and hence led the groups 
without face masks. For the consequences of being identified could be severe. This usual-
ly began with the kōan contacting one’s workplace, asking if they employed so-and-so, 
and informing the company of one’s activities. If things got more serious, the kōan might 
pay one a visit at home and ask to come inside. It also happened that Zengakuren students 
received phone calls from the kōan discouraging them from participating. Notably, one of 
the more weathered Chūkakuha participants had made it a practice to stand with a banner 
outside his company to protest its actions every morning. And he seemed to take pleasure 
in knowing the company would be notified of his actions, causing them, rather than him-
self, an inconvenience. Although he was married with children, this man in his forties 
explained that he did not take risks that might justify his dismissal, or for that matter, his 
transference to another prefecture. He merely grinned self-assuredly that his bosses were 
contacted every time he attended a demonstration.19 
However, there did exist a generalized fear of the figure of the “radical” (kageki). 
In accordance with this fear, the slightest similarity or contiguity with radical groups was 
                                                
19 The first paragraph of this man’s handout says: “While the world’s great depression proceeds full-blown, 
and while the bankruptcy of neoliberalism, as the hopelessly prolonging form of imperialism in its final 
stages, destroys society itself, those capitalist rascals are trying to push all sacrifices on the workers, and 
continuing with their useless struggle” (世界大恐慌が本格的に進行し、最末期帝国主義の絶望的延命
形態である新自由主義の破産が、社会そのものを崩壊させていくなかで、資本家どもは、すべて
の犠牲を労働者に押し付けようと、悪あがきを続けています). (MGC, “TPP Kōnai no Subete no 
Rōdōsha no Minasama e”) 
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imagined to pose possibly permanent and destructive consequences for a successful daily 
life.20 By extension, such fear carried the consequence that taking part in union activities 
was generally regarded as the behavior of a “weirdo” (henjin), and was therefore avoided. 
As if such an exclusion constituted the condition of possibility for participation in social 
life, the “radical” (kageki) was said to endanger prospects of hireability, promotion and of 
job security, casting a burden on friends and family. Hence, my friend who was applying 
for a job as a policeman was led to wonder whether my sojourn at his apartment would 
affect his application, since I was commuting from his apartment to the protests. For the 
kōan kept tabs on everyone, he insisted, and computer imaging could identify me through 
the mask. Recalling the factional strife of the ‘60s and ‘70s, others warned that extremists 
were not to be trusted, and to be careful. You never knew what they might do to you! 
 And there was some truth to these statements. Dafuka-san himself explained how 
the Chūkakuha had passed through three stages: the first involved its interfactional strife 
with the Kakumaru, during which some thirty activists were tortured and murdered in the 
‘70s and ‘80s; the second phase involved activities of attacking and bombing government 
buildings in the ‘80s; and its third, current phase, focused on the revival of labor unions.21 
                                                
20 Lacan writes about metaphor and metonym in “The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious, or Reason 
since Freud,” but the notion of contagion by similarity or contiguity can, of course, be traced back at least 
to Sir James George Frazer writing on magic in The Golden Bough: A Study in Magic and Religion (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2009). On his blog, William Andrews writes of a raid conducted on the 
Chūkakuha in June, 2015, on account of supposed “benefit fraud”: “As usual, these new raids were typical-
ly performative – with police putting on a show of force for the cameras of the press, who were notified in 
advance, and the activists futilely protesting the search with placards. All this increases public fear of such 
groups – invariably labelled kagekiha (extremist or radical faction) by the media, the same word used for 
ISIS – so much so that any “legal” or “genuine” activism is tainted by association. This led one film distri-
bution company to withdraw a documentary about children in Fukushima after it emerged that a subject in 
the film was a member of Chūkaku-ha and that a clinic briefly featured in the film is also backed by the 
group.” See William Andrews, “Chūkaku-ha Base Raided by Police on Suspicion of Links to Non-Profit 
Organisation, Alleged Benefit Fraud,” on Throw Out Your Books, 4/6/2015. 
21 This third phase focused, then, on struggles at the “workplace,” or “workshop,” as Nakano Hiroshi writes 
in We Live on the Railway: “First of all, workshop struggle is essentially a battle for the hegemony over the 
workshop. It is a struggle for labor union to gain the control over the workshop, and consequently a severe 
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Notably, Dafuka-san himself was in his early thirties, and could not have lived through 
the Chūkakuha’s previous phases. The admission of murder and bombing was said with a 
hint of embarrassment, though Dafuka-san quickly added that it constituted a sign of how 
“seriously” (shinken ni) the Chūkakuha had fought “capital” (shihon), that is, to the point 
of taking arms. 
Dafuka-san was as committed as the Zengakuren came. He unflinchingly referred 
to himself as a “communist” (kyōsanshugisha), and introduced the Zengakuren in an 
email declaring that they were dedicated to “fundamentally changing society” (shakai o 
konponteki ni kaeru). Usually sleep-deprived with chapped lips and pimples, Dafuka-san 
would smoke while sipping coffee during our secret meetings at McDonald’s or Denny’s. 
Invariably dressed in plain cotton slacks and generic black shoes, it was his collared shirt, 
with sleeves rolled up in a bundle above his elbows, that gave him the distinctive air of an 
uniformed communist ready for action, along with a shoulder-bag, filled to the brim with 
handouts, pamphlets, magazines, and newspapers. It was a “hobby” (shumi) of his to cut 
and paste newspaper clippings from all the available newspapers at Zenshinsha, and thus, 
on every occasion we met, he would hand me a stack of stapled photocopies that tracked 
immediate developments ranging from the Arab Spring and American military activities 
in the Middle East, to Japanese politics, the status of U.S. military bases in Okinawa, TPP, 
radiation leakage from Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, recent statements by so-
called “scientists in the employ of the state” (goyōgakusha), the emergence of thyroid 
cancer in children of Fukushima, and activities of the ILWU in the U.S., etc. Interspersed 
                                                                                                                                            
factional struggle, in other words, a violent political strife between two antagonistic forces. Factional strug-
gle is not just the conflicts between the Socialist Party or between the Kakumaru and the Chukaku and 
something like that. Factional struggle in its fundamental form is a struggle between labor and capital.” 
(27).  
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with photos of the ravaged Fukushima nuclear plant, military airplanes flying to Okinawa, 
citizens in violent confrontation with the state, and war, the seemingly endless stacks of 
clippings gave expression to a world endlessly traumatized by capitalism, the debt for 
which had to be paid. Every time we met, we would flip through this bundle of clippings, 
while Dafuka-san smoked cigarettes and indicated points of outrage or interest in specific 
articles. An embittered theoretician and strategist who inquired into the “course of action” 
(hōshin) of the Occupy Wall Street movement, Dafuka-san’s voice would rise to a pitch 
of anger when he spoke. In fact, it took me one year to discover that he was married and 
had two children in Sendai, where he said his student activities had started alongside Oda 
Yōsuke, the former leader of the Zengakuren. Indeed, he rarely saw his wife and children. 
His wife’s parents were understanding of his activities, he said, since they had been part 
of the student uprisings in the ‘60s. Yet, Dafuka-san was clearly risking his marriage and 
family for the “movement” (undō). Living off “donations” (kampa), he said it was not his 
place to go easy on himself as an activist, seeking to change a society in which it was no 
longer possible to live as “human beings” (ningen). Nor was it characteristic of activists, 
Dafuka-san related, to be “happy” (happī). The former chairman of Dōrō-Chiba, Nakano 
Hiroshi, had achieved incredible things – at the cost, however, of nearly losing his family. 
I was to learn of Dafuka-san’s personal life on a rare evening in which he came to Sanya, 
and joined me for drinks in front of Mutō-san’s hole-in-the-wall. Unfazed, for a good part 
of the evening Dafuka-san sat face-to-face with Akia, the emperorist: 
When Dafuka arrived at the corner bar, Akia had been real excited, spreading out 
chairs and saying that he was gonna learn something. I was almost embarrassed 
at the forthrightness with which he addressed Dafuka, telling him not to try and 
convince people of this or that, and as the evening moved on, to “enlarge” (haba 
hiroku) his experiences. Dafuka seemed to warm to Akia, with liquor in him. 
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Dafuka had already softened upon coming out of the station. That evening, he ex-
plained how he’d met his wife, whose father was also an activist. She’d been com-
ing to his gatherings in Sendai. Dafuka is originally from Fukuoka, but he’d gone 
to Sendai for university. Hadn’t really attended any classes, he said. Back then, 
through his activities with unions that liked younger students, he’d been drinking 
and having fun more often, but not since coming to Tokyo. His daughters, one of 
whose name is “Love” (Ai) – because if anything, Dafuka said, love is important, 
so his wife and him had decided on this name – are going to be four years old in 
September. They’d been born right after he had come to Tokyo. He commented on 
his relations with his wife, saying it wouldn’t be a surprise if she asked for a di-
vorce at any time. He had not been there, either, when the children had been born. 
Describing his wife’s sentiment then, with the word “unforgivable” (yurusenai). 
That he hadn’t been there. Every three months, though, he goes to Sendai. His 
wife had actually been at the 7.16 gathering, but she’d had to stay outside the pa-
rade on account of the baby carts. Akia’s face had dropped while talking to Dafu-
ka, when the latter said his wife was working regularly, i.e. suggesting that she 
was earning while he was not. 
 
We’d moved from the outside drinkery to the Chinese place, where Dafuka spoke 
briefly of something vis-à-vis self-abnegation, stating that it doesn’t really make a 
difference to him if he doesn't get any sleep, etc. I remember feeling slightly 
stunned at the abandon and indifference with which he said this. It seemed to of-
fer only a glimmer of the disdain he holds for certain things … care of the self, for 
instance. He asserted that, at least through his forties, he would dedicate himself 
completely to revolutionary activity. He said, as if conscious of himself, that those 
in the center of revolutionary activity are not “happy” (happī). It was as if he was 
saying that they were NOT supposed to be happy. In that moment, he cut the fig-
ure of the activist who would give up everything for the cause. 
 
I’d asked why it was they didn’t drink or have a good time, on occasion, in the 
Zenshinsha, and Dafuka admitted that it was quite nerve-wracking to live there. 
Four to five times per year, the police take a chainsaw to the doors, break into the 
building, and conduct full body searches of those inside, checking cellphones, etc. 
Finally, Dafuka also noted how they are living off “donations” (kampa) and thus, 
as the organizer of student activities, he urges everyone to be as “stoic” (sutoiku) 
as possible. He also expressed the heavy sense of responsibility he felt since they 
were living off donations. The responsibility to conduct “revolutionary activities” 
(kakumei undō). Thus, he said he finds himself working from morning to evening, 
writing or preparing for this and that “meeting” (kaigi).22 
                                                
22 August 10th, 2012, edited journal entry. In 2015, Dafuka-san was arrested for imprisoning a Zengakuren 
student for seven days in a solitary room within the confines of Zenshinsha, and for pushing this student off 
the five-story roof when he attempted to escape. The Zengakuren charged that the student had been a “spy” 
(supai), working for the kōan, while the news reported that the purpose of the imprisonment was to subject 
the student to political “self-criticism” (jikohihan). Whether the charges were true or a “set-up” (decchiage), 
as the Chūkakuha claimed, the event of the arrest was televised. News reportage showed riot police putting 
a chainsaw to the doors of Zenshinsha, and kōan emerging with Dafuka-san from within Zenshinsha amidst 
scores of riot police. This arrest was followed by further news reportage of kōan and riot police descending 
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It was as if Dafuka-san, like so many of the Zengakuren, was citing directly from 
Nakano Hiroshi, who himself writes in We Live on the Railway:  
I consider it most important to build up a group of devoted and class-conscious 
union activists. To be devoted means to sacrifice all one’s private time for union 
activities. For a married worker, it is needed to put priority to union activities be-
fore his family life. That is the implication of devotion to union activities.23 
 
Implicit in the self-evidence of “his” – as if all unionists were necessarily men – and the 
notion that the properly “class-conscious” unionists should be prepared to “sacrifice” not 
only his “private time,” but his “family life” for the cause, Nakano imports and replicates 
the patriarchal family model in his union. Of course, it should be observed that members 
of Dōrō-Chiba were primarily men on account of Japan Railway’s hiring practices. Yet, 
gender constituted a long-standing problem for the “radical” (kageki) left. David E. Apter 
and Nagayo Sawa write of Tomura Issaku and Kitahara Kōji, both leaders of the Hantai 
Dōmei in Sanrizuka in the ‘70s and ‘80s, that: “He depends heavily, as Tomura did, on 
the active support of his wife. Although in principle both men saw the Sanrizuka struggle 
movement as a way of liberating women, their practice in the home fell short.”24 Nakano 
                                                                                                                                            
en masse on Zengakuren campus offices in Kyoto, Hiroshima, and Sendai. It should be observed, however, 
that the timing of these state actions occurred precisely during the Abe administration’s passage of security 
bills that enable Japan to wage war, thereby stigmatizing the “radical” (kageki) left when opposition to state 
was most vociferous among the general populace. Sure enough, Dafuka-san was released few months after 
his arrest. 
23 Nakano, We Live on the Railway, pg. 29. In fact, when I asked members of the Chūkakuha about gender 
equality, Dafuka-san and others gave the example of Dōrō-Chiba’s Sunday family gathering as an instance 
of gender inclusiveness. Under normal circumstances, Japan’s atrocious gender equality record would have 
constituted a point of negativity which would have fueled the Zengakuren’s “anger” (ikari). In 2014, Japan 
numbered 104th out of 142 nations in the World Economic Forum’s gender gap index, yet, this social issue 
was absent from the Chūkakuha discourse. See “Gender Equality Goal for 2020 Elusive: White Paper,” in 
The Japan Times, 19/6/2015. Notably, positing gender equality goals, and other goals, like carbon emission 
reduction or suicide prevention, recalls Rancière’s observation in The Philosopher and His Poor that: “To 
pose equality as a goal is to hand it over to the pedagogues of progress, who widen endlessly the distance 
they promise they will abolish. Equality is a presupposition, an initial axiom – or it is nothing” (223). 
24 Apter and Sawa, Against the State: Politics and Social Protest in Japan, pg. 31. Apter and Sawa write of 
the “sects” at Sanrizuka in the 1980s: “The majority of the solidarity huts and fortresses are manned by 
“cadres,” which range in size from about five members to forty-five. The cadres are generally posted from 
central headquarters, particularly in the case of the larger sects. There are very few women, but in several 
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writes of how it was before “300 workers and their families” that he delivered “the most 
impressive speech in my life from the bottom of my heart,” and of how, at the conclusion 
of this speech, a “certain chief of local remarked, “You needn’t tell us such a severe story 
in the presence of our wives. Don’t worry. I’ve already made up my mind.””25 And while 
some of the most active Zengakuren members were women who had been expelled from 
Hōsei University, the leadership of Zengakuren, not to mention of the Chūkakuha, whose 
bureaucratic echelons Dafuka-san had entered, were primarily composed of men. 
Perhaps driven partly by the thought of his family, whom he had practically given 
up to stay in the Chūkakuha, Dafuka-san’s sense of obligation seemed to have taken him 
to the brink of exhaustion. Whenever we met, he was sleep-deprived, either from having 
come back from a faraway demonstration or symposium, or from writing to meet article 
deadlines for Zenshin. Always smoking away with a pale expression, it was as if Dafuka-
san had driven himself into the place of the worker who could not live “as a human being” 
(ningen to shite). Nothwithstanding his humility, this exhaustion could not be uncoupled 
from the intimation of power that attended the way in which he explained the necessity of 
forming a single “party” (tō) – describing a pillar with a gesture of his hand – to lead the 
labor movement in Japan. It was as if Dafuka-san’s fatigue furnished the justification for 
the party, for, as Rancière writes: “Fatigue demands that the workers be represented by a 
                                                                                                                                            
of the most important sects a woman has had major responsibilities under a top male leader. She looks after 
relations with the farmers, farmers’ wives and families, and visitors, and is responsible for general man-
agement and organization. These women tend to be exceptionally intelligent, with a long history of militant 
participation. Most are divorced or separated from their husbands” (129). Of the Hantai Dōmei, they con-
tinue: “Perhaps the most perplexing problem for all these groups and the Hantai Dōmei is the future of the 
role of women. It was not only Ōki Yone who set an example. The women who visited from the Kita-Fuji 
movement taught the Sanrizuka women their techniques of violent protest, such as chaining themselves to 
bulldozers or trees, and standing well in front of the men in confrontations with the police so they took the 
first blows. In some families, including quite traditional ones, such actions had the effect of changing basic 
family relationships, particularly those between husbands and wives” (192). 
25 Nakano, We Live on the Railway, pg. 75 – 76. 
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party. At the same time it demands that this party absolutely not represent them since 
they are pure passivity and it must be pure act.”26 Indeed, if there was one precept which 
the Chūkakuha promulgated, it was to “unite!” (danketsu!) and “fight!” (tatakau!) against 
the state and “capital” (shihon). And Dafuka-san was the ultimate strategist, theoretician, 
and philosopher of this confrontation. 
Of course, Dafuka-san seemed to be aware that the moment of world “revolution” 
(kakumei) was not lurking around the corner. If he spoke of revolution on the public train, 
it was with an emphatic whisper. Unlike younger members of the Zengakuren, who truly 
seemed to believe in the imminence of world revolution and were embarrassed when, a 
few years later, it had not yet happened, Dafuka-san would say that he wished some day 
to act as a student leader, as they had done back in the ‘60s and ‘70s. Yet, when pushed to 
describe society after revolution, Dafuka-san was ready to relay that, in the “commune” 
(komyūn), capitalist profit-making would be forbidden; it would, in effect, be based on a 
prohibition. When I asked about the commodity-form, he explained hesitantly that tokens 
would take their place. And when the number of Zengakuren members swelled by single 
digits, this was invariably interpreted as a sign of changing times. Indeed, for Dafuka-san 
and the Zengakuren, the “world economic crisis” (sekai daikyōko) signalled that the capi-
talist system was approaching the “limit” (genkai) at which laborers would rise up. Thus, 
                                                
26 Rancière, The Philosopher and His Poor, pg. 140. As if to explain the isolation which encompassed the 
radical left, Rancière continues: “So it is logical that the party, in its directives and watchwords, does not 
take account of the needs of those workers whose needs it expresses. But it is also completely logical that 
they, in turn, do not feel the need to obey the watchwords of the party that expresses their needs. Thus, on 
28 May 1952 the working class did not appear at the demonstrations organized by its party against General 
Ridgeway’s arrival in Paris. The pure act of the party had then to become street theater: a demonstration put 
on by party hardliners for the masses about what they should have done if they had not remained precisely 
what they are – the masses. The party had performed for the masses their own power so that they might 
forget their fatigue. But the masses were too tired to be represented by such power, thereby confirming in 
the most striking way that the solitude of the party is indeed their unique power” (140). 
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the specter of worldwide economic unevenness gave impetus to the fantasy of a (violent) 
end to the endless everyday.27 
More than anything, it was the state’s guilt in causing the death of workers which 
triggered the insistent cries of the Zengakuren. When Japan Railways (JR) demanded that 
trains be run at higher speeds, Dōrō-Chiba refused to do so; increasing the speed of trains 
risked not only the lives of workers, but that of the passengers. Likewise, when two long-
distance buses crashed in 2012 (on account of driver sleep-deprivation), the Zengakuren 
located the cause of the incident in the deregulatory pressures implicit to “neoliberalism” 
(shinjiyūshugi), rather than in the driver’s negligence. The emergence of so-called “black 
businesses” (burakku kigyō), known for making laborers work overtime without pay and 
firing laborers in contravention of labor laws, angered the Zengakuren all the more. And 
when actual deaths were reported as stemming from adminstrative negligence, sighs and 
shouts of anger would rise from the audience, as if they had always known it would occur. 
The irradiated train compartment that Dōrō-Mito refused to operate was regarded – quite 
rightly – as a thing that would kill children. Needless to say, it was thus the tsunami and 
“human-made disaster” (jinsai) at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant of March 11, 
2011, that sparked not only the outrage of the Zengakuren, but in their isolation, the hope 
of solidarity with the newly arisen anti-nuclear movement. But much as the Zengakuren 
protested on the same streets as the anti-nuclear masses and much as they made friends of 
personages like the actor, nuclear activist and politician Yamamoto Tarō (known for the 
central role he acted in the 2000 movie, Battle Royale), and other important figures in the 
anti-nuclear movement, such as Satō Sachiko and Shiina Chieko, it was obvious that the 
                                                
27 Yoda, “A Roadmap to Millennial Japan,” pg. 34 - 35. See also Iida, “Between the Technique of Living 
an Endless Routine and the Madness of Absolute Degree Zero: Japanese Identity and the Crisis of Moder-
nity in the 1990s.” 
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Zengakuren constituted an exception in the crowd. With its fantasy of “violent revolution” 
(bōryoku kakumei) and all-too-heavy language of anti-Stalinism and anti-imperialism, the 
Zengakuren stood out from an anti-nuclear movement that was avowedly “without party” 
(mutōha), and hence, ostensibly without political affiliation. The negative implications of 
this lack of affiliation had to be disavowed by the Zengakuren, in turn, which proceeded 
to say that the anti-nuclear masses could not identify with any one party, and had taken it 
upon themselves to change society by organizing from below. Indeed, having become the 
“actors” (shujinkō) of society, the anti-nuclear movement coincided with the 
Chūkakuha’s vision of the revolutionary masses of which the Chūkakuha itself desired to 
be the representative. Any sign of weakness, or rather, of the lack of solidarity, had to be 
deflected into a demonstration of resolve. 
Yet, there was also a distinct sense in which precisely the isolation of the “radical” 
(kageki) left confirmed its practices. The absence of solidarity with the nuclear movement 
had to be disavowed, but disavowed with a conceit in which a gap emerged between the 
masses, unversed in the ways of demonstration, and the weathered Chūkakuha who knew 
that “violence” (bōryoku) was necessary to fight the state.28 It was not simply solidarity, 
                                                
28 In “Kakumaru – Analysis of an Ultra-radical Group,” in Zengakuren: Japan’s Revolutionary Students, 
Nakanishi Masahiro lists certain foreign loanwords that were naturalized in the language of the radical left, 
including geba, another word for the Japanese bōryoku (violence). Writing in 1970, Nakanishi’s description 
suggests a corollary between the excess of violence – in demonstrations – and that of the amplified voice: 
“The most important words in this new lexicon were ‘geba’, ‘demo’, ‘suto’, aji’, ‘barikedo’ and ‘shupure-
hikoru’. Nearly all of these words are the short renderings of some foreign loan word which has been in-
corporated into Japanese. Central to the whole anti-Yoyogi movement is the word ‘geba’. It derives from 
the German word ‘gewalt’, which is pronounced ‘gebaruto’ in Japanese, and means power, authority or 
violence as is associated with an act of God. In the student meaning, it is divine violence in the revolution-
ary struggle. There are many other words which stem from it. There is a verb ‘gebaru’, to make revolution-
ary violence, and the ‘gebabo’, which we introduced already, which is a geba-stick. Internal fighting be-
tween factions within campus is called ‘inner-geba’ or ‘uchigeba’ while street fighting with the police is 
‘outer-geba’ or ‘sotogeba’. This word caught the public fancy so much that a new television comedy pro-
gram, which started in 1969, was called ‘Geba Geba’. ‘Demo’ is the short form for demonstration, ‘aji’ for 
agitate and both of these can become verbs by adding ‘-ru’ to them. ‘Suto’ comes from the English strike 
and there is a compound word ‘hansuto’ which means hunger strike. ‘Barikedo’ is quite simply barricade 
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but the desire to lead the masses that prompted the Chūkakuha to action, and that, indeed, 
necessitated this action as the marker of their difference and entitlement. The passivity of 
anti-nuclear movement, which lost momentum only few years later while the Chūkakuha 
continued to fight as before, established the necessity of party leadership. In this respect, 
Rancière writes: “the solitude of the party clearly proved what, in any case, could not but 
be proved – that it alone makes the proletariat into the negation of worker fatigue.”29 The 
unity propagated by the Chūkakuha was, at once, one of self-entitling division. 
 Hence, the 10.9 Sanrizuka demonstration concluded with the protestors forming a 
string on the paths lining Shitō-san’s farmland, encompassed by the walls of the airport, 
and in a final sign of “unity” (danketsu), thrusting their fists in the air to the slogan: “We 
will obstruct the construction of taxiway #3!! (daisan yūdōro kensetsu o soshi suru zo!!). 
When, two years later, Hagiwara Susumu passed away, his passing was met with a no 
less emphatic assertion of solidarity: 
The Hantai-Dōmei has truly taken a serious blow. However, those left behind 
would be laughed at by Susumu-san if they were defeated at that. Receiving sup-
port from everyone all over the nation and overcoming the sorrow, we will pro-
ceed by increasingly hardening our resolve. The Hantai-Dōmei has held an Ex-
ecutive Officer’s Meeting and has resolved on the course of holding a local series 
of actions in the March 23 – 26 struggle. We will fight and follow in the footsteps 
of Hagiwara Susumu-san by even further strengthening our solidarity with Fuku-
shima, Okinawa, and labor unions and citizen movements spearheaded by Dōrō-
Chiba, with the motto: ‘marching towards Kasumigaseki.’30 
                                                                                                                                            
… the last word in our list is ‘shupurehikoru’ which is the German word for sprechchor, which means an 
announcer or speaking chorus. This word originated in the Russian practice of having political talks given 
by a group of people and has now come to be associated with the peptalks that group leaders give to the 
students during demonstrations. The ‘shupurehikoru’ is usually made with the aid of a hand-held battery 
powered megaphone. If an impromptu meeting is held with a large number of people, then the microphones 
of many megaphones are placed in front of the one the speaker is using to get better amplification all round” 
(215 – 216). 
29 Rancière, The Philosopher and His Poor, pg. 140. 
30 Zenshinsha, ““Sanrizuka Hata Hirakide, Hagiwara Susumu-san no Ishi o Tsuzuki Nōchi Kessen Shōri o 





Concluding with the slogan of “marching towards Kasumigaseki” – or state headquarters 
in Tokyo – the Hantai-Dōmei’s “resolve” (ketsui) hitherto could not have been sufficient. 
As if it were possible, this resolve requires “increasingly” (masumasu) and “even further” 
(yori) to be strengthened. Moreover, the form of this strengthening of resolve, and of the 
“overcoming” (norikoeru) of loss, consists in “solidarity” (rentai). The Hantai-Dōmei has 
received “support from everyone all over the nation” (zenkoku no minsan no shien) and it 
seeks, above all, to join forces with those other sectors of the nation – Okinawa, and now, 
Fukushima – that have been sacrificed by the state for the economy. Finally, the form of 
this “solidarity” (rentai) is idealized and epitomized in the leadership of the labor union, 
Dōrō-Chiba. Indeed, known to have fought hardest against the “privatization” (mineika) 
of Kokutetsu (now Japan Railways or JR) under Prime Minister Nakasone in ’87, when, 
in England and the U.S., Thatcher and Reagan were likewise enforcing neoliberal reform, 
the militant JR labor union of Chiba prefecture and its former Chairman Nakano Hiroshi 
had achieved legendary status among the Zengakuren for their fight against privatization, 
outsourcing and the “rationalization” (gōrika) of work in favor of part-time workers: that 
is to say, against the “enemy” (teki), neoliberalism. 
 Spearheaded by a labor union, the definitive moment of this march on the state 
would necessitate “violence” (bōryoku). As the Zengakuren’s repeated and ritual return to 
the veritable battlegrounds of Sanrizuka or the Okinawan U.S. military bases suggests, it 
was only through violent confrontation with concrete manifestations of the state that the 
conflict between laborers and the state would be resolved. The march on Kasumigaseki 





entailed “staking the body” (mi o haru) in a “clash” (gekitsotsu) with the kidōtai, the final 
outcome of which would be determined in a “struggle of strength” (jitsuryoku tōsō). 
Demonstrations constituted an instantiation of this impossible apotheosis, the definitive 
moment of which was reenacted repeatedly in the ritual gatherings and the affirmation of 
solidarity. 
 In actuality, however, the line drawn by the state that separated the demonstrators 
from the kidōtai was not transgressed by the Zengakuren themselves. In fact, if arrests did 
occur during demonstrations, they were most often “set up” (decchiage) by the kōan who 
would instigate a scuffle over the line hemming the demonstrators in, and then, pretend to 
be tripped by the protesters.31 The far left was on the defensive, since they could not deny 
that Narita had been constructed. Even though three farms still obstructed construction of 
taxiway #3, the battle to preserve the Sanrizuka of old had been lost. But it was precisely 
this irretrievable, traumatic loss that was constitutive of the protesting subject’s cries and 
the hysterical discourse that these cries instantiated.32 The Hantai-Dōmei, Chūkakuha and 
Zengakuren fantasized an impossible restoration in a violent confrontation with the state. 
Thus, the origin of their movement consisted in their status as symptomatic of capitalism. 
Either bereft of their means of subsistence or threatened to lose these means, the farmer, 
laborer, and fisher verged on losing the loss that was constitutive of general sociality. It 
was thus, that, as the “internal negation” of capitalist production, the voice of the laborer 
unravelled the “very universal rational principle of this totality,” that is, of the equivalent 
                                                
31 See the documentary on Aum Shinrikyō, A, for an instance of such conduct caught on camera. Miyazaki 
Manabu also writes of such police tactics in Toppamono. 
32 As Jacques Lacan observes in The Other Side of Psychoanalysis: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book 
XVII, trans. Russell Grigg (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2007), the hysteric’s discourse revolves 
around an impossible place, as symptom, in the structure of the master’s discourse: “In supposing the for-
malization of discourse and in granting oneself some rules within this formalization that are destined to put 
it to the test, we encounter an element of impossibility. This is what is at the base, the root, of an effect of 
structure” (45). 
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form.33 As this symptomatic cry, the issues to which the Chūkakuha gave representation 
still harbored the possibility of enabling difference, heterogeneity, hospitality, and lateral 
social intercourse through a certain workers’ unity that facilitated mutual recognition. But 
the (threat of) loss was subverted into a compulsion to “solidarity” (rentai) that ultimately 
consisted in a totalizing reference to a counter-discourse which repulsed the disciplinary 
gaze of the state, and in the dream of “overturning” (hikkurigaesu) capitalism, fantasized 
an encounter which was always deferred. Occupying an impossible place, the Chūkakuha 
sought the impossible, in turn. For the very passivity of the laborers in whose place they 
fought mandated their leadership to counteract exhaustion, and only logically implied the 
possibility of overturning or “victory” (shōri). The laborer who is not paid the equivalent 
value of his or her labor constitutes the internal negation of the money form as equivalent 
value, and the possibility of world “unity” (danketsu) in such negativity logically implied 
the possibility of ending capitalism. Yet, the imminence of this world revolution, which 
was endlessly repeated – even in 2010, the Chūkakuha posited this imminence – also had 
to be endlessly deferred, precisely in its imminence, because it was only the gap between 
the fighting Chūkakuha and the passive workers which consolidated the necessity of their 
leadership in isolation – of their very “unity” (danketsu) – and that sustained the privilege 
of their place. Consequently, the cries of the Chūkakuha occupied an endless now-time of 
emergency, in which the exhaustion of the incapacitated workers at once confirmed their 
negativity – on the brink of revolution – and the necessity for the Chūkakuha to take them 
out of their chains. It was a gap which, through the isolated unity of Chūkakuha, also had 
to remain as a gap charged with a negativity that would never be resolved. Indeed, just as 
capitalism was imagined as total and totalizing, the Chūkakuha presented a total front. In 
                                                
33 Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, pg. 23. 
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order to attain certainty, a rule of law had to be enforced. For instance, there was always a 
rebuttal to the suggestion that Sanrizuka was a lost cause: revolution. Then there were 
those who had subverted the movement from within, by selling out the singular value of 
their land to the state, and to the commodity-form. In undoing unity, such former mem-
bers were referred to as “traitors” (uragirimono). In its insistence on “fighting” (tatakau), 
as opposed to “words” (kotoba), the counter-discourse of the far left thereby reproduced 
the exclusive logic of state by which the “radical” (kageki) or “anti-patriot” (hikokumin) 
were expelled from the interior of the nation.34 In its insistence on total victory, the far 
left risked losing the very loss that constituted the truth of their movement. 
 Much as the shameful, overdetermined fact of loss was not mentioned, it was lack 
that compelled the radicalism of the far left. Members of the Zengakuren and Chūkakuha 
were, in fact, painfully aware that the left in Japan, or rather backtalk by the population to 
the state was relatively non-existent. If militant gatherings at Sanrizuka attracted a paltry 
1,000 some individuals, and no one from the general population, the novel anti-nuclear 
demonstrations were said to mark a turning point since more than 10,000 protesters took 
part.35 Such figures were unheard of in recent decades, even if events like the Sumida 
river fireworks festival of August 2012 attracted 900,000 people. Moreover, it was said of 
an imagined Japanese “youth” (wakamono) that it was “indifferent” (mukanshin) to poli-
tics and the issues of radiation raised by the Fukushima nuclear disaster. In contrast to the 
100 members of the Zengakuren, young people were, indeed, conspicuously absent from 
the anti-nuclear crowd. Why was it that, unlike in the USA, where young people flooded 
                                                
34 On decisionism, see Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty. 
35 At the peak of the movement, anti-nuclear demonstrations in Tokyo numbered over 100,000. The actual 
figure of participants was always under contestation, however, as newspapers reported what the police told 
them, while demonstrators claimed that the numbers had been played down. At one point, the anti-nuclear 
activist, Hirose Takashi, even hired a helicopter to take count. 
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the streets of Wall Street, the Japanese youth appeared to be so indifferent? Why was it 
that I was repeatedly told, even by young individuals opposed to nuclear energy, that they 
said they felt uncomfortable participating in demonstrations, the very raison d’être of the 
Zengakuren?36 
In response to such questions, the Zengakuren gave a doctrinaire narrative of loss 
that located origins back in the mid-80s when Japan was to have arrived at its postmodern 
moment. Eschewing any reference to Japanese “culture” (bunka) as an explanatory factor, 
and thereby also misrecognizing, if not willfully eliding the normative force of state ide-
ology, the Zengakuren tracked the origin of the “neoliberal attack” (shinjiyūshugi kōgeki) 
back to the 1987 privatization of the national railway system, Kokutetsu. The left and the 
student movement in Japan had, in effect, been progressively “crushed” (tsubusareta) by 
neoliberalism. Notably, by framing the fall of the left in terms of an “attack” (kōgeki), the 
Zengakuren not only addressed itself to an other (of the other of the Symbolic) operating 
behind the objective order of the economy, but also affirmed the identity of unions as the 
subject of the attack. The rhetoric of the Zengakuren located an agentive “enemy” (teki) 
behind the neoliberal attack instigated by the state, the phantasm of which was material-
ized through ritualized and repeated demonstrations that established both the certainty of 
the enemy and of the postwar unions as its target. The idolized leader and founder of 
Dōrō-Chiba, Nakano Hiroshi, says: “The major aim of the JNR division and privatization 
scheme was to destroy the national railway workers’ movement, which was the core force 
                                                
36 Nothwithstanding articles in The Japan Times tracking the rise of Students Emergency Action for Liberal 
Democracy (SEALDs), both its factionalism – opposing, for instance, the Zengakuren – and its diminutive 
numbers (175 members, according to The Japan Times) should be noted. See Mike Sunda, “Nation’s Youth 
Are Attempting to Establish a New Political Norm,” in The Japan Times, 26/9/2015, and Hayashi Yuki, 
“Campaign Group SEALDs Hooking Japan’s Youth With Jazzy Placards, Fliers,” in The Japan Times, 
21/7/2015. 
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of the post-war labor movement of Japan.”37 And Zengakuren members could recite the 
history of this “scheme,” as if it were a mantra, clearly replicating the story as told by the 
late Nakano Hiroshi himself. It began when the Nakasone administration privatized Ko-
kutetsu, restructuring a third of its national workforce. In 1985, Dōrō-Chiba had already 
broken off from Kokutetsu’s main union, Kokurō, and fought privatization on its own by 
striking. 200,000 workers were relocated in the process of privatization, which, it had 
been promised, would not result in dismissals. From within these relocations, 200 work-
ers committed suicide. Most of these suicides, the Zengakuren pointed out, had been 
members of Kokurō, which had effectively withdrawn from the fight against privatization, 
and from which Dōrō-Chiba had already broken off. Though Dōrō-Chiba was only com-
posed of 1,000 union members at the time, its decision to fight privatization resulted in 
lives saved, the Zengakuren said, since the majority of suicides occurred on the side that 
folded to state pressure.38 In effect, the final creation of JR was likened by the Zengaku-
ren to the work of the traitorous Kakumaru faction, who pretended to be of the “left” 
(sayoku), but pressured workers to accede to the state. The Japanese Communist Party, 
too, had run from the Kokutetsu fight, disavowing on-the-ground resistance – indeed, as 
                                                
37 Nakano, We Live on the Railway, pg. 64. Of course, Nakano also elucidates the financial pressures that 
prompted the privatization, namely, the “stalemate of the growth of the Japanese economy,” and its debt, 
then, of ¥96 billion. He says: “To look back from now, we may say “only” 96 billion. At that time, however, 
it was often said, “If left uncontrolled, the outstanding national debt will cause catastrophe”” (Ibid, 62). As 
if writing of Japan in 2015, Nakano furthermore locates the overcoming of this limit within the temporality 
of the postwar: “Nakasone Yasuhiro, who took office of the prime minister in January 1982, declared in his 
first news conference: “My mission as prime minister is a final settlement of the post-war politics.” From 
that time on, “final settlement of the post-war politics” has become his catchword. The intention of the 
Nakasone administration was a fundamental overthrowing of the “post-war politics” under the constitution 
with the “peace clause” and a overall transformation of Japan into a state capable of waging a war” (62 – 
63). 
38 Nakano writes in We Live on the Railway: “Meanwhile, many JNR workers committed suicide through-
out Japan. There was no suicide in the Doro-Chiba. Workers do not kill themselves in a fighting union. The 
JNR workers who committed suicide had been torn between the management and the fellow workers. The 
enemy forces warned them that they would not be allowed in the new companies when they don’t disaffili-
ate from the Kokuro. On the other hand, they were afraid of disrupting the solidarity with their fellow un-
ionists. I think that the essential problem was the leadership’s inability to set up a policy to fight back” (75). 
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it had done since the ‘60s – by claiming that parliament was the only appropriate place to 
fight the battle. And in the same breath as the Nakasone administration privatized Koku-
tetsu, it set about dismantling the largest labor union of postwar Japan, Sōhyo, which was 
largely identical to Kokurō, and heralded the end of the Japan Socialist Party.39 Notably, 
the means by which these take-overs was achieved consisted, quite simply, in buying off 
the top. According to the Zengakuren narrative, when Rengō (Japanese Trade Union 
Confederation) was formed in 1989 as a merger of Dōmei (Japan Confederation of La-
bor), Chūritsu Rōren (Federation of Independent Labor Unions), and in 1990, of Sōhyō, it 
constituted the disappearance of “class consciousness” (kaikyū ishiki), at the peak of the 
bubble economy, no less. For the Zengakuren, this disappearance of class consciousness 
was most evident in the disintegration of a broad-based leftist movement that was willing 
to “fight” (tatakau), and in the concomitant disappearance of masses from demonstrations. 
But contrary to the coal miners of England or Professional Air Traffic Controllers 
Organization (PATCO) in the USA, the struggle of the 1,047 fired Kokutetsu workers is 
still continuing. When JR reneged on its promise to maintain the employment of previous 
employees and fired 1,047 workers in 1990, 966 of whom were former Kokurō union 
members, these workers pressed charges.40 In this respect, Japan was observed to occupy 
an exceptional place, for while the battle to preserve a broad-based leftism had failed, the 
singular fight of the 1,047 persisted. Japan manifested two extremes, and the question 
                                                
39 Having formed a coalition with the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) from 1994 – ’96, the Japan Socialist 
Party (JSP) finally collapsed in 1996. After its collapse, in 1996, its members formed the Social Democratic 
Party (SDP) in opposition to the LDP. 
40 See “Top Court Settles 23-Year JNR Suit,” in The Japan Times, 29/6/2010. Though JNR was privatized 
in 1987, the suit was filed in 1990. The title of the article should read “20-Year JNR Suit.” See Nakano, We 
Live on the Railway, pg. 62 – 86, for a narration of the “Struggle Against Division and Privatization of 
JNR.” 
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was how to go beyond Trotskyism from the bottom.41 However, on June 28, 2010, some 
900 members of the original 1,047 acceded to a deal with the government, each receiving 
¥22 billion. The “management” (kanbu) of the 1,047 plaintiffs had cut a deal with the 
Democratic Party of Japan earlier, on April 9, and told everyone to accept the settlement. 
Twenty years after the event, it was not, in any case, possible to reinstate the plaintiffs to 
their old jobs. Indeed, it was common for the defendants to ask what the purpose of the 
lawsuit was, twenty years after the fact: did they hope to get their old jobs back? Never-
theless, there were the few among the 1,047, who, supported by the 400-member strong 
Dōrō-Chiba, still refused to settle for anything less than the impossible. It was a fight for 
which laborers would “stake their entire lives” (zenjinsei o kakete), and for which Dōrō-
Chiba, and the Chūkakuha at one more remove, functioned as bastions of support. 
This structure of a single concentration of inflexible visible opposition to the state 
could be seen across an array of arenas that exceeded the radical left. Giving the lie to the 
rule, it was the singular figure of the sitting school teacher who undid the self-evidence of 
the graduation and entrance ceremonies, the handful of fired JNR employees who undid 
the fiction of settlement by refusing to be paid off, Shitō-san’s single farm that obstructed 
further construction of taxiway #3, and the small “tent in front of METI” (keisanshō mae 
tento) – Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry – that, occupied by two or three people, 
condensed the anti-nuclear movement in Kasumigaseki.42 Each occupied the place of an 
impossible possibility in contemporary Japan which, in and of itself, was not necessarily 
self-entitling. 
                                                
41 Contrary to the “theory of one-country communism” (ikkoku shakaishugiron), Trotskyism recognized the 
ills of Stalinism and the need for an international coalition to bring about revolution. 
42 See the homepage, Keisanshōmae Tento Hiroba, 6/4/2006. 
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As farmers had Sanrizuka, and Okinawa had U.S. military bases, the Zengakuren 
had their own ‘Thing,’ or struggle, that constituted the kernel of their enjoyment: namely, 
the fight at Hōsei university for students to exercise the right to post billboards and hand 
out flyers. While the battle had been lost at other universities like Waseda, where protests 
concluded with four arrests in 2005, the struggle between the Zengakuren, Bunka Renmei 
(the only other intransigent student “circle” (sākuru)), and the Hōsei administration was 
continuing. Under the leadership of the Zengakuren, students had gathered from around 
the nation to support Hōsei students who had received “punishments” (shobun), including 
“suspension” (teigaku) and “expulsion” (taigaku) for breaking the rule against billboards 
and flyers. In fact, over the years, students protesting at Hōsei racked up an arrest record 
exceeding 100 for handing out flyers and organizing demonstrations on campus, the latter 
of which constituted an infraction which was prosecuted and punished with six months in 
jail. The figure of the number of arrests was repeatedly cited by Zengakuren members, as 
if it signified the intensity of the fight at Hōsei.43 It had started in 2000, with the gradual 
raising of university fees, the building of high-rise buildings, and in 2004, the demolition 
                                                
43 In a translated appeal to supporters abroad on August 17, 2008, Oda Yōsuke and Kukino Kazuya write of 
“Struggle in Detention”: “The total number of the arrested students on Hosei campus amounts to 88 since 
the start of the struggle on March 14, 2006. At present moment, 20 students are held in Tokyo Detention 
Center. Japan pretends to be a 'democracy', but in reality it is a brutal, repressive state. Once arrested, po-
lice can detain him or her for 23 days at most without any visitors except lawyer. In case of indictment, 
detention can continue for more than half year. During investigation, police attempts every means to have 
arrested people converted, urging them to quit the 'movement'. We make it our principle to keep complete 
silence in front of police and to refuse conversion from the instant of arrest. We are proud to tell you that 
all of those arrested 88 students carried out this principle in their struggle against police investigation, that 
is, "no word, no conversion". Even though significant numbers of major activists are in detention, Hosei 
University struggle is being fought courageously as fighting student movement and is gaining wider popu-
lar support. Among others, fighting lawyers are helping the arrested students in detention in their struggle 
against the university authorities, police, prosecutor and court. Thus the Hosei struggle is threatening the 
social order imposed by the capitalist class.” See Oda Yōsuke and Kazuya Kukino, “Appeal to US workers 
and students from fighting Japanese students of Hosei University and ZENGAKUREN,” on Archiv, 
18/12/2012. 
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of the old student hall.44 On March 14, 2006, when Hōsei university formalized its prohi-
bition against flyers and billboards, the Zengakuren held a protest which was anticipated 
and suppressed by kōan running to the scene, and arresting 29 students under the “public 
order maintenance law” (chian iji hō); a revival, the Zengakuren stated, from the “prewar” 
(senzen).45 Subsequently, Hōsei university proceeded to set up surveillance cameras on 
campus, to post a billboard of students prohibited from entry and to hire thugs – actually 
yakuza – to police the campus, ousting students by force when necessary. Of course, the 
                                                
44 The Zengakuren fight at Hōsei was shadowed and overdetermined by the student protests of the ‘60s and 
‘70s. Back then, too, it had been the raising of tuition fees – alongside a plethora of other issues, ultimately 
pointing to the commodification of education for profit, and the inability of students to be the “actors” (shu-
jinkō) of the university – that triggered student uprisings. See Dowsey, Zengakuren: Japan’s Revolutionary 
Students. Moreover, student demands in the ‘60s and ‘70s resonated with those of the Zengakuren at Hōsei 
in the early 2000s. After a strike by medical students, who were subsequently punished, students shut down 
Yasuda Hall at Tokyo University in 1968. As Sawara Yukiko writes in “The University Struggles,” in 
Zengakuren: Japan’s Revolutionary Students, the list of demands presented to the university president were 
as follows: “1) nullification of the medical students’ punishments; 2) self-criticism by the university over 
it’s policies, especially regarding the use of riot police on campus; 3) recognition of Seiinren (Young Doc-
tors Federation) as the official spokesman for the medical department students; 4) nullification of the pun-
ishments meted out to students involved in the Literature Department dispute; 5) a promise never to bring 
the police onto campus again; 6) adoption of a policy to never punish students over campus disputes, mak-
ing this retroactive to January 25, 1968; 7) written acknowledgement to all of these demands” (145). As in 
the early 2000s, the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) did not support student activism in the ‘60s and ‘70s. 
Writing in 1970 of the “anti-Yoyogi faction” – the Zengakuren I write of – Sawara says: “In their analysis 
of the present university disputes, the JCP takes into account the question of mass education, increasing 
tuition fees, intervention in the autonomy of the university and the maneuvers of Trotskyists. The last item 
refers to the students of the anti-Yoyogi factions, who claim they are going to make the university a base 
for revolution. The JCP says that on the contrary, their activities are anti-revolutionary as they provide an 
excuse for suppression by the establishment and also serve to produce splits in the movement” (Ibid, 173). 
45 Alongside the “public order maintenance law” (chian iji hō), a group of lawyers signed a petition protest-
ing the “Law Concerning Physical Punishment and Others” (bōryoku kōi nado shobatsu ni kansuru hōritsu). 
Noting its application to the student movement at Hōsei, they write: “The “Law Concerning Punishment of 
Physical Violence and Others”, legislated in 1926, is a repressive law and played a terrible role, together 
with the Maintenance of the Public Order Act, in establishing a national mobilization system into war. 
About 5,000 people were arrested by this law till 1932, a year after the “Manchurian Incident” (Japanese 
military invasion in north east China). This notorious unjust law survived the post-war juridical reorganiza-
tion through the intrigue of the Ministry of Justice and the Home Ministry. It has since been functioning as 
“the most convenient repressive law” (Professor OGINO Fujio) to destroy unity of labor unions because it 
needs only very ambiguous allegation for indictment, for example, threats by “demonstrating a force of an 
organization or of a numbers of persons” or “joint action of several persons”. Now this law is applied to 
suppress growing student movement … [the] University today has degenerated into prison. This situation 
symbolizes the present time of war and constitutional revision. We call on the whole society to pay a seri-
ous attention to this critical development in university. We demand that TPPO and TMPD drop all charges 
and immediately release the students in detention. We also demand that police stop forcible hearing of 
members of the cultural clubs of Hosei University.” See Japanese Lawyers Against Repression, “Japan 
Emergency Appeal From Lawyers Against Repression Of Hosei Student Movement And Jail,” in Interna-
tional, 3/6/2009. 
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Zengakuren’s “strategy” (rosen) consisted in the refusal to be divided and conquered. 
They demanded that “punishments be retracted!” (shobun tekkai!). Just as with the 1,047 
fired railway workers, there could be zero compromise. The fight was a matter of trans-
forming the university from the bottom up, so that “students” (gakusei), like “laborers” 
(rōdōsha), would emerge as the true “actors” (shujinkō) of society. 
Nor, for that matter, was the white-collar workplace an exception to the existence 
of workers who flagrantly disobeyed the administration. There was the above-mentioned 
man who stood outside his company gates, MGC, with a flag and speakers in the morning, 
handing out flyers with the subtitles: “There is no future to capitalism! Rally to the MGC 
union, and let’s triumph!”. And across the spectrum of the left, there was Tanaka Satoshi, 
or “Tanaka-san,” as an English documentary refers to him, who “will not do calisthenics.” 
Objecting to his wrongful dismissal from Oki Denki, Tanaka-san stands outside the gates 
of his company every morning with a guitar and songbook. As the translated introduction 
to the documentary recounts:  
I once was an engineer at a big Tokyo company 
 
I supported dismissed co-workers 
I stood against company candidates in workplace elections 
I refused to do company calisthenics 
 
So the company ordered my transfer to a far-away factory 
 
I refused  
I was sacked 
For 25 years I have protested every morning at the company gate 
and each year I attend the company shareholder’s meeting46 
                                                
46 See Tanaka-san Will Not Do Calisthenics, directed by Maree Defolski (Blue Room Productions: 2008). 
Tanaka-san recalls how he began watching all the other workers do calisthenics:  
 
Oki was a fairly liberal company. It had a relaxed atmosphere until a new management came in. 
The management called for a change in workers’ attitudes. 1,350 workers were dismissed in the 
name of rationalisation. The mood changed dramatically when the new management introduced 
loyalty tests [fumie]. They were very effective. 
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Like radio calisthenics, which, in Oki Denki’s case, were performed prior to work hours 
– that is, during unpaid time – every morning postal workers were required to perform the 
senseless ritual of placing their left hand on their hip while pointing at a “safety” (anzen) 
sign with their right arm and reciting the safety mantra. Naturally workers were evaluated 
on the basis of this performance, which fed into their working day, and led them to hurry 
in traffic. 
 The exploitative character of hierarchy and self-sacrifice at work was affirmed at 
annual rallies, but also at regular informal gatherings at which a spectrum of left-oriented 
workers took part. Though organized under the umbrella of the Chūkakuha, many of such 
workers were only loosely affiliated with the Chūkakuha, or invited along as friends. For 
instance, the “youth workers’ assembly” (seinen rōdōsha shūkai) gathered postal workers, 
nurses, construction workers, teachers, railway workers, and part-timers of all kinds, be it 
                                                                                                                                            
 
One test [fumie] was not to take a protest flyer from a sacked worker. Management maintained 
that not only distributing flyers, but even accepting a flyer was an act of disloyalty to them. If a 
worker was sympathetic to the sacked employees their pay was cut, they were ostracized by other 
workers. They were refused promotion, they were assigned to meaningless tasks. 
 
Oki is changing. Work hard is not enough. You should show loyalty for the company. 
 
The other ‘loyalty test’ introduced was calisthenics before work. Although it was in unpaid time, if 
you didn’t do it you were considered disloyal. I refused to be controlled in this way. So I would 
just watch, because I went to work early anyway. That didn’t go down well. I was repeatedly 
called in and harassed by management, ‘We won’t force you to take part … but don’t come and 
watch when everyone is doing calisthenics.’ I refused to obey, because it was against human dig-
nity. I wanted to remain true to my principles … I continued to disobey. At first it felt odd sitting 
and watching 200 workers do calisthenics. It was a hair-raising experience. But then I realised 
they felt uncomfortable. They didn’t have the guts to look at me. They turned their backs on me. 
Gradually I became confident I was doing something right (Tanaka-san Will Not Do Calisthenics). 
 
In a short article entitled “Then there was nobody” (soshite dare mo inakunatta) on his homepage, 
Tanaka-san recounts how he ran for office as a union representative in 1980. One day, as he stood up to 
speak to a crowd of some 1,000 employees, the entire audience got up and left. Reminiscent of “bullying” 
(ijime) in schools, it had been decided on in advance – naturally to the exclusion of Tanaka-san – that lead-
ers pitched by the administration would be listened to, but that everyone would leave when it came to 
Tanaka-san’s turn. See Tanaka Tetsurō, Anata Wa Keiken Shimashitaka? Nihon no Kigyō Fashizumu o!, 
6/4/2015. 
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factory workers, clothes salespeople, or lunchbox packers. It was common for speeches at 
such assemblies to devolve into sheer railing, and understandably so, given the stories of 
wrongful dismissals and managerial abuse which emerged across the array of workplaces, 
so that at the symptomatic limit of capital, injury was materialized in the very grain of the 
voice.47 Laborers were expendable, and there was nothing uniquely Japanese about this. 
In this respect, the Chūkakuha’s reading of Marx was literal. Quite aside from the social 
force that invested the commodity with its fetish character or the act of exchange that had 
always-already put the machinery of domination into effect, as a “commodity” (shōhin), 
labor was a “thing” (mono). Under capitalism, laborers were “discarded” (tsukaisuteru) 
as things, or “garbage” (gomi), and it was “anger” (ikari) that propelled laborers to action. 
It was said that something had been “left unfinished” (yarinokoshita): a remainder which 
precipitated the subjectivity and the repetition compulsion of the “radical” (kageki). Thus, 
it was demanded that a debt be returned that, at first glance, consisted in the restitution of 
what had been taken: student status, a job. 
 If the discourse of the radical left was organized around a constitutive loss or theft, 
“revolution” (kakumei) would replace it: revolution was their ‘Thing.’ As Žižek observes, 
the empty place of the ‘Nation-Thing’ is not limited to the nation, but can have “a distinc-
tive ‘leftist’ connotation.”48 Of course, the left, too, had its anthems. If its postwar legacy 
                                                
47 Here I reference Roland Barthes’ essay, “The Grain of the Voice,” in Image Music Text, trans. Stephen 
Heath (New York: Hill and Wang, 1977), insofar as the “grain” of voice “is the body in the singing voice, 
in the writing hand, in the performing limb,” which, rather than constitute the subject, threatens to “destroy 
him” (276). Just as the hate speech of the Zaittokai, the cries of the Zengakuren materialized a constitutive 
split between the body and language that was literally amplified in their use of megaphones, and its crackle. 
See Ch. 10. 
48 Of working class culture, Slavoj Žižek writes in “Eastern Europe’s Republics of Gilead”: “Note George 
Orwell’s essays from the war years, in which he attempted to define the contours of an English patriotism 
opposed to the official, puffy-imperialist version of it: his points of reference were precisely those details 
that characterize the ‘way of life’ of the working class (the evening gathering in the local pub, and so forth)” 
(52). 
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led it to be staunchly opposed to the Hinomaru and Kimigayo, there was nevertheless that 
moment at the conclusion of rallies, be it the annual Kokutetsu Struggle (Kokutetsu Tōsō) 
meeting, which attracted a couple of thousand people, the Chūkakuha meetings, or an in-
formal meeting of Zengakuren students, in which everybody joined shoulder to shoulder 
and, swaying back and forth, sang The Internationale in unison. At especially large rallies, 
the lyrics were printed (in Japanese) on the final pages of the program pamplet and a des-
ignated singer was called onstage to lead the chorus. Followed by this singing, the “slo-
gan-call” (shupurehi kōru) “let’s do our best to unite!” (danketsu gambarō!), was enacted 
without fail. Holding the microphone while the crowd had risen with their right hands 
raised, clenched as fists, the MC would give the prompt – “unite!!” (danketsu!!) – which 
everybody then repeated three times, thrusting their fists into the air at each turn: “let’s do 
our best!” (gambarō!). Brief clapping would then ensue among the audience, as people 
started to slowly file out of the auditorium. 
In the spirit of  “international solidarity” (kokusai rentai), it was likewise common 
at large gatherings for overseas unions to be represented by their leaders. The Chūkakuha 
and Dōrō-Chiba sustained connections with both the Korean Federation of Trade Unions 
(Minju-Nochong) and the International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU) on the 
U.S. West coast. Japanese union or Zengakuren members would also go abroad, be it to 
join students at UC Berkeley, CSP-Conlutas in Brazil, or Gorleben anti-nuclear activists 
in Germany, to broaden the international scope of their activities. Of course, although it 
did happen that demonstrations were staged simultaneously across borders, it was hard to 
imagine that the presence of four to five overseas figures provided concrete support to the 
movement. What was crucial, rather, was the effect of the address by overseas emissaries 
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in which the audience – through a translator – recognized a coincidence of interests in the 
same historical moment. When speakers from abroad recounted tales of state oppression, 
neoliberal privatization, outsourcing and the perennial issue of apparent allies giving in to 
the state – what everybody always-already knew: betrayal! – a ripple would pass through 
the audience. Naturally, there were also moments of slippage, as when the ILWU leader 
said before an audience of a few thousand that he had been reading Miyamoto Musashi’s 
Book of Five Rings on the airplane – quoting from it! – and that he admired the Japanese 
so much for this or that. And there was the time when the Zengakuren leader, replicating 
Nakano Hiroshi’s take on the necessity of leadership to spread the movement, insisted to 
German students – wary of Hitler’s heritage – that “leaders” (rīdā) had to be produced to 
head the revolution. However, such moments of thorough misrecognition were redeemed 
by an equally fetishistic insistence that the representative close his speech with the Japa-
nese word: “unite!” (danketsu!). When leaders of the Korean Federation of Trade Unions 
closed speeches, they did so with the Korean word for “unite” – “yeonhap!” – which was 
recognized and repeated by the audience. 
 
Figure 5: The final “let’s do our best to unite!” (danketsu gambarō!) moment at  
a Chūkakuha rally. 
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Because the force of the movement resided in its capacity to present a united front, 
it necessitated and ultimately demanded participation. It was not enough to attend indoor 
talks. One had to take part in actual public demonstrations. Although it was perfectly ac-
cepted for individuals to attend demonstrations covered from head to toe to conceal one’s 
identity, it still had to be known that one had participated. Indeed, participation would be 
commented on by other Zengakuren or Chūkakuha members, as if one had emerged into 
visibility. So-and-so had noticed so-and-so in a Zenshin photo. Hence, it happened that, 
having expressed consternation at the overwhelming cameras of the kōan at protests, one 
first-year student had to altogether quit the group. While he had hoped to continue in his 
other activities as a Zengakuren member, he was unable to find a middle ground with the 
remaining members, and it was decided that, if he felt that he could not participate in the 
demonstrations, it was best that he leave. 
 Demonstrations constituted the central and main activity of the Zengakuren, and 
of the particular mode of enjoyment it practiced. As one veteran activist explained, there 
were only two places where the state could be publicly challenged. One was in the courts, 
in which protocol had to be observed and verdicts validated the state, particularly in the 
high and supreme courts. The second was “on the street” (gaitō), where anything could 
be stated, virtually without reserve. Yet, although the dream was to transgress those very 
boundaries, there were limits to demonstrations which, for all the Zengakuren’s panache, 
were a docile affair. To begin with, it was difficult getting people to participate, and the 
Zengakuren’s tireless efforts seemed to revolve around increasing people by single digits. 
Demonstrations themselves, moreover, tended to be organized affairs: hemmed in by the 
strictures imposed by the police and kidōtai walking alongside demonstrators. It rarely, if 
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ever, happened that the demonstrating crowd was allowed to break out of control, for the 
the number of police and the amount of street space allocated to demonstrators kept them 
from forming a crowd. Even when some 15,000 anti-nuclear demonstrators had formed a 
veritable sea of banners at their original starting point, by the time they made it out onto 
the streets, the 15,000 protesters had been so compartmentalized that they formed a paltry 
patch by the sidewalk. For one, demonstrators were rarely allocated use of the whole of 
the street, so they had to walk in between the sidewalk and the passing cars. Perhaps they 
could make use of one car lane. Likewise, processions became divided by traffic lights, if 
not by the police actively segmenting the demonstrators so they had dwindled into 20 or 
50 meter stretches. Walking down Omotosandō boulevard, demonstrators were far out-
numbered by the young sidewalk consumers for whom – by their surprised, goggle-eyed 
expressions – the yelling protesters must have presented themselves like the noisy foreign 
object of a passing spectacle to which the consumers were ultimately indifferent. Notably, 
the Zengakuren were well aware of the limits imposed on demonstrations and strategized 
accordingly. Some demonstrations, such as Zengakuren-only protests against American 
military bases, were explicitly designed to transgress the line hemming in the protesters, 
and were undertaken with preparedness for arrest. Given the sign, the Zengakuren would 
charge into the guarded entryway of Yokosuka or Yokota military base. Most of the time, 
however, veteran demonstrators like Jinokawa or Dafuka would walk along the perimeter 
of the protesters to forestall possible attempts by the kōan or kidōtai to create the pretext 
for arrest. With a physique practically designed for physical confrontation, one burly man 
played the role of muscling the crowd’s way through police barricades when the pressure 
mounted from behind. In instances when the police were holding back the crowd, this 
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man would push with all his body weight and effectively force the string of policemen to 
give way to a stream of demonstrators. Similarly, Kuraoka-san, an expelled Hōsei student 
with a booming voice, regularly performed the role of leading the slogan calls on the 
speakers, which, when the police obstructed passage, quickly transformed into a thorough 
verbal thrashing from her: “police, go home!” (keisatsu wa kaere!). Only rarely did the 
slogan-calling stray from the topic and prepared text of the day. However, on one such 
impetuous occasion, the slogan, “we’ll overthrow the Noda regime” (noda seiken o datō 
suru zo) degenerated to the all-too-pleasurable: “we’re going to kill prime minister Noda” 
(noda shushō o korosu zo).49 
It was the pleasure of such shameless irreverence, in which anything could be said 
in the moment, seemingly without fear of repercussion, that constituted the apotheosis of 
the demonstration as enjoyment.50 Gathered in Yoyogi or Meiji parks, it was the entirely 
                                                
49 In “Kakumaru – Analysis of an Ultra-Radical Group,” Nakanishi Masahiro writes of demonstrations in 
1970: “The one thing that still attracts the most attention is the street demonstration. If this degenerates into 
a fight, then the focus of the television cameras is assured. Demonstrations can take many forms from the 
orderly marches of the left-wing parties to the violent street battles of the anti-Yoyogi students. Especially 
popular with the latter is the zig-zag demonstration. The students link arms and form a solid mass, which 
may be four or five people wide and as long as possible. Those in front make the formation by holding onto 
a flagpole or gebabo. The squad leader runs in front blowing a whistle, and conducting the whole group 
like an orchestra leader with energetic gestures and blasts on the whistle. Two quick blasts spaced with 
pauses of equal length set up the rhythm for jogging. The students take up a chant which is based on one of 
their slogans. The most popular are ‘Ampo Funsai’ (Smash the security treat!) and ‘Toso Shorii’ (Victory 
to the Struggle!) amongst the anti-Yoyogi students. Also heard is the blood-thirsty cry of ‘Minsei Korose’ 
(Kill the Minsei!). These chants fit into the rhythm of the demonstrations and follow a pattern laid down in 
ancient festivals found all over Japan. The traditional chant is ‘Wasshoi, Wasshoi’ and is used in many in-
stances, including running, training for judo groups, and other athletic pursuits. It is a familiar rhythm for 
most Japanese and has an almost mesmeric effect upon the marchers. Merged into one group and surrender-
ing all sense of identity and responsibility, the students carry on for a long time” (217 – 218). 
50 In Toppamono, Miyazaki Manabu describes university scenes of shamelessness during the 1960s: 
 “The venue, the Memorial Hall, was packed with 15,000 students. Despite the cold weather, it was 
so hot inside that I was sweating. The hall bristled with student union and class council flags. 
 At two o’clock in the afternoon, President Ohama took the stage to a chorus of boos and hisses. As 
he started speaking, though, a dead silence fell over the auditorium. Many students expected that this time 
their obdurate president would have to yield. To their intense disappointment, however, he was provocative 
from the outset. 
 “You students should reflect on your behavior!” he said. “How dare you greet the president and 
professors of this highest seat of learning in such an unseemly fashion.!” 
 A thundering surge of boos and shouts arose from the packed hall. 
 520 
novel sight of thousands of anti-nuclear masses – their sheer numbers – that prompted the 
Zengakuren to say “incredible” (sugoi), and their leader, Oda, to triumphantly declaim in 
a post-demonstration talk that: “with these numbers, even the police cannot do anything!!” 
(konna kazu dato keisatsu datte te ga dasenai!!). Indeed, at the climax of the anti-nuclear 
demonstrations, the crowd outside the prime minister’s residence so exceeded its allotted 
space that the stretch of road was effectively occupied. It was said that, contrary to police 
predictions, 10,000 demonstrators had gathered that night. In this vainglorious moment, 
however, one student had nevertheless had the audacity to rain on the parade by declaring 
that 10,000 people was not that many. As the newly appointed master of the Chūkakuha’s 
anti-nuclear division – Nonukes Zenkoku Network, or NAZEN – Oda took it on himself 
to relate the incident at the following annual Chūkakuha rally.51 Addressing himself to an 
audience, from within which I suddenly felt myself singled out – wait, was it me who had 
rained on the parade? – Oda inveighed against such comments: “It is not the duty of ac-
tivists to say that there are many or few people. It is to fight!” (hito ga sukunai toka ōī 
toka iu no wa undōka no yakume de wa arimasen! sore wa tatakau koto desu!).52 Perhaps 
in my own conceit, I was struck, as always, by the Chūkakuha discourse which alienated 
                                                                                                                                            
 “Reflect? Fuck that, you bastard!” 
 “What kind of crap is this?”” (105). 
51 See Zenshinsha, Zengempatsu o Hairo ni: Fukushima no Ikari to Tomo ni Rōdōkumiai no Chikara de 
Yononaka Kaeyō (Tokyo: Zenshinsha, 2011) for the Chūkakuha’s reading of Japan’s nuclear energy policy. 
The 1982 documentary Gempatsu Wa Ima, dir. Ōmi Michihiro (Saitō Seiji/Hibaku Rōdō o Kangaeru Net-
towāku, 1982), follows the efforts of Saitō Seiji, a former nuclear laborer and anti-nuclear activist active in 
Chūkakuha circles in his efforts to form a labor union among nuclear workers in the early 1980s. In English, 
the title of the documentary translates as: “Nuclear Power Is Now.” Finally, see Kamata Satoshi, Sayōnara 
Gempatsu no Ketsui (Tokyo: Sōshinsha, 2012), for a description of the anti-nuclear movement as a whole. 
52 Of the master seeking to be the desire of the Other, Lacan writes in The Other Side of Psychoanalysis:  
“Is it not evident that what is restituted to him is not necessarily his own share? Capitalist exploita-
tion effectively frustrates him of his knowledge by rendering it useless. What, in a type of subversion, gets 
returned to him is something different – master’s knowledge. And this is why all he has done is change 
masters. 
What remains, in effect, is the essence of the master, namely, that he does not know what he wants” 
(“Other Side,” 32). 
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it from the very workers it purported to represent, and that preferred not to inquire why it 
was so isolated. In this respect, Rancière writes that, “first of all the purpose of a party is 
not to unite but divide: “Proletarians of all countries, unite!” That also means: “Workers 
of each country, divide!””.53 Yet, in this divisioning, by which the representative of the 
Chūkakuha subverted its hysterical origins into the prohibitive form of a master discourse, 
the Chūkakuha was, indeed, alienated from the immense mass of productive units whose 
recognition it desired. Addressed to the audience, Oda’s words sought the response which 
was given – “that’s right!!” (sōda!!) – but in the absence of which the Chūkakuha would 
have been at a loss. 
  The origin of the Chūkakuha’s narrative of proletarian revolution was, in fact, 
marked by a betrayal. Dedicated to action, the subtitle of the Chūkakuha’s 2010 “General 
Draft Plan” (kōryō sōan) reads: “Under the banner of anti-imperialist, anti-Stalinist prole-
tariat world revolution/Laborers of all nations, unite!” (hanteikokushugi, hansutārinshugi 
puroretaria sekai kakumei no hata no moto/bankoku no rōdōsha, danketsu seyo!). There 
was, in effect, a necessity of acknowledging that the communist models of China and the 
former USSR had gone wrong. Before its demise, the USSR, like China had transformed 
into the very enemy of the proletariat: imperialism. Making reference to Lenin’s thesis 
that imperialism constitutes the “highest stage” (saikō no hattendankai) of capitalism, at 
which its inherent “contradictions” (mujun) predicate its “explosion” (bakuhatsu), the 
General Draft Plan propounds the necessity of a second revolution which would eradicate 
Stalinism and reinstate “the genuinely human community” (shin no ningenteki 
kyōdōshakai), that is, the “communist society” (kyōsanshugisha shakai). Indeed, “the age 
                                                
53 Rancière, The Philosopher and His Poor, pg. 86. 
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of imperialism is the very age of communist proletarian revolution” (teikokushugi no 
jidai wa puroretaria shakaishugi kakumei no jidai sono mono de aru)”:54  
The 1917 Russian revolution cut open the way for the breakthrough of the over-
throw of imperialism as the proletariat revolution, and the current world stormed 
into the historical transitional period from capitalism to communism. However, 
destroying Marxism and Leninism with the theory of one-country communism, 
the Stalinism that perverted the Russian revolution betrayed and suppressed the 
completion of the international laboring class fight for world revolution, and on 
the contrary, became a complement to the world dominance of imperialism, de-
grading into an enormous anti-revolution that supported the prolonging of imperi-
alism. This Stalinism has already been historically bankrupted with the collapse of 
the former USSR and Eastern Europe, but it has not been completely overthrown. 
Today, China is turning into a giant economic nation in accordance with acrobatic 
capitalist policies, but its essence is the anti-proletarian survival of Stalinism itself. 
Moreover, the distortion of socialism/communism by Stalinism, or, rather, the ne-
gation and dismantling above all of the core Marxist notion of the self-liberation 
of laborers, is even today continuing to exert harm on the world’s class struggle. 
In order to complete the proletariat revolution, it is essential to see through a se-
cond revolution to completely overthrow Stalinism together with the overthrow of 
imperialism, and to completely take back genuine Marxism to the hands of the la-
boring class and fight.55 
 
                                                
54 Zenshinsha, Kōryō Sōan: Han Teikokushugi, Han Sutārinshugi Puroretaria Sekai Kakumei no Hata no 
Moto, Mankoku no Rōdōsha, Danketsu Seyo! (Tokyo: Zenshinsha, 2010), pg. 7 – 8. The General Draft Plan 
claims that: “The historical conditions to realize the proletariat world revolution have already overwhelm-
ingly ripened. The explosion of today’s world economic depression signals that the time has entirely come 
for the whole working class to revolt and altogether overthrow capitalism/imperialism wriggling in final 
crisis” (プロレタリア世界革命を実現する歴史的条件はすでに圧倒的に成熟している。今日の世界
大恐慌の爆発は、労働者階級が総蜂起して、最末期の危機にのたうつ資本主義・帝国主義を最終
的に打ち倒す時が完全に来ていることを示している。) (9). See also Zenshinsha, Kakumeiteki 
Kyōsanshugisha Dōmei Dai Rokkai Zenkoku Taikai Hōkoku, Ketteishū (Tokyo: Zenshinsha, 2001). 
55 Zenshinsha, Kōryō Sōan: Han Teikokushugi, Han Sutārinshugi Puroretaria Sekai Kakumei no Hata no 














The first “genuine” (shin no) proletariat revolution would see through what the revolution 
of 1917, undercut by a “betrayal” (uragiri), did not. Caught in a temporality of repetition, 
this dream of a pure first world revolution would, in effect, also be the second. Betrayed 
by the imperial interests of Stalinism, the internationalism of Marx and Lenin required an 
external revolution against imperialism, as well as an in-house cleansing of the Stalinist 
element.56 At stake in this elimination was the “self-liberating” (jiko kaihō) subject of the 
revolution, as if the unit of this self-liberating subject did not and ought not require self-
recognition in an other. To this end, the language of the Chūkakuha could not be more 
exclusive, dogmatic and totalizing. Indeed, The State and Revolution (kokka to kakumei), 
even more than Marx’s writing, was popular reading in the Zengakuren and provided the 
subject matter of yearly “study sessions” (benkyōkai). Like the writings to be found in the 
Chūkakuha’s newspaper, Zenshin, the writing of the General Draft Plan is suffused to 
excess with a language which, in the 2010 emergency “night before” (zenya) revolution, 
cannot do enough to eliminate the constitutive stain of Stalinism that is, moreover, “con-
tinuing to exert harm” (gaidoku o unagashi tsuzuketeiru) on the “world’s class struggle” 
(sekai no kaikyū tōsō). Of this Plan, Dafuka-san would observe: “The Plan is the party 
itself” (sōan wa tō sono mono). Like the extimate leftist stain of Japan’s postwar legacy, 
the Stalinist traitor in the midst called for a totalizing response to rectify the “perversion” 
or “distortion” (waikyoku) that dislocated the origins of the movement.57 In effect, the 
                                                
56 With neither publication date or location – though presumably published at Zenshinsha – the Zengakuren 
read a specific version of Lenin’s The State and Revolution. See Vladimir Lenin, Kokka to Kakumei (‘Kok-
ka to Kakumei’ Kenkyūkai). 
57 Mirrored by the form of Stalinism as an originary “perversion” (waikyoku), Marilyn Ivy writes of the 
postwar Constitution with reference to Katō Norihiro’s Haisengoron: 
“Katō writes of an originary twist, or deviation, in the very foundation of Japanese nation-
statehood born of its formation in war defeat and, equally crucial, its constitutional incapacity to engage in 
war again. It is not only that it was defeated in what is now commonly claimed, both in Japan and else-
where, to be an ignominious war of aggression in Asia (and thus perpetually judged an unjust war) that 
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Chūkakuha was caught within a temporality of repetition whose origins were posited by 
the Chūkakuha discourse in the failed revolution of 1917. Yet, just as the Chūkakuha was 
established in the immediate postwar years, this temporality of repetition was bound to 
the Japanese state’s drive to end the interminable postwar in war. For it was the specter of 
this war which promised the alternative of revolution in the Chūkakuha discourse. And 
yet, unlike the drive to war, the imminence of this revolution had to be endlessly deferred 
in the maintenance of a gap that established the Chūkakuha position vis-à-vis workers. 
There was a precedent in the Chūkakuha of “spies” (supai) infiltrating their ranks. 
In fact, rather than “actual names” (honmei), pseudonyms were even employed within the 
Chūkakuha to refer to other members. But the “harm,” “evil,” and “poison” (waidoku) of 
Stalinism could, of course, be identified in more obvious forms than the spy. If a betrayal 
had warped the revolution of 1917, a series of repetitious betrayals could be observed to 
undermine the history of the movement. Indeed, if the clarion call of the Kokutetsu 1,047 
Struggle was to “unite” (danketsu), it was marked – twenty years down the road – by the 
“4.9 political compromise” (4.9 seiji wakai).58 Of course, the Japanese Communist Party 
had never supported the Chūkakuha or, for that matter, leftist movements of the ‘60s and 
‘70s; disavowing the “violence” (bōryoku) of Sanrizuka, not to mention, the Chūkakuha 
                                                                                                                                            
forever marks Japan as ‘‘polluted’’ (yogoreta) at the origin. But Japan is uniquely forbidden to rehabilitate 
that war through another war in its Constitution and its Article 9, which expressly prohibits Japan’s mainte-
nance of war-making capabilities … Forever doomed to a frozen relationship to national origins in defeat, 
and forever kept from producing a new national narrative through a fresh war, Japan is thus twisted in its 
very essence by an originary nejire, ‘‘deviation.’’ 
This nejire, however, is doubled. Not only is there the fundamental perversion of its national ori-
gins in defeat and its twinning with a twisted foreclosure of war-making potential, the constitutional prohi-
bition on war was forced on Japan by the American occupiers after defeat” (“In/Comparable Horrors: Total 
War and the Japanese Thing,” 140). 
58 In accordance with the “4.9 Political Compromise,” former workers were given ¥22,000,000 ($220,000 
USD). See Zenshinsha, “1047 Mei Tōsō no Handōteki Kecchaku Yurusuna! ‘Seiji Wakai’ no Chōinfunsai 
o!”, 10/4/2010, and Dōrō-Chiba, “Kaiken Kōgeki to Kokutetsu Bunkatsu, Mineika,” in Nikkan Dōrō-Chiba, 
27/5/2013. While the compromise was reached on April 9, 2010, the court case was concluded on June 28, 
2010. 
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stated, the very right of laborers to strike.59 The specter of 1917 doggedly followed every 
time the call to unite was invoked. 
But it was the Chūkakuha’s notorious clash with the Kakumaru faction of the new 
left in the ‘70s and ‘80s that illustrated, in Dafuka’s words, just how “serious” (shinken) 
the Chūkakuha was about fighting for revolution. Indeed, in 1975, the founder and leader 
of the Chūkakuha, Honda Nobuyoshi, was killed in his home by the Kakumaru faction. 
His death prompted the Chūkakuha to send their second-in-command, Shimizu Nobuo, 
                                                
59  The Chūkakuha’s adversarial relationship with the Japan Communist Party is as long-standing and 
given to hyperbole as it is with the Kakumaru. As David E. Apter and Nagayo Sawa recount in Against the 
State, perhaps the definitive break occurred in Sanrizuka during the 1960s, where the JCP actively opposed 
the participation of the radical left: “The sects were not originally the farmers’ main source of support. The 
first groups to get involved at Sanrizuka were the Japan Communist Party and the Japan Socialist Party. An 
early Hantai Dōmei rally, held at Narita Municipal Athletic Field on October 2, 1966, had over five thou-
sand participants, among them representatives of women’s and worker’s organizations and JCP and JSP 
dietmen … By February 1967 Komaino fort was built and in April Kinone fort. It was not until the follow-
ing September that Akiyama Katsuyuki, president of the Three Sects Zengakuren, visited Sanrizuka and 
attended meetings at Komaino fort. During these meetings he spoke to the defenders, emphasizing the rela-
tionship between the Sanrizuka struggle and the larger anti-war movement … Shortly thereafter, on No-
vember 28, 170 farmers from the Hantai Dōmei went to the governor of the prefecture to protest the prefec-
ture’s participation in land acquisition as well as police violence. The farmers were joined by JSP Prefec-
tural Assemblymen and sixty students, among them the president of the Three Sects Zengakuren. The JCP 
withdrew from this rally, saying that Trotskyites were trying to destroy the movement. At a rally later that 
same evening, the JCP proposed to the JSP that the Three Sects Zengakuren be expelled, even though the 
students had been explicitly invited by Tomura … when a major rally was held in Sanrizuka Park in June 
1968, the students wore helmets and armed themselves with spears and sickels. As they helped farmers, 
participated in confrontations, and recruited support from the outside, militants gradually replaced both the 
JCP and the JSP as the main partner of the Hantai Dōmei” (125 – 126). See also Miyazaki Manabu’s Top-
pamono, pg. 51 – 168, for an autobiographical account of how factional strife among student groups in the 
1960s was divided along pro-JCP and anti-JCP lines. 
 However, as Nakano writes in We Live on The Railway, the JCP abandoned the workers’ cause as 
early as 1955. At the JCP’s 6th party conference, it was “decided upon a conversion to “peaceful revolution 
line” from an armed struggle line, which had been practiced as “Molotov cocktail struggle,” for a couple of 
months in the post-war period. The JCP declared: “We have given up violence for ever. We swear to be 
loved by all from now on.” Thus summing up, the JCP liquidated its ten years’ history after World War II” 
(13). Of Sanrizuka in 1967, Nakano writes: “During a protest sit-in on the planned construction site, carried 
out in arm-in-arm joint action, Mr. Tomura, the president of the League, fiercely denounced the JCP that 
stood aside the sit-in and only chanted protest songs, opposing direct actions to prevent the surveying” (44). 
Of course, the Kokurō leadership, which folded in its struggle against privatization, was likewise composed 
of JCP men (71). And of the JCP in 2003, Nakano writes (in an awkward translation): “The major interest 
of the JCP now is to develop its parliamentary activities and to increase parliamentary seats. This is an un-
derlying motivation of present revision of the party program. For this purpose, all other things are com-
pletely discarded from it: the issues of mass movements including labor movement are thrown out of the 
program. Renege of the JCP goes beyond recognition of the Emperor system and the Self-Defense Forces. 
All sorts of commitment in workers’ struggle are completely abandoned. That’s why the word “the working 
class” is only one time seen in the New Program. At the very moment when the capitalism is facing an ag-
gravating crisis day by day, the JCP intends furthermore to promote its reformist policy” (4). 
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underground, where he remains to this day, writing and ostensibly leading the Chūkakuha. 
Of course, to the external world, the factional strife which claimed the lives of Honda and 
dozens of other revolutionaries was precisely that: strife focused on factional interests 
altogether foreign to the general public.60 
As disclosed in its General Draft Plan, the Chūkakuha language was suffused with 
a vocabulary instantly recognizable as an ideological departure from general normativity: 
“Marxism” (marukusushugi), “imperialism” (teikokushugi), “proletariat” (puroretariāto), 
“capitalism” (shihonshugi), “class struggle” (kaikyū tōsō), “communism” (kyōsanshugi), 
“Stalinism” (sutārinshugi), “Leninism” (rēninshugi), or “revolution” (kakumei). However, 
within the Chūkakuha, it was exactly these terms that attained the obviousness Althusser 
attributes to the ideological.61 Of course, the Chūkakuha knew that their language was as 
alienating to the public as that of a “sect” (sekuto); a charge that, like the hooded image 
of the “radical” (kageki), the Chūkakuha was rightly used to defending itself against on 
the ground that it constituted state propaganda. But the Chūkakuha’s conceit consisted in 
claiming that it was all right for the central leadership to employ a language that only 
they could understand. Manifested in the very surfeit of heavy terms, the fetishism with 
which the Chūkakuha deployed their language instantiated a division between themselves 
– who knew the truth of betrayal – and the general public alienated in ideology. It was not 
belief in the possibility of revolution which was out of whack, but instead, its opposite: “I 
don’t believe in revolution” (kakumei o shinjinai). In turn, the refusal by others to believe 
                                                
60 In “Kakumaru – Portrait of an Ultra-Radical Group,” Nakanishi Masahiro observes: “This is one of the 
great paradoxes of the Zengakuren movement that the Kakumaru and Chukaku share the same parent body, 
Kakukyodo, and though one would expect their thinking to be similar, it is in fact very different and repre-
sents years of emnity” (198). 
61 Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatus,” pg. 119. See also Chapter 2. Nakano writes in We 
Live on the Railway: “Capital and management are spreading day and night their thought, ideology and 
principle in the whole society. It gives rise to all sorts of thinking, especially opportunism among workers. 
To fight against those ideological offensive is a primary factional struggle” (27). 
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in revolution established Chūkakuha identity. Members of the Zengakuren said they were 
convinced they could convince those around them, be it family or friends, of the possibil-
ity of revolution. 
At stake in this division was, in fact, that constitutive theft of enjoyment; the theft, 
the accusation of which concealed “the traumatic fact that we never possessed what was 
allegedly stolen from us.”62 As if it were impossible to actualize the moment of a world 
historical uprising of the working classes, the Kakumaru and Japanese Communist Party 
gave the lie to revolutionary activities. As Rancière shows, they threatened the place the 
Chūkakuha had established vis-à-vis workers. Though the Kakumaru gave themselves to 
be seen fighting for workers, like the Chūkakuha, they were actively undermining the 
movement from within. Seemingly worse than capitalists, the Kakumaru faction undercut 
the self-recognition of the revolutionary. In the past, it had triggered a compulsion to kill 
in an irrecoverable excess of violence that necessitated repetition. Couched in the equally 
excessive doctrinaire language of the Chūkakuha, one such murder is described in a 1973 
issue of Zenshin:  
                                                
62 Žižek, “Eastern Europe’s Republics of Gilead,” pg. 54. In We Live on the Railway, Nakano writes of the 
Kakumaru at Sanrizuka: “The Kakumaru had already been expelled from the Sanrizuka struggle because 
the Kakumaru had made all sort of attempt to hinder vigorous development of the Sanrizuka struggle, scat-
tering nails on road to stop traffic to Sanrizuka or making nuisance in restaurants (eating without pay) etc. 
Upon complaint of many supporters of the struggle, the Opposition League decided to exclude the Ka-
kumaru” (45). He continues: “It is well known that the Kakumaru ran away from the barricade during the 
campus occupation of the Tokyo University in 1969. The main concern of the Kakumaru in intervening the 
struggle was apparently to destory the influence and organization of other political organizations in the 
movement” (58 – 59). According to Nakano, there are two kinds of labor movement: “when you look into 
the problem behind the issue, you’ll find the two different stands on the labor movement: the establish-
ment-supporting labor movement and the class-oriented labor movement” (83). Mutually constitutive, a 
similar relation can now be seen between the Zengakuren and the newly emerged SEALDs movement. As 
William Andrews writes, the latter “or at least their supporters, are aggressively trying to prevent far-left 
groups from pamphletting at the Diet or Kantei.” See William Andrews, “The Changing Shape of Protest in 
Japan,” on Throw Out Your Books, 5/9/2015. On the other hand, the Zengakuren leader, Ikuma Saitō, says 
that “SEALDs members are really afraid of getting arrested … SEALD’s leader, Aki Okuda, goes to the 
protests in front of the Diet as if he’s going to the beach or karaoke or Disneyland – he just wants to protect 
his everyday lifestyle and not risk anything.” See Mike Sunda, “Nation’s Youth Are Attempting to Estab-
lish a New Political Norm,” in The Japan Times, 26/9/2015. 
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When it had become around 10:00 in the evening, our unit carefully ventured its 
neck out the door, checked surroundings, and having bided its time, danced out in 
front of the man who presently appeared nervously with his body wrapped in ki-
mono. With his legs, not to mention his body movements, cowering, unable to say 
a single word, the companion was pulled to the ground, and without a moment’s 
delay, pummeled with the bar and steel pipe. 
 
With class anger on account of the slaughter of comrades Tsuji, Masata, Mutō, 
and Kawaguchi, some ten repetitive, blows with an iron hammer put the anti-
revolutionary Tōdai element sinking deeper and deeper in an ocean of blood. 
Meanwhile, all the companion was able to do was to cry out two and a half times 
with a thin voice, “murderers, murderers, murd …..”. 
 
However, our anger is not so shallow as to be satisfied with only this. Above all, 
as ‘the depth of the wound and amount of blood,’ we pursue absolute extermina-
tion with a sense of purpose. First, lifting both his legs high, we completely shat-
tered both ankles and the left knee, carefully depriving him of the ability to fight. 
Subsequently, riding horse on this awkwardly stretched thing, we slowly pulled 
out an industrial hammer and mustering full force, brought it down on the back of 
his head. Sinking in, the hammer made a sound of dosun, dosun on the cranium of 
the anti-revolutionary element. At last, he had a revolutionary period put to his 
“lifetime” as an anti-revolutionary element, and did not even twitch. 
 
Our unit spit ample saliva on the bloodied “corpse” of the anti-revolutionary, easi-
ly dodged the Totsuka police cordon, and boldly completed its retreat.63 
 
Two decades had elapsed since the occurrence of such murders, mythified in their excess, 
and with their diminishing membership, the Chūkakuha had shifted into their third phase: 
                                                
63 Quoted in Tachibana Takashi, Chūkaku VS. Kakumaru, Jō (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 2012), pg. 14 – 15. The 

















the revival of labor unions. But as the description itself suggests, not enough can be done 
to eradicate the “anti-revolutionary element” (hankakumei bunshi). The excess of killing 
triggers repetition. It is not enough to beat someone into an “ocean of blood” (chi no umi). 
The anti-revolutionary element must have his or her ankles and knee methodically broken, 
and must have a hammer strike repeatedly through the cranium. As an ultimate gesture of 
finality, saliva is spit on the body. Moreover, as a textual inscription whose repetition can 
be discerned in the 2010 General Draft Plan, the brackets surrounding the word, “corpse” 
(shikabane) gives the lie to the death of the antirevolutionary. It not only suggests that the 
“element” (bunshi) can hardly be called a ‘corpse’ in its mangled state, but that, indeed, it 
is not dead! It is not a self-identical corpse, but a ‘corpse’ that, like the “period” (piriodo) 
which ostensibly puts an end to the “lifetime” (shōgai) of the antirevolutionary element – 
notably written in Japanese with the English word: period – displaces the finality of death. 
Even if the phase of the Chūkakuha’s battle with the Kakumaru had momentarily abated, 
the threat of imperialism was as alive and undead as ever. The possibility of world revo-
lution was ever-present and, paradoxically, its initial stage would take place in Japan. 
It was the specter of war that prompted the Chūkakuha to accord Japan the pivotal 
place in revolution, for the 2010 General Draft Plan stated that contemporary Japan, after 
two decades of endless recession, was located at the weakest point in the world economy. 
That the “contradictions” (mujun) of capitalism had been taken to their breaking point in 
Japan logically dictated that there would either be war, or revolution. Thus, article #12 of 
the General Draft Plan outright says: “The weakest boundary of international imperialism 
is Japanese imperialism” (kokusaiteikokushugi no saijaku no sakai wa nihonteikokushugi 
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de aru).64 Not surprisingly, albeit without much or any comparative basis that recognized 
wars that were already then in progress, as if there could only be one war, the Draft Plan 
goes on to identify the unique world-historical place occupied by Japan in the temporality 
of the postwar. It is, in effect, the imminent specter of the repetition of war that prompts 
the Chūkakuha to locate the “ultimate impasse” (saidai no hatanten) of Japanese, and of 
world imperialism in the “U.S.-Japanese Alliance” (nichibei dōmei): namely in the “crisis” 
(kiki) and “contradiction” (mujun) of the postwar constitution and the concomitants of the 
postwar order in Okinawa and ANPO.65 Precisely the impossible instant of “war” (sensō) 
appears as the possibility of “revolution” (kakumei). War – so the logic of the Chūkakuha 
runs … – would push the contradictions of the postwar order to their limit, thus enabling 
the Japanese proletariat to create the “breakthrough” (toppaguchi) for world revolution in 
“solidarity” (rentai), of course, with the Korean, Chinese, and American working classes. 
Like the discourse of repetition of war, moreover, the discourse of revolution operates in 
the emergency now-time of future anteriority. In the imminent specter of war, the burden 
to act befalls Japanese workers to “flip” (tenka) the possibility of war into the actuality of 
revolution. The necessity is not to talk, but to act. Thus, in the interest of maintaining the 
fighting subject, all signs of neoliberal reform, or of the worker’s subjection to the brute 
mechanism of the economy, are inverted into signs, not of defeat, but of the desperation 
of the capitalist system. Alongside neoliberal privatization, the strengthening of its stance 
toward an imperial war, and its “attack” (kōgeki) on Okinawa, the constitution and unions 
demonstrate that Japan “has fallen into structural crisis” (taisei kiki ni ochiitteiru). This 
                                                
64 Zenshinsha, Kōryō Sōan: Han Teikokushugi, Han Sutārinshugi Puroretaria Sekai Kakumei no Hata no 
Moto, Mankoku no Rōdōsha, Danketsu Seyo!, pg. 17. 
65 ANPO refers to the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States and Japan. See 
Chapter 2. 
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crisis has assumed the form of a “financially bankrupt state” (zaisei hatan kokka), pushed 
on the population. In fact, not since “the postwar revolutionary moment” (sengokakumei-
ki) – when, from the years ‘45 – ’50, the left had risen to power, to be crushed – has there 
been a revolutionary moment like the one facing Japan in 2010, when the General Draft 
Plan was published. Indeed, “the ultimate revolutionary state of affairs has arrived” (sai-
dai no kakumeiteki jōsei ga torai shita no de aru). Resonating with the moment of murder 
above, at stake is an impossible form of difference:  
Now at last, it is either to be thrust into a hell of suffering of war, unemployment, 
exploitation, plunder, ill health, slaughter, or to achieve the overthrow of Japanese 
imperialism and Japanese state power through the proletariat revolution, and cut 
open the path to communism – it all hinges on this. This natural consequence of 
war or revolution above all hinges on the offensive and defensive victory of the 
laboring class surrounding labor unions and movements. 
 
As capitalist political dominance and class dominance fall into trembling dissolu-
tion, the emperor system will become a concentrated symbol of anti-revolutionary  
bourgeois imperialism. As part of the proletariat revolution, the working class will 
crush every form of the imperial system, and will altogether eradicate it.66 
 
It is no coincidence that the revolution would eradicate the Japanese imperial system, and 
not merely because it constitutes “a concentrated symbol of anti-revolutionary bourgeois 
imperialism” (teikokushugi no burujuajī no hankakumeiteki kesshū no sinboru). Redolent 
with the trauma of war and transhistorical repetition – both inside and outside of history – 
the Japanese “emperor” (tennō) occupies a place in the postwar temporality of repetition 
that, on the other side of the political spectrum, is mirrored in the total form of revolution 
                                                
66 Zenshinsha, Kōryō Sōan: Han Teikokushugi, Han Sutārinshugi Puroretaria Sekai Kakumei no Hata no 









for the Chūkakuha and “radical” (kageki) left, who would repeat and complete the failed 
1917 revolution. While the Chūkakuha certainly do not make reference to fascist symbols 
of blood or race to legitimate their struggle, the totalizing form of revolution promises to 
eliminate precisely the unevenness of capitalism – epitomized in the incapacitating “hell 
of suffering” (jigoku no kurushimi) of the working masses – which fascism displaces and 
seeks to eliminate. Where the imperial figure offers the pure presence of social relations 
unmediated by the commodity form, the Chūkakuha promise to restore the “the genuinely 
human community” (shin no ningenteki kyōdōshakai). For the Chūkakuha, everything is 
made to appear as if it depends on the originary difference of one word: “or” (soretomo). 
Either there will be revolution “or” (soretomo) war conducted under the “emperor system” 
(tennōsei). As if a constitutive difference that has always-already occurred is at stake, the 
Chūkakuha repeatedly declare that a “violent revolution” (bōryoku kakumei) is necessary: 
“it all hinges on this” (koko ni kakatteiru). Enacted repeatedly through the ritualized form 
of demonstrations and symposiums, the excess of action through confrontation castrates, 
subjectivizes, and demands repetition. Yet, the communist society that would supplement 
the originary moment of revolutionary reckoning permits no difference. For the sublime 
moment of revolution to have occurred, workers must “crush every form of the imperial 
system” (tennōsei no issai no keitai o funsai). There can be no remainders of emperorists, 
capitalists, or Stalinists in the social totality that revolution would install.67 
                                                
67 Under the subheading, “Unity through discussions among union members to the end,” Nakano writes 
in We Live on the Railway: 
 “The core problem was what is unity for the labor union. We need unity in labor union to fight 
against the Capital. In order to maintain and develop unity in the labor movement, it is necessary to keep 
fighting against reactionary thought and inclination that inevitably exists in labor union, represented by 
certain tendencies, parties and groups. Only through this conscious effort militant unity is achieved in labor 
union. Unity in labor union is not an abstract confirmation but is materialized in a concrete action under 
militant policy. 
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Notably, it is precisely in the assertion of “unity” (danketsu) that the loss thereof 
is produced. As product and loss that was always-already there, this remainder triggers a 
repetition that is, moreover, dependent on the other for recognition.68 Giving the lie to the 
very notion of totality itself, the General Draft Plan is overrun with signifiers of totality – 
if only indicated by the qualifier “total” (zen): “total world” (zensakai), “total humanity” 
(zenjinrui) “totality of power” (zenkenryoku), “totally” (zenmenteki) “totality of society” 
(zenshakai), “totally overthrow” (kanzendatō), “total contradiction” (zenmujun), “total” 
(kanzen), “total problem” (zenmondai), “total world scale” (zensekaikibo), “total people” 
(zenjinmin), “total class” (zenkaikyū) … – endlessly repeated across its pages. Triggered 
by failure to repetition, the Chūkakuha “party” (tō) would be endlessly given to achieving 
an impossible “self-liberation” (jiko kaihō) in the eradication of difference.69 The trick for 
the Chūkakuha, then, was to subvert this constitutive loss and failure into the appearance 
of a gap between iself and the incapacitated masses in the “hell of suffering” (jigoku no 
kurushimi), whose pure negativity – as Rancière cites Marx: “only,” “merely,” “nothing 
but,” “simply” and “no further” – would be actualized in the “total” (zen) positive princi-
ple of revolution endlessly deferred in the maintenance of this gap. Thus, the Chūkakuha 
                                                                                                                                            
 It concerns also every union membership. All union members, being brought up in a capitalist 
society, are inevitably influenced more or less by corrupt thought, for example on money problem. Bourgo-
is ideology latent in individual workers comes up by chance. Therefore, it is necessary for each of the 
workers to fight against erroneous thought of his own in the struggle of labor union. You should mention 
distinctly the fellow workers what is wrong with his argument. With organizations, the problem is the same. 
Just imagine, when each member is the opinion, “It doesn’t matter whatever happens to the union if every-
thing is okay with me.” Then what will become of the union?” (59 – 60). 
68 In The Other Side of Psychoanalysis, Lacan says: “And what, in this connection, is well spelled out by 
Freud himself is that, in the very repetition, something is produced that is a defect, a failure … by virtue of 
being expressed and as such repeated, of being marked by repetition, what is repeated cannot be anything 
other, in relation to what it repeats, than a loss” (46). 
69 Zenshinsha, Kōryō Sōan: Han Teikokushugi, Han Sutārinshugi Puroretaria Sekai Kakumei no Hata no 
Moto, Mankoku no Rōdōsha, Danketsu Seyo!, pg. 4 – 19. The entire The General Draft is, in fact, organized 
under “the goal of our party” (waga tō no mokuteki). 
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claimed that the establishment of a “party” (tō) was necessary to lay the groundwork for 
revolution.70 
 
                                                




“Internet” (Netto) Emperorism 
 
 The Japanese right-wing has a field day on August 15th every year. The day marks 
the end of the Pacific War and, in the presence of the emperor and empress, occasions the 
televised “All-Japan Memorial Service for War Dead” (Zenkoku Senbotsusha Tsuitōshiki). 
After the emperor has prayed for “peace” (heiwa) on national television, the anniversary 
prompts leading politicians to visit Yasukuni shrine, where civilians likewise come to pay 
homage throughout the day.1 Indeed, August 15th is one of the few days in the year when 
Yasukuni shrine is thronging with people. 
 
 August 15th, 2012, was not an exception. Hundreds of people were moving slowly 
in and out of the massive, towering wooden torii (gate) that marks the main entryway to 
the shrine. At this far edge of the expansive walkway leading to the shrine, children could 
be seen turning to bow, before walking away with their parents. Tourist buses filled with 
the elderly lined the roads adjacent to the walkway. And on this scene of collective effer-
vescence, the Hinomaru was everywhere. Here, a young man was playing the harmonica 
in front of the Hinomaru. There, someone dressed in a sparkling white navy uniform was 
having his photo taken beside the Hinomaru. Traditional-style fascists could be identified 
in the crowd by their crewcuts in military uniform, and posters on signboards announced 
talks by the retired military officer and notorious denier of Japanese aggression in World 
War II, Tamogami Toshio. 
                                                
1 See chapter 1 regarding the significance of Yasukuni Shrine. 
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A solemn atmosphere prevailed inside the actual shrine compound, where people 
lined up to pay their respects at the main offering hall, and priests and priestesses, dressed 
in pure white, went about their duties. But it was outside, beyond the wooden torii, down 
the slope past the Falun Gong activists and NGOs, that the encounter of the day had been 
scheduled. By noon, at the main crossing in front of Kudanshita subway station, the riot 
police had already begun preparing: parking armored cars, setting up road blocks and lin-
ing the sidewalks with barricades. Along with the riot police, the traditional right-wing 
could also be seen gathering here and there, distinctly recognizable by their military caps, 
boots, tinted glasses, and denim, dark-blue uniforms embroidered with small Hinomarus 
on the cap, sleeve, or chest, side by side with their institutional name. Some carried about 
walkie-talkies, while others looked inebriated, gearing up for the arrival of anti-Yasukuni 
demonstrators. It was purportedly to prevent this clash between activist rightists and anti-
Yasukuni demonstrators from escalating into a full-blown physical confrontation that the 
riot police was setting up. 
However, it was not the traditional right-wing, but another group of rightists that 
stole the show preceding, and during the anticipated passage of anti-Yasukuni protesters. 
This group had assembled by the Kudanshita subway exit that adjoins the main crossing, 
forming an amorphous mass organized around a central figure with a microphone, albeit 
from the sidelines, the view of the rotating central speakers – for individuals in the crowd 
took turns speaking, or rather, jeering – was obstructed by the dozens of raised Hinomaru 
flags and camcorders. Unlike the uniformed right-wing, it was difficult to distinguish this 
crowd from random passers-by who had stopped to watch, be it the generic salary-man or 
the college student in T-shirt and jeans. But even at the periphery someone could be seen 
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walking about with a cardboard sign with the words – “Fuck Korea” – written in English. 
There were individuals dressed in military uniform, too. However unlike the denim, these 
uniforms gave the flimsy plastic appearance of having no practical purpose. In fact, it was 
as if they had been designed for cosplay.2 In the center of this main gathering that spilled 
across the street to the four corners of the main crossing, were raised multiple banners of 
the acting organization: Zainichi Tokken o Yurusanai Shimin no Kai or “Citizens Against 
Special Privileges for Resident Foreigners” (hereafter referred to as “Zaittokai”). 
Having already made a reputation for themselves on account of their compulsive, 
shameless, and overwhelming acts of “hate speech” (hēto supīchi), the Zaittokai were out 
in full force on August 15th. Awaiting the approach of the protesters, somebody shouted 
into the microphone that “there is no other nation than Japan” (nihon shika nai) in which 
citizens protest their own national institutions. Echoing the claim by Japanese educational 
bureaucrats that Japan is the only nation in which civil servants refuse to respect national 
symbols, the Zaittokai lumped Japan’s entire postwar legacy of leftism into a monolithic 
category opposed to national aggrandizement. Replete with racist slurs for this “ultra-left” 
(gekisa), the Zaittokai escalated the name-calling into a veritable onslaught – “cockroach” 
(gokiburi), “chink” (shinajin), “slaughter them” (tataki korose), “get out of Japan” (nihon 
kara detekke) – as the moment of encounter approached. The Zaittokai even turned on the 
riot police, calling them “spies” (supai) when they enforced the barricades separating the 
Zaittokai from the oncoming protesters. The speakers continued in this veritable harangue 
against authority itself: “are you not ashamed!?” (hazukashikunai no ka!?), and “what on 
                                                
2 A combination and shortening of “costume” and “play,” “cosplay” refers to the practice of dressing up in 
the costumes of anime characters. 
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earth is this country?!” (koko wa ittai doko no kuni na no?!), the Zaittokai screamed, as if 
they themselves were victims of the state. 
And yet, much as the Zaittokai speakers had spread to the corners of the crossing, 
each surrounded by a crowd of spectators declaring that they were “defending” (mamoru) 
Japan, there was little evidence that its members intended to transgress the line separating 
them from the approaching demonstraters. One woman in her early twenties lay writhing 
on the ground, screaming as the police attempted to carry her off. A young man in a busi-
ness suit had made his way up a traffic pole and, bracing himself, stood there furiously 
waving the Hinomaru. However, for all their posturing, most Zaittokai remained within 
the areas cordoned off for them. Dressed in everyday clothes, two ladies in their forties 
even asked permission from their local leader to intercept the protesters as they finally 
arrived. They proceeded to stand behind the barricades, rattling the steel bars and scream-
ing invectives with all their might as the leftist demonstraters passed. It would have taken 
little effort to climb the waist-high barricades or, for that matter, to have attacked their 
target before it arrived at the junction. 
Indeed, if the passage of the demonstrators was so chaotic that their paltry banners 
could hardly be seen in the mayhem – passing before the moment could be registered! – it 
was on account of the traditional right-wing. They had crossed the barricades and, though 
they might not have been intent on delivering physical blows, charged at the protesters as 
the riot police scrimmaged to stay in-between. 
 
Needless to say, the Zaittokai’s signature “hate-speech” (hēto supīchi) is inscribed 
in a temporality of repetition that ultimately conforms to the Japanese state’s drive to war. 
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But the utterly irreverent and shameless form of pleasure with which the Zaittokai attack 
their target ‘Thing’ discloses incipient forms of nationalism contingent on technological 
mediation by cyberspace, wherein state authority coincides with the threat of the extimate 
interior: the “resident foreigner,” or zainichi. The place of cyberspace must, however, be 
situated within the social context from which it derives its urgency, namely, in a sociality 
that the Zaittokai threatens to replace, in turn. 
Inaugurated on January 20th, 2007, the Zaittokai materialized out of an amorphous 
online entity identified as the “internet right-wing” (netto uyoku). Under the leadership of 
its founder, Sakurai Makoto (professional name), “doronpa,” as he was known in chat 
rooms and 2channel, or simply, Takada Makoto, the Zaittokai grew from a meagre 500 to 
over 10,000 members within four years.3 Although this growth rate is not exceptional in 
terms of the viral speeds with which online videos become popular, it is indicative of an 
incipient social phenomenon that, as a freelance reporter on the Zaittokai, Yasuda Kōichi 
observes, is significant against the backdrop of Japan’s newly entrenched “working poor” 
(wākingu pua).4 It is with reference to the emergence of this particular demographic that 
Yasuda inquires, “why do altogether normal young people suddenly transform into racists” 
(goku goku futsū no wakamono tachi wa, naze reishisuto ni hyōhen suru no ka).5 Indeed, 
the Zaittokai’s obsessive drive to eliminate so-called “special privileges” (tokken) cannot 
be dissociated from the precarity of sustaining a livelihood. Despite his emergence into 
the public limelight as leader of the Zaittokai, even appearing in the New York Times, the 
                                                
3  The “handlename” (handorunēmu) – online pseudonym – of “Doronpa” is also the pen name of 
a manga artist, and the name of the manga serial publication, “COMIC BiRZ.” 
Inaugurated in 1999, “2channel” is Japan’s largest online textboard, numbering some 2.5 million 
posts per day in 2007. 
4 Yasuda Kōichi, Netto to Aikoku: Zaitokukai no ‘Yami’ o Oikakete (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 2012), pg. 52. See 
also Mark Schreiber, “Poverty Takes on a New Look in Today’s Japan,” in The Japan Times, 6/12/2014. 
5 Yasuda, Netto to Aikoku, pg. 51 – 93. 
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42-year-old Sakurai reputedly works as a “part-time” (hiseiki) guardman. Unsurprisingly, 
one of the favorite rallying cries of the Zaittokai consists in the outrage of the state giving 
welfare to zainichi, when 30,000 Japanese commit suicide every year. One member thus 
repeats the party-line: 
In this age, many Japanese are suffering from poverty. There are not a few people 
who become homeless, or commit suicide. 30,000 people take their own lives per 
year. In spite of this, zainichi have foreign citizenship but receive welfare prefer-
entially and, moreover, only bad-mouth Japan. I’ve never heard of a zainichi 
committing suicide on account of poverty.6 
 
Notably, it is the “foreign citizenship” (gaikokuseki) of welfare-recipients which activates 
the ire of the Zaittokai, predisposing places with a substantial number of foreign welfare-
recipients, like Sanya, or its neighboring burakumin district of Imado, to become targets 
of attack. Indeed, in the “Suiheisha Museum Incident” (Suiheisha Hakubutsukan Jiken), a 
Zaittokai member shouted discriminatory slogans at a museum tracing the historical roots 
of burakumin in Kyoto. While this attack was disavowed by the Zaittokai as a group, the 
object and exhibit that instigated the attack was called a “violation of the human rights of 
our ancestors” (wareware no senzo ni taisuru jinken shingai) by the Zaittokai leadership. 
Entitled “Korea and Japan” (korea to nihon), this exhibit spotlighted Japan’s colonization 
of Korea.7 Notwithstanding the association of burakumin with foreign origins, the appela-
tion – zainichi – could be deployed by the Zaittokai to attack any suspicious object. In the 
Zaittokai discourse, zainichi referred to Koreans, Chinese, Filipinos, and other minorities 
of ‘Asian’ descent, while excluding individuals from the United States, Canada or Europe. 
                                                





7 See Yasuda, Netto to Aikoku, pg. 230 – 236. 
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As the organizing nodal point of the Zaittokai discourse, the “special privileges” (tokken) 
of zainichi cannot be localized in a discrete set of social issues. Rather, taking the form of 
hyperbole, and making a norm of such hyperbole, ‘special privileges’ are rendered visible 
precisely in the act of accusation. Transposed into truth, the suspicious absence of stories 
relating suicide by poverty of zainichi attests to the existence of their ‘special privileges,’ 
and in so doing, reverses the order of privileges given to Japanese citizens. Absence is, in 
effect, transformed into proof of the presence of ‘special privileges.’ Thus, redolent with 
the stain of defeat in World War II, there is, indeed, a certain theft at stake in the ‘special 
privileges’: something has been “stolen” (ubawareta) over the course of the interminable 
postwar.8 The Zaittokai member quoted above hence continues: “While enjoying special 
privileges, are the zainichi not the root cause of Japan’s state of affairs, as they undertake 
factually ungrounded anti-Japanese actions, like anti-discrimination activism or pursuit of 
war guilt.”9 In a fabulous reversal and projection of guilt, the Zaittokai partake of a vic-
timization discourse that assigns guilt of aggression to the other by implication.10 Its hate 
speech recalls the impropriety of school graduation and entrance ceremonies in requiring 
that everyone mirror the enactment of paying respect to state symbols. Yet, the Zaittokai 
not only push propriety to the point where it slips into its opposite of shamelessness to the 
other. They demonstrate irreverence even towards the state authority that would, ostensi-
bly, constrain them. 
                                                
8 Yasuda, Netto to Aikoku, pg. 104. 
9 Ibid, pg. 53. The text in Japanese reads: “特権を享受しながら、差別反対運動や戦争犯罪追及など、
事実無根の反日活動を行なっている在日こそ、日本の元凶じゃあないですか。” The word, “cause” 
(genkyō) is commonly used to describe a negative state of affairs, and can also be translated as the “source,” 
“author,” “ringleader,” “culprit” or “generator.” 
10 Consider the “peace” (heiwa) discourse that attends the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. See 
Chapter 9. 
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 It was the 2009 so-called “Obstruction of a Kyoto Korean School” (Kyoto Chōsen 
Gakkō Bōgai) incident that accelerated the Zaittokai’s popularity in cyberspace, and that 
established its scandalous reputation through the general news. As one of two exceptional 
incidents in which the Zaittokai prompted criminal prosecution, the attack on the Korean 
school was instigated by the contingent: the Zaittokai had ostensibly received anonymous 
online “complaints” (kujō) from “residents” (jūmin), or rather, neighbors of the school in 
question. In response to a query by the reporter, Yasuda, a 10-year resident self-identified 
as the mythic person who complained to the Zaittokai. He expressed “gratitude” (kansha) 
for their invention. The man recounted how he had picked his apartment on account of its 
proximity to Kyoto station. But there were a number of things that angered him, and it all 
involved the use of a public park by the Korean school. “Those people (affiliated with the 
school) have bazaars and stuff in the park. They drink liquor, pig out on yakiniku, and get 
all boisterous. The smoke of yakiniku flows all the way into our place. There is no burden 
like this. Moreover, whenever there is some event, the environs of the park are filled with 
cars, becoming an illegal parking lot.”11 The man said that he had called the local police 
regarding the parking. Yet, despite their promise to “instruct properly” (kichin to shidō), 
there was no sign of follow-up. Rather, the signs of the others’ excessive enjoyment had 
crept inside his apartment and, ultimately, presented themselves as theft to the upstanding 
Japanese.12 The man continues: “When our child tried to play in the park, a Korean 
                                                




12 In “Eastern Europe’s Republics of Gilead,” Žižek writes: “what really bothers us about the ‘other’ is the 
peculiar way it organizes its enjoyment: precisely the surplus, the ‘excess’ that pertains to it – the smell of 
their food, their ‘noisy’ songs and dances, their strange manners, their attitude to work (in the racist per-
spective, the ‘other’ is either a workaholic stealing our jobs or an idler living on our labour; and it is quite 
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school student threatened them: “You’re in the way, so get out”. Does this kind of thing 
really happen? That is a local park that anyone can use. Or rather, call it difference of 
race, or difference in thinking, many times I cannot understand with people over there.”13  
The man had also approached the local city administration many times, but as with the 
police, there was no sign of action. “For this reason” (dakara), he said, “I thought I had to 
ask some place that would do something extreme for us” (kageki na koto yattekureru 
tokoro ni tanomanai to ikenai to omoimashita). The lack of response by local authorities 
called for extraordinary measures and, in effect, the suspension of talk. Consequently the 
man went online to look for a “place that appeared likely to fight” (tatakatte kure sō na 
tokoro) and contrary to the traditional right-wing – by which he felt threatened, as if they 
might attack him – what he “discovered” (hakken) was the self-professed “citizen’s group” 
(shimin dantai): Zaittokai. “If here” (koko dattara), he explained, “I thought they would 
take radical action with the power of citizens” (koko dattara, shimin no chikara de kageki 
na kōdō o okoshite kureru to omoimashita).14 Unlike representatives of the state, who left 
citizens to fend for themselves, the Zaittokai would surely act on his behalf. 
 This account of an anonymous resident searching for, and “discovering” (hakken) 
the Zaittokai online reproduces similar accounts of Zaittokai activists “awakening to the 
truth” (shinjitsu ni mezameta) by finding the Zaittokai online. Of the “abduction problem” 
(rachi mondai), in which between 17 and hundreds of Japanese citizens were kidnapped 
by the North Korean state from 1975 to 1985, one Zaittokai member recounts: “I simply 
                                                                                                                                            
amusing to note the ease with which one passes from reproaching the other with a refusal to work, to re-
proaching him for the theft of work)” (54). 




14 Ibid, pg. 112 – 113. 
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could not forgive the kidnapping incident. What on earth kind of country is North Korea? 
While searching on the internet, what I hit on was a Zaittokai video. According to this, I 
was able to understand it is not only North Korea, but also the existence of zainichi that is 
driving Japan into crisis. I ended up knowing the truth.”15 As “truth” (shinjitsu) or, as the 
man above says, “cause” (genkyō) of Japan’s contemporary “crisis” (kiki), the remainder 
of the zainichi must be eliminated. The exterior threat of North Korea kidnapping citizens 
from the interior of the nation is reproduced by the interior, foreign kernel of the zainichi 
whose status in contemporary Japan was contingent on defeat in World War II. The “cri-
sis” (kiki) or emergency situation requires a decisionism by and for citizens who take 
matters into their own hands.16 For lack of a protective state structure, the crisis calls for a 
“conservative that acts” (kōdō suru hoshu) and acts in the interest of “citizens” (shimin).17 
And the Zaittokai were, indeed, swift to act at the Korean school in Kyoto. Having never 
met face-to-face with the original complainant, the Zaittokai investigated matters on their 
own and protested at the local city administrative office. Before the complainant knew of 
it, the incident had already occurred.18 
 The by-now infamous “Obstruction of a Kyoto Korean School” involved some 10 
members of Zaittokai’s “Team Kansai” (chīmu kansai) descending on the school without 
warning. Armed with loudspeakers, wireclippers, and the necessary camera, the Zaittokai 
characteristically proceeded to create a state of general pandemonium at the school gates, 
                                                




16 Regarding decisionism, see Carl Schmitt’s Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sover-
eignty. 
17 Yasuda, Netto to Aikoku, pg. 159. 
18 Ibid, pg. 112 – 113. 
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while classes were in session. In videos available on youtube, they first taunt and shout at 
two staff members in suits, one of whom points a camera back at the Zaittokai. The latter 
scream “Koreans!” (chōsenjin!) and order them to “open up!” (akenasai!). At one point, a 
Zaittokai member even gestures to a child to “come here” (kocchi oide). In the absence of 
a satisfactory response, however, the megaphone comes out. Shouting into a megaphone 
that whines and crackles with static, the Zaittokai say the public park, used for morning 
assembly and sports gatherings, “has been illegally occupied for 50 years by the Korean 
school” (chōsen gakkō ni yotte 50 nen fuhō senkyo sareteiru). Thus, the Zaittokai proceed 
to clip the electrical wires connecting the park speakers to the school and to transport the 
pedestal used for morning assembly to the gate of the school. The Zaittokai’s intervention 
was, in fact, well-timed, for they were aware the city had requested the removal of school 
equipment from the park: if they were to stage an intervention, it had to occur before the 
scheduled removal. Occasionally challenged by a staff member muttering from behind 
the gates, which sets off an avalanche of invectives and, in one instance, even approached 
by a staff member outside the gates, the “Team Kansai” delivers an altogether relentless, 
30-minute volley of “hate speech” (hēto supīchi). As the staff members stand inside with 
outraged and worrisome expressions, the Zaittokai rattle the metal gates with the pedestal 
pushed against them, wave the Hinomaru, and scream: 
“Open the gates!” (mon o akenasai!) 
“You’re not following the school education law!” (gakkō kyōikuho ni motozuite 
imasen!) 
“Something like that is not a school!” (sonna mono wa gakkō jyanai!) 
“We came along because Kyoto city isn’t doing it!” (kyōtoshi ga yaranai kara, 
ware ware ga yattekita!) 
“Give back the park!” (kōen kaese!) 
“Come out!” (detekoi!) 
“You are completely surrounded!” (kimitachi wa kanzen ni hōi sareteiru!) 
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“Kick out the Korean school from Japan!” (chōsen gakkō o nippon kara ta-
takidase!) 
“Originally, the grounds of this school are also an illegal occupation!” (somosomo 
kono gakkō no tochi mo, fuhōsenkyo nandesuyo!) 
“Originally, this is all Japanese ground!” (koko wa zenbu nihonjin no tochi ya, 
motomoto wa!) 
“This is the General Association of Korean Residents that kidnapped Japanese!” 
(nipponjin o rachi shita, chōsen sōren desu yo!) 
“We are the brave warriors of the Kansai Zaittokai” (zaittokai kansai no yūshita-
chi de gozaimasu) 
“Hurry and open the gates, and clean up your things!” (hayaku mon o akete, jibun 
no mono o shimatsu shiro!) 
“Spy-rearing-school!” (supai ikusei gakkō!) 
“It stinks of kimchi!” (kimuchi kusai dē!) 
“Eat shit Koreans!” (chōsenjin wa unko kuttoke!) 
“Koreans stole the land of our ancestors! They raped women of Japan and took 
this land!” (chōsenjin wa wareware no senzo no tochi o ubatta! nihon no onna o 
reipu shite ubatta no ga kono tochi ya!) 
“We’re letting you live in Japan! You get to walk on the edge of the road!” (nihon 
ni sumasete yattennya! omaera tannko no hō aruitottara ēnya!) 
“Korean school, let’s destroy it!” (chōsen gakkō, konna mono wa bukkowase!) 
“We won’t be as soft as other organizations!” (ware ware wa nā, hoka no dantai 
mitai ni amaku nai zo!). 
“It’s only that Japanese until now were too weak!” (imamade no nipponjin ga 
yowasugita dake!) 
“You are not human!” (kimitachi wa ningen jya nai!).19 
 
And when one teacher approaches them, from behind the gates, to tell them to be “quiet” 
(shizuka) because of the children inside, the Zaittokai scream back: “Children?! They’re 
kids of spies!” (nani ga kodomo ya?! supai no ko yanke!). Another teacher similarly went 
running upon learning what was unfolding, believing that, “by talking, they will certainly 
understand” (hanaseba kitto wakatte moraeru). But when he arrived on site, it dawned on 
him that there was no “entrypoint for talk” (hanashi no itoguchi): “using the park issue as 
a pretext” (kōen mondai o kōjitsu ni), he says, “they only wanted to discriminate against, 
and to attack Koreans” (chōsenjin sono mono o sabetsu, kōgeki shitakattano deshō).20 
                                                
19 kaka01kuku, “Chōsen Gakkō ga Kyōto no Jidō Kōen o 50 Nenkan Fuhō Senkyo,” on Youtube, 
20/10/2011. 
20 Yasuda, Netto to Aikoku, pg. 99. 
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 The shouting finally dies down once local city officials, followed by a policeman, 
accost the Zaittokai, the latter of whom shout intermittently in the speakers as they insist 
that they had received permission to demonstrate. As if to elicit a reaction from them, the 
policeman even mutters: “you’re the same as the extreme left” (kyokusa to issho 
jyanai).21 But the Zaittokai parry into the megaphone, insisting they are acting on behalf 
of “Kyoto citizens” (kyōto shimin). When the Korean school sends a Japanese lawyer out 
to talk, his suggestion that there might be more appropriate, official channels of achieving 
their goals is peremptorily shut down: “It’s futile talking” (hanashiatte mo muda nandesu 
yo) and “it stinks of alcohol” (sake kusai ya). Eventually the Zaittokai members retreat, 
laughing into the camera as they round the corner. 
 Among teachers who refused to stand for the anthem, it was precisely the inability 
to “converse” (hanashi o suru) with recent right-wingers that differentiated them from the 
past. At least with the former right-wing, it was possible to engage them in conversations 
that did not automatically collapse into name-calling. Just as the figure of the sitting 
teacher during school ceremonies sets off a machinery designed to produce conformity, 
today the mere occurrence of backtalk triggers an onslaught of verbal violence from the 
right-wing. 
Implicit to the ritual act of “standing to attention” (kiritsu), the hate speech of the 
Zaittokai reiterates a shameless violence that constitutes the necessary twin of propriety. 
Indeed, the “Team Kansai” positioned the Hinomaru in front of the gates, marching back 
and forth with it. Always enacted in the presence of the Hinomaru, the form of violence 
that characterizes the actions of the Zaittokai would, as they themselves attest, “destroy” 
                                                
21 kaka01kuku, “Chōsen Gakkō ga Kyōto no Jidō Kōen o 50 Nenkan Fuhō Senkyo,” on Youtube, 
20/10/2011. 
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(kowasu), or kill. In this respect, Marilyn Ivy shows that, in enabling the self-recognition 
of Japan as a monolithic “shame-culture” – guiltless in relativity – the wartime American 
academy was complicit in formulating a “strange culturalist alibi” for the Japanese: “One 
feels no shame towards those who don’t belong to one’s social world.”22 Yet, much as the 
Zaittokai would never mess with the meta-guarantee of Japanese sociality, the “emperor” 
(tennō), a figure whom they would reinstate in his former glory, they exhibit anything but 
proper conduct towards concrete manifestations of state authority. In effect, the Zaittokai 
vacillate between the face-to-face sociality observed among members, in which hierarchy 
and propriety are reinstated in a form peculiar to the Zaittokai, and the shameless form of 
their hate speech, which replicates online forms of writing, but which also occurs within a 
structure of address that solicits (online) recognition. 
 The hate speech of the Zaittokai gives itself to be recognized, not by any concrete 
manifestation of social authority, but to an imagined online audience. As the exchange of 
signifiers, then, reciprocity is effectively foreclosed in Zaittokai demonstrations. Much as 
they address themselves to a virtual audience that is characterized in terms of anonymity 
and quantifiable numbers, and in whose place they simultaneously imagine themselves to 
be, on the other side of the screen, the Zaittokai demonstrators cannot meet face-to-face 
or interact with this audience.23 Ideally, then, the structure of a prohibitive gaze in which 
the Zaittokai give themselves to be seen is as absent from the scene of demonstration as it 
is for the viewer in cyberspace. In this structure of address, the demonstrator on the street 
would be identical with the online viewer, as if the symbolic did not exist. Yasuda is led 
                                                
22 Marilyn Ivy, “Benedict’s Shame,” pg. 66. 
23 As recipients of their own performance, Zaittokai demonstrations conform to a structure of narcissism. 
See my discussion below, with specific reference to the essay by Rosalind Krauss, “Video: The Aesthetics 
of Narcissism,” in October, Vol. 1 (Spring, 1976). 
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to label the actions of ‘Team Kansai’ at the Korean school a “performance called crime,” 
(hanzai to iu pafōmansu), as if Zaittokai hate speech was merely performed for an online 
audience, bereft of any actual intent to kill; although, hate speech most certainly carries a 
damaging effectivity.24 Clips of their actions were indeed posted to Nico Nico Douga and 
youtube on the day of their protest, from which copies were made, distributed, and where 
popular clips quickly exceeded 10,000 views. And the ‘Team Kansai’ met overwhelming 
support online, where commentary included phrases like: “good job” (yoku yatta), “thank 
you, Zaittokai” (zaittokai, arigatō), “go Zaittokai!” (gambare zaittokai!), and “applause 
for “Zaittokai”!” (“zaittokai” ni akushu!). If the scripted Zaittokai performance called for 
approbation – “applause” (akushu) as in a theater – the event achieved its intended effect: 
sparking a peak in the Zaittokai’s online popularity; with an anonymous audience, that is, 
with which Zaittokai members never met face-to-face.25  
 Indeed, in an edited youtube posting of the school incident, the Zaittokai members 
are made to appear as heroic performers. With more than 130,000 views (three years after 
the event), the first of a continuous seven-section stream – the third of which is missing –
speeds the viewer through Kyoto station, and introduces some of the actors in front of the 
Korean school as they smile, bow and salute, each about to perform their own role. With 
a soundtrack of upbeat rap and rock music, the viewer is thus shown footage of actions to 
come: of the Korean school principal behind the gates, of a Zaittokai member (dressed as 
an electrician) clipping the wires connecting the park speakers to the school, of Zaittokai 
standing outside the school gates with the Hinomaru hoisted on a pole, shouting in at the 
staff, and of fellow Zaittokai members coming to the rescue when a school staff member 
                                                
24 Yasuda, Netto to Aikoku, pg. 93 – 143. 
25 Ibid, pg. 99 – 100. 
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approaches them. As if to foreshadow what is to come, the members smile in the camera 
when introducing themselves. Before cutting to a continuous stream of that day’s events, 
the actors and their actions are made to look cool and virtuous. And this self-projection is 
recognized online. Calling their actions that day “a fight of justice” (seigi no tatakai), the 
four Kansai members, who were consequently arrested and found guilty of “forcible ob-
struction of business” (iryoku gyōmubōgai), were referred to as “brave warriors” (yūshi) 
by the Zaittokai.26 
 If the Team Kansai gave themselves to be recognized online, relations among the 
Zaittokai themselves seemed to replicate the form of online relations. And yet, it must be 
said that these relations consisted in face-to-face meetings, in which reciprocity occurred 
between members otherwise alienated from each other in cyberspace. In these relations as 
members, individuals did not use their actual, everyday names, and did not disclose their 
true professions or addresses, but preferred to use their online “handle names” (handoru 
nēmu). In fact, as the “head of reporting” (hōkokuchō) remarked in an interview: “Unless 
one becomes very close, there is no exchanging of real names or professions. There exists 
an atmosphere in Zaittokai in which it is somewhere taboo to ask about such things, even 
among members.”27 Notably, it is on account of the possibility of exchanging real names 
through face-to-face relationships that this taboo emerges. Similarly, even the Akihabara 
address of the Zaittokai office is not made public. The “head of reporting” thus continues: 
“Though it calls itself a citizen’s group, its activities started from a focus on internet users. 
Unlike real society, so-called customs of the internet were carried over as they were. 
                                                
26 Ibid, pg. 101. 




Nowadays, there exists no idiot who would write their real name on an internet black-
board. Insofar as there are many who are caught by the Zaittokai as an extension of inter-
net activity, it is only natural they should want to hide their actual name. To begin with, 
not a few people conceal they are taking part in the activities, obviously so from work 
and school, but also from parents and friends.”28 As the quote suggests, the “secretiveness” 
(himitsushugi) of the Zaittokai is two-fold. On the one hand, actual everyday names, pro-
fessions, and addresses are concealed between Zaittokai members themselves. On the 
other hand, Zaittokai activists seldom let on to others – in their “real” (riaru) lives – that 
they are partaking in Zaittokai activities, be it by writing and watching online, or by tak-
ing to the streets. Such disclosures can, no doubt, bring about a fair amount of trouble, 
not least on account of the Zaittokai’s rise to infamy through events like the Kyoto school 
incident. The source of this form of secrecy, moreover, is said to be located in cyberspace. 
However, Zaittokai members likewise said that it was the insufficiency of their everyday 
lives that prompted the drive to seek the solace of cyberspace, and ultimately, recognition 
by other Zaittokai members. 
 As if the framing act of isolating oneself to the screen were at stake, the trick was 
for Zaittokai activities to be separated from a postwar prohibitive ideology, wherein the 
actions at the Korean school appeared as a “crime” (hanzai) proper, rather than as mere 
“performances” (pafōmansu) thereof. That peculiar theater in which the pleasure of “hate 
speech,” emblematized in the smile before the camera, can take place uninhibited must be 
                                                







preserved, as if it constituted a pure simulacrum.29 But just as hate speech transmits an 
indisputable violence as a performance, form, and hysteria, the mimesis of which renders 
its effects identical to that of actual hysteria, so too the character of the state’s prohibition 
must be questioned, for the state permits hate speech. On this note, Zaittokai participants 
at the Kyoto school incident were arrested over “forcible obstruction of business” (iryoku 
gyōmubōgai), and not their deployment of hate speech. Indeed, while Zaittokai activities 
have precipitated movements both at the municipal (in Osaka) and parliamentary level to 
enforce legislation against racial discrimination, it should be said that the passage of such 
legislation has been halted under account of opposition from the ruling Liberal Democrat-
ic Party and concerns that it may infringe on freedom of expression. In fact, even if such 
legislation were passed, it would carry no punitive measures.30 While the Zaittokai were 
fined ¥12 million on account of their actions at the Kyoto school and their appeals were 
denied by the Supreme Court, such punishment constitutes an exception which drives the 
Zaittokai claim that their punishment is unjust. The transgression of arrest constitutes the 
exception of a wrist-slap that restores displeasure to jouissance, while anonymity allows 
the Zaittokai to perform in a simulacrum that alleviates them of guilt. Yet, the possibility 
of this performance of impunity in shameless enjoyment is enabled by the state. 
                                                
29 Jean Baudrillard writes of the “precession of simulacra” in Simulacra and Simulation, trans. Sheila Faria 
Glaser (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1994). He observes that “signs of the real” have 
been substituted for the “real” to the point at which the map “precedes the territory,”  In this “hyperreal,” 
the disappearance of “reference” in favor of a “principle of equivalence” has given rise the “radical nega-
tion of the sign as value.” Nonetheless, Baudrillard notes there is a sense of the loss of the real (1 – 2, 6 – 7, 
9). 
30 Indeed, when an ordinance against hate speech was passed by the municipality of Osaka in January, 2016, 
it carried no punitive measures. See Eric Johnston, “Osaka Assembly Passes Nation’s First Ordinance 
Against Hate Speech,” in The Japan Times, 15/1/2016, “Osaka’s Assault on Ethnic Invective Stalls,” in The 
Japan Times, 15/6/2015, and Aoki Mizuho, “Opposition Slams LDP in Pushing Anti-Discrimination Bill,” 
in The Japan Times, 6/8/2015. 
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Nonetheless, it is not just against a prohibitive postwar ideology that the Zaittokai 
must bracket and frame their actions, thereby enabling their enjoyment to be instantiated. 
Indeed, as one member says, an “excessive sense of danger” (kajō na kikikan) attached to 
the prospect of disclosing one’s actual identity “because not a few people end up strongly 
believing that “it is the zainichi who are controlling Japan”” (“nihon o shihai shiteiruno 
wa zainichi” to tsuyoku shinjikomu ningen ga sukunaku arimasen kara).31 
 Notably, the difference between those who believe excessively in the zainichi and 
those who do not manifests a fetishistic split between knowledge and belief. Indeed, it is 
not the fact of believing, for the zainichi constitute the “truth” (shinjitsu) of the Zaittokai 
discourse, but of believing “strongly” (tsuyoku) or to “excess” (kajō) that is suggested as 
one possible result of partaking in Zaittokai activities. What is all the more striking in this 
excessive belief, however, is that the “truth” (shinjitsu) or “cause” (genkyō) – discovered 
online – of the zainichi has infected the everyday. As poison, that which was to have been 
the cure has exacerbated the cause.32 Lurking behind every relation, but especially that of 
the state, which gives preferential treatment to the zainichi, is the figure of the zainichi. 
Not only do the zainichi have representatives in parliament, but by monopolizing pseudo-
legal profits made from financial enterprises such as pachinko parlors, or gambling, they 
funnel money from the Japanese economy into North Korea, where these financial assets 
are transformed into military arms that threaten all things Japanese. As Žižek observes of 
the “figure of the Jew,” the zainichi displace a certain “social antagonism into antagonism 
                                                
31 Yasuda, Netto to Aikoku, pg. 42. 
32 Jacques Derrida writes in Dissemination, trans. Barbara Johnson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1981): “The pharmakon is that dangerous supplement that breaks into the very thing that would have liked 
to do without it yet lets itself at once be breached, roughed up, fulfilled, and replaced, completed by the 
very trace through which the present increases itself in the act of disappearing” (110). 
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between the sound social texture, social body, and the Jew as the force corroding it.”33 In 
effect, it is not a class antagonism between Japan’s “working poor” (wākingu pua) and its 
upper classes that drives the Zaittokai, but the figure of the zainichi as a displacement and 
condensation of this constitutive contradiction. The form of this paranoid displacement is, 
however, overdetermined by the medium in which the Zaittokai deliver their hate speech. 
Enforced by the taboo and, in effect, isolation that would prevent intercourse between the 
everyday world and that of the Zaittokai, the frame of cyberspace has been transposed on 
the everyday. The zainichi are “completely surrounded” (kanzen ni hōi sareteiru), and yet, 
they are everywhere pulling the conspiratorial strings that organize everyday life. At once 
contained in the screen and excessive to it, the zainichi threaten the enframement that has 
taken the place of everyday Japan. 
 The place of cyberspace must be situated within the network of everyday relations 
in relation to which the zainichi emerges as “truth” (shinjitsu). To start with, the fact that 
regular Zaittokai members do not disclose their identities as Zaittokai members in their 
everyday relations, and vice versa, suggests a certain blockage of lateral recognition. If 
the underlying truth of this precarious everyday is to be found online, moreover, then the 
internet, or specifically, 2channel, the massive textboard numbering millions of posts per 
day whose icon shows a crowd of cute colorful monsters jumping from an urn, is said to 
be the “mother-body” (botai) of “people clinging on to the cellphone or computer, franti-
cally writing in ‘Korean people, die’ from morning until evening” (asa kara ban made 
                                                
33 Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, pg. 125. Žižek continues: “Thus it is not society itself which is 
‘impossible’, based on antagonism – the source of corruption is located in a particular entity, the Jew. This 
displacement is made possible by the association of Jews with financial dealings: the source of exploitation 
and of class antagonism is located not in the basic relation between the working and ruling classes but in 
the relation between the ‘productive’ forces (workers, organizers of production … ) and the merchants who 
exploit the ‘productive’ classes, replacing co-operation with class struggle” (125). 
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pasakon ya keitai ni kajiritsuki, ‘chōsenjin wa shine’ nado to hisshi ni kakikomu mono).34 
As if the form of writing itself were at play, emerging as cute teratological monsters, the 
form of this “patriotism” (aikoku) is implicitly and explicitly in the negative: “anti-Korea” 
(hanchōsen), “anti-China” (hanshina) and “anti-left” (hansayoku).35 After the Fukushima 
nuclear disaster gave rise to anti-nuclear demonstrations, the Zaittokai even espoused an 
“anti-anti-nuclear” (hanhangenpatsu) stance; coupling it with other “anti” (han) stances – 
anti-anti-discrimination, anti-anti-war – arbitrarily motivated by the privileged preference 
accorded to such movements. Unlike those who keep a low profile and “observe the rules” 
(rūru o mamoru), until they join the Zaittokai, the sheer visibility of such movements that 
oppose the general national interest is subject to ressentiment. 
 It was a common story among Zaittokai members that they could not express their 
nationalistic sentiments to family or friends: the truth of the zainichi was felt to be taboo 
in everyday discourse. In an interview with Yasuda, one 28-year-old woman who worked  
as what is regularly referred to in Japan as an “OL” (ŌERU) or “office lady” – a term that 
Yasuda uses – said that she used to be “uninterested” (mukanshin) in politics, but had felt 
that there was “something wrong” (nanika okashī) with the ease with which children born 
out of wedlock between a Japanese citizen and foreigner could acquire Japanese citizen-
ship if the parent desired it. Online, she researched the 2008 “revision” (kaisei) of the 
“citizenship law” (kokuseki hō) which enabled this and was relieved to find in articles and 
blogs that a majority of voices were “against revision” (kaisei hantai). The online con-
servative discourse of “pure blood” (junketsusei) fed her flame. It was “relieving” (an-
shin) because, online, she “strongly felt there are in fact a great number of people with 
                                                
34 Yasuda, Netto to Aikoku, pg. 44. 
35 Ibid, pg. 44. 
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the same opinion” (onaji iken no mono ga konna ni mo ōzei iru no ka to kokoro tsuyoku 
kanjita no da). In addition, online she learnt about the “state” (kokka) and about: “What a 
state should be. For whom the state is there. What the state ought to do” (kuni to wa dō 
aru beki nanoka. kuni wa dare no tame ni aru noka. kuni ga subeki koto wa nanika). In 
cyberspace, moreover, it was not comments like “let’s preserve peace” (heiwa o mamorō) 
or “discrimination is bad” (sabetsu wa ikenai), but rather, the conservative that was 
overwhelmingly persuasive and powerful. Above all, it was videos of the Zaittokai, and 
of president Sakurai speaking, that gave her a “sense of danger” (kikikan). She noted: “If 
Japan continues to be at the bidding of China and Korea like this, it will be colonized” 
(kono mama chūgoku ya kankoku no iinari ni natte shimattara, nihon ga shokuminchika 
sareteshimaimasu). However, like the passersby on the street, friends, and family, those 
around her are “people who have not even noticed” (imada ni kizukanai hitotachi). She 
added: “Friends and family are practically no good. Even if I talk to friends about the 
problem of the right of foreigners to vote, I get a weird look. As if to say: ‘what’s wrong 
all of a sudden?’”.36 Paired with the “relief” (anshin) of finding fellow patriots online, 
there was the “danger” or “emergency” (kiki) of contemporary Japan.  
  The manager of a Hokkaido-based design company similarly recounted how his 
best friend reacted to him when he remarked, “what a terrible standpoint” (hidoi shuchō 
da ne), of the stance of the “Let’s Preserve Article 9” (dai kyūjō o mamorō) movement. 
With a shocked expression, the friend had retorted sarcastically: “you like war?” (omae, 
sensō ga sukina no?). At the time, Hokkaido was called a “socialist party heaven” 
(shakaitō tengoku), and provided no atmosphere in which to express “patriotism” (aiko-
                                                
36 Ibid, pg. 74 – 76. The Japanese text reads: “友人や両親もまるでダメですね。友達に外国人参政権
の問題を話しても、不思議な顔をされてしまうんです。‘いきなりどうしたの？’って感じで。” 
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kushin) or “veneration for the emperor” (tennoheika sūkei). After this incident, the man-
ager explained, he “gave up discussing with anybody, thinking it wasn’t possible” (mō 
dare tomo giron nante dekinai to akiramemashita). The most courage he could build up 
was to mutter something to the owner of a drinkery every once in a while. “There was no 
one I could rely on. I did have the enthusiasm to change Japan, even by myself. Above all, 
to express my will.”37 Moreover, this was at a time before the internet had become popu-
lar, so the manager would fax his opinions to the prime minister’s office, the Democratic 
Party of Japan, the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan, or the Social Democratic Party. 
Since then, cyberspace has of course taken off. “Young people today are happy. Via the 
internet, it is possible to freely transmit, and furthermore, to immediately find buddies 
who share the same awareness of issues.”38 “Without the internet” (netto ga nakereba), 
the manager noted: “I do not think it would have been possible to connect people with 
dissatisfaction or a sense of danger. Some say it is too simple, but what is wrong with 
that? If the entrance is wide, the wider the better. And even if we use the internet as a 
starting point, we haven’t settled for this. We continue on to press our case on the streets. 
What is important is not the means, but what is being done, and what the goal is. I myself 
am not so dependent on the internet. Nevertheless, if the entrypoint of the internet had 
existed during my college days, I might have been able to take part in the movement 
much earlier.”39 Before cyberspace had “spread” (fukyū), there was “the loneliness of not 
                                                
37 Ibid, pg. 79. The Japanese text reads: “頼れる人は誰もいませんでしたからね。一人でも日本を変
えてやるんだ、くらいの意気込みはありましたよ。とにかく意思表示だけはしておこうと。” 
38 Ibid, pg. 78. The Japanese reads: “いまの若者は幸せですよ。ネットを通じて自由に発言すること
が可能だし、しかも同じ問題意識を持った仲間をすぐ見つけることができる。いい時代じゃない
ですか。” 




being able to share anger with anybody” (dare to mo ikari o kyōyū dekinai samishisa). It 
was through the “power of the internet” (netto no chikara) that the Hokkaido-based Zait-
tokai grew from merely ten members to over 500.40 
The social relations that would facilitate the formation of the “internet right-wing” 
(netto uyoku) were, in this account, in place before cyberspace even arrived. Yet it was by 
searching online that these social relations, grounded in the “danger” (kiki) of the zainichi, 
were retroacted. Thereby, the emergence of the Zaittokai bespeaks a coincidence between 
the technological medium of cyberspace and the remains of a certain prohibitive, postwar 
ideology, as if one preceded the other. 
 It was by searching online, a 14-year-old junior high student said, that he came to 
“understand the wrongdoings of the zainichi and left-wing” (zainichi ya sayoku no akukō 
o rikai). It was also online that he learned about the Zaittokai and joined, professing that 
he “does not trust the mass media one bit” (masukomi nante zenzen shinyō shitenain desu 
yo). The media has a “left-wing inclination” (sayoku henkō), he said. Nor does he discuss 
“politics” (seiji) at his school. “Regarding politics, everybody is indifferent. Even if I talk 
about special privileges of zainichi, the level of response is only ‘uninterested,’ or ‘it has 
nothing to do with high school entrance exams’”.41 School, to begin with, “is not a place 
for politics” (seiji no ba jya nai). In fact, at school, he is still taught that ‘the zainichi are 





40 Ibid, pg. 77 – 80. 




to be pitied” (zainichi wa kawaisō na hitotachi), when they “might as well go home” 
(kaere ba ī).42 
 Finally, a woman and “OL” in her thirties remarked of the media at a protest in 
front of NHK, the Japan Broadcasting Corporation, that: “The media has a pointless ex-
istence. The local Kahoku Shimpō, for instance, reports at least a little when the left 
demonstrates, but when it is a conservative group like us, they don’t even show. We are 
completely ignored. We, by the way, are doing our very best without salary. Regardless, 
the media is too cold. This is how people in general are influenced by the media.”43 
Hence, in spite of her long-standing issues with zainichi and Korea, her parents and 
friends do not listen to her. She is surrounded by “people who honestly end up believing 
what is written in the newspaper” (shinbun ni kaitearu koto o socchoku ni mitomete 
shimau ningen). Only online did she “discover the truth” (shinjitsu o hakken), the Zaitto-
kai, and was “at last able to find buddies” (yatto nakama o mitsukeru koto ga dekitan 
desu).44 
 The drive to be recognized by “buddies” (nakama) finds its ultimate expression in 
the role of Zaittokai as proxy family. Indeed, as a “place to come home to” (kaeru basho), 
Yasuda reveals relations among the Zaittokai to operate as a “false” (giji) or “para-family” 
(giji kazoku). In the Zaittokai’s infancy, Sakurai himself was said to have been fostered 
by leading figures of other rightist citizens’ groups, notably: Nishimura Shūhei of The 
Society for the Recovery of National Sovereignty of Japan (Shuken Kaifuku o Mezasu 
                                                
42 Ibid, pg. 82 – 83. 





44 Ibid, pg. 86 – 87. 
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Kai), and Mizushima Satoru of The Japanese Culture Channel Sakura (Nihon Bunka 
Channeru Sakura). These men functioned as “adult” (otona) figures to the up-and-coming 
Sakurai, though these father-figures later distanced themselves from the Zaittokai, just as 
Sakurai discarded them. From the perspective of these “adult” figures, the Zaittokai came 
to lose sight of its original objectives. Nonetheless, despite this discarding and transgress-
ing of father-figures insofar as the activity of the organization was concerned, senior in-
dividuals in the Zaittokai were said to play the role of caretakers. One such person re-
marks: “The Zaittokai are all a cute bunch. In front of me they’re nothing but open-
hearted kids. That’s when the thought occurred to me. Of course, these kids want some-
thing like family relationships. Zaittokai is something like a para-family.”45 The image of 
a “cute” (kawaii) adult drowning their opponent out with racist slogans is, to say the least, 
counterintuitive. On the other hand, the unlikely conjuncture does bring to mind the 
world of anime, in which all too cute characters show zero tolerance towards the other. 
After all, it is no coincidence that the Zaittokai occasionally dress in cosplay costumes for 
demonstrations, that Sakurai Makoto’s “handlename” – “doronpa” – refers to an anime 
magazine, or that the Zaittokai’s mascot, Zaiko-chan, is an anime figure. The suffix, “-
chan,” indicates childhood age or endearment, and confirms the anime-like conflation of 
cute with the unrelenting cruelty that the Zaittokai would project. Having murdered their 
Oedipal predecessors, the Zaittokai might appear in the unrepressed guise of infantilism 
and perversion. However, the place of cyberspace, not to mention the compulsive behav-
ior of the Zaittokai, cannot be considered apart from the symbolic insufficiency of its 
                                                




members’ everyday relations.46 The sting of rejection feeds the drive for recognition that 
the Zaittokai would give. Indeed, each of the above characters share both their obsession 
with the zainichi and the inability to connect with friends or family regarding “politics” 
(seiji), and specifically, the emergency that the specter of the zainichi poses to Japan. 
Ranging from “indifferent” (mukanshin), to taken aback (‘what’s wrong with you all of a 
sudden’), sarcastic (‘you like war?’), and brainwashed by the media, responses by peers 
to their political expression provoke an affect of insufficiency. In everyday life, the Zait-
tokai member feels singled out and alone, although this is hardly surprising if they spend 
the majority of their time in front of the screen. It is as if they, rather than everybody else, 
occupy the single shameful place of standing out. Lest the ignominy of the initial reaction 
occur again, it even takes “courage” (yūki) to express one’s political views to the owner 
of a drinkery. Rather than consolidate the Zaittokai’s viewpoint, “everyone” (minna) ap-
pears to view them as strange. Contrary to this quotidian lack of recognition, one Zaitto-
kai member notes of his activism that “it only felt good when I was with buddies” (naka-
ma to iru toki dake ga kimochi yokatta): 
When demonstrating, it occurred that a heckler suddenly appeared. Without think-
ing, I screamed ‘kick them out!’, and at that time, everybody around me followed 
suit. There was the great feeling of the moment I gave the signal with a loud voice, 
and the feeling of security that buddies are protecting me. Albeit for a period of 
time, the reason I got hooked on the Zaittokai was because of this feeling. In my 
life, I have never had such a feeling of elation. Yea, I thought from my heart that 
buddies are nice. Quite honestly, we are not thought highly of by our parents or 
the general public, right. Nevertheless, my activist buddies recognize me without 
fail. In the Team Kansai, Aramaki-san and Nishimura-san may appear rough at a 
first glance, but they are actually incredibly kind people. They are the type who 
cannot leave someone in the group alone when they are in trouble.47  
                                                
46 In effect, the role of the symbolic must be considered with reference to arguments presented by Karatani 
Kōjin, Asada Akira and Azuma Hiroki. See Ch. 2. 





In this instance, the “feeling of elation” (kōyōkan) or euphoria that comes from partaking 
in Zaittokai activities does not derive from the enjoyment of employing hate speech itself. 
Euphoria arises as an effect of hate speech insofar as this speech victoriously consolidates 
the Zaittokai group – as metonym for the national body – and from the very recognition 
that is conferred by “buddies” (nakama).48 Notably, this moment of group consolidation 
is simultaneous with and indistinguishable from the action of expelling the heckler, as if 
the fetish violence of hate speech functioned precisely to establish social authority where 
the shamelessness of hate speech indicated its loss. Hence, hate speech recalls the enact-
ment of propriety in public school entrance and graduation ceremonies, where giving re-
spect to symbols of the state establishes social totality in an act that amputates difference 
from the social body. It is as if insufficiency drives Zaittokai members into cyberspace, 
where, in the absence of a prohibitive social gaze, they vacillate between the shameless 
enjoyment of hate speech, and the desire for sociality which hate speech itself instantiates 
as a solicitation for the recognition that face-to-face relations of Zaittokai demonstrations 
would attain. The establishment of a social body recalls the figure of the postwar emperor 
whose instantiation necessitates the elimination of difference. As Naoki Sakai observes of 







48 Ibid, pg. 322 – 323. One Zaittokai member and former mobster remarks on the similarity between the 
yakuza and the Zaittokai: “And the feeling that makes them want to seek a family. In the world of yakuza, 
too, not a few number of people enter the association being drawn to such a factor. Because, for them, the 
association itself is the most comfortable ‘house.’ Of course, the Zaittokai is not yakuza, and they do not 




なものは不思議と同じなんだな。) (Ibid, 322) 
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the 1989 mass mediated decease of the emperor, people were “solicited to feel sympathy 
toward the emperor, but what they achieved in feeling sympathy toward the absent body 
was a sense of camaraderie.”49 He writes of the self-evidence of this camaraderie, insofar 
as “one feels sympathetic because one is supposed to feel sympathetic: the sharing of the 
supposed suffering coincides with conformity.” But it should be noted that the sine qua 
non of this sentiment of familialism consists in the “restricted economy” within which 
self-evidence acquires its force, and on the violence with “which the otherness of the oth-
er was deliberately sealed off.”50 In the mode of a shamelessness which would establish 
the propriety of certain social relations, either in the anonymous form of a “para-family” 
(gii kazoku) or the school ceremonies, it need not be towards an object of reverence that 
sympathy is directed, shared, and “made into one body” (ittaika), as Sakai writes. It can 
just as well be through an object of hatred that familial camaraderie is formed. In “kick-
ing out” (tatakidasu) the single and no doubt, overwhelmed heckler, the Zaittokai “pro-
tect” (mamoru) one another; establishing, in turn, the form of a family in which no one 
can be left lacking. The necessity of thus protecting the group on the street is replicated 
by Zaittokai seniors – indicated by the suffix “-san” – being “incredibly kind” (mono-
sugoku shinsetsu) to underlings. In the Zaittokai, the social reality of everyday insuffi-
ciency is reversed and maintained by a sentiment of familialism that only attains certainty 
through the mechanicity with which the foreign object is driven out. Everything hinges 
on the figure of the zainichi or heckler on whom the consistency of the para-family is ul-
timately dependent. One Zaittokai member explains that once one starts asking “what on 
earth kind of special privileges these people have” (ittai kono hitotachi ni, donna tokken 
                                                
49 Naoki Sakai, “Return to the West/Return to the East,” in Translation and Subjectivity: On “Japan” and 
Cultural Nationalism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997). 
50 Yasuda, Netto to Aikoku, pg. 74 – 75. 
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ga arun yarōtte), the care and kindness of the family falls apart: “If you end up voicing 
such fundamental doubt, it’s finished. Once this happens, no one will listen to you and 
next you will be treated like the enemy. Ultimately, as long as you walk the same road 
straight without doubting, you are family and siblings, but you are not forgiven if you 
doubt the activity itself. Well, it’s a frail and easily broken family.”51 
 Because the figure of the zainichi structures the entirety of the Zaittokai discourse, 
it is not surprising that criticism thereof threatens to unravel the sociality of the group. By 
questioning the very veracity of the zainichi, the prospective outsider and “enemy” (teki) 
reinstalls the social ideology which singles members out and from which the participation 
in Zaittokai activities would have acted as a shield. Rather than allowing for this undoing, 
the mention of doubt triggers an identification of the doubtful individual with the zainichi 
and thereby effects their relegation to the outside. Thus, the expression of doubt exposes 
a constitutive insufficiency in the Zaittokai discourse, centered as it is on the figure of the 
zainichi whose “truth” (shinjitsu) is intimately interior to the Zaittokai. In the naming and 
ousting of this impossible object, the Zaittokai project and exacerbate the threatening as-
pect of this object, which at once constitutes and threatens to undo their discourse. 
 Not surprisingly, the Zaittokai’s imagined online audience all but assures them of 
victorious applause, in spite of the actuality of their performance. On the event of August 
5th, 2012, the memorial day prior to the dropping of the atom bomb on Hiroshima, the 
Zaittokai had thus scheduled a demonstration in the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park, to 
call for the reactivation of nuclear power plants, and for the nuclear rearmament of Japan. 
                                                





Yet, as the moment of their scheduled demonstration approached, it was not the Zaittokai, 
but rather, the public order police that was gathering in droves across from the designated 
meeting place. When the Zaittokai finally arrived, there were only four or five individuals, 
carrying recording equipment and the signature Zaittokai flags. Whereas dozens of public 
order police had shown up, the Zaittokai seemed hardly worthy of attention as they set up 
their video equipment, took turns addressing the camera, and concluded their speeches in 
almost the same duration of time it took them to prepare and pack their video equipment. 
If anything, their actions were carried out perfunctorily, with the aim of completing a task. 
To add to the apparent ignominy of its numbers, no one stopped to listen to their speeches. 
Unlike the Zaittokai showing on August 15th, at which thousands of members attacked a 
“target” (tāgetto) proper, the August 5th demonstration was, if anything, directed toward 
an internet audience whose numbers made the live streaming chatroom appear populous. 
Thus, before an haphazard explanation of “special privileges” (tokken), the first thing that 
stands out on the Zaittokai homepage is “the number of members” (kaiinsū): 15,303 as of 
December 20th, 2014.52 Online, the viewer cannot be singled out, as there is no normative 
social gaze. Commentators likewise stay anonymous and their comments are, in any case, 
joined by a surfeit of other comments supporting the Zaittokai. Of course, the very choice 
of platform – to watch the Zaittokai (live) – preselects an audience favorably disposed to 
the Zaittokai. On the rare occasion that the enemy writes a negative comment online, s/he 
is drowned out by invectives. Notably, this “impossibility” (muri) of conversing with the 
Zaittokai in cyberspace was not exclusive to the Zaittokai, but, as public school teachers 
noted, could be generalized to the “internet right-wing” (netto uyoku), and naturally also 
                                                
52 Zaittokai, Zainichi Tokken o Yurusanai Shimin no Kai, 20/12/2014. 
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to encounters on the street. Unless one joined the bandwagon, response was likely to end 
with the very hate speech the Zaittokai had taken to the streets. 
 As Žižek points out in an essay on psychoanalysis and the internet, attention must 
be given to the “socio-symbolic relations (of power and domination, etc) which always-
already overdetermine the way cyberspace affects us.”53 For, paradoxically, the Zaittokai 
is not composed of a minority per se, but by marginalized figures in the general, majority 
population; as if the precarity of the majority, socialized by recognition, predisposes it to 
feel neglect. Zaittokai members are described as people for whom “things do not go well” 
(umaku ikanai hito), be it in “life” (jinsei), “ work” (shigoto), “studies” (benkyō), or “hu-
man relations” (ningen kankei).54 Another member connects this general air of failure to 
the general lack of recognition that frames the everyday life of the Zaittokai: “Since they 
do not have a real ‘public.’ I myself was like that too. Think about it. How many are there 
in them who take part in activities rooted in the local neighborhood? To begin with, there 
is no perspective on local society. The reason they gather to Zaittokai is because they are 
faded people in the local neighborhood, or rather, the type who are not recognized in the 
local neighborhood. And so they secure recognition by a new ‘public’ simply by holding 
the Hinomaru. It is easy to be recognized here. Those who participate in a large number 
of activities, those who put out a loud voice on the street. It can be from the internet or 
anything, but above all those who were able to bring information. That is all it takes.”55 It 
                                                
53 Slavoj Žižek, “What Can Psychoanalysis Tell Us About Cyberspace?”, in Psychoanalytic Review (91.6 
(2004)), pg. 829. 
54 Yasuda, Netto to Aikoku, pg. 346. 






is, in effect, the mass, or general character, and the insufficiency which constitutes the 
generality of the Zaittokai that triggers the drive to be recognized. Prey to an unforgiving 
economy, the Zaittokai copes with failure as a reflection on him or herself. In their visi-
bility, minority movements would thus appear to possess precisely the sense of organic 
“locality” (chiiki), totality, and connectivity enviable to the Zaittokai. Significantly, the 
blockage of lateral recognition is itself the result of a punitive social gaze, the misrecog-
nition of which drives the Zaittokai to alienate themselves in patriotism all the more.56 
Socialization predisposes individuals to injury by any smidgen of leftist discourse. Indeed, 
if the introjection of capitalist crisis was to have produced a general population endlessly 
working for Japan, the Zaittokai appears as a symptom at the margins of the social which, 
bordering on the lack of the normative organization of lack, is driven to instantiate social 
totality precisely on account of its precarity. 
Obsessively pursuing the zainichi online constitutes a momentary escape from the 
social judgement that prescribes the failure of individual Zaittokai members. Indeed, not 
only does cyberspace afford the prospect of untrammeled enjoyment. Within cyberspace, 
the paranoid formation of the zainichi unravels the consistency of social authority itself. 
Yet, it is precisely from within the medium of cyberspace that online viewers seek to join 
other Zaittokai members in the face-to-face relations of street demonstrations. Moreover, 
as performances, these demonstrations solicit the gaze of an (absent) imagined audience 
of online viewers, and their recognition.57 Nonetheless, the shameless form of online hate 
                                                                                                                                            
するんです。ここで認められるのは簡単です。数多く活動に参加した者、街宣で大声を出した者、
ネットでもなんでもいいから、とにかくネタを引っ張ってこれた者。それだけでいいんです。” 
56 See Ch. 1 – 3. 
57 Significantly, it can be said that the Zaittokai give themselves to be seen to an (online) audience in whose 
place they imagine themselves. As both object and subject of the performance, the instantaneity with which 
Zaittokai demonstrations are streamed on the internet recalls the psychological condition of narcissism that 
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speech must be considered side by side with the objective conditions of Japan’s recession. 
With the retreat of the state and the handover of labor to the mechanism of the economy, 
it is unsurprising that the general population should exercise “cynical distance,” as Žižek 
says, towards public ideology. As floating signifier and “meta-guarantee” of the symbolic, 
the conspiratorial zainichi exercise ubiquitous influence: as that “Other of the Other,” or 
the “invisible, all-powerful agent [who] effectively ‘pulls the strings’”.58 They constitute 
the insufficiency of the Zaittokai discourse, which is itself organized in the absence of an 
online social gaze. Hence, on the one hand, cyberspace is that place where conservatives 
are to be met in “great numbers” (ōzei), giving rise to “relief” (anshin). But it is also the 
site of imminent “danger” (kiki). Online, “buddies” (nakama) can be found alongside the 
shared recognition that the mass media is “left-leaning” (sayoku henkō), if not controlled 
by the zainichi. The zainichi even have representation in parliament; making a formidable 
foe.59 As a constitutive remainder of postwar ideology within an age of neoliberalism, the 
zainichi emerges in cyberspace where it operates as an internal negation of social authori-
ty itself. Thus framed in the absence of a social gaze and transposed onto the everyday, it 
                                                                                                                                            
Rosalind Krauss has called “the condition of the entire genre” of video. See Rosalind Krauss, “Video: The 
Aesthetics of Narcissism,” in October, Vol. 1 (Spring, 1976), pg. 50. The live streaming of demonstrations 
conforms to a situation in which, as Krauss writes, the “simultaneous reception and projection of an image” 
occurs, and in which “the human psyche [is] used as a conduit” (Ibid, 52). Of the structure of such “mirror-
reflection,” Krauss says that it “implies the vanquishing of separateness. Its inherent movement is toward 
fusion. The self and its reflected image are of course literally separate. But the agency of reflection is a 
mode of appropriation, of illusionistically erasing the difference between subject and object … the mirror-
reflection of absolute feedback is a process of bracketing out the object. This is why it seems inappropriate 
to speak of a physical medium in relation to video. For the object (the electronic equipment and its capabili-
ties) has become merely an appurtenance. And instead, video’s real medium is a psychological situation, 
the very terms of which are to withdraw attention from an external onject – an Other – and invest it in the 
Self. Therefore, it is not just any psychological condition one is speaking of. Rather it is the condition of 
someone who has, in Freud’s words, “abandoned the investment of objects with libido and transformed 
object-libido into ego-libido.” And that is the specific condition of narcissism” (Ibid, 56 – 57). 
58 Žižek, “What Can Psychoanalysis Tell Us About Cyberspace?”, pg. 818. 
59 zainichi tokken o yurusanai shimin no kai, “(Sakurai Makoto Kōenkai) Gaikokujinsan Seiken ni Hantai 
suru Zaittokai no Kore Made no Kōdō,” on Youtube, 23/3/2010. 
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is as object cause of desire and enjoyment that zainichi constitute the “truth” (shinjitsu) of 
history, the everyday, and intersubjectivity. 
 In fact, for the Zaittokai, bashing the zainichi takes on the order of transgressing a 
taboo. Reputedly installed by the postwar order, Zaittokai members refer to this taboo as 
the “zainichi taboo” (zainichi tabū) in accordance with which one is disallowed from crit-
icizing resident foreigners. As Yasuda points out, there is, indeed, truth in the notion that 
resident foreigners were “victims” (higaisha), “weak” (jakusha) or “casualties” (giseisha) 
of World War II, and that Korean and Chinese gangs had it out with the Japanese yakuza 
and police.60 However, in the contemporary reference to “special privileges” (tokken), he 
writes, the Zaittokai “stretch the meaning” (kakudai kaishaku) of any consideration given 
by the state to the zainichi by reversing and magnifying actual conditions.61 For all their 
irreverence to the state, moreover, the Zaittokai’s zainichi are, in fact, all the more mar-
ginalized and atomized by state policy, for the stance of the Zaittokai does not differ sig-
nificantly from that of the Japanese state with regard to the main, so-called “special privi-
leges” (tokken).62 Alongside the failure of the state to ratify legislation that would render 
“hate speech” (hēto supīchi) illegal, in recent years the right of zainichi to receive welfare 
has been revoked, and Korean schools have been disqualified from receiving aid from the 
state.63 If the Zaittokai’s hate speech can be regarded as transgressing a certain taboo, it is 
that of the prohibition instantiated by the remains of postwar ideology. In this respect, the 
Zaittokai discourse overlaps with state discourse, yet, it also marks a departure from this 
dominant form of sociality. 
                                                
60 Yasuda, Netto to Aikoku, pg. 211. 
61 Ibid, pg. 210. 
62 Ibid, pg. 194 – 195. 
63 See Ōsaki Tomohiro, “Welfare Ruling Stuns Foreigners,” in The Japan Times, 19/7/2014.  
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 Thus the Zaittokai is not far from coinciding with interests of the state, although it 
does disrupt the “order” (chian) or “peace” (heiwa) every once in a while. Indeed, just as 
the Zaittokai discourse functions as a condensed iteration of state discourse, the power of 
language to negate, murder and establish the total social body is at stake in the Zaittokai’s 
hate speech. Nevertheless, if the Zaittokai’s hate speech is the twin of state propriety, its 
deadly phrases push shamelessly beyond narrating the nation. 
Even recent right-wing leaders of citizens’ groups from whom the Zaittokai 
founder, Sakurai, drew his inspiration, claim that “the Zaittokai has no ideology” (zaitto-
kai ni wa shisō ga nai).64 Disillusioned and uncomprehending of the Kyoto school inci-
dent, and by Zaittokai acts in general, Nishimura Shūhei of The Society for the Recovery 
of National Sovereignty of Japan (Shuken Kaifuku o Mezasu Kai) remarks: “No vision 
can be seen of how to develop the movement. Make a huge racket, drink liquor, and then 
it is finished. Even Sakurai-kun did not show his face a single time in court (for the Kyo-
to, Tokushima incidents). The will to fight to the end does not come across in the least.”65 
Whereas words ought to be a means, “the Zaittokai has made jeering itself a motive” 
(zaittokai wa basei sonomono ga mokutekika shiteiru).66 The founder of The Japanese 
Culture Channel Sakura (Nihon Bunka Channeru Sakura), Mizushima Satoru, observes 
that: “the Zaittokai can appear as if it is just finding easy-to-understand enemies and rais-
ing a fuss” (zaittokai wa, wakariyasui teki o mitsukete sawaide iru dake ni mo mieru).67 
Hariya Daisuke of The United Front Volunteer Army (Tōitsu Sensen Giyūgun), inaugu-
                                                
64 Yasuda, Netto to Aikoku, pg. 245. 




66 Ibid, pg. 237 – 238. 
67 Ibid, pg. 240. 
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rated in 1981 to fight for “national independence” (jishudokuritsu), “anti-American patri-
otism” (hanbei aikoku), for the “dissolution of the self-defense forces” (jieitai kaitai), and 
the “establishment of a national army” (kokugun sōsetsu), merely points out the obvious: 
“If you’re going to talk about special privileges, what should firstly be made an example 
of is the American army” (zainichi tokken to iuno de areba, mazu wa nani yori mo 
yaridama ni ageru beki wa zainichi beigun darō ne). He continues: “In the end, they’re 
just finding an easy enemy and agitating, right?” (kekkyoku ne, karera wa otegaru na teki 
o mitsukete sawaideiru dake de sho?). On the occasion of a meeting between the newly 
emergent internet right-wing and the old right-wing entitled, “Clash: UYOKU vs. uyoku,” 
the encounter quickly collapsed into a one-sided shouting match in which the Zaittokai, 
represented by Sakurai, deployed its usual slew of abuse against Hariya and others: “stu-
pid, you!” (baka yarō!), “kick out the cockroaches!” (gokiburi o tatakidase!). Hariya ex-
plains that he had “wanted to talk to people who believe that the only truth is the internet, 
about the fact that there are other forms of folk movements. But it was not possible. Be-
tween us and them, talk is not possible. It made me feel as if we were practically living in 
different worlds.”68 He continues: “They are rushing toward an instant movement … all 
they have done is to transfer the speech of the internet as it is onto real society … in other 
words, there is no differentiation between the internet and reality. The reason they so eas-
ily get out of control, without even having experienced physical clashes in everyday life, 
is because they try to deal with things with the sensitivity of the internet. From the stand-
                                                




point of those people, the internet and reality are ‘contiguous.’”69 As a representative of 
the “new-right” (shinuyoku), Hariya further notes that the Zaittokai have no sense of 
“honor and sympathy” (gi to jō) valued by his predecessors; a precept in accordance with 
which “bullying of the weak” (yowai mono ijime) is not allowed.70 
 In the absence of a metanarrative that would constitute “ideology” (shisō) proper, 
the devolution of right-wing activities to the “jeering” (basei) of the Zaittokai situates the 
internet right-wing within the condition of postmodernity. Most immediately, it brings to 
mind Jean-François Lyotard’s definition of The Postmodern Condition as an “incredulity 
towards metanarratives.”71 Indeed, in the organization of its “activities” (kōdō) and in the 
actualization of its so-called precepts, namely, to eliminate “special privileges” (tokken), 
the Zaittokai differentiates itself from traditional right-wing groups. If the phrase is its 
primary distinction, its dress likewise distinguishes it from right-wing groups which sport 
army uniforms as they circle around in black and white trucks blaring World War II army 
music on megaphones. At its demonstrations, the Zaittokai even has a rule that “prohibits 
the wearing of army clothes” (tokkōfuku no chakuyō kinshi), so as to prevent confusion of 
                                                





70 Ibid, pg. 248 – 251. 
71 Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, pg. xxiv. 
In “What Can Psychoanalysis Tell Us About Cyberspace,” Žižek says that: “In our era when – in 
politics and ideology as well as in literature and cinema – global, all-encompassing narratives (“the struggle 
of liberal democracy with totalitarianism,” etc.) seem no longer possible, the only way to arrive at a kind of 
global “cognitive mapping” seems to be the paranoiac narrative of a “conspiracy theory” – not only for the 
right-wing populism and fundamentalism, but also for the liberal center … and left-wing orientations … it 
is all too simplistic to dismiss conspiracy-narratives as the paranoiac proto-Fascist reaction of the infamous 
“middle classes” which feel threatened by the process of modernization: It would be much more productive 
to conceive “conspiracy theory” as a kind of floating signifier which, as we have just seen, can be appropri-
ated by different political options, enabling them to obtain a minimal cognitive mapping” (818). 
In The Spirit of Terrorism, trans. Chris Turner (New York: Verso, 2012), Jean Baudrillard like-
wise says of conspiracy theory that it just “adds” to and stems from a situation in which the real has been 
lost (80 – 81). 
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its members with the traditional right-wing.72 The Zaittokai outright shouts the traditional 
right-wing down – “shut up!!” (uruse!!) – when its trucks come circling around the same 
demonstration site.73 When Zaittokai members do dress up for demonstrations, their dress 
carries the distinct mark of cheap, glitzy cosplay costumes bought in Akihabara, as if its 
bearers had stepped out of an anime. Indeed, the mascot figure of the Zaittokai appears as 
the cartoon of a yellow, black, and brown, six-armed bumblebee, armed with a speaker to 
its mouth and megaphone on its back, winking, with a Hinomaru bandana tied around its 
forehead and sporting a red bow-tie. The cartoon image becomes all the more compelling 
given its resemblance with the kitsch attire of Zaittokai leader, Sakurai Makoto, whose 
pseudonym itself constitutes a play on the symbol of Japanese culture and evanescence, 
the sakura flower, and ‘truth’ or makoto, and who takes to dressing up his rotund body in 
a black and white suit adorned with a white handkerchief flowing out of the breast pocket, 
a bow tie, suspenders, and nerdy black eyeglasses to accompany a high-pitched, insistent 
voice. At times, the jacket comes off, as when Sakurai really gets riled up, and sometimes, 
he can be seen in a Hinomaru T-shirt. Of course, when Sakurai appears online from home, 
he is dressed in regular, everyday clothes. But as an empty sign of a sign in an age which 
has “forgotten to think historically,” the kitsch Sakurai Makoto emerges as a symptom of 
the postmodern itself; or rather, as an overcoming belied by its very insistence.74 
 Nevertheless, the Zaittokai discourse is helplessly inscribed within the temporality 
of the postwar. Indeed, if the Zaittokai’s repetition compulsion can be situated within the 
state’s drive towards war, it recalls Lyotard’s consideration of the postmodern sublime as 
supplying “reality” with “terror.” In effect, the postmodern “lack of reality” allows for a 
                                                
72 Yasuda, Netto to Aikoku, pg. 81. 
73 Ibid, pg. 246 – 247. 
74 Jameson, Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, pg. ix. 
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certain complementation – “the Idea of the world (the totality of what is)” – although this 
conception derives its force from the fact that it is constitutive of every presentation, and 
hence cannot be presented. Working out of Immanuel Kant, Lyotard writes of beauty and 
knowledge that there exists a certain pleasurable correspondence between the conception 
and presentation of some object. In its affect of pleasure in pain, the sublime, however, is 
by definition bereft of this correspondence, in which presentation falls short of notions of 
“the world,” or “totality.” Yet, the aesthetic of the sublime would incorporate this failure 
and constitutive negative as part of its presentation, as that “which denies itself.”75 As an 
event, the postmodern sublime would present the “unpresentable” within the presentation 
itself, thereby seeking the rules of presentation through the presentation, and to establish 
the rules of this presentation in the future anterior mode of what will have been the work 
of art.76 For the Zaittokai, this is the dream of perfectly visible slaughter that would end 
the endless postwar. Thus, the originary theft attributed to the zainichi hearkens back to 
World War II defeat, and Sakurai’s call for extermination recalls Iwao’s description of 
non-standing public teachers as “cancer particles” (gan saibō): 
If it is the case that zainichi Koreans will die if they do not receive welfare, then 
let them die. Right now, Japan is in a state of chaos. Next will come the period of 
rioting. And at the end will necessarily come the period of slaughter. The moment 
will certainly come when there will have to be an exchange of life in a true killing 
of zainichi Koreans and anti-Japan radical leftists. At that time, the strength of re-
                                                
75 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, pg. 78 – 80. Lyotard writes: “We can conceive the infinitely great, 
the infinitely powerful, but every presentation of an object destined to “make visible” this absolute great-
ness of power appears to us as painfully inadequate” (78). 
76 Ibid, pg. 78. Lyotard writes: “The postmodern would be that which, in the modern, puts forward the un-
presentable in presentation itself: that which denies itself the solace of good forms, the consensus of taste 
which would make it possible to share collectively the nostalgia for the unattainable; that which searches 
for new presentations, not in order to enjoy them but in order to impart a stronger sense of the unpresenta-
ble” (81). Žižek writes in The Sublime Object of Ideology: “The Sublime is therefore the paradox of an ob-
ject which, in the very field of representation, provides a view, in a negative way, of the dimension of what 
is unrepresentable. It is a unique point in Kant’s system, a point at which the fissure, the gap between phe-
nomenon and Thing-in-itself is abolished in a negative way, because in it the phenomenon’s very inability 
to represent the Thing adequately is inscribed in the phenomenon itself” (203). 
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solve of everyone will be questioned. Whether or not one will truly be able to cut 
down someone who is crying and begging for their life. It is a very severe choice. 
Regardless of whether it is a Korean or a child. But if the child is allowed to live, 
the same thing will be repeated.77 
 
In an outright shameless mode – espousing “slaughter” (satsuriku) – Sakurai continues to 
describe this moment, or event, as constitutive of the futurity of Japan. Only when it will 
have been done, will Japan have emerged from a state of emergency or “chaos” (konran) 
into peace. Thus Sakurai observes that the the Tokugawa Shogunate would not have been 
possible without Tokugawa’s act of eradicating Toyotomi Hideoyoshi’s house: “Without 
such severity, there would have been no Tokugawa 280 years of peace. This preparedness 
is demanded of us. An everyday preparedness” (sono hageshisa ga nakattara tokugawa 
280 nen no taihei wa nakattan desu yo. sono kakugo ga wareware ni towareteiru. nichijō 
kakugo desu).78 Sakurai would return to the enclosed Edo period, when Japan was closed 
off to the exterior, foreign world.79 Of course, Sakurai’s reference to the imminent threat 
posed by the zainichi, particularly under economic circumstances in which daily life has 
become precarious – living an “endless everyday” (owarinaki nichijō) – must be situated 
within a string of historical references in which the specter of extimate Koreans assumed 
magnified proportions; most recently by former Tokyo mayor, Ishihara Shintarō, when he 
lectured Self-Defense Forces on the threat of “third-world residents” (sangokujin) rioting 
after a natural disaster, and in the wake of the 1923 Kantō earthquake when thousands of 
                                                







78 Ibid, pg. 279. 
79 With the exception of Dejima in the port city of Nagasaki, the Tokugawa Shogunate exercised a policy of 
isolation or “locked country” (sakoku) from the early 1600s until Commodore Perry’s arrival in 1853. 
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Chinese and Koreans were, in fact, slaughtered by civilians and authorities.80 Transposed 
into Japan’s postwar temporality and the screen of cyberspace, the repetition of slaughter 
emerges as both destiny and origin. In the very act of framing, however, the specter of the 
zainichi always-already haunts the nation from within, triggering repetition. If zainichi is 
the name given to that constitutive object cause of desire, the fantasy of perfectly visible 
                                                
80 See “Ishihara Warns that Foreigners Likely to Riot After Big Quake,” in The Japan Times, 11/4/2000. 
 The mass slaughter of Koreans, Chinese, and other suspect individuals was triggered by rumors in 
the immediate aftermath of the 1923 earthquake that hit at 11:58 AM on September 1. Clearly magnified in 
the medium of the telegraph, one log reads as below. Although communists, prisoners, and religious organ-
izations (Ōmotokyō) are mentioned in the beginning, these references disappear in the course of September 
2nd as the rumors fix on the figure of the Korean. As Kan Tokusan documents in Gendaishi Shiryō 6 Kantō 
Daishinsai to Chōsenjin (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobō, 1963), pg. 39 – 41: 
 
  Sept. 1, around 1 p.m. 
“There was a big explosion at Mount Fuji which is still erupting with great force” 
(富士山に大爆発在りて今尚大噴火中なり). 
“There was a tremendous tsunami in the Tokyo bay where many livestock and 
humans are hurt or dead” (東京灣沿岸に猛烈なる大海嘯襲來して人畜の死
傷多かるべし).	  
“There will still come a huge earthquake” (更に大地震の来襲或るべし). 
  Sept. 1, around 3 p.m. 
“Many fires are being caused by Communists and Koreans” (社会主義者及び
鮮人の放火多し). 
  Sept. 2, around 10 a.m. 
“Lawless Koreans are attacking” (不逞鮮人の来襲あるべし). 
“Fires yesterday were caused by a large number of Koreans engaged in arson 
and planting bombs” (昨日の火災は多く不逞鮮人の放火又は爆彈の投擲に
依るものなり).	  
“Korean agitators are hiding in a shrine” (鮮人中の暴徒某神社に潜伏せり). 
“Several thousand members of the Ōmotokyō who have been dissatisfied with 
government authorities predicted this fire, which is now being realized, and are 
on their way to Tokyo with secret intentions” (従来官憲の圧迫に不満を抱け
る大本敎は、其教書中に於いて今回の大火災を予言せしが、今や其実現
せられしを機として、密謀を企て、教徒数千人名上京の途にあり).	  
  Sept. 2, around 2 p.m. 
“Prisoners released from Ichigaya jail are hiding in the Yamanote area and are 
planning arson when it becomes dark” (市ヶ谷刑務所の解放囚人は、山の手
及び郡部に潜在し、夜に入るを待ちて放火するの企てあり). 
“Around two hundred Koreans from the Teraoyama Kanagawaken buraku are 
planning arson, to hurt or kill people, and to steal, and are slowly heading to-
wards Tokyo” (鮮人約二百名、神奈寺尾山方面の部落に於いて、殺傷、掠
奪、放火等を恣にし、漸次東京方面に来襲しつつあり). 
“Around three thousand Koreans have already crossed the Tamagawa river, 




slaughter emerges precisely from the limits imposed (and lifted: the gaze) by the medium. 
As if he were writing of the screen, Jacques Alain-Miller says: 
It is precisely because the object a is removed from the field of reality that it 
frames it. If I withdraw from the surface of this picture the piece I represent by a 
shaded square, I get what we might call a frame: a frame for a hole, but also a 
frame of the rest of the surface. Such a frame could be created by any window. So 
object a is such a surface fragment, and it is its subtraction from reality that 
frames it. The subject, as barred subject – as want-of-being – is this hole. As be-
ing, it is nothing but the subtracted bit. Whence the equivalency of the subject and 
object a.81 
 
Thus, as the Zaittokai say, the zainichi emerges as the “truth” (shinjitsu) of contemporary 
Japan, yet also as the impossible, constitutive truth of the subject him or herself. The truth, 
but also stain, the constitutive nature of which only redoubles the necessity of presenting 
the impossible, unpresentable in presentation itself. As that unpresentable constitutive of 
the subject, the figure of the zainichi triggers a drive that would achieve, as Lyotard says, 
a sublime incorporation of negativity – failure – in presentation itself. In its visibility, this 
presentation would eliminate the specters of the zainichi. Yet, seeing would constitute an 
act of killing that, in framing, produces the exclusion that triggers repetition. Notably, the 
spectral status of this target must be clarified under technological conditions in which the 
instantaneity of cyberspace would have eliminated aura. While the general mass character 
of the Zaittokai is corollary to the loss of aura characteristic of the screen, the very excess 
and compulsiveness of their acts suggest that a certain gap cannot be closed.  
 Slavoj Žižek observes of the virtualization specific to cyberspace that, rather than 
eliminate the presence of the other as “digital phantom,” the online other is “not spectral 
enough.” He notes that cyberspace “cancels the distance between a neighbor and a distant 
foreigner,” so that the threatening jouissance of the other – that originary theft – is all too 
                                                
81 Quoted in Žižek, Looking Awry: An Introduction to Jacques Lacan through Popular Culture, pg. 94 – 95. 
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close on the screen.82 Indeed, the very notion of “special privileges” (tokken) constitutes a 
magnification of the theft of enjoyment grounded in Japan’s World War II defeat, warped 
to the point at which that which does not exist exists: “In my eyes, the Zaittokai’s activity 
of ‘not forgiving special privileges’ cannot help but look as if it started after such a thing 
as ‘special privileges’ had all but disappeared. Saying that what is ‘absent’ is ‘present,’ or 
saying that what is ‘slightly present’ is ‘largely present’ and assailing the other.”83 Online, 
on cyberspace blackboards like 2channel, this transformation of suspicious absence into 
phantasmatic presence consists in “rumor” (dema) or myth, so that the zainichi receive an 
endless array of privileges: exemption from the water bill, exemption from the TV bill, 
public transportation discount, reduction of the personal income tax, reduction of the car 
tax, and higher possibilities of being hired as public servants or by the mass media. The 
zainichi would be exempt from precisely those financial obligations and limitations to 
which every other citizen is subject. Facilitated by the privilege of their “residence” (eijū) 
in Japan, the theft by zainichi is thereby figured in terms of the equivalent form of money 
that displaces a constitutive class antagonism, but that also sugggests an economic order 
in which the prohibition of a singular master signifier is absent.84 Online, the prohibitive 
phrase, “discrimination is bad” (sabetsu wa ikenai) is reversed into its ironic opposite: “is 
                                                
82 Žižek, “What Can Psychoanalysis Tell Us About Cyberspace?”, pg. 802 – 803. 




84 As the general equivalent, the social form of money is itself infected for the Zaittokai. For instance, the 
Zaittokai oppose pachinko and gambling on the basis that the zainichi – as the third social party – takes the 
profit and funnels it into North Korea. See zaitokuaiti, “‘Pachinko wa Naze Ikenai no ka’ Zaittokai Sakurai 
Kaichō Kōenkai,” on Youtube, 20/7/2012. 
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discrimination really bad” (sabetsu wa hontō ikenai koto nanoka). As a subversion of the 
postwar ideology, such is the “pleasure of breaking the taboo” (tabū yaburi no kaikan).85 
Yet, Žižek says, if the absence of a prohibiting paternal signifier appears to herald 
a new freedom, the opposite is the case. Indeed: “If no forced choice confines the field of 
free choice, the very freedom of choice disappears.” The limitless field of choice merely 
brings about a situation of “radical closure,” announcing the end of history.86 Rather than 
disclose the intimate fantasy of the zainichi as an exterior sociality, cyberspace triggers a 
repetition compulsion exacerbated by the absence of a prohibitive agent, not to mention 
the vanishing of a critical line of difference between subject and screen. Notwithstanding 
cyberspace, this rhetoric of radical closure also recalls Theodor Adorno’s observation that 
it is precisely in the objective conditions of the labor market, to which subjects surrender 
“autonomous subjectivity,” that the possibility of fascism from “within democracy” arises. 
For this renunciation predisposes subjects to identify with “power as such.”87 Moreover, 
it provides an all-encompassing context within which to think both the turn to cyberspace 
by Zaittokai members in terms of individuals as productive units alienated in equivalent 
value, and the vacillation between the shameless form of online hate speech and the soci-
ality it would establish in the face-to-face relations among Zaittokai members. Indeed, the 
“radical closure” Žižek writes of is belied not least by the social relationships that prompt 
the turn to cyberspace, but by the excessive compulsion of the Zaittokai’s actions. Hence, 
if writing ‘zainichi!’ in cyberspace suppresses the social gaze, it necessitates all the more  
insistence, and the formation of social “unity” (danketsu), to shut out shame. And if the 
turn to cyberspace thus suppresses the figure of the symbolic, Oedipal father, the zainichi 
                                                
85 Yasuda, Netto to Aikoku, pg. 348. 
86 Žižek, “What Can Psychoanalysis Tell Us About Cyberspace?”, pg. 801. 
87 Theodor W. Adorno, “The Meaning of Working Through the Past,” pg. 90, 98 – 99. See Ch. 1. 
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returns online as a mythic figure for whom no pleasure is barred. Thus, writing ‘zainichi’ 
online would achieve the very death of the likes of the traditional right-wing, who say the 
Zaittokai have sacrificed their ends for the means.88 However, rather than pure freedom, 
cyberspace gives way to the reign of a relentless version of the superegoic: “when all the 
burden of the choice is on you … the big Other dominates you completely.”89 
On TV in 1973, Lacan says of the lack of a reciprocal gaze on television that “you 
will be pinned down by signifiers that are only countable signifiers and which will efface 
the singularity of the S1.”90 In place of the honor and shame of a singular master signifier, 
subjects marked by equivalent signifiers will display impudence towards the other. If not 
to the emperor, the Zaittokai’s irreverence extends to all and sundry, be it the state, police, 
politicians, and Hashimoto Tōru.91 Unless the Zaittokai are addressing other members in 
the face-to-face relations of demonstrations and symposiums, or are soliciting the passing 
crowd to join them, their speech is devoid of hierarchical considerations – “cockroaches” 
(gokiburi) – such that their hate speech, directed at the zainichi of cyberspace, would take 
                                                
88 Žižek, Looking Awry: An Introduction to Jacques Lacan through Popular Culture, pg. 24 – 25. The zain-
ichi’s untrammeled access to enjoyment recalls the father figure of Freud’s “primal horde,” of which Freud 
writes in Totem and Taboo: “a violent and jealous father who keeps all the females for himself and drives 
away his sons as they grow up” (175). 
89 Žižek, “What Can Psychoanalysis Tell Us About Cyberspace?”, pg. 801. 
90 Quoted in Jacques-Alain Miller, “On Shame,” pg. 23. Working out of Lacan and Jacques-Alain Miller, 
Rosalind C. Morris writes of subjectivity and television in “The War Drive: Image Files Corrupted,” in 
Social Text 91 25.2 (Summer, 2007): “it cannot be the site of a speaking subject, and we cannot imagine it 
(or we could not in Lacan’s moment) speaking to us, by which I mean answering to an address. It cannot, 
therefore, stand in for the Other. And it cannot, correspondingly, function as the place of law – even though 
it can depict a world in which law and order obtain. This does not mean that we live in an era, television’s 
era, where anything goes. On the contrary. What Miller proposes is that in the absence of an older, indeed 
“aristocratic” form of the master signifier, with its potential for elitism and repressive social organizational 
forms, we have reintroduced not shame but what he calls insecurity. And we have supplanted the imperfec-
tions of the master signifier and its discourse with a new authoritarianism and artificial mastery. The fortui-
tous resonance between the language of security and the politics of securitization is not accidental. Miller 
means, precisely, to invoke the contemporary milieu and the problematics of both neoliberal capitalism and 
the international regime of (in)security in which the war on terror is currently being waged” (130). 
91 See ryomato me, “Sakurai Kaichō (Zaittokai) VS Hashimoto Tōru (Ōsaka Shichō) (Shin no Furu Bājion) 
Masukomi ni Sekkyō Suru Bamen Kara),” on Youtube, 20/10/2014, to view Hashimoto and Sakurai debat-
ing. The encounter concludes with guards escorting Hashimoto out the door as Sakurai shouts in the back-
ground: “hurry up and go home!” (sassa to kaere!). 
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on an instantaneous effect of killing. Just as it is insufficiency that drives the Zaittokai to 
cyberspace, however, the shameless form of its hate speech reestablishes sociality in the 
face-to-face relations of its “para-family” (gii kazoku), within which hierarchical relations 
are assumed once again. Purely shameless as the Zaittokai hate speech would appear, and 
especially so in cyberspace, this hate speech necessitates attention to the form of sociality 
it would restore, and to the guilt that its shamelessness displaces. In effect, the Zaittokai’s 
shamelessness recalls the public school graduation and entrance ceremonies, in which the 
enactment of propriety demands the impropriety – murder – of expelling difference from 
the social body. In the face-to-face relations of Zaittokai activities, shamelessness cannot 
be conceived in the absence of its corollary, shame, and the notion that the Japanese only 
experience shame before members of their own social formation. Shamelessness thereby 
invokes the discursive formation of “shame culture,” and the alibi that this formation has 
provided for atrocities committed by the Imperial Japanese Army during World War II.92 
It brings back the guilt that “shame culture” so shamelessly displaces in the figure of the 
emperor. 
As Freud observed in his 1917 essay, “Thoughts for the Times on War and Death,” 
modern warfare has entailed a fundamental shift in the attitude toward death. Whereas the 
primitive recognized ambivalence toward the dead, leading to a doctrine of the souls and 
ethics, the civilized, Freud writes, deny guilt before the dead. Right after the outbreak of 
World War I, Freud rather observes that civilization “stamps strangers as enemies, whose 
death is to be brought about or desired.”93 While Japan may not have been at war during 
                                                
92 See the Introduction and Ch. 1 – 3 for discussions of this topic, with specific reference to Marilyn Ivy’s 
“Benedict’s Shame,” and others. 
93 Sigmund Freud, “Thoughts for the Times on War and Death,” trans. James Strachey, in Psychoanalytic 
Electric Publishing, 3/8/2009, pg. 298. 
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the emergence and consolidation of the Zaittokai, its members dream of the apotheosis of 
slaughter in war. Working out of Freud’s writing, Samuel Weber suggests that the “sense 
of guilt” over death is linked to the “fear of death,” so that the allure of representations of 
war consists in the denial of our death through a displacement of this guilt and fear to the 
other. While we cannot imagine our own death, the fear of this death can be displaced on 
the guilty other, whose death would secure our immortality.94 Thus, the shamelessness of 
hate speech reinvigorates the guilt of the social body which it would preserve. While this 
shamelessness has been exacerbated by the absence of a prohibitive gaze (in cyberspace), 
not to mention the closure of objective economic conditions under which exchangeability 
has marked individuals as “countable signifiers,” it is to the patriarchy of state discourse 
that the Zaittokai return. Indeed, the Zaittokai take pleasure in nothing so much as saying 
that World War II “comfort women” (jūgun ianfu) voluntarily prostituted themselves and 
that the Imperial Japanese Army did them a favor.95 Thereby it reproduces a state rhetoric 
by which the Japanese liberated Asian women. If the Zaittokai perform their shameless 
enjoyment in street demonstrations, as if the absence of a master signifier announced the 
end of prohibition and the foreclosure of the subject of desire, it does so in the shadow of 
a state that has not illegalized hate speech, and within a temporality of the postwar driven 
to the repetition of war. For it is war that would mark the apotheosis of shameless killing, 
and in which the Zaittokai’s dream of slaughter would be actualized in the effacement of 
guilt. As Marilyn Ivy writes: “atrocity is not atrocity in war, in total war, because total 
                                                
94 See Ch. 2 for a lengthier discussion of Samuel Weber and the attractiveness of wartime representations. 
95 Constrained by the postwar constitution, this rhetoric approaches (yet, does not achieve) what Rosalind C. 
Morris describes as a logic by which: “demand for the performance of consent to be violated, and moreover 
of that violation as satisfying, as in Abu Ghraib, works to obviate the perpetrator’s need for fantasy even as 
it institutes a mirroring (though not identification) in the place of relation. It is a development that express-
es on the plane of corporeal experience and psychic life the logic of a political relation already described by 
Jean Baudrillard (in relation to the 1991 Gulf War) as one in which alterity has been banished by the de-
mand for mimesis” (“The War Drive: Image Files Corrupted,” 105). 
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war is precisely a paradise of horror, in which atrocity escapes its designation as atroci-
ty.”96 Short of war, the Zaittokai perform their hate speech before a camera, anticipating 
(an absent) online viewership to revel in their feats. 
 This shameless enjoyment of the Zaittokai, or more generally, the “internet right-
wing” (netto uyoku), springs from the near simultaneous interplay between online image 
and phrase. As live commentary on live demonstrations, spectators of Zaittokai activities 
write anonymously on the screen while the demonstrations progress. Streamed live online 
in Nico Nico Douga, the online image to which the demonstrating Zaittokai member give 
themselves to be seen is overwritten with a stream of comments by online viewers. At the 
bottom of the screen, moreover, is written the number of viewers signed in to the viewing 
room. Naturally, Sakurai Makoto acknowledges that this number may include “enemies” 
(teki), as if the neighbor is, indeed, as proximate as the enemy, yet the actual comments 
reflect an overwhelming support for the Zaittokai, triggered by the scene of confrontation 
seen in cyberspace that repeats the online phrase of hate speech. Their form is replicated 
in the demonstrations, effacing the difference between what is said and what is written. 
 
 Figure 6: Screenshot of a live Zaittokai demonstration on Nico Nico Douga. 
 
                                                
96 Marilyn Ivy, “In/Comparable Horrors: Total War and the Japanese Thing,” in Boundary 2 (32.2 (2005)), 
pg. 146. 
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In one such demonstration against “the extreme left” (kyokusa), the Zaittokai goes 
searching for members of the Chūkakuha outside its central headquarters in Tokyo.97 Led 
by Sakurai, uncharacteristically dressed in blue-jeans and collared white shirt patterned 
with purple flowers, the camera follows four to five Zaittokai members while they wait 
outside Chūkakuha headquarters only to head around the block when one member returns 
to say that she spotted a “suspicious” (ayashī) Chūkakuha look-alike hanging around in 
front of a convenience store. All the while, the online viewers are writing in comments of 
support, as the group goes in search of their object: “the main event of the weekend” 
(shūmatsu no main ebento), “the Chūkakuha is an organized group of gangsters” 
(kyokusa bōryokudan dakarane chūkakuha), “let the police do its job at least today” (kyō 
koso wa keisatsu wa shigoto shitekure yona), “eradicate terrorists” (terorisuto bokumetsu), 
“it’s a cult” (karuto da na). And as they home in on their suspect: “be careful” (ki o tsu-
kete kudasai), “getting nervous” (doki doki shimasu), “it’s a good tense atmosphere” (ii 
kinchōkan da na), “Get angry! Get angry! Japanese!” (okore! okore! nihonjin!), “Japa-
nese kept it in for 70 years!” (nihonjin wa 70 nen kan gaman shitan da yo!), and repeat-
edly, “in rapture” (kōkotsu), or “in ecstasy” (kōkotsu).98 The online commentary effec-
tively forms a circuit with what the Zaittokai members are saying on the image, repeating 
and anticipating phrases, such that the source of the statement cannot be located. As a 
result, the line dividing the on-screen from off-screen is effaced: the online commentators 
are as much on the scene as Sakurai is on the screen. After six minutes of searching for 
the elusive Chūkakuha, it is, of course, when Sakurai confronts the man, who only stares 
                                                
97 The Chūkakuha is otherwise known as the Middle-Core-Faction or the Japan Revolutionary Communist 
League. See Ch. 9. 
98 pizzahatto, “(Niconama) Kamikai ‘Zaittokai’ Sakurai Makoto VS Chūkakuha Gekitotsu Chokusetsu 
Taiketsu!”, onYoutube, 19/7/2014. 
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silently back at him, that the viewers flood the screen with comments. With the public 
order police standing around, Sakurai talks to the man, at first in a low voice, and then 
screams in his face: “Are you in the Chūkakuha? Answer. Are you in the Chūkakuha?! 
So you are in the Chūkakuha, after all?! I’m asking you a question!!” (anata chūkakuha 
no hito? kotaenasai. anata chūkakuha no ningen na no?! yappari chukakuha no ningen 
kai?! dōnandai tte itten dayo!!). At the same time, the comments online stream across the 
screen: 
“It’s the Chūkakuha” (Chūkakuha da na) 
“No expression” (muhyōjō) 
“Not able to answer” (kotaerarenai) 
“Sakurai-san, not afraid of anything” (Sakurai-san, kowai mono nashi) 
“Not able to meet eyes” (shisen awasenai) 
“Suspicious” (ayashī) 
“This is perfect” (kampeki da na) 
 
The encounter continues thus for another eight minutes. With a small crowd of Zaittokai 
members and public order police looking on, Sakurai accuses the man, who stands silent 
as a statue, of having secretly taken a photo of the Zaittokai, and orders him to delete it. 
When Sakurai provokes the man by taking hold of his camera and shirt, the public order 
police pull Sakurai back and lead the man across the street, prompting Sakurai to shout at 
the police: “Shut your mouth, you!! If things were as they should, you police should have 
to arrest this guy!!” (kimi mo damattero yo, ciotto!! honrai dattara kimitachi keisatsukan 
koitsu o taiho shinai to ikenai jyanai ka yo!!). Online, the commentators repeat: “you’re 
in the way, public order police” (kōan jyama). 
 Already in 1971, Roland Barthes observed that the mythological had shifted into a 
mythic mode in which the density of the phrase itself had taken the place of the purported 
object of signification. Barthes writes: “mythologies are succeded by a more formal, and 
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thereby, I believe, more penetrating idiolectology, whose operative concepts are no long-
er sign, signifier, signified, and connotation, but citation, reference, stereotype.”99 This is 
no more evident than in the derogatory terms deployed by the Zaittokai, be it in reference 
to the “chink” (shinajin), “terrorist” (terorisuto), “Korean” (chon), or simply “suspicious” 
(ayashī). Such phrases carry a murderous effectivity that, by power of reference, denies 
subjectivity to the other. Moreover, the writing streamed across the screen usually lacks 
an explicitly stated object and subject. 
Sakurai Makoto himself explains in a series of youtube tutorials, entitled “Why 
give street speeches?” (gaitō enzetsu wa naze okonawareru no ka?), that the Zaittokai is 
aiming for a “ripple effect” (hakyū kōka). As opposed to the mundane “political speech” 
(seiji enzetsu), the “activist speech” (undō enzetsu) demands listeners and is performed in 
the mode of “listen to our talk!”  (hanashi o kike!), rather than the polite, “please listen to 
our talk” (hanashi o kīteku kudasai). The activist speech thereby seeks to be known to as 
many people as possible.100 By virtue of live streaming, moreover, Sakurai observes that 
the effectivity of street speeches has “drastically changed” (garatto kawatta) in recent 
years, enabling speakers to address the online audience. The internet emerges as the locus 
of the “ripple effect” (hakyū kōka), of which the speaker should be “conscious” (ishiki), 
and in the interest of effectivity, use brief, simply language that even a middle school 
student will understand. The “difficult” (muzukashī) and “long” (nagai) language of the 
“political speech” (seiji enzetsu), Sakurai says, “does not enter the head” (atama ni 
haittekonai). Rather, the speaker should “point-blank summarize what s/he wants to say” 
(jibun ga iitai koto o tanteki ni matomeru). It must, of course, fit youtube’s time-limit of 
                                                
99 Roland Barthes, The Rustle of Language, pg. 67 – 68. 
100 zaitokukai, “‘Gaitō Enzetsu wa Naze Okonawareru no ka?” – Zaittokai Seminā Part1,” on Youtube, 
16/9/2008. 
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10 minutes, but it must also employ “intonation” (yokuyō) so as to “threaten after going 
stronger and stronger” (dondon tsuyoku ittara, sono ato odosu), and moving from “one-
point” (wanpointo) –“Korean cockroaches!” (gokiburi chōsenjin!) – to the next. The one-
point, Sakurai states, “stays in the ear” (mimi ni nokocchaun desu). Rather than spreading 
knowledge, fact, or truth about zainichi by “getting people to know” (shittemorau), the 
“ripple effect” (hakyū kōka) of the speech consists not in its content or signified, but in 
the effectivity of name-calling.101 The point is for the words to stick. 
Yet, as Judith Butler has noted in Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative, 
the effectivity of hate speech is undercut by its constitutive iterability. Revisiting a debate 
between J. L. Austin and Derrida, Butler says that “the illocutionary speech act performs 
its deed at the moment of the utterance, and yet to the extent that the moment is ritualized, 
it is never merely a single moment.”102 The Zaittokai’s hate speech is doubled and split 
by the form of the mark, not to mention the historicity of its object – the zainichi – which 
is constitutive of Japan’s postwar. If, as Butler writes, “the violence of language consists 
in its effort to capture the ineffable and, hence, to destroy it, to seize hold of that which 
must remain elusive for language to operate as a living thing,” then every instance of ut-
terance reproduces and reinvigorates the ground of repetition.103 In this way, the deadly 
phrases of the Zaittokai’s hate speech would achieve the effect of killing, yet they revive 
that which they would expunge. And it is also precisely the impossibility of eliminating 
the zainichi that gives rise to the mode of pleasure in displeasure that the Zaittokai exhibit. 
                                                
101 zaitokukai, “‘Dōga o Katsuyō Shinasai’ – Zaittokai Seminā Part2,” on Youtube, 16/9/2008. In “The In-
stance of the Letter in the Unconscious, or Reason Since Freud,” Jacques Lacan writes: “We can say that it 
is in the chain of the signifier that meaning insists, but that none of the chain’s elements consists in the sig-
nification it can provide at that very moment” (419). 
102 Judith Butler, Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative (New York: Routledge, 1997). See also 
Jacques Derrida, Limited Inc and John L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words. 
103 Butler, Excitable Speech, pg. 9. See also James T. Siegel, Naming the Witch. 
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 However, it is not simply the iterable phrase, but the interplay between the image 
and the endless surface writing streaming across the online screen at variable speeds, that 
produces the subject (and affect) of the Zaittokai viewer and participant. Echoing Barthes, 
Fredric Jameson notes the privilege given to “disjoined sentences” in late modernity.104 
The “weakening of historicity” under late capitalism, Jameson says, is accompanied by a 
mode of schizophrenic signification marked by “a breakdown in the signifying chain.”105 
Working out of Lacan, Jameson notes how this breakdown disrupts the “meaning-effect” 
that emerges across signifiers and how this breakdown gives rise both to a disruption of 
the mirage of “depth,” and to “pure material signifiers, or, in other words, a series of pure 
and unrelated presents in time.” In this sense, isolated sentences of schizophrenic writing 
cease to relate to “content,” and rather, are released to generate the possibility of euphoria 
and “hallucinogenic intensity.” The postmodernist text operates through a differentiation 
– multiple screens instead of one – in which “radical difference” itself becomes the mode 
of apprehending the “relationship” between elements. The “unification” and depth of the 
modernist text is dispersed in favor of a difference which demands the “impossible” of all 
viewers, yet, enables certain affective intensities even in the dissolution of consciousness. 
Jameson even calls the word “expression” into question, since it suggests interiority and a 
subject as modernist “monad,” when the subject of postmodernism has disappeared under 
the sign of surface, pastiche, écriture, and an affect of euphoria that practically fragments 
consciousness.106 However, it is precisely also recognition that the Zaittokai subject seeks, 
notwithstanding the euphoria of the online viewing/writing experience. 
                                                
104 Jameson, Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, pg. 29. 
105 Ibid, pg. 26.  
106 Ibid, pg. 31, 17, 15 – 16, 21, 53. 
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 Such “euphoria,” “ecstasy,” or “rapture” (kōkotsu), as the writing on the Zaitttokai 
screen states, is in effect as the viewer’s eye is made to move between the image and the 
disjoined writing streaming across the screen. The virtual disappearance of the subject, as 
an effect of écriture, can similarly be observed in the very automaticity of the Zaittokai’s 
hate speech, seemingly incapable of acknowledging the other in conversation. Indeed, the 
slightest reaction from the other seems to merely trigger a fetishistic automatism. And yet, 
the violence of this hate speech solicits the recognition either of other Zaittokai members, 
or of an imagined, online audience. 
The compulsion to repeat suggests that spectrality undercuts the effectivity of the 
Zaittokai’s hate speech. On this note, Derrida writes of an “irreducibly spectral dimension” 
of media and considers even “real-time images” in terms of the “new speed of apparition 
(we understand this word in the ghostly sense) of the simulacrum.”107 Of course, Walter 
Benjamin famously writes of the “decay of aura” as an effect of the photographic image 
and mechanical reproducibility, yet, as Barthes observes, there is in the photograph “the 
absolute Particular, the sovereign Contingency … what Lacan calls the Tuché, the Occa-
sion, the Encounter, the Real, in its indefatigable expression.”108 As two other theorists of 
                                                
107 Derrida, Specters of Marx, pg. 65 – 67. In terms of cyberspace as a medium of inscription, perhaps it can 
be said that writing temporalizes though a “spacing” and deferral that puts the originary trace under erasure, 
and this “erasure of the trace” enables “something that can be called repression in general.” Just as Japan’s 
interminable postwar entails a certain spacing, the machinery of writing consists in a “relation to death” – 
“as seed or mortal germ” – in which life maintains a protected relation to death through a repression that, in 
this instance, constitutes and necessitates repetition. Derrida, “Freud and the Scene of Writing,” in Writing 
and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), pg. 225, 230 – 231. 
108 Walter Benjamin, ““The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” in Illuminations, trans. 
Harry Zohn, ed. Hannah Arendt (New York: Schocken Books, 1968), pg. 223. Roland Barthes, Camera 
Lucida: Reflections on Photography, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Hill and Wang, 1981), pg. 4. 
For Barthes, the photo presents the viewer with a certain “studium” – “education” or script render-
ing the image legible – however, its “pure contingency” is constitutive. As the “punctum,” any detail in the 
photographic image can set a “wound” off unto “indefatigable expression,” so that what is seen is not what 
is visible per se, but what “a kind of second sight” grants it. As such, the photo is “fantasmatic.” (Camera 
Lucida, 26 – 28, 40, 13). 
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technology, Friedrich Kittler and Marshall McLuhan write, the materiality of the medium 
is “irreducible” and requires disavowal of a constitutive “untranslatability.” The keyboard 
makes noise.109 
 In the violence of their hate speech, the Zaittokai dream of nothing so much as the 
instantaneous effectivity of its words, namely, to kill. To this end, the phrase must repress 
the fact of its iterability, and in its insistence, seek to close the gap between signifier and 
                                                                                                                                            
In “The Age of the World Picture,” in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, 
trans. William Lovitt (New York: Garland Publishing, 1977), Heidegger similarly recounts the emergence 
of modern subjectivity over against the world “conceived and grasped as picture.” He writes that by con-
ceiving the world as “picture,” all that is “only is in being to the extent that it is set up by man.” As if to 
anticipate the possibility, as Žižek says, that everything “exists only on the screen,” Heidegger states that 
representing in the modern sense means to “force” something “into this relationship as the normative realm.” 
(Heidegger, 129, 131, Žižek, 808). Moreover, as this setting up proceeds with greater “velocity,” the “gi-
gantic” emerges to spread an “invisible shadow” into a “space withdrawn from representation” (135 – 136). 
Thus, Samuel Weber writes in “Mass Mediauras, or: Art, Aura, and Media in the Work of Walter Benja-
min,” in Mass Mediauras: Form, Technics, Media (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), that “shad-
ow” constitutes the condition of possibility for the “picture” (79 – 81). 
Weber writes similarly of Walter Benjamin’s “aura.” Of course, the “decay of aura” that Benjamin 
describes in his famous essay, “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” partakes of the 
trajectory toward the depthless surface of the screen that Virilio and Baudrillard theorize in the present day 
(“The Work of art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” 222 – 223). However the auratic and “gigantic” 
both appear across a distance or difference that, Samuel Weber says, constitutes “something like an ena-
bling limit” (“Mass Mediauras,” 88). 
109 Friedrich Kittler, Discourse Networks 1800/1900, trans. Michael Metteer and Chris Cullens (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1990), pg. 199, 265. 
In Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man, ed. W. Terrence Gordon (Corte Madera: Gingko 
Press, 2003), Marshall McLuhan says “the medium is the message.” His writings disclose a constitutive 
limit of the medium, insofar as media only emerge into visibility by becoming the “content” of other media 
(22). 
 In Discourse Networks: 1800/1900, Kittler observes that the medium of inscription conditions the 
shift from the discourse network of 1800 to 1900, and that it does so with constitutive implications for gen-
der. In the 1800 discourse network, a “continuous transition from nature to culture” constitutes a disavowal 
of the constraints set up by the alphabet. Privilege is given to a “transcendental signified” – the “Mother’s 
Voice” – that functions to “call forth poetry” from nature and to eliminate “nonsense” from the alphabet. 
Behind the scenes, of course, is a power mobilizing the exclusion of women from the bureaucracy of the 
university, as the mother’s voice functions as source of nature and signification. “Mother Nature” must not 
make “noise.” She must be silent “so that others can speak of and for her” (194 – 195, 11, 24, 29, 173). 
 In the discourse network of 1900, it is precisely noise, difference, and the arbitrary “play between 
signs and intervals” that emerge with the typewriter. The typewriter “radicalizes the technology of writing” 
by severing the link between the mother’s mouth (as source) and writing, since it emerges as “the irreduci-
ble medium among media.” Media appear as “random generators” or as “the differentiality that precedes all 
meaning.” The “nonsense” that the “Mother’s Voice” displaced comes to the fore. Men now “dictate” while 
a plurality of women type. And as a rebus, Kittler says, Freud’s dreamwork operates as a “transposition of 
media.” But this transposition is based in “untranslatability.” Like the fetish, dreamwork disavows the for-
eign. But the medium is a medium. The medium “can appeal to nothing universal and must, therefore, leave 
gaps” (212, 199, 206, 209, 227, 214, 243, 265, 274, 265). 
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signified. Hence, in a meeting to rally up the group before a demonstration, Sakurai says: 
“When the enemy comes before our eyes, we will unify and fight” (teki ga me no mae ni 
kita toki wa, wareware wa icchidanketsu shite tatakaundesu).110 Only “unity” (danketsu) 
or “total cooperation” (icchidanketsu) would oust shame as constitutive lack, and effect 
the totalizing social force of their words. Sakurai formulates this code of action in terms 
of a condensed, 4-letter maxim – “見敵必殺” (kenteki hissatsu) – forming a combination 
of the ideogram to “see” (ken), “enemy” (teki), “definitely” (hitsu) and to “kill” (satsu).111 
No doubt taken from the Hellsing anime series, the four-letter phrase translates as “search 
and destroy,” which, from Japanese online sources, literally means to “kill all enemies 
that enter the field of vision” (shikai ni hairu teki wa subete korose).112 Sakurai calls it his 
signature “motto” (zayū no mei). In effect, to see is to kill. Mediated by cyberspace as a 
“weapon” (buki) of the disempowered against the mass media, Sakurai says the phrase 
not only suggests the power of the audiovisual synecdoche to stick to its referent, but the 
dream of off-screen killing as an extension of the screen.113 In a “history of radically 
changing fields of perception,” Paul Virilio hence writes of war that cinematic perception 
is corollary to military perception, for the screen would be identical to and simultaneous 
with its referent. As such, modern warfare resides in seeing as the very act of destruction 
                                                
110 zaitokukai, “[1.24 Zaittokai] Sakurai Kaichō Hōkoku VOL.3 [Gaikokujin Sanseiken Danko Hantai!]”, 
on Youtube, 24/1/2010. 
111 zaitokukai, “[1.24 Zaittokai] Sakurai Kaichō Hōkoku VOL.5 [Gaikokujin Sanseiken Danko Hantai!]”, 
on Youtube, 24/1/2010. 
112 fumipira-san “Herusingu no Integuramu ga Itteiru ‘Sāchi ando Desutoroi’ to wa Dō Iu Imi Desuka?”, on 
Yahoo! Japan, 7/1/2013. 
113 Thomas Doherty, Cold War, Cool Medium: Television, McCarthyism, and American Culture (Film and 
Culture) (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), pg. 210. 
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itself – “lighting reveals everything” – but with this loss of the “direct quality” of seeing, 
soldiers experience a certain “derealization.”114 
 Though the Zaittokai calls for “action” (kōdō) on the streets, a certain gap remains 
that is not transgressed there where the derealization of cyberspace is thrown in question. 
Sakurai’s call to “action” (kōdō) is not to be understood in the literal sense of getting “all 
bloodied” (chidarake) or “staking life” (inochi o kakete).115 For all their uproar on August 
15th, screaming both against the anti-Yasukuni demonstrators and the riot police, a line is 
observed. Rather than cross the barricades and transgress the state-enforced boundary, the 
Zaittokai rattled the bars, shouted invectives, and congratulated one another afterwards. If 
they were “true right-wingers” (honmono no uyoku), Yasuda writes, the Zaittokai would 
have “felt shame over the one point that ‘Yasukuni was dirtied” (‘yasukuni ga yogosareta’ 
sono itten nomi ni haji o kanji), and “might have deeply bowed to the souls of the dead” 
(eirei ni fukaku atama o sageta kamo shirenai).116 Rather, the demonstration was merely 
about “getting worked up” (moriagaru), “impact” (inpakuto), “extremity” (kagekisa), and 
a “repetition” (rensa) that is “machinic” (kikaiteki).117 In its dream of eliminating the 
zainichi – “die!” (shiné!), they cry – and thereby “resetting” (risetto), or restoring “an ob-
vious Japan” (atarimae na nihon) it is the excessive form of the Zaittokai’s hate speech 
which would eliminate the specter of the zainichi, immanent to cyberspace. Michael 
Fisch thus points out that even the digital medium requires a “vanishing interval” for the 
identity of online writing with “an attack” to occur: as an “indulgence in the medium,” or 
                                                
114 Paul Virilio, War and Cinema: The Logistics of Perception, trans. Patrick Camiller (New York: Verso, 
1989), pg. 7, 15. 
115 zaitokukai, “[1.24 Zaittokai] Sakurai Kaichō Hōkoku VOL.5 [Gaikokujin Sanseiken Danko Hantai!]”, 
on Youtube, 24/1/2010. 
116 Yasuda, Netto to Aikoku, pg. 360. 
117 Ibid, pg. 337, 81, 133, 358, 232. 
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an excess of the “graphic element” itself.118 On the street, where the order to “kick out” 
(tatakidasu) is not translated into actualized killing, excess assumes the place of killing. 
But clearly the Zaittokai’s hate speech exercises a violence of its own. In fact, this 
violence calls its victims into visibility in a fetishistic act that denies them difference and, 
in effect, their subjectivity. Yasuda recounts the lasting effect on two elementary students 
after the Zaittokai attacked their Kyoto school: 
‘Omonī (mother).’ Inside a supermarket. The daughter calls her mother in 
a loud voice. The heart missed a beat. Despite herself, the mother looks about her. 
‘After that incident, I’ve become a little nervous. That we may be attacked 
by someone if it is known that we are zainichi, in a space with many people.’ 
The mother (42) who sends her 11-year-old daughter to the Daiichishokyū 
school confessed with a dark expression. 
‘Why did those people get angry’ 
Referring to the Zaittokai who obtruded on the school. 
‘They were saying go home, go home, to the school. Omonī. Is it better we 
go home somewhere? Is there somewhere to go home to?’ 
The mother who does not know how to respond says. It did not look like 
the daughter was frightened. If anything, she looked indifferent. But unmistakably, 
the abuse has been etched in her chest. ‘Koreans, walk on the edge of the road.’ 
How did her daughter receive these words. Yet, even if the mother wanted to ask, 
she could not. Only keeping silent, she could only stroke her daughter’s hair with 
her hand. 
‘It wasn’t anger or anything like that, but that I was earnestly sad. When I 
saw my daughter absorbed in thought, there was nothing to do but cry. Since then, 
I have become cowardly’119 
                                                
118 Michael Fisch, “War by Metaphor in Densha otoko,” in Mechademia Vol. 4: War/Time, ed. Frenchy 
Lunning (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009), pg. 132, 137, 141 – 3.  
















At first Kim Wikan (40), who runs a yakiniku store in Kyoto, did not know 
the cause of his almost 10-year-old daughter’s change. That night, she suddenly 
had a convulsion, and started crying as if a fire had gone on. 
‘I don’t want to go to school’ 
During the demonstration, his daughter was heading alone for the fountain 
near the gates to brush her teeth after lunch. She happened on the demonstration 
the instant she got down from the classroom. On the other side of the steel gates, 
the men are clamoring. Her eyes met with one of them. The man is gesturing with 
his hand as if to say come here, come here. Her body hardened. It was not as if 
she was told something directly. But afterwards, the awareness will not leave that 
she happened on a terrifying scene.120 
 
As if merely external words or gestures do not carry the power to injure, the condition of 
possibility for the Zaittokai to perform their enjoyment in impunity resides with the state 
sanctioning of hate speech. Yet, if an inculcated insufficiency before the state predisposes 
the individualized subject to injury by anything that smells of leftism, and thereby to seek 
sociality in cyberspace, this did not foreclose the possibility of Zaittokai members being 
shocked by their own actions. 
With its “brave warriors” (yūshi), there were also members among the arrrested in 
Kyoto who expressed regret and withdrew from Zaittokai activities and for who the event 
took the wind out of their sails. One so-called “half” (hāfu) Japanese, who participated in 


















the Zaittokai because it confirmed his identity as Japanese, says after his arrest: “I want to 
think a little more about the content of the aggravation. There is no change in the fact that 
I like Japan, and I am proud that I am Japanese. But, whether it is all right that the pride 
of Japanese is established by attacking others, I have come to no longer know. In that 
sense, I think it was good that I was given time to think by being arrested”121 He remarks 
that he wants to “put distance from the movement” (undō kara hanaretai).122 Split by 
ambivalence and doubt arisen from an awareness of the other, the man nonetheless insists 
“that I like Japan, and I am proud that I am Japanese.” After the Kyoto incident, another 
participant remarks, as if shocked by his conduct: “When I look at the videos now, I think 
we ended up doing something awful. Although, I think the action itself was correct. De-
spite this, there is no mistaking that the remarks were childish.”123 Shocked into aware-
ness of the other by the very performance that was to have established the fact of his en-
joyment, this man is similarly split between awareness – “we ended up doing something 
awful” – and an insistence that “the action was correct.” In place of the non-relation of 
fetishism that denied subjectivity to the other, it is as if there is a third common element 
between perpetrator and perpetrated which enables the men to imagine themselves in the 
place of the other. Yet, the latter notes that: “It’s not as if I don’t like Koreans” (betsu ni 
chōsenjin ga kirai na wake jyanaishi).124 
                                                




122 Yasuda, Netto to Aikoku, pg. 137. In fact, this individual returned to the Zaittokai in full force (ibid, 290 
– 291). 
123 Ibid, pg. 315. The Japanese text reads: “いま、動画を見ると、エライことやってしまったなぁと
思いますよ。行動じたいは正しいことだったと思っていますけどね。それにしても幼稚な発言だ
ったことは間違えないですね。” 
124 Ibid, pg. 315. 
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 Then why take part in Zaittokai activities? One member points out: “I don't think 
zainichi special privileges has much to do with it” (zainichi tokken toka ne, amari kankei 
nai yō ni omoundesu). What matters is “clamoring” (moriagaru), and ultimately, he says, 
“the cry to kick out Koreans, also sounds to me like the cry to ‘recognize the existence of 
me!’” (chōsenjin o tatakidase to iu sakebi wa, boku ni wa ‘ore to iu sonzai o mitomero!’ 
to iu sakebi ni mo kikoerundesu). Diminishing everyday social recognition, Yasuda notes, 
only makes Zaittokai attacks all the more fierce.125 If not in a certain (exceptional) shame 
that holds open the space for difference and lack, not least in the Zaittokai subject her or 
himself, the apotheosis of Zaittokai attacks consists in a shameless war. Sakurai is thus 
most aware that insufficiency drives repetition: “I say this over and over, but the left won. 
Don’t get this wrong. We lost. I say this year in and out at yearly banquets. We lost to the 
left! We were laid waste of!”126 
Of a slogan posted on August 6th in Hiroshima – “Mistakes Will Not be Repeated” 
(Ayamachi Wa Kurikaeshimasen) – Sakurai declares there is “no subject” (shugo ga nai). 
But if the subject was Japan, the meaning of the slogan ought to read: “Mistakes Will Not 
Be Repeated: We Will Absolutely Win in the Next War!!” (Ayamachi Wa Kurikaeshi-
masen: Tsugi no Sensō ni wa Zettai Katsu!!).127 
                                                
125 Ibid, pg. 337 – 338. 
126 zaitokukai, “[1.24 Zaittokai] Sakurai Kaichō Hōkoku VOL.3 [Gaikokujin Sanseiken Danko Hantai!]”, 
on Youtube, 24/1/2010. The Japanese reads: “なんども申しますけど、左翼は勝ったんです。ここを
ね、感じがえしないように。我々は負けたんですからね。私はね、某宴会で年がら年中言ってい
ます。我々は左に負けたんです！こてっぱんにやられたんですよ！” 






A tireless social worker whom the media has dubbed “the Buddhist priest who has 
seen 2,000 deaths” (2,000 nin no shi o mita sōryō), Nakashita Daiki works everyday with 
the final consequences of the social atomization and disposability that I have written of in 
the preceding chapters. Nezu Kimiko, whom we encountered as the singular woman and 
figure of the disobedient school teacher, writes of the “self-destruction” (jimetsu) that she 
would have undertaken had it not been for the social connectivity she maintained with her 
students. Akia, my friend and day laborer in Sanya, attempted suicide when his relations 
fell afoul with the NPO at which he volunteered. It was a detail that precipitated his act: 
one day, his slippers had been removed from the shoe rack, and placed to the side. While 
the workers I encountered in Sanya found moments in which to converse regarding each 
their woes, they were increasingly retreating behind the solitary doors of their doya, and 
their relations prefigured the social death that had already overtaken the vast majority of 
Sanya’s residents. Zaittokai members were said to be faded, unsuccessful individuals in 
their everyday lives, yet the relations they established through hate speech did not permit 
any questioning of the truth of zainichi, and did not carry into their everyday lives. While 
the Zengakuren cried “unity” (danketsu) precisely to counteract the debilitating effects of 
the all-encompassing economy, they reproduced a sociality in which difference was to be 
eliminated. Be it in Nezu Kimiko’s thoughts of self-destruction, Akia’s suicide attempt, 
or the prohibitive conditions of Zaittokai or Zengakuren membership, the self-abnegating 
violence of a negative constitutive of proper sociality could be detected across each of the 
above instances. 
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Nakashita Daiki’s writing discloses the coincidence of this self-abnegating drive 
with indifference to the death of the other, one’s neighbor. In what he describes as at once 
the effect and instantiation of the political force of “making taboo” (tabū shi), Nakashita 
writes of one scene of “solitary death” (koritsushi) in his blog, entitled “Poverty, Suicide, 
Caregiving, Funerals: Accepting the Reality in Front of Our Eyes, What Can Be Done as 
a Person” (hinkon, jisatsu, mitori, sōgi: me no mae ni aru genjitsu o uketomete, hito to 
shite nani ga dekiru ka). His blog entry of November 12th, 2012, reads: 
The phone rang. The person who called was the middle-aged woman, A-san, who 
had run away from DV, and taken emergency refuge in a Buddhist shelter. 
 
Now she receives welfare and lives in an apartment. But, having a mental disabil-
ity, her life-style consists in shutting herself inside her room all day. 
 
It had been a long time since A-san called last. Suddenly, A-san said the follow-
ing to me: 
 
“My mother has died alone. I am in a room infested with maggots now, what am I 
to do? Please help.” 
 
“I understand. I will come right away.” 
 
Oh dear, again … 
 
To the readers reading this blog, this may be “out of the everyday.” 
 
But, for me, this kind of contact is “everyday.” 
 
When I go directly to the room, there is already a tremendous smell of death ema-
nating from it, and for an instant, I flinch at this smell of death. 
 
Putting on the mask I brought, I enter the room. 
 
The police had already come and the body had been lifted, but there, with massive 
numbers of maggots and flies fluttering about, “the picture of hell” was spread out. 
 
The place where A-san’s mother passed away was the toilet. 
 
It appeared that, when she had kneeled down at the Japanese toilet, some problem 
occurred, and she fell over in her place.  
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She lives alone, so no one noticed. Since she had no regular interaction with the 
neighborhood, several weeks had passed since her death. 
 
Because the “smell” from that room was so strong, somebody from the neighbor-
hood reported it, and it was only when the proprietor and police intervened that 
“solitary death” was ascertained. 
 
It happens a lot in the city. 
 
I joined my hands in prayer at that place where maggots and flies fluttered about, 
lowered my head at that place where the deceased had been until just before, and 
chanted a short sutra. 
 
Then, together with A-san, we started cleaning that place emitting an intense 
smell. 
 
As people take on in years, anybody becomes prone to fall sick. 
 
As a result, if one is getting old and living alone, it is “possible” in reality that one 
suddenly falls over with a thud from something like a coronary or cerebrovascular 
disorder, and ends up departing thus for the other world.  
 
However, most people do not think, “I will become the party concerned.” Or per-
haps it is better to say that they are consciously “not thinking about it”? 
 
To make matters worse, our current society detests death, puts death at a distance 
as “ill-omened,” and rarely even speaks of death, which is still “made taboo.”   
 
Alongside the decreasing birthrate and the aging population, more and more here-
after, solitary death will likely continue to increase. 
 
On this blog, too, I have explained it repeatedly. 
 
At the current moment (2012), regardless that the aging of the population is al-
ready proceeding at the world’s highest speed, it is said that in 2030, one in three 
persons will be an elderly person, and approximately 40% of all Japan will be-
come single-person households (living alone). 
 
It is said that there are approximately 7,000,000 people in the baby-boom genera-
tion (born 1947 – 1949). 
 
Those men and women will die in massive numbers. 
 
Even now, approximately 1,200,000 pass away per year. It is said that in 2030, 
1,700,000 – 1,800,000 people will pass away per year. 
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Approximately 1.5 times as many as now. 
 
Residents greatly oppose building new crematoriums in the city. Consequently, to 
cremate in the city, one will be made to wait at least one week, in some cases 
more than two weeks. 
 
(It might be a different story if crematoriums operated 24 hours like convenience 
stores …) 
 
Then, the problem will arise of securing a location to store the body. 
 
In the disaster-stricken areas of Tōhoku, from March to around May, 2011, there 
were too many corpses, so they were transported to Tokyo and cremated. (For in-
stance, at Edogawa-ku’s Mizue Funeral Hall, or Otaku-ku’s Rinkai Funeral Hall) 
 
Similar to that, I am predicting that there will come a time when, even if they pass 
away in Tokyo, the corpse will not be able to be cremated in the city, and will 
have to be transported as far as Gunma, Ibaraki, Tochigi, or Niigate to be cremat-
ed. 
 
Well, at that time, what is to be done? 
 
For people who can say “it has nothing to do with me” when their own parents die, 
it is fine. However, in reality, such people are likely very few in number. 
 
Even if one thinks “it has nothing to do with me” now, sooner or later “it cannot 
not have anything to do with me.” That is why it is better to think about it starting 
now. However, that is the most difficult … 
 
As long as human beings are not the party concerned, at the end of the day it is 
“somebody else’s affair.” 
 
This is clear if one looks at the response to the Fukushima nuclear accident. 
 
The reality is that, the more one says “radiation” in Fukushima, peer pressure is 
applied, and one is treated as an unpatriotic person … 
 
To the right and left is all elderly people, moreover, the young who take care of 
those elderly people are decreasing more and more. 
 
What on earth is to be done? 
 
Death comes to anybody equally. 
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For this very reason, I have repeatedly explained that, it is better to prepare to re-
spond to “that moment” while one is still healthy. 
 
For this purpose, I hold symposiums, write books, even make policy recommen-




Rather than getting better, the reality is getting worse and worse 
 
People of the general public also do not, hardly, have the air of thinking of the 
solitary death problem as “my own problem.” 
 
No matter how much I scramble from site to site, or run around in solitary death 
prevention, the speed with which society is falling apart is too fast. 
 
In a residential area in which solitary death is occurring frequently, even if I call 
out to think about the solitary death problem with residents as a whole, I am told 
“let sleeping dogs lie,” and become the object of bashing. 
 
What I thought was acting for the best becomes, conversely, the object of criti-
cism. 
 
I have been told that, “what you are doing is like spreading water in the desert.” 
 
In this Tokyo desert of a metropolis, no matter how much water one spreads, the 
reality does not change at all …  
 
I sigh, in spite of myself. What am I doing? my soliloquy continues. 
 
But surely something can be done … holding this thought, today is another day of 
spending time going around to people of the solitary death reserve army.1 
                                                





















































































































Side by side with the clarion call – “what on earth is to be done?” (ittai, dōsun da?) – the 
social violence of “taboo” (tabū) constitutes the structuring axiom of Nakashita’s endless 
“everyday” (nichijō). Notably, the word “taboo” (tabū) is not translated into Japanese but 
– like its counterpart: “shock” (shokku) – is rendered in syllabics denoting the English, as 
if the word itself marked a disavowal.2 But the violence of the social is to be encountered 
in the everyday in the form of indifference, and more specifically, with the phrase: “it has 





























2 In an impossible relation to “that place” (sono basho) of death, where the corpse had been, Nakashita’s act 
of prayer and writing recalls William Haver saying in The Body of this Death: Historicity and Sociality in 
the Time of AIDS (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996): “The corpse, in itself singular and therefore 
that scrap which refuses predication and judgement absolutely, is nevertheless that which is the impossible 
condition of possibility for every idealization, every historicization. This impossible relation, this impossi-
bility of relation, or this relation of nonrelation, or this radical alterity, of the corpse is thus the ground of 
every work of mourning, every historicization, every work of culture” (67). Thus, Nakashita and other 
Buddhist priests spoke of the limit, death, or the moment of thinking of suicide as one of “hope” (kibō). It 
was in the “nonrelation” to death that life took on significance. See Nakashita Daiki, Shinu Toki ni Kōkai 
Shinai Tame ni Kyō Kara Taisetsu ni Shitai Koto (Tokyo: Subarusha, 2012). 
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nothing to do with me” (kankei nai). In fact, the phrase itself discloses the self-destructive 
atomization implicit to the social violence of Japan today, in which the discourse of “self-
responsibility” (jikosekinin) mandates self-abnegation, for the phrase translates as “it has 
no relation” (kankei nai) or “connection” (kankei). The stuff of sociality is severed in this 
non-relation to a death, which, as Nakashita points out, might as well be yours. Needless 
to say, Nakashita is familiar with death – “the stench of death” (shishū), “maggots” (uji), 
“flies” (hae): “the picture of hell” (jigoku ezu) – in a way that few people, no matter how 
socially conscientious, would wish for. No doubt, that is why society accords people like 
him the role of disposing of the departed and aiding the bereaved through the time of 
mourning. Death must be accorded its place. Nor, for that matter, is Nakashita overstating 
matters when he says that he encounters these ghastly scenes on a daily basis. During the 
two years I attended his monthly gatherings for Buddhist monks and laypersons to talk on 
“living” (ikiru koto), “death” (shi), “that world” (ano yo), and “Buddha” (hotoke), it was 
altogether common for undertakers and Buddhist monks to speak of the corpse as facts of 
their vocation. Nakashita’s blog is typically matter-of-fact and insistent in its depiction of 
the social catastrophe, or “reality” (genjitsu), unfolding before our eyes. What he neglects 
to write explicitly in this blog, however, was said in multiple talks, namely: the fact of his 
being “powerless” (muryoku) before the reality with which he grapples. Nevertheless, he 
says “something can be done” (nani ka dekiru ka), while he asks “what am I doing” (nani 
o yatteirun darō). He is, in effect, addressing himself to indifference, that is, to the “taboo” 
(tabū) that violently instantiates social death. Thus, Nakashita’s mode of insistence would 
be free of the fetishistic violence which necessarily accompanies the totalizing impulse. It 
asks ‘what can be done?’, on the condition, that is, of “grasping,” “receiving,” “coming to 
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grips” or “accepting” (uketomeru) the impossibility of a turnabout. “Still, still!” (shikashi, 
shikashi da), he writes, and adds a reality-check: “Rather than getting better, the reality is 
getting worse and worse” (genjitsu wa yoku naru dokoro ka, waruku naru ippō da). In a 
different context, Nakashita’s stance recalls the refusal by public school teachers to stand 
and sing the Kimigayo, despite knowing that conditions will not improve. Nezu Kimiko 
does not call for a “revolution” (kakumei), but rather, for the movement’s cinders or “fire 
not to go out” (hi ga kienai yō ni). 
 But still, a certain moment of blockage must take place lest the subject lose him or 
herself. I experienced this when Akia called me repeatedly after I had gone to sleep after 
a night of drinking, only to learn the next morning that he had attempted to kill himself. I 
then had to go to his room, uncleaned from the night before, to pick up clothes for him. 
As Nakashita related in conversations, there is in Japanese a phrase – masaka – translated 
as “no way,” “surely not,” “it cannot be,” or “impossible.” It is said when that which was 
“somebody else’s affair” (tanin goto) suddenly – and shockingly – becomes one’s own. It 
was said when the magnitude 9.0 tsunami of March 11th, 2011, hit the northeastern shore 
of Japan, triggering meltdowns at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. For the word, 
masaka, does invoke a slippery likeness to the sublime, if only in the crucial sense that its 
expression – “impossible!” (masaka!) – establishes a triangulation, or minimal difference 
between the subject and object that threatens to engulf her or him.3 A mere glimpse at the 
phrases emerging in personal accounts of the 3.11 tsunami – “breakwater collapse right in 
front of my eyes” (me no mae de bōhatei hōraku), “escaping the tsunami by hairsbreadth” 
(kan ippatsu tsunami dasshutsu), “knocking electric poles to the ground, a seashore house 
                                                
3 See Nakashita Daiki, Kanashimu Chikara (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun Shuppan, 2011), pg. 164. See also Ch. 
2, Neil Hertz, “The Notion of Blockage in the Literature of the Sublime,” and James T. Siegel, “The View 
From Cornell,” in Diacritics 11.1 (Spring, 1981). 
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pressed near” (denchū nagi taoshi, umizoi no ie ga semattekita), “the waves withdrawing 
soundlessly, the ocean bottom reveals its figure” (oto mo naku hīta nami, umi no soko ga 
sugata arawasu) … – discloses endless iterations of precisely the minimal difference that 
separates life from death.4 And if the tsunami set off the negativity of a Kantian “dynamic 
sublime,” the continuous astronomical radiation leakage from Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear 
Power Plant – “Trillions of Becquerels of Radioactive Material Still Flowing Into the Sea” 
– invokes a certain “mathematical sublime.”5 It was on the coast of Northeastern Japan in 
the aftermath of the earthquake, that Nakashita and others like him, already inured to the 
materiality of death, would come upon endless rows of supine corpses, lined up in stacks 
that would reduce them to a “wretched” (nasakenai) state.6 Even for them, the magnitude 
of death had become too great for the reason to think. And this death was and, moreover, 
continues to be circulating around the nation in the form of “radiation” (hōshanō). 
 Echoing accounts of global warming, Nakashita’s vision of an imminent future of 
convenience crematoriums asks what an ethnography can impart if “the speed with which 
society is falling apart” (shakai ga kowareteiku supīdo) has spiralled beyond the limits of 
language. The death’s head itself cannot be witnessed. Only the traces of violence can be 
detected. But it is not only a matter of 1,700,000 – 1,800,000 deaths per year in 2030, an 
ever-increasing number of which will be “solitary deaths” (koritsushi), but of that “desert” 
(sabaku) of social relations in which indifference to the singularity of others, or oneself, 
achieves social death, and suicide.7 The rate “with which society is falling apart” consists 
                                                
4 See the newspaper articles posted to “Ishinomaki o Ōsotta Daitsunami no Shōgen, Sono 1,” on Daitsuna-
mi no Shōgen, 2/10/2015. 
5 See Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgement. 
6 See Nakashita Daiki, Kanashimu Chikara, pg. 169 – 175. 
7 For statistics on suicide in Japan, see Naikakufu Jisatsutaisaku Suishinshitsu, “Keisatsuchō no Jisatsutōkei 
ni Motozuku Jisatsushasū no Sui Nado,” 10/2/2015. 
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precisely in the violent force of “taboo” (tabū) that actualizes social atomization and that, 
as Nakashita writes, emerges in the form of “bashing” (basshingu). Indifference, after all, 
necessitates the displacement of a certain guilt, and it would be better not to make too big 
a fuss every time someone dies. In this respect, it is notably Fukushima that has emerged 
as a metonym for contemporary Japan, both in academic and popular discourses that are 
alternatively complicit with or critical of the state. Yet, just as attention must be given to 
the displacement of state guilt through a discourse that figures Fukushima as an economic 
negativity to be overcome – “do your best!!” (gambare!!), it was said in the aftermath of 
the earthquake – it should be said that critical references to “Fukushima” risk displacing 
the generality of a structure which is at work not only in Fukushima, but everywhere, and 
across social differences, the imagination of which ethnography can facilitate in place of 
indifference, and more specifically, in place of equivalent, quantitative signifiers of value. 
By focusing on the general character of state recognition that consigns social differences 
to death, I have sought to expose the non-relation between the capitalist state and its disa-
vowed margins, at the limits of the representable. As Nakashita’s “taboo” (tabū), it is the 
essentially political character of state recognition which Fukushima has rendered explicit. 
Indeed, as Nakashita observes, the force of “taboo” (tabū) materializes most violently in 
relation to Fukushima, and to “radiation” (hōshanō). 
 The form of indifference to Fukushima and the “disaster-stricken areas” (hisaichi) 
of Northeastern Japan replicates the indifference Nakashita describes between neighbors: 
“somebody else’s affairs” (tanin goto) or “it has nothing to do with me” (kankei nai). But 
it is only in relation to “radiation” (hōshanō) that Nakashita observes the transmutation of 
“bashing” (basshingu) into a specific “peer pressure” (dōchō atsuryoku) of being “treated 
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as an unpatriotic person” (hikokumin azukai). At anti-nuclear demonstrations in Tokyo, it 
was thus not uncommon to encounter individuals who had come from Fukushima to join 
the crowd because it was simply not possible to protest at home. “It is not possible to say 
anything” (nani mo ienai) was their familiar refrain. However, unlike other taboo subjects 
like “suicide” (jisatsu) or “solitary death” (kodokushi) – the final “smell” (nioi) of which 
would alert neighbors to death – “radiation” (hōshanō) exposed the coincidence of the 
social with the political, and thus, the responsibility of the state. In fact, the occurrence of 
suicides among Fukushima farmers and individuals displaced by radiation did give rise to 
a discourse which blamed the state; a discourse, it should be noted, that could have been 
expanded to encompass the incidence of suicide in its generality.8 For it was not only the 
isolation incumbent on displacement to so-called “temporary dwellings” (kasetsu jūtaku) 
– still standing now, four years after the disaster – cut off from one’s former community, 
but bankruptcy, and ultimately, money that was regarded as the common cause of suicide 
among former residents. Hence, Nakashita himself described suicide among middle-aged 
men (the demographic with the highest suicide rate in Japan, by far) with the paradoxical 
description of individuals emphatically “wanting to live” (ikitakatta), “yet, not being able 
to live” (kedo ikirarenakatta). Observing how “money” (kane) had become the sole and 
overriding signifier of value, not to mention the role of life insurance companies and debt, 
Nakashita relayed how the words, “I’m sorry” (gomennasai), regularly accompanied their 
suicide notes to families. Asides from the implications of neoliberal “self-responsibility” 
(jikosekinin) – ostensibly, mainly for men apologizing for their putative insufficiency – it 
is the violence of the social that emerges most strikingly in Nakashita’s account of men at 
their (financial) limit, wanting to live, but ultimately forfeiting their lives in an exchange 
                                                
8 See, for instance, Hasegawa Kenichi’s Gempatsu ni “Furusato” o Ubawarete. 
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that their families would never have wished for. However, when the cause of bankruptcy 
can be clearly identified in the flagrant malobservance of safety measures – who thought 
of building 54 nuclear plants on an earthquake-prone string of volcanic islands? – leading 
to a “man-made disaster” (jinsai), for which there has been little accountability, either on 
behalf of the state or Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), the very self-evidence of 
self-responsibility goes down the drain. Or, at least it ought to. As Nakashita says, stating 
the obvious can also trigger accusations of being “unpatriotic” (hikokumin). 
 
Thus, in conversation with two friends one day, one friend told me that her work 
conditions had improved with her new boss. Though her work hours still entailed getting 
up at six and arriving home past ten, even sleeping at the workplace if it was busy – as if 
there was “nothing to be done” (shōganai) – everything regarding her partner’s work was 
conveyed as “messed up” or “improper” (okashī ). Only recently, a “part-time” (arubaito) 
colleague had been fired out of the blue with ten days’ notice. When I asked if this person 
had consulted a lawyer or sought help, they explained that he probably did not know that 
such services existed, and would not have sought them anyways. In fact, as if the practice 
was common, one boss had been nicknamed the “firing boss” (kubikiri shachō). Thus, the 
administration constantly made indirect reference to the possibility of being “fired” (kubi), 
that is, if employees were to conduct themselves inappropriately; for example, by taking 
too many days off. When I asked why my friend was staying in this job, they explained to 
me that, since he was applying for a position as a fireman, it was important he appear as a 
dedicated and stable worker, and hence, that he retain the same job. Switching jobs would 
reflect negatively on him. However, my friend had already applied for the public servant 
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position three consecutive years and was quickly approaching the applicant cut-off age of 
30. If his application was declined the following year, he said, he would leave his current 
job and seek other employment. Indeed, his latest qualm over work concerned an incident 
because of which the administration had pressured his own department to have somebody 
take a forklift license. The problem had started when an other department complained of 
extra work, since no one in his department could operate a forklift. As a result, my friend 
volunteered to take the license out of his own unpaid time – 30 hours – and money ($500 
or ¥50,000). They, too, noted that, “it is not possible to say anything” (nani mo ienai). 
It therefore came as a surprise when, in reaction to my subsequently criticizing the 
notion of “self-responsibility” (jikosekinin) in this day and age, my friend burst into a fit 
of anger. I had been talking about the educational system, and how the Japanese state had 
taken no responsibility for the nuclear disaster. At first, one friend responded by recalling 
that the Japanese state had already issued financial aid to residents affected by the nuclear 
disaster, as if this was sufficient. When I raised the concern that food from Ibaraki, Chiba, 
Miyagi, Gunma, Tochigi and Yamagata prefectures was irradiated, adding that I hesitated 
to eat it, my other friend exploded with an anger that had been building up. He said that if 
I was not going to eat food from Chiba, Ibaraki, and Fukushima, I might as well “get out!” 
(detekke!) of Japan. His partner said that she had decided to eat produce from Ibaraki and 
and Chiba, because otherwise the economies of those regions would collapse. She nodded 
when I noted this resembled “group suicide” (shūdan jisatsu) – everyone eating irradiated 
food to save the economy – but nevertheless insisted on the rectitude of her actions. As if 
self-sacrifice and “doing your best” (gambaru) for everyone was essentially Japanese, her 
partner went on to berate me, shouting: “You don’t understand a thing! That’s the culture 
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of Japan!” (nanmo wakattenai! sore ga nihon no bunka dakara!). He went on to call me a 
“communist” (shakaishugisha), saying that I wanted everyone to be “equal” (byōdō), and 
when I pointed out that 20% of the population lives under the poverty line, he accused me 
of using their example to criticize the rest of society. I lashed back, stating how ludicrous 
the notion of “self-responsibility” (jikosekinin) sounds when, as in the Fukushima nuclear 
disaster, the truly responsible parties had not assumed any responsibility, while residents 
were being encouraged by the state to “do their very best” (gambatte) in their battle with 
radiation. However my friends took my polemic as a personal assault on their values. One 
asked sarcastically if he should stop attending “cram school” (juku) for the public servant 
exam, seeing that it was hopeless. The other told me that my viewpoint was “prejudiced” 
(katayotteiru), asking me why I bothered reading the newspapers everyday if I was going 
to adopt such a biased perspective, insisting that I be “objective” (kyakkanteki). She said 
it was “normal” or “obvious” (futsū) to be held accountable for one’s social predicament. 
To my disbelief, when I mentioned the number of suicides per year as a counter-example, 
my friend paused for a moment and replied that it was their fault. Likewise, all the people 
who had not fled from Fukushima in time were “ignorant” (muchi) for not having known 
any better. Finally, as if possessed by the social, my friends added in a spiteful tone that I 
was “criticizing” or “denying” (hitei shiteiru) “self-responsibility” (jikosekinin). 
 
 Naturally, Dafuka-san of the Chūkakuha advanced a view of society diametrically 
opposed to that of my friends above, yet one that acknowledged the political there where 
Nakashita shied away from it. “Radiation” (hōshanō), Dafuka-san said, “is society itself” 
(wa shakai sono mono); or rather, radiation is the “essence,” “thing itself” (sono mono) of 
 613 
“society” (shakai). A parallel emerges between Dafuka-san’s statement and Nakashita’s 
remark on “the speed with which society is falling apart” (shakai ga kowareteiku supīdo), 
for Dafuka-san names the in/visible cause, the effects of which are everywhere evident to 
Nakashita. Moreover, like the effects of “radiation” (hōshanō) – in/visible, yet detectable 
in its effects everywhere from geiger counters to the social fracturing of Fukushima – the 
final effects of this in/visible cause will have become apparent when it is already too late.9 
It is the violence of the social – as both cause and effect: detectable in its effects, yet also 
society “itself,” in its very “essence” (sono mono) – which Dafuka-san names “radiation” 
(hōshanō). So too, for Nakashita, the effects of indifference are everywhere evident in the 
individualization of social life. Indifference is this social death. To say “somebody else’s 
affair” (tanin goto) is to actualize the auto-destructive social “taboo” (tabū) that fractures 
sociality and that creates the conditions in which “solitary death” (kodokushi) or suicide – 
also the objects of taboo – occur. Yet in a society of exchangeable signifiers, the death of 
one’s neighbor might as well be one’s own death. Somebody else’s affair is emphatically 
one’s very own. Through its internalization – directed to the other as much as to the “self” 
– the economic mandate of “self-responsibility” (jikosekinin) negates the other in the self, 
and, possessed by the social, the act of actual suicide is but one step away. Like “solitary 
death” (koritsushi), suicide – written in Japanese as a combination of ideograms meaning 
to “kill” (殺) the “self” (自), jisatsu (自殺), or as the euphemistic self-death of “self” (自) 
and “death” (死), jishi (自死) – is simultaneously the effect of Nakashita’s “taboo” (tabū), 
its instantiation, and its object. Like solitary death, suicide was a taboo topic. Companies, 
or for that matter, schools were rarely held accountable for suicides stemming from social 
                                                
9 See the introduction for a discussion of this future anterior temporality. 
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conditions at the workplace.10 Instead, its occurrence was driven into the silence of shame, 
and when it did make it into court, defendants claimed that the individual had been “weak” 
(yowasa). In court, the social force which might have precipitated the actual act of killing 
the self was reiterated by the defendants and powers that be. Thus the “causal relationship” 
(inga kankei) between suicide and the workplace was disavowed. If anything, the matter 
was retrojected on the individual (and individual family) as her or his “self-responsibility” 
(jikosekinin). S/he had not been strong enough. 
 As Nakashita repeatedly said in talks and interviews, however, the words – “I am 
sorry” (gomennasai) – almost invariably appeared in the suicide note of the middle-aged 
man who addressed himself to his family. Though it must be further asked just how much 
Nakashita’s statement is reflective of the patriarchal organization of sexual difference, he 
observed that, unlike women, this demographic of men were also the least likely to reach 
out for help. And on the rare occasions when such men found themselves calling for help, 
Nakashita added, they were likely to be placed on hold on the suicide hotline, begging for 
someone to pick up. As Émile Durkheim once pointed out, suicide is an eminently social 
act. And while the violence of the social is not specific to Japan, but is constitutive of any 
sociality, the specific organization of lack that can be witnessed in contemporary Japan in 
the demand for self-abnegation accounts for the reinvigoration of the trope of suicide as a 
solicitation for recognition.11 It is as if the departing words – “I am sorry” (gomennasai) – 
at once testified to the failure or insufficiency of the individual, of which social alienation 
                                                
10 See Kudomi Yoshiyuki and Satō Hiroshi, Shinsai Kyōshi wa Naze Oitsumeraretanoka – Kunō to Zasetsu 
Kara Shitsubō to Saisei o Motomete. 
11 Émile Durkheim, Suicide: A Study in Sociology, trans. John A. Spaulding and George Simpson, ed. 
George Simpson (New York: The Free Press, 1951). For suicide as a trope in the context of modern Japan, 
see Masao Miyoshi, Accomplices of Silence: The Modern Japanese Novel (Berkeley: University of Califor-
nia Press, 1974), Iga Mamoru, The Thorn in the Chrysanthemum: Suicide and Economic Success in Mod-
ern Japan (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1986), and Alan Wolfe, Suicidal Narrative in 
Modern Japan: The Case of Osamu Dazai. 
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operates as proof, while also constituting an aspiration for recognition. Only connectivity, 
as Nezu Kimiko writes, saved her from “self-destruction” (jimetsu). Akia’s act, too, was 
framed by social ostracization. In a previous job, he had been fired because of his health, 
and had attempted suicide.12 And when I went to see him in the hospital – from which he 
was discharged almost right away: after 36 hours – it was evident that familial issues also 
weighed him down. When he passed away, Akia wanted to be buried in his family grave 
overlooking the ocean in Miyakojima, but his siblings held grudges against him because 
of his yakuza past. “They will not let me in” (iretekurenai sa), he said. While there was a 
moment when he came to his senses during his attempt and called an ambulance, the man 
across the hall said his eyes had been clouded over when he asked for the “knife” (hōchō). 
Notwithstanding a reading of suicide that would attempt to intercept every instance of its 
occurrence in terms of irony, resistance, or the purity of a self-negation to compensate for 
insufficiency, it could not be denied that Nezu’s thoughts, Akia’s act, and the words – “I 
am sorry” (gomennasai) – both replicated the judgement of the social force that isolated 
them, and thus, constituted an aspiration to be recognized beyond the moment of death. It 
was in this respect that, when my friend failed his public servant exam on his fourth and 
final attempt, suicide was the first thing that popped into his head, despite the fact that the 
fire department had severely cut the number of positions that year. Given the unforgiving 
demand for conformity and “self-responsibility” (jikosekinin) in contemporary Japan, it is 
no surprise that the trope of “suicide” (jisatsu) has been reinvigorated. Although the state 
has figured the suicide rate (like Fukushima) in terms of a financial loss to be overcome – 
                                                
12 See Jisatsu Misuisha, Jukai Kara no Seikan (Tokyo: Taiyō no Kai, 2011) for an autobiographical account 
of the suicide attempt of a man following upon dismissal from work, debt and divorce. See also the collec-
tion of talks in Hanhinkon Nettowāku/NPO Hōjin Jisatsu Taisaku Shien Center Lifelink, Jisatsu to Hinkon 
Kara Miete Kuru Nihon: Report Book (Tokyo: Beside Wi’s Shuppan, 2010). 
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suicide “cost” the economy ¥2.7 trillion ($32 billion US) in 2009 – the state emphasis on 
instilling youth with the “will to live” (ikiru chikara) produces the social conditions that 
compel suicide.13 Exacerbated under a discourse of “self-responsibility” (jikosekinin) and 
self-abnegation, the trope of suicide subtends the normative violence of the social as the 
literalized act of killing the self, and thus occupies that place of the negative constitutive 
of sociality. The financial loss of suicide must be overcome, however the enforcement of 
sociality risks a reinvigoration of suicide. Hence, as a Japanese ‘Thing,’ the suicide rate is 
at once immensely visible in the mass media – as a financial negativity – while its actual 
occurrence in the everyday, as Nakashita observed through interviews, “is hidden” (inpei 
sareru), “criminal” (hanzai), “shameful” (hazukashī), and “taboo” (tabū). Its paradoxical 
status owes to the concurrence of the abstracted rate (to be overcome in the “will to live”) 
with the shame of its occurrence. But this shame achieves an other work of displacing the 
guilt for suicide. Akia, too, did not wish for anyone to know that he had attempted suicide. 
Yet word inevitably spread at the NPO, where the incident assumed the silent features of 
stigma, and where staff never spoke to him of the matter. 
Thus for Dafuka-san, it was not simply that the metaphor of “radiation” (hōshanō) 
coincided with the violence of the social, but that it made visible the guilt of the state. In 
this sense, it is the “causal relationship” (inga kankei) between the increasing emergence 
of thyroid cancer cases among children in Fukushima prefecture, and radiation exposure, 
that the Japanese state will not recognize.14 But the point should not have to be belabored 
that nuclear power plants ought never to have been constructed in Japan, on top of a fault 
                                                
13 See Andrea Arai’s essay, “Killing Kids,” regarding the state discourse of the “will to live” (ikiru chikara) 
and Nakashita Daiki, Kanashimu Chikara, pg. 173, for an iteration of this discourse – as “let’s do our best” 
(gambarō) – in Fukushima.  
14 See Fukushima Shūdan Sokai Saiban no Kai, Ima Kodomo ga Abunai: Fukushima Gempatsu Jiko kara 
Kodomo o Mamoru “Shūdan Sokai Saiban”  (Tokyo: Hon no Izumisha, 2012). 
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zone, no less. The word – “risk” – gives the lie to “risk management.” For non-specialists, 
the Kyoto University scientist, Koide Hiroaki has shown that Japan does not, in fact, need 
nuclear energy to sustain itself.15 In his 2010 book entitled “Nuclear Reactor Time Bomb: 
The Japanese Archipelago that Fears Major Earthquake” (Genshiro Jigen Bakudan: Dai 
Jishin ni Obieru Nihonrettō), the tireless anti-nuclear activist, Hirose Takashi, pointed out 
the abominable safety measures taken at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant.16 And 
for those professionals of “risk management,” whose job it is to anticipate the unexpected, 
the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami of magnitude 9.3 should have set off roaring alarms. Nor 
is it surprising that students at the few schools that had undergone emergency training for 
tsunamis knew to run, rather than wait in the courtyard. However such facts do not even 
begin to touch on the Japanese state’s conduct during and after the nuclear disaster which, 
as of March 2015, has not been contained. In the immediate aftermath of the catastrophe, 
as the state task force considered the apocalyptic possibility that a full-blown explosion in 
Fukushima might render Tokyo, not to mention, Northeastern Japan, unlivable, and while 
winds carried radiation levels through Tokyo that ought to have called for the evacuation 
of children, Trade Minister Edano Yukio came out with his by-now infamous declaration 
that: “damage to health will not appear immediately” (tadachi ni kenkō higai wa denai).17 
Naturally, anybody with but a rudimentary knowledge of radiation knows that its effects 
appear in the future, when it will have been too late. But if it is even possible to consider 
degrees of criminal conduct on behalf of the Japanese state, perhaps it was its decision to 
deploy Yamashita Shunichi to Fukushima that drew most attention. As “Radiation Health 
                                                
15 See Koide Hiroaki, Damasareta Anata ni Mo Sekinin ga Aru (Tokyo: Gentōsha, 2012). 
16 See Hirose Takashi, Genshiro Jigen Bakudan: Daijishin ni Obieru Nihon Rettō (Tokyo: Diamondsha, 
2010). 
17 See SankeiNews, “Edano Kanbōchōkan Kaiken No1 ‘Tadachi ni Kenkōhigai wa Denai. Shōrai Mo …’”, 
on Youtube, 23/3/2011. 
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Risk Management Adviser” (hōshasen kenkō risuku kanri adobaizā), the reputed scientist 
of Nagasaki University took it upon himself, immediately after the meltdowns, no less, to 
tell local residents – mothers, fathers and children – that there was nothing to worry about. 
Having been introduced as the bearer of “accurate knowledge” (tadashī chishiki) – and it 
should be noted that “accurate” (tadashī) in Japanese slips from “exact,” “true,” “correct,” 
“right,” to “proper” (tadashī) – Yamashita ends a speech in Fukushima City on March 21, 
2011, as follows: 
Above all, what I would like to ask for between you and ourselves, or you and the 
prefecture, or the country, is to build ties of a trusting relationship. What can you 
trust now? It is to ask what data can you trust in most. Whether we like it or not, it 
is that we are Japanese citizens. In this Japan that was defeated in World War II, 
and that achieved the recovery you see now by supporting the nuclear industry, as 
citizens of a democratic nation, we must at least believe the policies of the nation, 
and the information that comes from the nation. Our nation does not, in fact, have 
an organization to strictly audit and survey such information to explain whether it 
is correct or not. There is no organization that neutrally assesses if the information 
the nation puts out is correct or not. Be it one-sidedly pro-nation, one-sidedly anti-
nation. In other words, because arbitrariness and profit motivation comes in, the 
national population more or less sees it with distrust, uncertainty, or doubt. What 
you need is the guarantee of an authority. Like Mito Kōmon pulls out his coat of 
arms, to know that everything is okay. With the moment of the Fukushima nucle-
ar plant, Japan needs to rebuild that kind of relationship. Unfortunately, that was 
not done after the JCO accident, or the Chernobyl accident.18 
 
From now on, the name “Fukushima” will be widely known throughout the world. 
Fukushima, Fukushima, Fukushima, everything Fukushima. This is superb. Now, 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki have lost. Fukushima’s name will hold the unparalleled 
ring in the world. A pinch is a chance. It is the biggest chance. Hey, without doing 
anything, Fukushima has become famous. There is no not taking advantage of this. 
Use it for what? Firstly, for recovery. The people who passed away in the tsunami 
and earthquake. I truly give my heartfelt condolences, and at once with supporting 
these people, it is necessary without delay to recover from the nuclear disaster. I 
do not know what will happen with the nuclear energy that sustains the core of the 
nation’s energy policy. However, I can tell you that the health effects are minimal. 
Above all, it is necessary to attentively secure the radiation exposure of the people 
                                                
18 JCO stands for the former Japan Nuclear Fuel Conversion Company. In this context, it refers to the JCO 
or Tokaimura nuclear accident of 30 September 1999. JCO is the worst nuclear accident in Japan preceding 
Fukushima, in which exposure resulted in the deaths of two workers. 
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working now with a do-or-die resolution. But there is nothing to worry about with 
regard to general residents. 
 
But still, there is uneasiness. Uneasiness about whom? Women, pregnant women, 
and infants. We are responsible for the children who carry the next generation. So 
that is why every radiation protection limit is based on the amount allowable for 
babies. You see. Administering potassium iodide, or evacuating and taking shelter 
are based on standards created for protecting children. When adults reach past the 
age of 20, they have have nearly no sensitivity to radiation. Basically zero. Firstly, 
please remember that adults have almost no sensitivity to radiation. Despite this, 
adults are the ones who worry the most. This is a mistake. Especially wrong for 
men. If we reflect on our bodies, one smokes cigarettes and drinks, and despite 
drinking alcohol, when it has a far higher risk than radiation. What should be pro-
tected are women, women and children, pregnant women and infants. If the cur-
rent situation gets worse, it is enough for pregnant women and children to escape. 
Men should fight. Towards recovery, here as Fukushima residents, the Byakkotai 
of Aizu. It is self-evident that there should be such resolution. 
 
In fact, the effects of radiation do not come to people who are smiling. It comes to 
people who are worried. This has been clearly understood by animal experiments. 
Luckily or unluckily, the effects of drinking alcohol are fewer. Of course, I’m not 
telling you to drink. Laughter will remove your radiation phobia. But there is very 
little information available now that academically, and scientifically explains that 
laughter. Please, having heard to my talk, since I am sure you have many doubts, 
please ask many questions. This is neither a lecture, nor a course. It is catch-ball, 
between you, and me.19 
                                                
19 See pcast311, “Yamashita Shunichi Shi, Fukushima Terusa no Kōen (2011 Nen 3 Gatsu 21 Nichi)”, on 
Youtube, 14 October 2013. For a full transcription of the speech, see “2011 Nen 2 Gatsu 21 Nichi 14 Ji – 
Yamashita Shunichi Shi – Takamura Noboru Shi ‘Hōshanō to Watashitachi no Kenkō to no Kankei’ 



















In videos posted to Youtube of this speech, held in the early stages of the nuclear disaster, 
it is perhaps not surprising to hear that the audience is, indeed, laughing in response to the 
jokes that Yamashita delivers, as proxy for the “nation” (kuni), or “state” (kuni). The time 
had yet to come when residents sought alternative sources of information (usually online) 
and when rumors of the state’s deceitfulness had circulated, leading to interruptions in 
Yamashita’s speeches, and fierce interrogations during Q & A.20 However, as Yamashita 
himself eloquently puts it, the occasion of his address to Fukushima residents – or, rather, 
the men of Fukushima – does not consist in a one-sided “lecture” (kōgi), but “catch-ball” 





























20 For an exhaustive consideration of the use of social media as a tool for political organization and source 
of information in the wake of the 3.11 tsunami and nuclear disaster, see David H. Slater, Nishimura Keiko, 
and Love Kindstrand, “Social Media, Information and Political Activism in Japan’s 3.11 Crisis,” in The 
Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus. 
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(kyacchi bōru). As the form of that “trusting relationship” (shinrai kankei) between state 
and populace, what is at stake is the exchange of signifiers – hence, catch-ball – by which 
residents misrecognize the authority of the state and, through the act of asking questions, 
give themselves to be recognized as citizens. Yamashita thus dissimulates disingenuity by 
pretending to lay all his cards on the table, admitting that the “moment of the Fukushima 
nuclear plant” (fukushima genpatsu o keiki ni) – notably, “moment” (keiki) also translates 
as “chance” – calls for a certain restoration of trust. Indeed, “a pinch is a chance” (pinchi 
wa cyansu). Yamashita would insert himself, as proxy for the state, precisely in the place 
of a breach opened up by the disaster, in the lack of lack of abjection, anxiety and unease. 
It is in this respect that the slippage in Japanese between “country” and “state” – for both 
are named by the single word, “kuni,” whose identity-in-difference discloses the properly 
tropic violence of Yamashita as proxy of state; a proxy, in turn, for the democratic people 
of Japan – is unleashed, because, as Yamashita points out, the only “data” (dēta) that can 
be trusted, is the fact of being Japanese. “Whether we like it or not” (konomu to konoma 
zaru to ni kakawarazu), this is your duty. Hence, if Yamashita does not explicitly say that 
residents need the “emperor” (tennō), he references the coat of arms of Mito Kōmon – the 
TV character of a retired feudal lord of Mito (just south of Fukushima) who travels the 
nation, vanquishing corrupt officials in the name of the weak – and the mythic Byakko-
tai regiment of teenagers who committed ritual suicide in the Boshin war of 1868, believ-
ing their lord to be dead. 
 Yamashita’s speech is suffused with metaphors of war, spectralizing the discourse 
of state with memories of World War II. Notably, the coincidence of nuclear disaster with 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki already doubles and overdetermines the import of “radiation” 
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(hōshanō) in Japan, the only nation in the world with residents who have experienced the 
atom bomb. Yet, where the reference to World War II, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki, might 
have triggered memories of state guilt, Yamashita figures Japan’s World War II defeat as 
the occasion of a “recovery” (fukkō) that was achieved thanks to nuclear power. In effect, 
the state guilt associated with World War II, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, is displaced by the 
compelling demand for the repetition of “recovery” (fukkō). With an exodus of residents 
threatening to leave a black hole in the economy, the economic interests of the state could 
not have been made clearer. What happened in Hiroshima and Nagasaki is laughed away 
with the implication that “Fukushima,” having so effortlessly become world-famous, will 
outdo them. Indeed, there are already those on the front-line, working in the nuclear plant, 
who are demonstrating a “do-or-die resolution” (kesshi no kakugo). Consequently all men 
over 20 should unquestionably stay put to “fight” (tatakau). In the spirit of the patriarchal 
imperial family, if not preempting the eventuality that radiation would become a political 
issue especially for mothers, Yamashita addresses himself primarily to the putative heads 
and money-makers of families. Women, pregnant women, and children, he says, “should 
be protected” (mamoru beki). However, if Yamashita’s comment that (only) children and 
women should take refuge if the situation deteriorates seems even remotely motivated by 
genuine concern for the health of residents, it may be considered against the backdrop of 
his claim – in this same speech – that anything below 100 millisieverts of exposure is safe. 
If only to put this response into perspective, the current yearly limit for radiation workers 
in the U.S. is 20 millisieverts. The five-year limit is 100 millisieverts.21 In Japan, prior to 
Fukushima, the yearly limit for nuclear workers was at 50 millisieverts, with a five-year 
                                                
21 See U.S. NRC, “Information for Radiation Workers,” 3/10/2015. 
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limit of 100 millisieverts.22 Needless to say, these limits are not for any adults, but for a 
specific group of adults who specialize in work in which radiation exposure is inevitable. 
It is in this context that Yamashita informs parents to go right ahead and let their children 
play outside as much as they want. 
 It is not surprising that anti-nuclear demonstrations would embrace the slogan that 
the state “is killing kids” (kodomo o koroshiteiru). Precisely there where the state sought 
to mobilize the floating signifier of a “guarantee” or “signature of authority” (osumitsuki) 
to achieve a magical effectivity whereby 100 millisieverts exposure is “safe” (anzen), the 
cure turns out to have been poisonous. Of course, the emperor was, in fact, deployed to 
Fukushima and the “disaster-stricken areas” (hisaichi) in highly visible mediatized visits, 
calling on the common folk in shelters. Yet, his figure was vehemently protected against 
any contact with the political issue of radiation, if not with radiation itself.23 Nor, for that 
matter, did the anti-nuclear movement recognize the murderous violence of Fukushima in 
the emperor himself. Rather, it was the effect of his mobilization that became evident as 
the apogee of the anti-nuclear movement expired with time, and claims that the reality of 
Fukushima had been “hidden” (inpei) shifted into declamations that it had been altogether 
“shut down” (fūsa sareta). It would therefore be mistaken to conclude that state deceit in 
Fukushima became evident to all and sundry over time, for, as Yamashita himself points 
out, what was at stake was not “data” (dēta), but rather, “trust” (shinrai). Hence, one anti-
nuclear activist described the parents of Yamashita’s audience, stating that, “in the midst 
of doubting … they want to believe” (utagatte inagara … shinjitai). Side by side with the 
                                                
22 See “Japan to Scrap Workers’ Annual Radiation Dose Limit at Normal Times,” in the Mainichi Daily 
News, 28/4/2011. As the article states, allowable exposure rates were raised to 250 millisieverts (from 100 
millisievertes) in an “emergency” situation such as that of Fukushima. 
23 See Ch. 2. 
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anti-nuclear movement’s cry that the state was making “guinea pigs” (morumotto) out of 
residents or the statement by Koide Hiroaki that “scientists who say irradiation under 100 
millisieverts is harmless should go to jail” (100 millisieverts ika no hibaku nara mugai to 
iu gakusha wa keimusho ni hairu beki) the disavowal of radiation by the “silent majority” 
(sairento majoritī) assumed the form of fetishism.24 Like the debilitating, general effects 
of the economy and the self-responsibility doctrine, radiation will wreak its effects on the 
general population in a futurity which forecloses the verification of a “causal relationship” 
(inga kankei) between illness or death and radiation on a case-by-case basis.  
Rather than awaken consciousness of the murderous instrumentality of the state in 
sacrificing citizens, Fukushima constituted the site of a contaiment that, in spite of Prime 
Minister Noda’s “containment declaration” (shūsoku sengen) in December 2011, has not 
been effected. Neither the radiation from the leaking plant, nor the stories emerging from 
Fukushima could be properly placed by a state discourse that folded on itself in triggering 
memories of World War II. In late February, 2015 – nearly one year after The Economist 
published an article titled “Anti-nuclear Protest in Japan: Fizzling Out” – it was revealed 
that TEPCO had been leaking radioactive water into the ocean (since May, 2014) without 
reporting the matter.25 Yet, these revelations merely come within a string precedents that 
verify what was always-already known. Speeches by activists, social figures – including 
singers and actors like Ryūichi Sakamoto and Yamamoto Tarō, and Nobel Prize winners 
like Kenzaburo Ōe – and scientists at anti-nuclear gatherings served as occasions to hear 
the latest news of flagrant disregard by the state, or TEPCO, for the exposure of residents. 
                                                
24 See “Koide Hiroaki Shi ‘100 Millisieveruto Ika no Hibaku Nara Mugai to Iu Gakusha wa Keimusho ni 
Hairu Beki’”, on Suginami Kara no Jōhō Hasshin Desu, 25/2/2013. 
25 See, for instance, “Fisheries ‘Shocked’ at Silence Over Water Leak at Wrecked Fukushima No. 1 Plant,” 
in The Japan Times, 25/2/2015. 
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Not quite uncanny, for there was an expectation to hear such stories after the initial stages 
of the disaster, such revelations were nevertheless repeatedly sought by the audience that 
invariably responded with knowing sighs or audible under-the-breath exclamations of “no 
way” (uso). Like cyberspace, anti-nuclear gatherings or educational meetings on radiation 
formed a counterpoint to the mass media, which – with the exception of Tokyo Shimbun – 
was considered complicit in the “covering up” (inpei) of Fukushima by the conglomerate 
of the “nuclear village” (genshiryoku mura). Of course, once the lid was ajar, there was 
no stopping the influx of leaked atrocities, starting from the state’s decision not to release 
the information revealed by the Speedi system (which would have alerted residents to the 
flow of radiation carried by winds), its decision not to distribute potassium iodide pills to 
residents, the deficiency of the 30 KM circular evacuation zone – not least because it was 
progressively expanded and was ultimately too small, but since the radiation was carried 
northwest by winds, irradiating the areas surrounding Iitate Village where radiation levels 
shot above 100 microsieverts per hour; and where Yamashita visited on April 1 to inform 
residents that, for up to a month, drinking the water and eating local produce would have 
no effect on health – the vent that was opened in one of the nuclear reactors to reduce the 
internal pressure, the station blackout that descended on the nuclear plant, the worst-case 
scenario that was hidden by the state task force, TEPCO staff fleeing in buses and leaving 
behind unknowing residents, the nosebleeds, the loss of hair and fingernails (posted to the 
internet as photos), flowers growing wildly out of size, generalized lassitude reminiscent 
of “Bura Bura Disease” (bura bura byō), fish mutations, the discovery of fish with deadly 
becquerel levels, thyroid cancer in children, infants born with heart defects, and the state 
denial of the effects of “internal radiation” (naibu hibaku) … 26 
                                                
26 “Bura Bura Disease” or Chronic Fatigue Syndrome refers to the effect of fatigue witnessed in individuals 
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Naturally, the decision of state not only to not release information in a timely way, 
but to deliberately spread false information prompted the excuse that complete disclosure 
would have created chaos. As the appearance of external “order” (chitsujo), that Japanese 
‘Thing’ was clearly enforced in the immediate aftermath of the disaster, but what must be 
noted is how reference to this cultural characteristic functioned as an alibi for the powers 
that be. Thus, the English introduction of the Diet’s so-called “Independent Investigation” 
identifies the cause of the disaster in a certain “mindset,” observing that: “what this report 
cannot fully convey – especially to a global audience – is the mindset that supported the 
negligence behind this disaster.” Rather than the cause consisting in certain individuals or 
individual decisions, the ineffable characteristics of this unique “mindset” are essentially 
Japanese. The text continues: “What must be admitted – very painfully – is that this was a 
disaster “Made in Japan.” Its fundamental causes are to be found in the ingrained conven-
tions of Japanese culture: our reflexive obedience; our reluctance to question authority; 
our devotion to ‘sticking with the program’; our groupism; and our insularity.” Of course, 
it is precisely in what Ruth Benedict called “shame culture” that conformity to the rules 
and organizational interests takes precedence over individual decisions and consideration 
for the other. Thus recognized by the anglophone reader to whom the report is addressed, 
shame displaces the fact of guilt. Indeed, the statement that follows establishes the heart 
of the matter: “Had other Japanese been in the shoes of those who bear responsibility for 
this accident, the result may well have been the same.” Indeed, “the goal” of the report, it 
continues: “is not – and should not be – to lay blame. The goal must be to learn from this 
                                                                                                                                            
under long-term low radiation exposure. For further rumors and facts relating to Fukushima and radiation, 
see Numayu’s closed blog, Numayu no Burogu, Hida Syuntaro’s Naibuhibaku (Tokyo: Fusōsha Shinsho, 
2012), and Tsuchida Atsushi, Yamasaki Hisataka, and Harada Hiroshi, Fukushima Gempatsu Tajūjinsai, 
Tōden no Sekinin o Tou: Higaisha no Kyūsai wa Osensha Futan no Gensoku de Ari (Tokyo: Nihonhyōron-
sha, 2012). 
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disaster, and reflect deeply on its fundamental causes, in order to ensure that it is never 
repeated.”27 In other words, it will suffice to feel ashamed over the “fundamental causes,” 
and, in fact, none of the four major investigative reports on the nuclear disaster prompted 
criminal prosecutions, all of which were instigated by the populace.28 It might, of course, 
be remarked that there can be no “risk management” in the absence of accountability for 
those who reap profit by exposing others to risk. Indeed, “risk management” consists pre-
cisely in this displacement of “risk.”  
However, the wreckage of the nuclear “safety myth” (anzen shinwa) could not but 
trigger memory of the primal state guilt that inaugurated Japan’s postwar. As a repetition 
of that which generated the conditions of the catastrophe to begin with, the state response 
to Fukushima was doubled in the present by memories of past state conduct. In order for 
this unscheduled return to occur with the force of inevitability (or death), however, it was 
                                                
27 See NAIIC, “Reports,” on The National Diet of Japan Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investi-
gation Committee, 3/10/2015. The English version of the report lays further blame on Japanese society as a 
whole and writes of the bureaucracy:  
 
by which the first duty of any individual bureaucrat is to defend he interests of his organization. 
Carried to an extreme, this led bureaucrats to put organizational interests ahead of their paramount 
duty to protect public safety. 
 
Only by grasping this mindset can one understand how Japan’s nuclear industry managed to avoid 
absorbing the critical lessons learned from Three Mile Island and Chernobyl; and how it became 
accepted practice to resist regulatory pressure and cover up small-scale accidents. It was this 
mindset that led to the disaster at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant. 
 
This report singles out individuals and organizations for harsh criticism, but the goal is not – and 
should not be – to lay blame. The goal must be to learn from this disaster, and reflect deeply on its 
fundamental causes, in order to ensure that it is never repeated. 
 
The consequences of negligence at Fukushima stand out as catastrophic, but the mindset that sup-
ported it can be found across Japan. In recognizing that fact, each of us should reflect on our re-
sponsibility as individuals in a democratic society (9). 
28 See Fukushima Shūdan Sokai Saiban no Kai, Ima Kodomo ga Abunai: Fukushima Gempatsu Jiko kara 
Kodomo o Mamoru “Shūdan Sokai Saiban”  (Tokyo: Hon no Izumisha, 2012), as well as Tsuchida Atsushi, 
Yamasaki Hisataka, and Harada Hiroshi, Fukushima Gempatsu Tajūjinsai, Tōden no Sekinin o Tou: Higai-
sha no Kyūsai wa Osensha Futan no Gensoku de Ari. 
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necessary that a certain “protective shield” be penetrated.29 It was also for this reason that, 
as the call materialized for new educational textbooks on nuclear power and radiation, the 
more traumatizing images of the real effects of radiation – for instance, the “punctum” or 
traumatic excess of the bloody and withering arm of a nuclear worker exposed during the 
‘99 JCO nuclear accident – were removed and made taboo. After all, such images would 
have short-circuited the nuclear origins of postwar Japan itself, brought about, no less, 
than through a war fought in the name of the “emperor” (tennō). Indeed, as Shivelbusch 
notes, the “ever-present subliminal fear” of early train travel was repressed as the journey 
was made smooth. As the bumps and jolts that threatened accident were removed, smooth 
train travel necessitated a forgetting of the possibility of accident. A “new psychic layer” 
emerged, Shivelbusch writes, that enabled fear to “lapse into oblivion.” Even the seatbelt 
was gotten rid of because it reminded disconcertingly of the possibility of accident. And 
yet, when something interrupted smooth travel, it “immediately reawakened the forgotten 
danger and potential violence.”30 Especially for residents living in the immediate vicinity 
                                                
29 See Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle. Further, as Harry Harootunian writes in “Reflections 
From Fukushima: History, Memory, and the Crisis of Contemporaneity,” in Boundary 2 (42:3 (2015)), this 
puncturing of state discourse in Fukushima was to singularize subjective memory and the everyday, thereby 
opening the space of a different history: “I would like to suggest that the forced convergence of history and 
memory in Fukushima resulted in singularizing expressions of experience and memory, thus inducing sur-
vivors to focus on the immediate context of the everyday itself rather than the nation and national history, 
which increasingly were seen as distant and abstract manifestations. In other words, the response to the 
historical event was to individualize experience and recall it at the level of the everyday the survivors had 
actually known and lived through; the disruptions they were forced to endure would result in the writing of 
their own history. This move was enabled because history, especially national history, was already formed 
into a fixed representation of a now completed past” (24). On the other hand, Harootunian notes: “The state 
used the occasion of what it perceived as a regional crisis to emphasize national solidarity, requiring all 
Japanese to share the pain. This resulted in proposals that the nation should trust the government and its 
leaders and learn how to live with radiation” (28). 
30 Wolfgang Shivelbusch, The Railway Journey: The Industrialization of Time and Space in the 19th Centu-
ry (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1986), pg. 130. As Freud observes when writing of the 
uncanny and the “more than usually violent jolt of the train” that confronted him with the stranger in the 
mirror, it is not simply the repressed possibility of accident that is at stake in the “jolt.” When Freud does 
not recognize himself, the lack lacks, and he ceases to be alienated in the image of “himself.”  The accident 
threatens to undo alienation in the social “I,” and with it, the effectivity of symbolic authority. (“The ‘Un-
canny,’” 225) 
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of nuclear plants, it was thus that the contingency of disaster had at once been altogether 
unfathomable, and threatened death the instant it occurred. In response to questions posed 
by committee members of the Diet’s “Independent Investigation,” a TEPCO employee of 
twenty years, and fireman at the time of the disaster, responds to questions regarding the 
“safety myth” (anzen shinwa): 
Fireman: 
Well, of course, I thought that nuclear energy is safe. I thought that an explosion 
would not occur, no matter what happened. But, in reality, the explosion occurred 
and … I thought that, now the radiation has come up right before my eyes. Then, 
there is no particular reason, but, well, I thought this is it. Only, strangely enough, 
I was with the village people, and, there was no fear towards that. Yes, well, I 
thought that nuclear energy was safe no matter what. 
 
Committee: 
It’s in regard to the safety myth but. Why, well, is there that aspect that you ended 
up believing firmly that nuclear energy is safe? The reason for it. 
 
[long pause, hesitating.] 
 
Fireman: 
Well, well … why it was safe … 
 
Committee: 
Why you ended up firmly believing it was safe. Well, no matter where we go the 
majority of people say that, like that, they believed that nuclear energy was safe. 
And, almost all people say that even in their dreams they never have thought an 
accident like this could occur. Why it became like that, or rather, the reason it be-
came like that. How about that. 
 
Fireman: 
Well, first off, what I feel firstly, well, I think everyone is the same but, that there 
is ‘no way’ [masaka] in one’s own village, one’s own, that oneself won’t meet 
such circumstances was, I believe, probably thought. Although there is no particu-
lar basis. And then, I worked more than 20 years at the nuclear plant. Of course, 
in relation to TEPCO. And so, well, the direct customers are the people who use 
the electricity in the Kantō region, but, towards them, I thought that I was safely 
sending energy. TEPCO and the country … well, TEPCO is a private industry so I 
think there was also an aspect of securing profit, but, I thought it had been built 
thinking of the abundant livelihood of the national population. There was also that 
kind of consciousness, so, to think it is not safe … there was something like repu-
diating myself, I think. But, well, there were people who were talking of the risk 
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of nuclear energy, but, well, there was no point at which I thought about it for real. 
There is no basis for it, but we had come along being told that nuclear energy is 
safe, so I thought that was probably the case.31 
 
In this way, the impossible specter of a nuclear accident was doubly protected against by 
residents in the vicinity of the plant. The nuclear plant was not only “safe” (anzen). It was 
“safe no matter what happened” (nani ga attemo anzen). Similarly, “even in their dreams” 
                                                















[long pause, hesitating.] 
 
 Fireman: 























(yume ni mo), residents did not think that an accident like Fukushima could occur. Indeed, 
the seeming closure effected by the “safety myth” (anzen shinwa) is nearly reproduced in 
the sheer majority of people, living next to the plant, who believed that accident could not 
occur. Being unable to identify a “reason” (genin) for “believing firmly” (kataku shinjiru) 
in the impossibility of accident, the fireman describes this belief as an effect of repetition: 
“we had come along being told that nuclear energy is safe, so I thought that was probably 
the case” (genpatsu wa anzen da to iwaretsuzukete kimashitanode, sō nanokana to wa-
tashi mo omotteorimashita). Notably, and particularly so for an employee of TEPCO of 
20 years, this belief was of a social character, such that the mere thought of unsafety was 
akin to “repudiation” (hitei) – and, my friends above used this same word to describe my 
“criticizing” (hitei) the notion of “self-responsibility” (jiko sekinin) – of the social “self” 
(jibun). But when the actual accident occurred, it was as if the fireman had always known 
of its possibility. Suddenly standing in the front line – “the radiation has come up right up 
before my eyes” (hōshanō ga mō me no mae made kiteru) – the fireman felt the certainty 
of death. And there was just as little “basis” (konkyo) for this realization, as there was for 
the belief in the impossibility of accident, for with the “explosion” (bakuhatsu), it was the 
containment that constituted the structuring condition of possibility for the everyday that 
was ruptured. As the enabling limit or difference, the object of containment – radiation or 
death – was antecedent to any “reason” (genin) or “basis” (konkyo) for the belief in safety, 
or certainty of death. Rather, once that ‘protective shield’ was ruptured, it set off a chain 
of signifiers with the inevitability of death. 
 Now ostracized from political life on account of his opposition to nuclear energy 
and his decision to evacuate all his residents to Saitama right after the disaster, the former 
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mayor of Futaba City, Idogawa Katsutaka, recalls how his thoughts slipped to the nuclear 
plant an instant after the earthquake. At first, Idogawa says, it was as if “the earth would 
crack” (chikyū ga wareru). Having never experienced such an earthquake, and fearing, “it 
cracking here and there, that my own place would crack, too” (mō acchi kochi waretete, 
jibun no tokoro mo warechaun jyanai no kana), Idogawa “next” (tsugi ni) thought of the 
plant. “After the thought that it would crack, it entered my head right away if the nuclear 
plant was alright” (warete shimaun jyanai ka to iu omoi no tsugi ni, gempatsu wa daijōbu 
ka to iu koto ga sugu atama ni hairimashita).32 As if it was necessary to explain the basis 
of this immediate reaction, Idogawa thus recalls having worked on the construction of the 
nuclear plant, noting the decrepitude of reactors #1 and #2, and his skepticism, as mayor, 
when he was repeatedly reassured as to the safety of the reactors, in spite of the fact that 
proper safety inspections had not been conducted.33 Hoping all the while that the reactors 
would hold, it was when he finally heard the reactor explode that, like the fireman above, 
Idogawa thought the end had come: “When the blunt sound of ‘boom’ came, so this is the 
sound of the nuclear plant exploding. I still cannot forget that sound. From small to large 
lumps of mass come quietly floating down. Truly quietly floating down. It was not black 
ashes, but for a moment I thought, maybe it was ashes of death.”34 Although there was no 
flash preceding the “dull ‘boom”” (nibui ‘bon’) – the atom bombings are referred to with 
                                                
32 See labornetTV, “Gempatsu Izon no Machi Kara no Dakkyaku o Mezashite ~ Idogawa Chōchō Interview 
(1),” on Youtube, 20/4/2012. See John Pemberton, “Ghost in the Machine,” in Photographies East: The 
Camera and Its Histories in East and Southeast Asia, ed. Rosalind C. Morris (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2009), for a further elucidation of the spectrality that accident can trigger. 
33 See labornetTV, “Gempatsu Izon no Machi Kara no Dakkyaku o Mezashite ~ Idogawa Chōchō Interview 
(1),” on Youtube, 20/4/2012. 
34 See MIRMC SENDAI, “Shizuka ni Shi no Hai ga Futta … Futaba Chōchō no Kotoba o Kikō,” on 





the term ‘pikadon,’ meaning “flash-” (pika-) and “boom” (don) – Idogawa’s observations 
slip back to the two other moments when residents saw irradiated rubble falling from the 
skies after a nuclear explosion. This time, however, it was not “black” (kuro) – for “black 
rain”  (kuroi ame) was said to descend from the skies after Hiroshima and Nagasaki – but, 
“maybe the ashes of death” (shi no hai kana). The scene is exactly that of the responsible 
mayor staying behind to take care of matters for the innocent residents, who, after having 
fled to Saitama, were made to live, Idogawa states, like “perpetrators” (kagaisha) in exile, 
rather than as “victims” (higaisha). The order of guilt, and of those made to atone for that 
guilt, has been reversed.35 Notably, a similar structure whereby guilt is introjected can be 
detected in the words of the fireman, since the mere thought of the plant being unsafe was 
felt as self-repudiation. Nakashita’s observation that speaking of radiation in Fukushima 
prompts peer pressure thus returns. It can only be said that the disaster at once punctured 
and reinvigorated a normative discourse of safety. As the author of “Nuclear Labor Diary” 
(Genpatsu Rōdōki), Horie Kunio, says two decades before the disaster befell Fukushima: 
“It was the same at the nuclear plant that, like before during the war, if one cried ‘no war,’ 
or rather, if one even slightly expressed unease or dissatisfaction toward the war, one was 
right away treated as an ‘unpatriotic person.’ Even if one had doubts or unease regarding 
the safety of the nuclear plant, there was definitely an indescribable, heavy ‘atmosphere’ 
covering the entire plant that made it impossible to say.”36 It was not merely the topics of 
                                                
35 See labornetTV, “Gempatsu Izon no Machi Kara no Dakkyaku o Mezashite ~ Idogawa Chōchō Interview 
(1),” on Youtube, 20/4/2012. 
36 Horie Kunio and Shigeru Mizuki, Fukushima Gempatsu no Yami (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun Shuppan, 




See the collection of tanka poems by Satō Yūtei, in Aoshiroki Hikari (Tokyo: Irinosha, 2011) for an ac-
count of the effects of nuclear energy on residents living near nuclear plants, long before the Fukushima 
 634 
radiation safety in the nuclear plant that was taboo, or of the radiation in Fukushima after 
the disaster. Nuclear labor itself was organized so that a clear division could be observed 
between full-time TEPCO staff with university degrees, stationed temporarily at the plant, 
and the so-called “nuclear gypsies” (genpatsu jipushī) who traveled from nuclear plant to 
plant as the yearly clean-up schedules rotated. Like laborers in Sanya, the nuclear gypsy 
occupied a taboo place, the thorough containment of which sought to ensure that neither 
TEPCO staff, nor regular civilians, were exposed to radiation. Nor was it unheard of that 
foreign workers were flown in to do one-time jobs that entailed especially high radiation 
exposure.37 
 The Fukushima nuclear disaster briefly exposed the hypocrisy of the social order 
which dissimulates structural inequality in the guise of self-responsibility (jikosekinin). In 
Fukushima itself, the disclosure of the state’s intention of keeping residents in Fukushima 
would not only cause local levels of administrative leadership to fracture in disagreement 
over whether or not to follow the state’s guidelines, but also families to split, leading to a 
veritable exodus of children and mothers from Fukushima, as Yamashita’s breadwinners 
stayed behind to earn. In other places, the plight of scattered Fukushima residents would  
meet with indifference and even discrimination, as reports emerged of evacuated children 
being bullied, presumably because they had been irradiated. Yet in some social spheres, 
such as the anti-nuclear movement, the Fukushima disaster prompted the claim that, with 
“a single stroke” (ippatsu), all the “make-up” (keshō) of the postwar had come off. It was 
                                                                                                                                            
catastrophe. For similar, (un)told stories relating to nuclear energy in the U.S., see Leslie J. Freeman, Nu-
clear Witnesses: Insiders Speak Out (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1981). More recently, the op-
position to “fracking” or hydraulic fracturing for natural gas in the U.S. has emerged in a discourse that 
also makes reference to the sacrifice by corporations of local residents for profit, capitalism, hidden truths 
of the industry, and state indifference. See GASLAND, dir. Josh Fox (New Video Group/HBO/International 
WOW Company, 2010). 
37 See Horie Kunio, Gempatsu Rōdōki (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 2011). 
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in this respect that a lawyer, whose parents had been jailed for dissidence during the war, 
and who remembered growing up in the immediate postwar period, addressed a group of 
lay people in support of public teachers refusing to stand for the Kimigayo. Recalling the 
years right after World War II, when “the shadow of the war” (sensō no kage) was “raw” 
(nama), and the feeling was in the air of entering upon a “new age” (atarashī jidai) – that 
is, in which students would never again be sent to war – he likened the awareness then to 
the visibility that had followed the 3.11 nuclear disaster. As if the change were permanent, 
he observed that what has “fundamentally” (konponteki ni) changed – what has “become 
visible” (mieta), “what is comprehensible” (rikai dekiru koto) – is that “we have entered 
into an age in which the contradictions can be distinctly seen” (mujun ga senmei ni mieru 
jidai ni haitta). Notably, it should be asked whether this emerging into visibility does not 
signal the passing of an age, rather than the arrival of one. But it can certainly be said that 
coincidence triggered an unscheduled doubling of time. Thus, as if the new consciousness 
of contradiction were shared by all and sundry, the lawyer observed that “everyone feels 
it” (minna ga kanjiru): that “it was a lie all along” (minna uso dattan da). “It has become 
normal for everyone to think this” (futsū ni minna omou yō ni natta). Needless to say, the 
immediate reference here is to the “lie” (uso) of the “safety myth” (anzen shinwa), but the 
very reference to a time out of joint – two eras born of nuclear disaster – splits the present 
and places post-Fukushima Japan in the “shadow” (kage) of World War II.38 So too, the 
emergence of the anti-nuclear movement – and, the first large-scale demonstrations since 
the ‘60s and ‘70s – would similarly spectralize the contemporaneous present, doubling it 
                                                
38 The “safety myth” (anzen shinwa) slips to the avowed “peaceful usage” (heiwa riyō) of nuclear energy; a 
phrase drawn from Dwight D. Eisenhower’s 1953 speech, “Atoms for Peace,” wherein the shift to nuclear 
energy was signalled in the midst of the Cold War. The “lie” (uso) of safety cannot be uncoupled from the 
“lie” (uso) of “peace” (heiwa), and the specter of war. 
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with the heyday of ANPO. The “contradiction” (mujun) that has emerged consists simply 
in the sacrifice the state makes of the national population – and of the rural population, in 
the case of nuclear energy, since plants send electricity to the cities – for the sake of the 
economy. However, noting that somewhere the state is “trying to create order” (dokoka 
de chitsujo o tsukutteiru), the lawyer warned against giving in. It had been thus before the 
war itself, when lawyers of the “bar association” (bengoshi kyōkai) had initially opposed 
the drive to war, only gradually to be pressed into the service of state, until it had become 
“impossible to say anything” (nani mo ienakunaru). Finally, lawyers became complicit in 
“the worst of human rights violations” (saidai no jinken shingai): war. At cinemas, before 
shows, it was common for lawyers to preach to the crowd, telling them just how much the 
soldiers at the front were doing to protect Japan. When it “enters in the hearts of people” 
(hito no kokoro no naka ni fumikomu), he said, it becomes “even more dangerous” (motto 
abunai). Indeed, side by side with the observation that the “contradictions” (mujun) of the 
past era had become clear, the lawyer noted that Japan “will be entering such an age” (sō 
iu jidai ni haitteiku), in which “power” (kenryoku) will be “stepping into the world of the 
conscience” (ryōshin no sekai ni fumikomu). Such power is necessitated by the weakness 
of the nation. Thus a number of developments can be “connected to one thing” (hitotsu ni 
tsunagaru): “The Fundamental Law of Education” (Kyōiku Kihon Hō), “raising a people 
with ambition” (kokorozashi aru kokumin o sodateru), the “alteration” (kaizō) of thought” 
(shisō), or the deployment of the “emperor” (tennō) in the present age – and not simply as 
a reversion to the past, but as an indication of “this age” (kono jidai) – in his mobilization 
to the “disaster-stricken areas” (hisaichi) and speaking publicly in favor of state policy.39 
If resistance is “half-hearted” (aimai) and “acknowledgement of consent” (ryōkai shōnin) 
                                                
39 Emphasis not added to “this age.” 
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is given, however, then things “start to become unclear” (yoku wakaranaku naru). It must 
be “said without reservation that it is mistaken” (tokoton to machigai da to iwanakereba). 
The “quality of things” (monogoto no ryōshitsu) cannot be sacrificed and so not even one 
millimeter can be conceded. For what state representatives fear, above all, he continued, 
is the figure of Nezu Kimiko residing within each and every one of us. 
 However, state discourse is shamelessly repeated side by side with the momentary 
visibility of the “contradictions” (mujun) that constitute it. In preaching the safety of 100 
microsieverts per hour, the state and its minions, the lawyer said, “know no shame” (haji 
o shiranai). While the disaster at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant opened a space 
of “hope” (kibō) for social change, particularly within exceptional social circles explicitly 
critical of the state, it also reinvigorated the disavowals which maintain the appearance of 
“order” (chitsujo). It is “the culture of Japan” (nihon no bunka) to sacrifice oneself for the 
social whole. As if “radiation” (hōshanō) were intertwined with the figure of the emperor, 
Nakashita relates that to bring up radiation in Fukushima is to risk “peer pressure” (dōchō 
atsuryoku) that invokes the “nation” (kuni). Describing Fukushima, Nakashita writes that: 
“regarding the problem of radiation, there is a group that says it is safe and a group that 
says it is dangerous, and the former group is overwhelmingly large. The latter is likely to 
become isolated, as the majority of scientists and doctors assert it is safe.”40 The structure 
of shame – and ‘shame culture’ – emerges here, wherein rectitude is determined solely by 
the relative orientation of the group, and shamelessness can be deployed toward the other. 
Guilt is displaced in the repetition of safety which renders everyone complicit and which 
                                                





individualizes the subject through the disavowal of difference demanded by the patriotic, 
“overwhelming” (attōteki) majority. Everyone must overcome each their insufficiency by 
conforming to the social totality. There can be no doubt that radiation is safe. 
Alongside rare instances in which the cause of suicide or death was recognized in 
court to reside with the state, indemnity payments to Fukushima residents constituted an 
exception which confirmed the general rule. If anything, the momentary visibility of state 
payments announced the end of an era.41 Even in Kōriyama city, where radiation was said 
to exceed levels within the no-go zone of Chernobyl, the right of children to evacuate was 
not recognized in court.42 Rumors, records and photos of nosebleeds, flaking fingernails, 
hair loss, fatigue, tooth decay, or of plants grown wild, made it to online blogs, but rarely 
(if ever) into the official news. One such “Numayu’s Blog” (numayu no burogu) was shut 
down (twice) on account of local public pressure.43 And while individuals like the mayor 
                                                
41 “TEPCO Ordered to Pay Over Suicide Linked to Nuclear Evacuation,” in The Japan Times, 30/6/2015. 
42 See Fukushima Shūdan Sokai Saiban no Kai, Ima Kodomo ga Abunai: Fukushima Gempatsu Jiko kara 
Kodomo o Mamoru “Shūdan Sokai Saiban” (Tokyo: Hon no Izumisha, 2012). 
43 Numayu, Numayu no Burogu, 3/2013. In her final blog entry on March 28, 2013, Numayu writes: 
 





By posting a newspaper article, 






As apology to the bereaved, 





For this reason, 
I am ending the blog. 
 639 
of Futaba, Idogawa Katsutaka, unilaterally decided to evacuate the entirety of his city, he 
was ultimately put under such political pressure that he was forced to resign; leaving it to 
“history” (rekishi), he said, to confirm the rectitude of his decisions.44 Hence, residents of 
Fukushima have had to rely on their own (financial) devices to evacuate, leaving the most 
destitute with no recourse but to remain. So too, more than three years after the “accident” 
(jiko) occurred, those who were evacuated by the state still live in “temporary dwellings” 
(kasetsu jūtaku). The hopeful moment in which the Fukushima-born activist, Mutō Ruiko, 
delivered her much cited speech – “From Fukushima, to You” (Fukushima kara anata e) 
                                                                                                                                            
To all those people who read up until now, 

























I am closing the blog. 




44 See labornetTV, “Gempatsuizon no Machi kara no Dakkyaku o Mezashite – Idogawa Chōchō Intaview 
(1)”, 20/4/2012. 
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– has passed. On September 19, 2011, when the anti-nuclear movement had just gathered 
momentum, Mutō spoke before an audience of 60,000 in Meiji Park, Tokyo:45 
I want to tell you all that Fukushima is a very beautiful place. 
 
To the east, the Hamadori region gazes out across the deep blue Pacific Ocean. 
The Nakadori region is a treasure-house of fruits: peaches, pears and apples. 
Golden rice stalks droop their heads on the Aizu plain, around Lake Inawashiro 
and Mount Bandai, while the far side is framed by deep mountain ranges. This 
land, with its blue mountains and clear water, is our homeland.  
  
The nuclear accident of 3/11 was a turning-point. Radiation, invisible to the eye, 
descended on this landscape, and we too became “hibakusha”. 
  
In the midst of widespread confusion, various things happened to us.  
  
Caught between a rapidly rolled-out "safety campaign" and feelings of alarm, the 
connections between people were torn apart. Who can say how many people wor-
ried and grieved: in our localities, our workplaces, our schools, our homes? Day 
after day, many inescapable decisions were forced upon us. To flee, or not to flee? 
To eat, or not to eat? To hang the laundry outside, or not to hang it outside? To 
make our children wear masks, or not to make them? To plough our fields, or not 
to plough them? To speak out about something, or to remain silent? There were 
various agonising decisions.  
  
And now, here we are.  
  
During the past half year, the following things have become clear: 
  
The truth of the situation is being hidden 
 
The country is not protecting its citizens 
 
The accident is still not over 
 
The inhabitants of Fukushima prefecture are being made the subjects of a nuclear 
experiment 
 
A huge volume of radioactive waste remains 
 
Despite the enormous price that we have already paid, there are powers that are 
intent on driving nuclear power production forward 
 
We have been discarded 
                                                
45 See Sayōnara Senmannin Akushon, 19/9/2011. 
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We heave deep sighs of exhaustion and overwhelming sadness. But the words that 
spill from our mouths are "Don't you dare treat us like fools!", "Don't snatch away 
our lives!" 
  
In the midst of our anger and grief, we, the citizens of Fukushima prefecture, are 
quietly rising up:  
 
Mothers and fathers, grandmothers and grandfathers, wanting to protect their 
children... 
 
The young generation, fighting to stop their future from being stolen... 
 
Workers trying to help those cleaning up the stricken nuclear plant, exposed to 
huge doses of radiation in the process... 
 
Farmers filled with despair at the contamination of their land... 
 
People with disabilities, determined that the radiation should not give rise to a 
new discrimination and separation... 
 
One by one, each of us citizens is asking questions about the responsibility of the 
state, and of TEPCO. And we are raising our voices to say "No more nuclear reac-
tors!"  
 
We have become the ogres of Tohoku, quietly burning with fury.  
  
We, the people of Fukushima, want to share our suffering, responsibility and hope, 
and to support each other as we move forward with our lives, whether we have 
left our hometowns or have stayed in our land. Please join with us. Please take 
note of the action that we are undertaking. We are learning about negotiations 
with the government, evacuation rulings, temporary evacuation, recovering our 
health, decontamination, measurement of radiation levels, nuclear reactors and ra-
dioactivity. And we are going everywhere to tell people about Fukushima. Today, 
companions of ours are giving a speech in New York. We are working on this in 
every way we can think of. Please help us. Please don't forget Fukushima.46 
 
With the dwindling of the anti-nuclear movement, today, this message from the “ogres of 
Tohoku” (tōhoku no oni) has, indeed, devolved into the emergency of maintaining social 
contact: “please don’t forget about Fukushima” (dōka fukushima o wasurenai de kudasai). 
                                                
46 Mutō Ruiko, Fukushima kara Anata e, trans. by Emma Parker (Tokyo: Otsuki Shoten, 2012). See Haseg-
awa Kenichi’s Gempatsu ni “Furusato” o Ubawarete for the story of a Fukushima town-head turned by 
bureaucrats. 
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Despite the political propaganda of the “safety campaign” (anzen kyanpēn) that, as Mutō 
says, drove a shaft between people by penetrating every aspect of their daily lives – to do 
as the state says, or not to – even a basic knowledge of radiation reveals that the effects of 
radiation exposure emerge within the temporality of the future anterior: when it will have 
been too late. In the midst of what anti-nuclear activists would refer to as a state “crime” 
(hanzai) reminiscent of the forced sacrifices made in World War II, and for which “guilt” 
(tsumi) was never assumed, the politicization of radiation raised the question: “To speak 
out about something, or to remain silent?” (nani ka ni mono mōsu, damaru). To speak out 
was, in effect, to be political. Hence, the exhortation by state scientists to “trust” (shinyō) 
the state was made not in the name of science, but with reference to the Japanese nation. 
As Japanese citizens in the wake of the accident, was it not their duty to rebuild relations 
with the state precisely when such relations were at a low point? What you need, the state 
scientists declared, is the “guarantee of authority” (osumitsuki).47 Indeed, state scientists 
could not have been any more shameless in interpellating worried Fukushima residents, 
for they were right in observing that the failure of social integration predisposed individ-
uals to an identification and misrecognition. It was the self-legitimating gaze of the state, 
and the location of shame that had to be restored, such that, when the disastrous effects of 
Fukushima emerged, the matter would have been “contained” (shūsoku). Resocialization 
would produce the deleterious effects it sought to contain. As anti-nuclear activists would 
say two years after the meltdowns, Fukushima had been “covered up” (fūsa sareta). Like 
                                                
47 Predisposed to misrecognition, the split subject is illustrated in Mutō’s speech. Torn between “feelings of 
alarm” (fuan) and the “‘safety campaign’” (‘anzen kyanpēn’) – notably, bracketed in quotation marks that 
foreground its hypostatization – abjection discloses the gap which separates the subject of state recognition 
from her or himself. Counterposed to the state, it is from within this gap that Mutō makes reference to an 
other “we” (watashitachi) that is caught in the emergency of establishing social connectivity: “please don’t 
forget about Fukushima” (dōka fukushima o wasurenai de kudasai). 
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the “negative history” (fu no rekishi) of World War II, the district of Sanya, and “suicide” 
(jisatsu), “radiation” (hōshanō) in the everyday had become a “taboo” (tabū) topic. 
 Ultimately, such an insistence on the rectitude of state discourse produces exactly 
the response that Nakashita received when, hoping to hold a symposium on the subject of 
“solitary death” (kodokushi) in one Tokyo neighborhood where many elderly live solitary, 
residents objected with: “don’t expose the shame of our housing complex to the outside” 
(danchi no haji o gaibu ni sarasuna), or to “put a lid on that which stinks” (kusai mono ni 
wa futa o shiro).48 Its effect can similarly be observed in the “feeling of self-abnegation” 
(jiko hiteikan) that Nakashita identifies with suicides in the young generation: “I have no 
value living” (jibun wa ikiru kachi ga nai), “there is no shortage of replacements for me” 
(jibun no kawari nante ikura demo aru), or “I am not needed by society” (jibun ga shakai 
kara hitsuyō to sareteinai).49 It is also strikingly reminiscent of that disruption of public 
order that occurred on June 8th, 2008, when 25-year-old part-time worker, Katō Tomohiro, 
crashed a van into the “pedestrian heaven” (hokōsha tengoku) of Akihabara, killing seven 
people and injuring ten. In the month prior to the day when he would arrive at work only 
to find his work clothes removed from his locker – a sign that he (mistakenly) interpreted 
as dismissal and which triggered the rampage – Katō wrote online: “I have no value. I am 
worth less than garbage. What gets recycled in garbage is worth more.” (mukachi desu  
gomi ika desu.  risaikuru dekiru bun, gomi no hō ga mashi desu). Two days prior to the 
incident, Katō wrote: “A call comes telling me to come because there aren’t enough peo-
ple … not because I am needed, but since there aren’t enough people … who would go 
for that” (hito ga tarinai kara koi to denwa ga kuru … ore ga hitsuyō dakara, jya nakute, 
                                                
48 Ibid, pg. 10 
49 Ibid, pg. 58. 
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hito ga tarinai kara … dare ga iku ka yo).50 Finally, it is similarly constitutive of that lack 
which Nakashita identifies as the attraction of Aum Shinrikyō, the religious organization  
responsible for the 1995 “Subway Sarin Incident” (chikatetsu sarin jiken), in which sarin 
gas was released into Tokyo’s subway system by a group of highly educated individuals, 
killing 12 people, and injuring approximately 1,000 commuters. As Nakashita points out, 
individuals were initially drawn to the organization by its appeal, namely: “we need you” 
(anta ga hitsuyō da).51 Of course, channeled into the national army, the impulse to kill the 
other is recognized by the state. Indeed, it has not been long since Nezu Kimiko pointed 
out the identity between Aum Shinrikyō and the educational system in which orders must 
be unthinkingly obeyed.52 
 A noncontemporaneity is disclosed at the disavowed margins of the social, where 
failure to partake in general sociality – “I have no value” (mukachi desu), Katō Tomohiro 
says – precipitates the formation of distinctive modes of sociality that are contained in the 
all-encompassing, capitalist economy of the state. In the symptomatic hate speech of the 
Zaittokai, the faded individual seeks recognition through a shameless performance of the 
elimination of the other. Yet, the violence of this technologically mediated hate speech is 
equally directed at Zaittokai members, whose sociality mandates the truth of the zainichi, 
the “resident foreigner,” or foreign object intimately interior to the nation and its subject. 
No less shameless in its demand for the excess of “violent revolution” (bōryoku kakumei), 
the Zengakuren perpetuate their entitlement to represent the masses through the violence 
                                                
50 See “Akihabara Musabetsu 7 Nin Satsugai,” in The Yomiuri Shimbun, 9/6/2008. Among other instances, 
Katō’s act was echoed in 2010, when former Mazda worker, Toshiaka Hikiji, drove his car into ten people 
at the Mazda factory in Hiroshima, killing one person, and in 2015, when Hayashihizaki Haruo, a 71-year-
old man who ostensibly could not live off his pension, set himself on fire on the Japanese bullet train. 
51 Nakashita, Daiki, Anata Nara Dōsuru: Koritsushi, pg. 141. 
52 See Nezu Kimiko, Kibō wa Seito: Kateika no Sensei to Hinomaru, Kimigayo. 
 645 
of an activism that constitutes its self-exclusivity through eliminating the capitalist other. 
“Unite!” (danketsu!), the Zengakuren scream. Notably, it was the normative force of the 
trope, otoko, that, when his shoes had been misplaced, triggered Akia’s suicide attempt. 
However, it was also in abject Sanya, that the seemingly inadvertent words and gestures 
of Izukenji-san recognized the plethora of failed masculine figures in their differences, 
and restored comfort in departure from the norm. Finally, it was Nezu Kimiko, a woman 
within the patriarchal order of Japan, who disclosed the originary wounds and shameless 
violence on which contemporary Japan is founded. Perhaps it was her decision, above all, 
to accede neither to the orders of the state, nor to the institutional demands of the anti-
Himomaru/Kimigayo movement, that opened up a space for the consideration of each of 
the characters herein, be it the former mobster and day laborer, Akia, the minimum-wage 
guardman and Zaittokai leader, Sakurai Makoto, the communist intellectual, Dafuka-san, 
the indefatigable Buddhist priest and social worker, Nakashita Daiki, or the “ogres” (oni) 
of Northeastern Japan who, as Mutō Ruiko says – “From Fukushima, to You” – “quietly 
burn with fury” (shizuka ni ikari o moyasu). 
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